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

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FORTRESS AND CITY OF GUNZEE.

London, Hurst & Blackett, 1854.

MEMOIRS AND CORRESPONDENCE

OF

MAJOR-GENERAL

SIR WILLIAM NOTT, G.C.B.

COMMANDER OF THE ARMY OF CANDAHAR,
AND ENVOY AT THE COURT OF THE KING OF OUDE.

DITED, AT THE REQUEST OF SIR WILLIAM NOTT'S DAUGHTERS, LETITIA NOTT AND CHARLOTTE BOWER, FROM DOCUMENTS IN THEIR EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION,

BY J. H. STOCQUELER, ESQ.

AUTHOR OF

HE 'LIFE OF THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON,' THE 'HAND-BOOK OF BRITISH INDIA,'

&c. &c.

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VOL. I.

PORTRAIT OF MAJOR-GENERAL SIR WILLIAM NOTT.—*Frontispiece.*

VOL. II.

VIEW OF FORTRESS AND CITY OF GHUZNIE.—*Frontispiece.*

THE LIFE

OF

SIR WILLIAM NOTT.

CHAPTER I.

NOTT'S ANXIETIES—THE DOORANEES—THE DEFENCE OF JELLALLABAD —MAJOR-GENERAL POLLOCK—MAJOR OUTRAM—BRIGADIER ENGLAND'S REPULSE AT HYKULZYE—LORD ELLENBOROUGH ASSUMES THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA—THE GOVERNMENT RESOLVES TO WITHDRAW THE TROOPS FROM AFFGHANISTAN—NOTT'S VEXATION—HIS OBEDIENT SPIRIT—ENGLAND JOINS NOTT—THE RELIEF OF KHELAT-I-GHILZIE—THE FALL OF GHUZNI.

THE anxieties of Major-General Nott had by no means terminated with the dispersion of the Dooranees. The situation of the garrisons of Ghuzni and Khelat-i-Ghilzie, and the condition of the sixteen officers, the ladies, children, and soldiers, who had been taken prisoners by the Affghans in the Caubul Passes, formed subjects of the deepest solicitude. It was part of his instructions to bring away the garrisons of the two fortresses, if he

should find it necessary to retire to Scinde; and how to reach them, beset as the intervening country was with large bodies of the enemy, became a question of deep concern. Without cavalry—for a reinforcement of which arm he had frequently applied—without ammunition, medicines, and a sufficiency of carriage, it was impossible for Nott to move with any prospect of achieving much good. An accession to his strength had been promised from Scinde under Brigadier England, but March, 1842, was waning, and England came not. The plan chalked out for Brigadier England is thus given in a letter from Captain Hammersley, the political officer at Quettah, to Major Outram:

March 15th, 8 A.M.

My dear Major,

I have received your letter of the 10th just now, and am delighted to find that my own views on the subject have so far agreed with yours. Rawlinson's letter of the 4th has arrived most opportunely, and has still further strengthened my opinion that Brigadier England should not delay an advance towards the Kojuk, but that his advance should be made with as little incumbrance as possible. I would recommend his moving a compact little force, with only five lacs, or even less, of rupees, some of the most useful medicines, and no more ammunition than is absolutely necessary for the detachment. If General Nott moves down to the Kojuk, well and good; the treasure &c., which will be sufficient to maintain the troops for at least a month more can be made over, and the force from this can either occupy Fort Abdoolah, or return to this place to await the remainder of the division, and, if necessary, to assist it through the Zig-Zag. I do not

see what advantage is to be gained by the reoccupation of Killa Abdoolah, and any small force placed there would be liable to much annoyance from the enemy's horse, who would most certainly prevent supplies for man and beast being brought in there, and it is out of our power to procure carriage here just now for the conveyance of a month's supply beyond what would be required for the march. Should General Nott feel disinclined to move down to the Kojuk, which is very possible from what Brigadier England wrote to him, we shall turn our march to good account by opening the now completely closed road to Pisheen, and thereby giving an opportunity to the Syuds and the Tireenees to bring in their supplies of grain and camels for sale. Unless something of this sort is done, carriages will be found wanting by-and-bye, for not an animal is procurable for hire to Candahar, and should we have to retire in the autumn, we must depend altogether on our own Government camels. I have already mentioned my having written to the Tireenees, recommending them to remain as they have hitherto done at their homes, and not to be led into any compact with the rebels Mahomed Sadig and others, who wish to bring all into the same dangerous position they themselves have foolishly chosen. I pointed out how the Tireenees, from their homes being in the plains, would be the first to suffer if they were found to deserve punishment, and that if they continued quiet their property would be certainly respected by us. Yesterday a man whom I had placed at the Hydezye returned, and states, "The day before yesterday (12th) the Tireenees left Mahomed Sadig, as he would not promise anything or give anything." Now, if we were to move at present towards Killa Abdoolah, these Tireenees would gain confidence, and most probably shake off all connection with Mahomed Sadig. The late turn our connection with the Kakurs has taken renders the necessity for strengthening this place the more urgent, for we must be pre-

pared for opposition to the advance of the next convoy; and if the Brigadier takes the force he *proposed* from this, we cannot create a diversion at Doozdea in support of the escort, as the latter passes through the Zig-Zag. You will see by what I have written that I think Brigadier England should advance, but neither cross the Kojuk nor remain at Killa Abdoolah, and that the move back on this place will be preferable to either—these infernal camels take up such a line, that there must be great difficulty in protecting them. I am thinking that our treasure boxes, so well known now, might be exchanged for this trip for something less likely to cause suspicion. Even green bags would be preferable; but waggons, if procurable, would be better still—we used to carry treasure in them in India, and they are very easily defended. I have one, and there are some tumbrils which answer the purpose just as well.

Quetta, March 18, 1842.

My dear Hammersley,

I will thank you to acquaint Major Rawlinson, for the information of General Nott, that I propose to leave this on the 22nd, and hope to be at Hykulzye on the 24th; that under present circumstances I think that I shall best serve the public cause by trying the influence of the presence of a body of troops thus far in the Pishing valley, and that I shall stay there unless I hear that General Nott has actually sent two or three Regiments to the Kojuck to meet the treasure; that I shall take ten camel-loads of musket ammunition, in the hope of their transferring it to Candahar, and four lacs of rupees; that our scarcity of carriage still impedes us on every point, therefore that General Nott had better send camels enough to meet these things with the battalions he detaches to meet me at the Kojuck; that I have but one troop of cavalry with me and 75 Poona Horse; that I expect in ten days 150 more of the 3rd cavalry, and thus it will be seen that there is a total

impossibility to detach cavalry from hence to Candahar; that although I have now no apprehension of disappointing General Nott by not being at the Killa Abdoola so early as the 20th, yet that I shall not delay to make the movement into the valley in the full confidence that my doing so will act as a good diversion in favour of the operation at Candahar.

(Signed) R. ENGLAND.

Pray be so kind as to say that I should write to General Nott myself, but that I know the difficulty of transmitting more than one small note at a time, and that as you were writing I begged you to convey these particulars.

Letters from the Brigadier had reached the General, mentioning the anxiety of the former to get to Candahar; but Nott dissuaded him from attempting a rapid movement without an adequate escort. The General knew that an opposition was organizing in the Bolan and Kojuck Passes.

Nearer home the General was much troubled by the Dooranees. They had not retired to any great distance after their signal defeat. They hovered in the neighbourhood, committing depredations upon the villages on the left bank of the Urgundab River, appropriating the forage, and turning off the water. To protect the villages and procure forage, Major-General Nott detached Lieutenant-Colonel P. Wymer, an officer of excellent judgment and determined bravery, with three infantry regiments, and two troops of horse. The Lieutenant-Colonel came up with the rebels at Baba Wullee on the 25th of March, and after a smart action, in which

they received much severe punishment, succeeded in dispersing them.

Amongst the minor matters worthy of notice, as illustrative of Nott's anxiety for the tranquillity of Candahar, and the well-being of the people, may be mentioned his establishment of a bazaar outside the town under the charge of Lieutenant Tytler, and the disbandment and disarming of the Janbaz cavalry, in regard to the treachery of which corps the details have been before given.

Turn we for a moment to the condition of affairs east of Caubul.

Sir Robert Sale had found the town of Jellallabad in a very dilapidated state, and wretchedly defended. It would have been easy for him, tried, skilful, and daring soldier as he was, to have continued his march through the Khyber Pass, and so into the Punjaub. He felt, however, that so long as there remained a chance of the escape of the troops in Caubul from their beleaguered condition it was his duty to provide them with a rallying point and a place of shelter. Aided, therefore, by the energy and talent of the officers by whom he was surrounded, Captains Macgregor, Abbott, Backhouse Broadfoot, and Oldfield, and relying on the excellent discipline of the 13th Light Infantry under Colonel Dennie, and the 35th Bengal N.I. under Colonel Monteath, he caused the town to be fortified in the best possible manner; and although repeated shocks of earthquake destroyed the works and a part of the town, the

indefatigable exertions of the officers and men repaired the damage with incredible rapidity.* After the massacre of the retiring army of Caubul, Mahomed Ackbar Khan with a considerable force surrounded Jellallabad and cut off the communication with India. The Khyberee Chiefs warmly seconded his endeavours. An attempt was made to release Sale with a brigade of four regiments under Colonel Wild. The attempt failed. Destitute of artillery, and perhaps lacking science, Wild was driven back with heavy loss. Everything now depended upon the advance of Major-General Pollock with a large force. But Pollock was delayed for some time by the absence of carriage. It was not until the beginning of April that he could enter the Khyber Pass. Occasion will presently offer for noticing the sequel to this movement.

The purpose with which Pollock was directed to proceed to Jellallabad was to relieve and withdraw the garrison, and treat for the release of the prisoners in the hands of the Affghans. No idea was entertained of his advancing to Caubul at that time, whatever might have been contemplated at a future season, when his force should have returned to India.

To insure a correspondence of action between Pollock and Nott, Mr. George Clerk communicated the

* For a very interesting and accurate account of the defence and tenure of Jellallabad, see the Rev. G. Gleig's little volume, "Sale's Brigade in Affghanistan;" forming part of Murray's Home and Colonial Library.

Government plan to Major Outram, by whom it was made known to Nott, whereupon the General wrote the following letter to the Secretary to the Government of India.* It was dated the 24th of March, and there cannot be a doubt that it exercised a very material influence upon the ultimate resolution of the authorities.

Candahar March 24, 1842.

Sir,

I have the honour to acquaint you that a copy of a demi-official communication, dated the 25th of February, 1842, addressed by Mr. Clerk to Major Outram, has just reached

* How entirely Outram, who has been justly called the Bayard of India service, entered into Nott's views, in respect to an advance, is demonstrated in all his private and demi-official correspondence at this time. In a private letter to Mr. Maddock, dated the 13th of March, we find him writing: "I know not how Mr. Clerk will act on the discretionary powers given to him; but I conclude, from his character and devotion to Government, that he will not scruple to take upon himself the responsibility of strengthening instead of withdrawing from Jellallabad, because I think he will, with me, see utter ruin to our cause in Affghanistan, and consequent evils nearer home to result from that measure; and it is in that hope, and with the view in that case, to add my humble testimony as to the necessity of maintaining our position at Jellallabad and Peshawur, that I venture thus to write to you. My purely disinterested motives for doing so will, I trust, be a sufficient apology to yourself for this intrusion, and as I beg you to let it go no further, unless you approve of my sentiment, none is due to others. I do declare to you that I consider withdrawing from Jellallabad, and shrinking from forcing the Khyber, and supporting that post tantamount to disgracefully throwing up the game in Affghanistan, not in any way to be counterbalanced by the most extensive operations in this quarter."

Candahar, from which I learn that "Government have directed the Commander-in-Chief to require Major-General Pollock to withdraw the Jellallabad garrison, unless unforeseen circumstances, &c."

When I view the intimation thus received of the orders of Government, in connexion with their intention conveyed to me in despatches as per margin,* and also with their avowed determination to redeem the credit of the British arms in Affghanistan, publicly notified in General Orders, under date the 31st of January last: I feel that a degree of perplexity and embarrassment has been thrown on my position at Candahar, which I did not contemplate, and could not have contemplated, when the letters I have hitherto addressed to you, were written.

The communications I have hitherto received from Government, have, it is true, prescribed to me no decided line of conduct; but I am warranted in saying that their general tenour was to the effect that if, under existing circumstances, I could maintain my position at Candahar, without risking the safety of my troops, it would be consonant with the views and wishes of Government, that I should do so.

I had a considerable body of troops, and with much pains had collected a reserve of upwards of six months' provisions. I felt assured of support, and of the receipt of ammunition and stores I stood in need of, from Scinde or India. I knew that Jellallabad was in our possession, that it was the resolution of Government to maintain it, that large reinforcements were preparing for its support. I could not overestimate the value of this powerful diversion in my favour, nor could I shut my eyes to the fact that the abandon-

* See previous pages.

ment of Candahar by me, must have an unfavourable effect on the measures in progress for the retention of our position at Jellallabad. Under these considerations, I never had a moment's hesitation as to the course I ought to pursue, so long as discretionary power was left to me; and all my arrangements have consequently been made with a view to the present maintenance and future extension, should such prove desirable, of our power in this country.

But could I have foreseen that so immediately following their proclamation of the 31st of January, Government should have determined on withdrawing their troops from Jellallabad, excepting on the occurrence of "unforeseen circumstances," I should most probably have regarded this resolution of theirs as distinctly pointing to their intention of evacuating the country altogether, and have taken measures accordingly.

Now, however, the position of the troops at Candahar is so far fixed, that I consider retirement would not only be disadvantageous, but almost impracticable until the autumn; and I trust that my having determined on remaining may ultimately prove fortunate. But the state of uncertainty into which I am now thrown, regarding our present position at Jellallabad, and the probable future policy of Government, must preclude my acting with full confidence in measures calculated to restore British influence in the country by force of arms. I am also become doubtful of the propriety of retaining Khelat-i-Ghilzie as a separate garrison; for there is but too much reason to fear that the sacrifice of the garrison at Ghuzni, must closely follow on the abandonment of our position at Jellallabad.

As long as both the positions of Candahar and Jellallabad are occupied by us, the attention of the insurgents in Affghanistan is distracted. No general or combined move-

ment can be made by the Affghans, while they are threatened from both these points. But if one source of apprehension be removed by the withdrawal of our troops from Jellallabad, the undivided force of the people, backed by success and inflamed by religious enthusiasm, will be at liberty to concentrate its energy against our position at Candahar.

I believe that many people have been prevented from joining the rebel Chiefs now in arms against us near Candahar, from a feeling that we meditate the reoccupation of Caubul from the side of Jellalabad, an impression that has been confirmed by the non-arrival of succour from Caubul since the deputation of Attah Mahomed on the first outbreak of the insurrection in that city. While we maintain an imposing attitude at Jellallabad, even supposing no advance takes place beyond that post, it is my opinion that but few troops and no artillery will be sent from Caubul in aid of the rebel cause at Candahar; but if Jellallabad be abandoned, I not only look forward to having to contend with a force from Caubul, much better equipped than is ordinarily the case with Affghan troops, but I anticipate a general movement against us from every part of the country.

If Government intend to recover even temporarily, and for the saving of our national honour, their lost position in that country—even if doubtful of the policy that it may be deemed expedient to pursue—I earnestly hope, that before any immediate retrograde step is made in either direction, our whole position in Affghanistan will be deliberately viewed and that the effect which a hasty retirement would certainly and instantly have on the whole of Beloochistan, and even on the navigation of the Indus, will be taken into consideration. At the present time, the impression of our military strength among the people of this country, though weakened by the

occurrences at Caubul, is not destroyed. But if we now retire, and it should again become necessary to advance, we shall labour under many disadvantages; the most serious of which, in my opinion, will be a distrust of their strength among our soldiers, which any admission of weakness is so well calculated to induce. And in what other light could a withdrawal from Jellallabad or Candahar be viewed?

If retirement should become necessary, it should take place simultaneously and at a proper season. If Government should select Candahar as the point whence future operations against Caubal are to be directed, still the retention of a position at Jellallabad in considerable force, will be of the most essential service in all future contemplated operations.

In the sanguine hope that some unforeseen circumstance may have occurred to postpone the execution of the Government order for the evacuation of Jellallabad, I have thought it incumbent on me to address this letter to you.

Before closing my letter, I may mention that I am now in expectation of the march of Brigadier England from Quettah with supplies for Candahar. I have no correct information regarding the probable date of his quitting that post, nor of the strength of his force; but there is room for apprehension that the convoy he has to escort will be but weakly guarded, and every probability that it may be attacked. I am at present therefore compelled to remain at Candahar, prepared to move with a sufficient body of troops to the Brigadier's support, whenever I may receive certain intelligence of his movements.

Yours, &c.

W. Nott.

T. H. Maddock, Esq.
Secretary to the Government of India,
Calcutta.

The detachment under Brigadier England, who had now reached the rank of Major-General, had approached Quettah on the 22nd of March. He was indifferently supplied with camels, and complained of the paucity of troops under his command. He felt, however, that the presence of the detachment would inspire the people of the Pisheen valley with confidence, and induce them to bring in camels for sale, and he then proposed halting until reinforcements should join him from Scinde. On the 25th of March he had got as far as Koochlach; here a party of insurgent horse showed themselves, and England caused them to be attacked and dispersed by a troop of the Horse Brigade, and one of the 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry. On the 26th the Major-General moved from Quettah, and early on the 28th reached the entrance of a defile, which leads to the village of Hykulzye, where he intended to await the reinforcements. Here, however, to his great astonishment, he found the enemy under Mahomed Sadig, an insurgent Chief, strongly entrenched behind a succession of breastworks, improved by a ditch and abbattis. Major-General England attacked the enemy, who now developed his strength, and proved more than a match for the light companies of the 41st Foot and the Bombay N.I. They fell back, were assailed by a large body of cavalry, formed square, repulsed the foe, with the aid of four guns and a small detachment of horse, and effected a steady retreat to the village of Bazar. On the 29th of March England perceived that the insurgents had been

collecting reinforcements of armed villagers during the night, and had made arrangements on an increased scale for resisting any renewed assaults on his part. He therefore fell back upon Quettah, for it was evident that the object of his remaining in the Pisheen valley was negatived, while its resources were in the hands of an enemy much stronger than himself, and whom he could not dislodge from the heights without incurring additional severe losses.

This check, which was not altogether unexpected by General Nott, who had done his best to support England by deputing Wymer with his detachment to approach the southern outlet of the Passes,* demonstrated

* Candahar, April 2, 1842.

MY DEAR SIR,

Major Rawlinson has read to me a letter from Lieutenant Hammersley, dated the 20th ultimo, by which I learn that you intended to leave Quettah on the 22nd instant, with a small escort conveying four lacs of treasure, and a very small quantity of ammunition; but that it was not your intention to cross the Kojuck. This I deeply regret; firstly, because I cannot send a force to the southern side of that Pass; secondly, I require a large supply of ammunition which I have for two years been endeavouring to get, but without success; thirdly, four lacs of rupees will be of little use here—the troops and establishments are going on for four months in arrears; fourthly, your moving into Pisheen with a convoy, known by the whole country to be intended for Candahar, and there halting or returning to Quettah, will have the very worst effect throughout Affghanistan and will be more injurious to my present position than 20,000 of the enemy in the field. I sincerely hope you have not moved, or that you have determined to push across the Kojuck with all the force you can muster.

I know not what the intentions of Government are regarding this country; but this I know and feel, that it is now from four to five

how successfully the enemy had baffled the sagacious political officers at Quettah. For two months previous to General England's advance the works had been in preparation, and no one in the British interests seemed to have known anything about them. "Let it be observed," writes Colonel Stacey, who volunteered to accompany General England on the expedition, "that our ignorance of the existence of this entrenchment, and the time necessarily taken to prepare it, prove, no less, our want of common information beyond our pickets, than the astonishing unanimity which is leagued against us."

months since the outbreak at Caubul, and in all that time no aid whatever has been given to me. I have continually called for cavalry, for ammunition, treasure, stores, and medicine for the sick. I have called loudly, but I have called in vain. Had the least aid been sent, even a regiment of cavalry, I could have tranquillized or subdued the country. I have been tied to this important city when a very few additional troops for its garrison would have set me free, and I could now have been on my march to Ghuzni and Caubul. All I have now to do is to uphold the honour of my country in the best manner I can, without the assistance above stated, and in ignorance of the intentions of the Government I serve.

A native report reached Candahar yesterday that you had crossed the Kojuck on the 28th ultimo. I immediately ordered a brigade to move three or four marches to meet and support you. The officer commanding will now return unless he should hear that you are on this side the Pass.

Yours, &c.,

W. Nott

To Brigadier England,
Commanding in Scinde.

Ten days after the announcement of his repulse, England wrote the following letter to General Nott:

Copy of a Letter from Major-General England to Major-General Nott.

Quettah, April 10th, 1842.

Sir,

Since my letter to you of the 1st, I have received one from Major Outram, dated Sukkur, 4th, in which he expresses much apprehension as to the tranquillity of Cutchee, and holds out no hopes of reinforcing me at this place, deeming it best that additional troops, if procurable, should rather be sent to Dadur, &c. Since my letter also of the 1st to you, I have seen the Government despatch of the 15th ult., which has been forwarded to you in duplicate from two sources. I have heard of the reported fall of Ghuzni. Then matters may materially alter your intentions. Our information here as to the number or position of the enemy, is still completely closed. I believe that the heights of Hykulzai are occupied by them, but we can only rely on that which is *seen* by our own piquets or patrols. I have at this place 3,600 men of all arms (200 being Bombay Light Cavalry), and am throwing up breastworks to protect the straggling cantonments, whilst the walls of the town are also in progress of being strengthened, and a covered way is prepared to communicate from the latter to the Commisariat Godown. I am not aware if you know these localities, but I mention these particulars to enable you to judge of the number of men required to defend works of this extent. If I advanced with 2,100 men to the Southern extremity of the Kojuck Pass, (and I really doubt the *success* of moving with less), I should thus leave Quettah with 1,500 men. The effect of my being in *their* front, would be advantageous, but you will probably be of opinion that a good deal would be hazarded if these

extended defences were committed to so small a body of troops. If I advance, I must take with me at least twelve days' provisions, and you are aware of the train of baggage entailed by that quantity. The league against us is too strong to enable us to imagine that we could rely on supplies in the valley of Peshing. I will beg to draw your attention also to the impossibility of adopting a concerted operation whilst my communication with you by letter is so precarious, and to the mortifications which would ensue if either your Brigade or mine reached the Kojuk, and then discovered no prepared or possible co-operation. These Brigades could not hold their ground for more than a day or two, from want of supplies, and possibly would be obliged to retire without effecting any part of the intention of their march. I have not heard from Candahar, neither has Mr Hammersley, since the 19th ultimo; a circumstance which best shows the danger of attempting *concerted* movements. My desire to deliver treasure, or to be of use to your garrison, is, however, unabated, and I merely think it necessary to detail the foregoing facts to show the difficulties belonging to that gratification.

Whenever it so happens that you retire bodily in this direction, and that I am informed of it, I feel assured that I shall be able to make an advantageous diversion in your favour from this side. I request you will have the goodness to apprize me of your views on the subjects I have referred to, and I shall do my best to forward them.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

(Signed) R. ENGLAND,
Major-General Commanding S. and K.

(True copy.)

(Signed) S. B. BOSANQUET,
Assistant Political Agent.

(True copy.)

C. F. NORTH,
Lieut. Engineers.

Nott was deeply concerned for the repulse of Major-General England. Without money to pay the troops their four months' arrears of pay, destitute of medicine and ammunition, he felt the impossibility of advancing or retreating. In the intensity of his vexation he addressed a highly soldier-like letter to the Major-General, pointing out his future course of conduct. It bears date the 18th of April.

After briefly expressing his regret at the Hykulzye disaster, he proceeds:

I think it absolutely necessary that a strong brigade of 2,500 men should be immediately pushed from Quettah to Candahar, with the supplies noted in the foregoing paragraph. I therefore have to acquaint you that I will direct a brigade of three regiments of infantry, a troop of horse artillery, with a body of cavalry, to march from Candahar on the *morning of the 25th instant.* This force will *certainly* be at Chummun, at the northern foot of the Kojuck, on the morning of the 1st of this May, and possibly on the 30th of month; I shall therefore fully rely on your marching a brigade from Quettah, so that it may reach the southern side of the Pass on the above-mentioned date. I believe there can be no difficulty whatever in accomplishing this, nor of crossing the Kojuck without loss, provided the heights are properly crowned on either side. I have crossed it three times in command of troops, and I know that what I now state is correct. There can be no danger in passing through Pisheen, provided a careful and well-ordered march is preserved, and patrols and flanking parties of horse are thrown well out. The people of this country cannot with-

stand our troops in the open field. I am well aware that war cannot be made without loss; but yet I hope that British troops can oppose Asiatic armies without defeat; and I feel, and know, that British officers should never despair of punishing the atrocious and treacherous conduct of a brutal enemy.

You say you are "not aware if you know the localities" (of Quettah). I know them well, and I hope I shall be excused when I express my surprise that the authorities at Quettah should for a moment have thought of throwing up breastworks and entrenching that straggling and wretched cantonment, when the town with its citadel is so well calculated for every purpose which can render a post at all desirable in Shawl, and I am quite certain may be well defended by 500 men. Did I command at Quettah, I would relinquish the cantonment; it is useless. Quettah is not a place for a large body of troops.

I feel obliged to you for pointing out the many difficulties attending our position; but you are well aware that it is our first and only duty to overcome difficulties where the national honour and our military reputation are so deeply concerned. Nothing can be accomplished without effort and perseverance.

In reply to the last paragraph of your letter of the 10th instant, I have only to observe that I have not yet contemplated falling back.

Without money, I can neither pay the long arrears due to the troops, nor procure carriage for field operations. I deeply regret this state of things, which ought to have been attended to months ago. Had this been done, I should now have been on my march to Ghuzni.

I shall fully rely on your brigade being at the Kojuck on the 1st of May, or before.

This letter I request may be forwarded to Major Outram.

P.S.—You will of course perceive that I intend that your brigade should join and accompany to Candahar the detachment sent from this. I have no cattle for treasure or stores.

To Brigadier England,
Commanding Scinde Force.

Lord Ellenborough reached Calcutta on the 28th of February. Expectation was on tiptoe regarding his Affghan policy. From his well-known energy of character it was expected that he would at once have lent all the resources at his command to the re-establishment of the British power in Affghanistan, the vindication of our military renown, and the infliction of retributive vengeance upon the destroyers of our army, and the captors of our countrymen and countrywomen. Attached as he was to a political party antagonistic to that of which Lord Auckland was a member, very many persons believed that he would only too readily avail himself of the opportunity of triumphing over a policy which had been proved to be utterly mistaken. Those, however, who had learnt to regard Lord Ellenborough as a statesman of enlarged views, brought up in the practical and decided school of Wellington, and accustomed to support the opinions of that incomparable soldier, and astute, because honest, diplomatist, gave

him credit for a loftiness of purpose alien to the gratification of personal pique at the expense of his country's interests.

Attaching great importance to secresy in the conduct of public affairs, Lord Ellenborough commenced his career by discontinuing those communications with the Calcutta Press, which it had been accustomed to receive from the Government of Lord Auckland. Lord Auckland was quite above any desire to purchase the support of the local newspapers by making them participators in those facts connected with Affghanistan which interested the public at large; but he was too great a friend to truth, and too much alive to the mischief of the dissemination of unfounded reports to withhold information which might serve to tranquillize the public mind, and check undue excitement. Lord Ellenborough, on the other hand, preferred the spread of rumours, however absurd and dangerous, to a departure from a settled system of reserve. Thus withholding a privilege which the Press had learnt to value, his Lordship threw down the gauntlet to a power which has proved itself far from mean and inoperative, and, as a consequence, exposed himself to much groundless animadversion, and to the most uncharitable construction of his intentions.*

* How important Lord Ellenborough considered secresy in all matters relating to the conduct of public affairs is evident from later letters addressed to the Political Agents. On the 26th of May, a circular was issued, in which the following paragraphs occurred.

The first act of Lord Ellenborough, in relation to Affghanistan, was the signal for extraordinary severity

"The Governor-General deems it right to impress upon every officer employed either in the military or political service of the Government, the necessity of preserving absolute secresy in all matters of a military or political nature, which may officially come to his knowledge. Such secresy, the want of which is at all times disparaging and injurious to a government, is at the present moment essential to the success of measures upon which the safety of armies may depend.

"The comparative unimportance of all movements of troops, and of most political transactions, during a long and profound peace may gradually have led to the habit of inconsiderately divulging the orders and intentions of the Government, but this cannot be done without the most extensive injury to the State in time of actual or apprehended war, or at a period of great political excitement; and the Governor-General must observe that officers, whose knowledge is limited to what comes before them in their official capacity, are not competent judges of the importance of the several facts thus brought to their knowledge, and in divulging that which to them may seem little and unimportant they may really be divulging that which, taken in conjunction with other facts not known to them, may convey very valuable intelligence to the enemy.

"The Governor-General hopes that it will be enough thus to convey his opinion to the several higher officers of the military and political departments to secure their own absolute secresy, and their active aid in preventing the publicity which, through the means of their subordinates, may be given to matters of high public concernment."

And a week later, the Secretary to Government is instructed thus to write to Outram:

"The Governor-General has been informed that some papers, which were in the so-called 'Secret Department,' have again been made public at Bombay. These related to the affair at Hykulzye.

"A Calcutta newspaper adverts to a rumour relative to the Fort of Khelat-i-Ghilzie which must have had its origin in the improper communication of the contents of a recent despatch to Major-General Nott.

"The Governor-General depends upon your putting an end to this

of comment. He manifested no inclination to realize the almost universal desire for the summary chastisement of the Affghans. The fact was, his Lordship could not readily make up his mind as to the most prudent course that should be adopted. He wanted to feel his way. Summoning his Council, he developed his views. He considered the conduct of Shah Soojah to have cancelled his claims upon the British to aid him in maintaining his position in Caubul; and he regarded the possession of Affghanistan, "could we recover it,"

infidelity amongst the public servants, by the immediate dismissal of such as you have any reason to suspect, be they who they may. Where some one of many must have betrayed his trust, and that one cannot be discovered, all must be dismissed, for it is far better that some innocent men should lose their places, than that good soldiers should lose their lives and the State an army.

"When all understand that the whole body is made answerable for the offence of each individual, the offender will probably be discovered or the offence cease.

"I am directed distinctly to inform you, and you will have the goodness to inform all your subordinate officers, that the Governor-General expects that each of them will consider that the betrayal of a high public trust by any one employed under him is an impeachment of his own fidelity, and that he will apply himself to the discovery and punishment of the offender, as he would to the clearing up of any matter which affected his personal honour.

"The Governor-General is unwilling to think it possible that any European servant of the Company should have been guilty of so disgraceful an offence; but if there should be proof sufficient to lead to a moral certainty that this has been the case, the offender, be he who he may, will be exposed, and if he should not be dismissed from the service by the Court of Directors, the Governor-General will advise Her Majesty to remove him by the sign-manual."

as a source of weakness rather than of strength. On the 15th of March, a fortnight after Lord Ellenborough's arrival, the Governor-General in Council agreed upon a despatch to Sir Jasper Nicolls, the Commander-in-Chief, which contained the following paragraphs.

Whatever course we may hereafter take, must rest solely upon military considerations, and have in the first instance regard to the safety of the detached bodies of our troops at Jellallabad, at Ghuzni, at Khelat-i-Ghilzie and Candahar, to the security of our troops now in the field from all unnecessary risk, and, finally, to the re-establishment of our military reputation by the infliction of some signal and decisive blow upon the Affghans, which may make it appear to them, to our own subjects, and to our allies, that we have the power of inflicting punishment upon those who commit atrocities and violate their faith, and that we withdraw ultimately from Affghanistan, not from any deficiency of means to maintain our position, but because we are satisfied that the King we have set up has not, as we were erroneously led to imagine, the support of the nation over which he has been placed.

But while the facts before us justify the withdrawal of our troops from Affghanistan and the refusal of all further assistance to Shah Soojah, they are yet not such as to make it consistent with our reputation to give our future support, as suggested by Major Rawlinson to Shah Kamran, and to make over Candahar to that nominal ruler of Herat, even were it consistent with prudence to engage in a new speculative enterprise beyond the Indus, which might render it necessary for us to retain, at an enormous cost, a large body of troops

in the difficult country between that river and Candahar, for the purpose of maintaining in the country so made over to him, a Sovereign personally incapable, and for many years unknown to its inhabitants otherwise than by the fame of his degrading vices.

We are of opinion that it would be erroneous to suppose that a forward position above the passes in Upper Affghanistan would have the effect of controlling the Sikhs, or that a forward position above the passes in Lower Affghanistan would have the effect of controlling the Beloochees and the Scindians, by the appearance of confidence and strength. That which will really and alone control the Sikhs, the Beloochees and the Scindians, and all the other nations beyond and within the Indus, is the knowledge that we possess an army perfect in its equipments, possessed of all the means of movement, and so secure in its communications with the country from which its supplies and reinforcements are drawn, as to be able to act at any time with vigour and effect against an enemy.

In war, reputation is strength, but reputation is lost by the rash exposure of the most gallant troops, under circumstances which render defeat more probable than victory, and a succession of reverses will dishearten any soldiers, and most of all those whose courage and devotion have been mainly the result of their confidence that they were always led to certain success; we would therefore strongly impress upon the Commanders of the Forces employed in Affghanistan and Scinde the importance of incurring no unnecessary risk, and of bringing their troops into action under circumstances which may afford full scope for the superiority they derive from their discipline. At the same time, we are aware that no great object can be accomplished without incurring some risk; and we would consider that the object of striking

a decisive blow at the Affghans, more especially if such blow could be struck in combination with measures for the relief of Ghuzni, a blow which might re-establish our military character beyond the Indus, and leave a deep impression of our power and of the vigour with which it could be applied to punish an atrocious enemy, would be one for which risk might be justifiably incurred, all due and possible precaution being taken to diminish such necessary risk and to secure decisive success.

The Commanders of the Forces in Upper and Lower Affghanistan will, in all the operations they may design, bear in mind these general views and opinions of the Government of India. They will in the first instance endeavour to relieve the garrisons in Affghanistan which are now surrounded by the enemy. The relief of these garrisons is a point deeply affecting the military character of the army, and deeply interesting the feelings of their country; but to make a rash attempt to effect such relief in any case without a reasonable prospect of success, would be to afford no real aid to the brave men who are surrounded, and fruitlessly to sacrifice other good soldiers, whose preservation is equally dear to the Government they serve. To effect the release of the prisoners taken at Caubul is an object likewise deeply interesting in point of feeling and of honour. That object can probably only be accomplished by taking hostages from such part of the country as may be or may come into our possession, and with reference to this object, and to that of the relief of Ghuzni, it may possibly become a question in the event of Major-General Pollock effecting a junction with Sir R. Sale, whether the united force shall return to the country below the Khyber Pass, or take a forward position near Jellallabad, or even advance to Caubul.

We are fully sensible of the advantages that would be

derived from the re-occupation of Caubul, the scene of our great disaster and of so much crime, even for a week, of the means which it might afford of recovering the prisoners, of the gratification which it would give to the army, and of the effect which it would have upon our enemies. Our withdrawal might then be made to rest upon any official declaration of the grounds upon which we retired as solemn as that which accompanied our advance, and we should retire as a conquering not as a defeated power; but we cannot sanction the occupation of an advanced position beyond the Khyber Pass by Major-General Pollock, unless that General should be satisfied that he can, without depending upon the forbearance of the tribes near the Pass, which obtained only by purchase, must under all circumstances be precarious, and without depending upon the fidelity of the Sikh Chiefs, or upon the power of those Chiefs to restrain their troops, upon neither of which can any reliance be safely placed, feel assured that he can by his own strength overcome and overawe all who dispute the Pass, and keep up at all times his communication with Peshawur and the Indus; and we would caution Major-General Pollock, and all the officers commanding the troops in the field, not to place reliance on, or be biassed by, the representations of native Chiefs who may have been expelled from their country in consequence of their adherence to us, and who will be naturally ready to lead us into any danger by operations which may have the possible effect of restoring them to their former possessions.

We have been informed that Major-General Pollock does not consider himself strong enough to force and to keep the Khyber Pass, without the 1st Reserve Brigade, which was not known to have passed the river on the 2nd of this month, and which can hardly join him before the second week in April; and being informed likewise that Major-General Sir

R. Sale had on the 21st of last month only forage sufficient to last about thirty days, we cannot but expect that those officers will have endeavoured to effect their junction before the arrival of the 1st Reserve Brigade, and that they will, when that junction shall have been effected, occupy a secure position near the Khyber.

In such a position they will under all circumstances be better enabled to assist any operations of Major-General Nott on the side of Ghuzni, by the moral effect of their concentrated strength, than they would be in a more advanced position of extreme hazard to the troops under their command.

We look further to the effect which the concentration of a large force, under your Excellency's command upon the Sutlej, would have upon the policy of the Sikhs and of all Indian States, exhibiting the British Government in an attitude of imposing strength, and giving confidence to its army and its subjects.

The operations of the large force under Major-General Nott and Brigadier England, a force numerous enough to overcome all resistance whenever it might march, if its numbers comprised a due proportion of cavalry, and if it possessed the perfect equipments and ample means of movement, without which numbers of the bravest and best-disciplined men have not the character of an army, are necessarily so crippled by the want of cavalry and of animals of burthen and draught, that we cannot safely rely upon those officers being able to effect any object beyond that of withdrawing the garrison of Khelat-i-Ghilzie and securing their own retreat at the proper season, and their communications in the meantime with the Indus.

We cannot review all the circumstances of the present crisis without being deeply impressed with a sense of the

danger arising from the dissemination of troops in an enemy's country, having difficult communications; and of the farther danger of leaving any force intended for operations in the field, and at any time liable to be called into action, so composed in the several arms of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, and so supplied with ammunition, provisions, and the means of movement as to be in fact incapable of executing with promptitude and effect and even of attempting without peril to itself any important operation with which it may be entrusted.

Some weeks later the Governor-General left Calcutta for Benares, and thence was dispatched the following letter to General Nott.

Benares, April 19, 1842.

Sir,

I am directed by the Governor-General to instruct you to take immediate measures for drawing off the garrison of Khelat-i-Ghilzie. You will effectually destroy all such guns as you cannot conveniently carry away. You will destroy the fort likewise; unless at the time at which the operation shall be effected, which is herein before enjoined. Prince Timour having remained faithful to British interests, shall possess a sufficient force to be reasonably expected to be able to maintain that fort upon your giving it into his charge.

You will evacuate the city of Candahar, giving that too into the charge of Prince Timour, under the circumstances above mentioned. You will otherwise ruin its defences before you evacuate it.

You will then proceed to take up a position at Quettah, until the season may enable you to retire upon Sukkur.

The object of the above-directed measure is to withdraw all our forces to Sukkur at the earliest period at which the season and other circumstances may permit you to take up a position there. The manner of effecting this now necessary object is, however, left to your discretion.

You will understand that in the event of Prince Timour's having continued faithful, it is the desire of the Governor-General to afford him the means of preserving, by his own native troops, or any other troops in his pay, the city of Candahar and the Fort of Khelat-i-Ghilzie. But no British guns must be left, which you can carry away, and no British officer must remain in his service, retaining his commission in the British army.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) T. H. MADDOCK,
Secretary to the Government of India,
With the Governor-General.

To Major-General Nott.

The determination of the Government affected General Nott deeply, because he not only entertained strong opinions as to the policy of recovering the position of the British in Affghanistan, but felt himself strong enough to accomplish that object when cavalry, money, and carriage, should be available. Obedience was, however, with him the first law.* Concealing

* "I shall, therefore, not lose a moment in making all necessary arrangements for carrying into effect the orders I have received, without turning to the right or to the left, by the idle propositions and wild speculations daily and hourly heaped upon me from all parts of Affghanistan and Scinde, by persons who are or fancy themselves to be representatives of Government, west of the Indus. I know that it is my

from his own confidential staff the purport of the letter, because he felt that the slightest publicity given to the

duty and their duty implicitly and zealously to obey and carry into effect every order received without enquiry into the reasons for the measures adopted, whatever our own opinions or wishes may be, and without troubling Government with unnecessary reference.

"Perhaps it is not within my province to observe, that, in my humble opinion, an unnecessary alarm has been created regarding the position of our troops in this country, and of the strength and power of the enemy we have to contend with. This enemy cannot face our troops in the field with any chance of success, however superior they may be in numbers, provided those precautions are strictly observed which war between a small body of disciplined soldiers, and a vast crowd of untrained, unorganized, and half-civilized people, constantly render necessary. True, the British troops suffered a terrible disaster at Caubul, and it is not for me to presume to point out why this happened, however evident I may conceive the reasons and the long train of military and political events which led to the sad catastrophe.

"Had I been reinforced even with a single regiment of cavalry, I feel convinced that I could long since have tranquillized or subdued the rebellious feeling in the provinces, dependant upon Candahar; and that a very few additional troops from Scinde to garrison this extensive and important city would have set me free from my present difficult position, and have enabled me at this moment to have been on my march to Ghuzni and to Caubul; but although near six months have elapsed since the outbreak at that city, no aid of any kind has been sent to me; and the circumstances I have now detailed still confine me to this post and its immediate vicinity.

"It is with deep concern that I feel myself disappointed in the long-expected convoy from Scinde. No doubt Major-General England has fully acquainted Government with the unfortunate check received by the detachment under his command in Pisheen on the 28th ultimo, the moral influence of which has been great throughout the country, and has added considerably to the difficulties of my position. I am now under the necessity of directing a strong brigade to march as far as the Kojuck Pass in hopes of at length getting the treasure, stores, &c., I

expressed intention to withdraw the troops would prove a source of great embarrassment to them,* he gave his attention to the execution of the commands of the Government, in respect to the withdrawal of the garrisons of Ghuzni and Khelat-i-Ghilzie. To this end he urged General England, who had now been reinforced, to move on Candahar, and in order to support him, Wymer was dispatched with a considerable detachment to the foot of the Kojuck. General England accomplished the task on the second occasion without difficulty.

In the meanwhile General Pollock had continued to communicate with General Nott. The impressions which Nott received of his brother General from the private letters of the officers at Peshawur were very favourable. He was described as deserving of success, for "he is one of the most thoughtful commanding officers we could possibly meet with. He issues now and then small, short orders, to be read at the head of

stand so much in need of, and without which my force is paralyzed. I have requested Major-General England to send a detachment from Quettah for its conveyance. This strong brigade will be absent from Candahar for fifteen or twenty days at a most critical period. I herewith transmit copies of letters transmitted by me to that officer on this subject."—*Letter to Mr. T. Herbert Maddock, Secretary to Government, 21st of May*, 1842.

* Such of the chiefs as were friendly to the English, and appreciated the integrity of their dealings, did not hesitate at all times to supply cattle, carriage, and grain on credit, but Nott sensibly judged that they would be very loth to supply anything to a retiring army, leaving no representative or hostages, unless they received payment in ready money.

regiments and companies, telling the men to trust in him, and that he will not unnecessarily expose them, and he backs up his protestations by giving little things. The last bonus from Government was haversacks for the whole force."

It was natural that Nott should be anxious to co-operate with so good a soldier as Pollock; and he was proportionately vexed at his utter inability to stir. In the intensity of his distress at his helplessness he writes to General Pollock: "I believe I shall go mad." "I ought to have been on my way to Ghuzni to extend my hand to you, instead of which I am obliged to make a movement on the Kojuck." "As far as cattle are concerned we are nearly helpless. God knows why such delay has occurred in sending me money and stores. *This is dreadful.*"

The bruised spirit is still more apparent in his confidential letters to his daughters. These communications were now few and far between; but they breathe the same sentiments of affection, the same impatience of the decision of Government, the same anxious wish for retirement.

Candahar, April 22, 1842.

MY DEAR CHILDREN,

I have during the last five months contrived to send you several small slips of paper, telling you that I am in good health. It is a very long time since I have heard from you; and to show you our state of ignorance here, I have merely to mention, that I have only received one newspaper during

the last five months. Our letters and papers are all in the Quettah post-office.

I wrote a very long letter to William last month, and enclosed it in a very long letter to you. We ventured to send the dawk off; we now find that it was captured by the enemy, and then recaptured, and sent on; but unfortunately again taken close to Quettah, and the dawk man wounded, and I have neither time nor inclination to write another long letter just now. But I wish you would write to William and tell him to send me every particular of the new country he is in, the climate, appearance of the country, mode of living; what the advantages or disadvantages of Sydney, when compared with Van Diemen's Land and the other colonies; whether he could select a pretty spot with a cottage some thirty miles from Sydney, for me to end my days in, &c. &c. to the end of the letter. I long to receive a letter from Robert. Could I have foreseen that he would have been sent to Affghanistan, I would have had him posted to a regiment here, and he would have been with me, and have been my aide-de-camp.

The people in power are all mad, or Providence hath blinded them for some wise purpose. I am very tired, tired of working, tired of this country, and quite tired of the folly of my countrymen, and I long more than ever for my *clay-built cottage*. My soldiers are four months in arrears; there is not one rupee in the Candahar Treasury, and no money can be borrowed. I have no medicine for the sick and wounded, I have no carriage cattle for the troops, nor money to buy or hire, and therefore cannot move. I have no good cavalry, and but little ammunition. I have been calling for all these for six months, but *not the least aid* has been given me! I *might now* have been on my way to

Caubul. They have sent five regiments of cavalry to be starved in the Khyber Pass, and would not give me one.

I have a regiment of the Shah's Hindostanee Cavalry here. In an affair, a few days ago, in which the Affghan army would not come near my brave sepoys, I did all in my power to get this rascally cavalry to charge, but they would not. The fellows annoyed me so much, that, did not the welfare of my noble sepoys depend upon me, I think I should have spurred my horse into the midst of the Affghan cavalry. A party of this 1st Shah's Cavalry moved to attack, but instantly turned and fled, galloping wildly through the light company of the 38th Regiment, with the enemy close at their heels. This light company received the Affghan Horse on the points of their bayonets, and nobly beat them back. This company is composed of the Patan Boys, whom you saw frequently when they were recruits at Delhi, when they used to range themselves in line near the band, on band evenings; and you will recollect that they attracted much notice. They are reckless dogs, but they are noble soldiers, equal to any in the world. I have now several times seen European troops under fire with sepoys alongside of them, and, believe me, the more I see of sepoys the more I like them; properly managed they are the best troops in the world. Some John Bulls would hang me for saying this. Although our cavalry would not charge, we licked the enemy well, and drove them into the Urgundab River with great loss.

How I do long to be on some nice spot in Australia!

Yours ever,

W. Nott.

In his eagerness to obtain supplies Nott wrote to Major Leech, who was in political charge of Khelat-i-

Ghilzie, and urged his negotiating for the needful with the Chiefs. "They," said he, "have not murdered any of our countrymen; you have my authority to treat with them." A week or two previous to this communication General Nott received the subjoined letter from Major Leech:

Khelat-i-Ghilzie, 31st March, 1842.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

This morning I received your letter of the 28th instant; I think from the 15th to 20th of April would be a capital time for you to leave Candahar in moving up the road. Last year there was rain to the 20th. M'Laren will be able to tell you how many days the Ghuznie spring is behind the Candahar one; the fields about this are now beginning to look green, the young grain being from six to eight inches high, and the boota is sprouting. Last year the wheat crops about Hoolan Robat were beginning to be ripe on 10th July. Grass-cutters have been able to find grass for our horses since the 26th ult. Khelat-i-Ghilzie seasons are, I am told, twenty-seven days in rear of Candahar, Tazee seven days in rear of Khelat, and Makoor twelve days of Tazee; but I doubt the exact correctness of this. I have not more money in the treasury than suffices to defray my expenses in the intelligence department. Dr Mackinnon says he is badly off for medicine. We now ground (grind?) nearly one-half our consumption of flour in three-quarter rations, and in a day or two we shall have a new mill going. Her Majesty's 40th and 41st Foot, four N. I. Regiments, the four 9-pounders, eight 6-pounders, including the European troop with Brigadier England, the two 18-pounders from this, with some good Cavalry, will, I guess, be the force to move up the road for the relief of Ghuznie. I think I hear you say, there goes the Political meddling in things he knows nothing about. Walker, in case

he is required to move these 18-pounders, requires everything to be sent in the same proportion as taken to Khelat-i-Nusseer under Anderson, more especially drag-ropes, tar and grease, and all contingent stores for repairs, &c. As none are to be had here on indent, and none are on hand, he has 990 round shot, 90 canister, and 50 shrapnell, with powder for the same. Last night a Juzälchiee of the King's, by name Myairdad, by tribe an Anduree, arrived from Caubul with a letter from the King to me, requesting me to write the news to him, and to take care of myself, saying we had to thank ourselves for the present disastrous state of affairs, as we never listened to his advice, but insisted on squandering our money away upon the Affghans. The man says he left Caubul on the 18th instant; the news from Jellalabad was, that one troop were secure in the fort, Mahomed Ackbar could do nothing, and had sent to Caubul for reinforcements, and it was reported that Nuwab Zuman Khan was preparing to start with some reinforcements from the tribes in the neigbourhood of Caubul. The advance had been made by General Pollock, and the Khyber was held by the rebels in great force under a nephew of Dost Mahomed's. He says he spent the night of the 24th at Rozah, near Ghuznie, and that there was not a soul of our garrison alive, except three officers who were prisoners with Shumsodeen; the latter got Palmer to vacate the citadel under a solemn pledge of safe-conduct to Jellalabad or Candahar, and then attacked them. The man did not himself enter Ghuznie, but saw many men at Rozah, some with whom he was acquainted, who had just come from the town, and though he had it in his power so easily to test their assertions, he was persuaded that they required none. Pray tell Rawlinson that the bearer of the King's letter to me had one also for the Prince Timour, which I have kept. His father is very anxious to hear from him. The letter itself far from proves the King inimical to us. The Cossid is a short man, about 35, with a slight beard, has a

deep scar down his left cheek, and has a way of winking his right eye, and sometimes both. Although he promised he would immediately return to Caubul, he may have gone on to Candahar, and I see no object to be gained in his being allowed to have intercourse with the Prince. We are strengthening ourselves more and more daily.

Yours sincerely,
(Signed) R. LEECH.

The letters from the Shah Soojah to his son, referred to by Major Leech, duly reached Rawlinson, and in the following communication we have his sentiments upon the subject. The letter of the King is an interesting historical document.

Candahar, March 14th, 1842.

SIR,

I do myself the honour to submit copies of translations of two letters, which were yesterday received by Prince Timour, from His Majesty the Shah, at Cabool, and which His Royal Highness, immediately on their arrival, voluntarily placed in my hands.

2. The letter, No. 2, is in His Majesty's own hand-writing, and was concealed about the person of the messenger. We may consider it, therefore, a confidential document, indicating the true state of His Majesty's feelings; and it is thus not a little curious to observe, that while His Majesty insinuates that he has been placed in his present position contrary to his inclination, he still expresses no hope that he may be restored to the independent exercise of his authority by the support of our arms. It appears to me, from a careful perusal of the document, as well as from an examination of the messenger, that His Majesty is under a strong appre

hension of being considered and treated by us as an enemy; and when I connect the reports mentioned by Major Leech, of the nature of the messenger's errand, with the anxiety expressed by His Majesty to see his son at an early period, I am thus led to think it far from impossible that an attempt will be made to remove Prince Timour from Candahar with a view of relieving His Majesty from embarrassment on his son's account.

3. At the same time Prince Timour himself certainly acts with all apparent sincerity, and if he could be assured that his father would receive a continuance of our support, or even that our hostility to Shah Shuja would not in any way act prejudicially to his own future interests, I should feel pretty confident that he would remain true to us, notwithstanding the present trying circumstances in which he is placed.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient servant,
H. RAWLINSON,
Political Agent.

To Major-General Nott,
Commanding at Candahar.

Translation of a dustkhat from His Majesty Shah Shuja, to His Royal Highness Prince Timour.

(Shah Shujah's Seal.)

7th February, 1842.

No. 1.

Be it known to our noble and well-beloved son, Prince Timour, that a long time has now elapsed since we sent two foot messengers and one horseman to you at Candahar, and yet, up to the present day, we are without any intelligence of your proceedings in that quarter. The people of Cabool raised a religious war against the unbelievers, and, as the Chiefs pledged their allegiance to us with oaths upon the Koran,

we did not attend to the wishes of the others (the English). These people (the Caboolees), were, in the first instance, disinclined to us, but afterwards, as we knew them to be true servants of the State, we conducted ourselves in a becoming manner to them, and they all returned to their allegiance. We are intent upon the general good. We direct you to send instantly, and without delay, for our information, full accounts of your own proceedings and of those of the gentlemen (Sahiban), together with all particulars regarding the province of Candahar. Rest assured of our favour and protection.

Given at Cabool on the 25th Zil Huj.

(True translation.)

(Signed) H. C. RAWLINSON,
Political Agent.

(True copy.)

E. R. ELLIOTT, Assistant Political Agent.

No. 2.

Translation of an Autograph Letter from His Majesty Shah Shuja to His Royal Highness Prince Timour.

This is to inform my beloved son, Prince Timour, that I have sent three foot messengers to you,—one of them was stripped and returned—of the others I have no intelligence. I also sent a horseman, but I am still without information of what is going on in that quarter. Here we have had a repetition of those scenes which the people of this place have so often before enacted. I frequently warned those (the English) of what would take place—but they paid no regard to me. Fate had decreed that those scenes, which I had hoped never again to see, should take place. The people of this place sounded a war-cry of Unbelievers and Mussulmans, and got up this revolution. They even withdrew themselves from me, saying, the Shah is with the English;—they turned themselves altogether away from me. By the blessing of God, I tried a great number of expedients, and spent a large

sum of money. I was engaged from sunset during the whole night, even to sunrise, in swearing oaths to these people upon the blessed Koran, until at last I persuaded them to return to me. They still declared, however, that I would not separate myself from the English. I remarked to them—you yourselves say, what have not the English done for you, what support have they not rendered you?—and then you add—for the love of God, join the Mussulman cause. You have said it yourselves. I am a Mussulman. What of course can the English be to me? They certainly treated me with kindness, and I was a long time a guest of the nation—but what else? This even was unworthy of me—may God shield me from the shame I feel. If, by the blessing of God, I should ever see you again, I will unfold to you the secrets of my heart. It was my fate to act as I have done. The wealth that I had amassed has been entirely expended. If I had money at command I would still, perhaps, bring about my heart's desire. Alas! that I am destitute. Do not you grieve—a better state of things is now in progress. I keep a careful eye upon you. Be happy and contented—we shall still attain the objects of which we have been disappointed. I cannot send you particulars as I could wish, the road is full of danger. Let this be a token that you were sitting with me one evening when I gave you a shawl, and said, I know the character of these men, they have always acted in this manner. There is much to communicate,—if matters should turn out happily, and according to my heart's desire, you will know all very soon. Send back the bearer with an answer speedily—do not delay him.

(True translation.)

(Signed) H. C. Rawlinson,
Political Agent.

Candahar, March 14, 1842.

After England had joined him, Nott sent off to the officer commanding at Quettah, desiring him to forward to Candahar all the camels that could possibly be collected, under an escort of 800 men, and to garrison the fort at Killah Abdoollah for one month. On the same day the General directed Colonel Wymer to march to Khelat-i-Ghilzie to bring away the garrison. The force sent with Wymer was considerable, for the General had ascertained that 5,000 Ghilzies had surrounded Khelat, and stout opposition was therefore expected. It was on the 19th of May that Wymer marched to the rescue;* but before he could reach

* How eagerly Nott seized upon every opportunity of rendering justice to the sepoys is markedly evident in the letter to his daughters of the 22nd of May.

"I have sent a force under Wymer of four infantry regiments, some cavalry, and two batteries of Bombay artillery. There are said to be 6,000 Ghilzies assembled. If Wymer meets them, have I any fears of the result? *None!* I sit writing here in full confidence that if he is at this moment engaged, my beautiful, my *noble* regiments will give them a good licking; but they *will not* face them. I tell you I never saw troops in such high trim, full of zeal, in high spirits—cheerful, laughing dogs. Looking at them the last time I was in the field with them, believe me, I felt the tear of joy and pride dim my eye. And these are the men whom it has become the fashion to reflect upon! that *they cannot* face the Affghans! Not face the Affghans, indeed! Why, I am now about sending to Government, begging a reward for a Subadar of the 43rd Regiment, who, some time back, at the head of only 40 of these abused sepoys, formed his *tiny* square, and beat off upwards of 400 Affghan horsemen, though they charged his square three or four different times. This he did, and brought off safely the camels he had in charge, as well as the arms and clothing of his comrades who fell. Yet even the Press whine forth 'the sepoys cannot

Khelat-i-Ghilzie, the gallant garrison under Captain Craigie had achieved its own deliverance. Rather more than a month previously the garrison of Jellalabad had in a similar manner released itself from the presence of an enemy. The failure of Colonel Wild to relieve Sir Robert Sale had rejoiced the Affghan camp, and Mohamed Ackbar Khan fired a salute in celebration of the event. Sale, construing the *disaster* into a defeat of Pollock's force, resolved on a sortie as the only means of getting rid of the presence of the enemy; and this was effected in so spirited a manner that they experienced no further annoyance. The whole story has been so admirably told by Kaye, Gleig, and other writers, that this passing reference to the "illustrious garrison" of Jellalabad will suffice.

The defence of Khelat-i-Ghilzie was a very gallant affair. The brief despatch of Captain Craigie merely described the assault and its repulse; but the history of the operations of the garrison, from the time when the place was, in a measure, invested by the Ghilzies, is too interesting to be passed over. It will be found in the Appendix. Captain Craigie described the attack as

cope with Affghans. They cannot bear the cold, and we want more Europeans.' *We want better officers!* Men of all countries have died, and will die from the effects of severe cold; but, strange as it may appear, I have it in my power to *prove* that the *Bengal* sepoys *did* bear the cold better than Europeans, that there was a greater proportion of deaths from cold among the Europeans than among the sepoys, although the sepoys stood sentry day and night, in frost and snow, while the European was snug in his barrack!"

having taken place on the morning of the 21st of May, at a quarter before four o'clock. He wrote:

"The enemy advanced to the assault (of a long neck of the fortress and an outwork) in the most determined manner, each column consisting of upwards of 2,000 men, provided with thirty scaling ladders; but after an hour's fighting were repulsed and driven down the hill, losing five standards (one of which was planted three times in one of the enclosures), and the whole of which are now in our possession. Of the enemy's loss I am unable to give any correct account, as their killed and wounded, during the greater part of the attack, were immediately taken to the rear; but 104 dead bodies were left on the slope of the hill, and from 6 A.M. till 3 P.M. the enemy were employed in carrying off such of their dead and wounded as had been taken to the rear. The greatest gallantry and coolness were displayed by every commissioned, non-commissioned officer, and private (both European and Native) engaged in meeting the attack of the enemy, several of whom were bayoneted on the top of the sand bags, forming our side. I am happy to say only six sepoys were wounded—viz., two of the detachment of the 43rd N.I. and four of the 3rd Infantry. A body of about 300 of the enemy, when driven back, took shelter under the rocks below the outwork, but were immediately dislodged by a company of the 3rd Infantry, which I detached for that purpose."

The Government at a later period rewarded the

heroism and constancy displayed by the defence, by incorporating the Shah's regiment into the Indian army by the title of the Regiment of Khelat-i-Ghilzie.

As a contrast to these successes, Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer had surrendered the fortress of Ghuzni to the Affghans, under circumstances which, if they did not justify the procedure in the eyes of rigid soldiers, must appear a sufficient palliation and excuse to the world at large. On the 20th of November (1841) the town was surrounded by the Ghazees, a peculiarly savage tribe, and the ground was covered with snow. "The enemy and the snow came together." The news of Colonel Maclaren having left Candahar to relieve Ghuzni caused the enemy to break up their encampment, and advantage was taken of their departure to destroy the villages and buildings near the fort, which gave cover to a beleaguering force; but on the 7th of December the enemy returned, and in a week from that date contrived to get into Ghuzni by thousands through a hole dug in the wall by the people of the town, their confidants. The detachment was then compelled to take to the citadel, after fighting for a day and night. The weather now set in with unusual severity, and told fearfully upon the men; and, to add to their sufferings, provisions fell so short that all hands were reduced to half rations of bad flour and raw grain; on alternate days, with a seer (half a pound) of wood per man each day, either for cooking or warmth. Yet it was necessary to be constantly on the watch; eight hours a day

was the allotted portion of vigilance to each man and officer. This soon wore out the sepoys, who went into hospital in numbers with ulcerated feet from frost bites, the thermometer having fallen by Christmas day to *fourteen degrees below zero.* The enemy in the meantime continued to fire upon the garrison, picking off four men per day if they showed themselves above the walls. At length a truce was established with the enemy, and Colonel Palmer agreed to evacuate the place on the arrival of a Chief who was to assume the Government. He arrived in the middle of February. Colonel Palmer, hoping for the arrival of reinforcements, contrived to keep him in play till the beginning of March, when the Chief and his followers assumed a menacing attitude; and the provisions of the unfortunate garrison being exhausted, the snow, on which alone they depended for supplies of water, having disappeared, and no prospect presenting itself of the arrival of succour, Colonel Palmer and his detachment marched out of the citadel under the terms of a treaty which would have saved the honour, the arms, and the persons of the garrison, had the Ghazees been men of truth and probity. But the Ghazees thirsted for the blood of the infidels; they attacked them as soon as they emerged from the citadel, and it required all the efforts of the Chiefs to restrain their savage fury. Many of the sepoys were killed, and several of the officers wounded. In despair a number of the sepoys afterwards deserted, hoping to make their way to Peshawur, which they never reached, while the

officers were ultimately imprisoned, most cruelly treated, and finally marched to Caubul. The story of their sufferings was only second in its tragical features to the melancholy tale of the Caubul treachery and massacre. It is given in greater detail in the Appendix.

Amongst the papers which reached General Nott from Colonel Palmer at different times was the treaty entered into with the Chiefs, and Colonel Palmer's own observations on the management of the British affairs in Affghanistan.

Stipulations of Treaty between Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer and Sirdar Shamso Deen Khan, Naib Rohoollah Khan, and other Ghazee Chiefs, dated 21st February, 1842.

ARTICLE 1.

On the part of Lt.-Col. Palmer.	On the part of Sirdars.
That the garrison will evacuate the fortress of Ghuznee in ten days on the following terms.	Five days allowed to remove baggage, the garrison to evacuate on sixth day. Coolies to be furnished to remove baggage.

ARTICLE 2.

That the lower fort remain in our possession, and from the Cabool gate to the large Masjid and Abdool Hug's Well of the city, the houses shall be emptied for our accommodation, and no Affghans allowed to come into that quarter; to prevent which	Occupying the lower fort not agreed to; recommend both parties being distinct and separate. The European officers to occupy Mahmood Khan's house, and the men that part of the town stipulated. Declare themselves most

parties of Jezailchees to be placed at the above Musjids. This arrangement to last till the snow melted.

solicitous for the preservation of our lives and property.

ARTICLE 3.

That treasure, arms, and ammunition, food, and tents in our possession be taken to the town, but on marching for India to leave all behind except arms, ammunition, and tents required.

Agreed that each man take his musket and 100 rounds of ammunition, also food for several days, and tents;—but the treasure, *spare* arms, ammunition, and tents to be left in the citadel.

ARTICLE 4.

That a party of Jezailchees under a Jemadar be stationed at large Musjid to prevent our men being molested on the day of evacuation.

About 200 men to be stationed for the purpose.

ARTICLE 5.

That supplies be furnished until our departure, we paying for the same.

Agreed to unconditionally.

ARTICLE 6.

The Cabool gate to be occupied by us. The water-course outside it and all the wells in the quarter of the city assigned us to be opened. No Ghazees to approach that portion of town, and our Mussulmen, if necessary, permitted to draw water from well under the Bala Hissar.

Agreed to, except opening the water-course outside Cabool gate, which could not be done on account of snow and ice.

ARTICLE 7.

The Ghazee Chiefs to ascertain the sum required by their men. All of them to quit the city for their homes five days before the going down of the garrison, giving a sealed agreement of their satisfaction before departure.

The Reizunamah of the Ghazees produced by the Chiefs, in whose hands they had left the settlement of the matter. They, themselves, would be dismissed, as the Sirdars were most anxious for our welfare.

ARTICLE 8.

That Naib Rohoolla Khan, Mirza, Malik Mahommud, and Abram Khan, with 800 horse and footmen, should form our escort on departure.

Agreed to unconditionally.

ARTICLE 9.

That as much carriage as required be provided us. Meer Alum Sohanee to be paid the hire at Peshawur.

Carriage to be furnished to Kabul, we paying for the same.

ARTICLE 10.

That on our departure, each man to carry only four rupees, all in excess to be deposited here. M. M. M. to be paid in advance for articles of food on road to Kabul.

Agreed to unconditionally.

ARTICLE 11.

That Naib Rohoolla Khan convey us viâ Shogur and Koord Kabul, or other road

Going to Peshawur viâ Shogur was the pleasure of the King and Wuzeer Nizam oo

direct to Peshawur, avoiding the capital, and forward information and our letters to the English officers at Kabul, to obtain permission for the purpose, and have carriage sent to Shogur.

doula, and the Chiefs here could not agree to it, but they swore by the grace of God to see us conveyed in safety home, and security to the capital, and leave us there in the hands of the King and Minister, who would decide the rest.

ARTICLE 12.

M. M. M. to take charge of our sick and wounded in his fort, as we should then be assured of their being taken care of.

Whatever Colonel Palmer wished regarding sick and wounded should be done. If left behind they would be taken care of, and carriage procured for their following us afterwards.

ARTICLE 13.

That the Chiefs swear solemnly on the Koran for the due observance of these articles in presence of Munshee Wuller oollah, Futtijah Khan, Mummoo Khan, being persons confided in by us.

Agreed to, and the treaty sworn to in presence of the parties mentioned.

ARTICLE 14.

That if the garrison were conveyed in security, honour, and safety to Peshawur, we promise to pay 40,000 rupees from the treasury there, and to obtain more if possible from our Government.

The Chiefs could not convey us farther than Kabul.

ADDITIONAL ARTICLE BY THE CHIEFS.

On the day of the evacuation of the Bala Hissar, as well as during the stay in the town, the garrison shall be protected in the name of God, and shall be conveyed, by the grace of God, to the capital with honour and safety.

This is the reply—

If either Captain Burnett, Captain Alston, or Lieutenant Harris are given over to the Chiefs to take care of, it will be agreeable to the Chiefs, Sirdar and Naib, as an earnest of the intention to evacuate the citadel, and on the day Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer leaves it, Lieutenant Harris shall be sent back, and all shall be well. Agreed to, Lieutenant Harris given as hostage on the 28th February, 1842.

Solemnly sworn to, the Sirdars placing their hands on the Koran, in presence of Wulee Polah, Rajah Munshee, Futtijah Khan, Resaidar, and Mummoo Khan, Rajah Tindal.

Sealed with the seals of Shumsudeen Khan, Roohoolah Khan, and said T. Palmer, Lieutenant-Colonel, Political Agent, and Commanding at Ghuznee.

(Signed)

J. S. Alston.

Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer's observations, to which reference is made above, ran as follows. They were written several months subsequent to the treaty, when the Lieutenant-Colonel believed that the destruction of himself and party was meditated.

Dread of the Press lost us Affghanistan in the winter of 1841, for to no other cause can the puerile and temporising measures of Sir W. Macnaghten be attributed, if the country

is again invaded, and you again fear to disarm the population, to execute the rebels, to destroy the fortified habitations of individuals, and to curtail the influence of the Mullahs, rest assured revolt will again take place, and Britain not only lose a large portion of the troops, but be again held up in derision to Asia and Europe. Affghanistan must be ruled by the sword, and stern, even-handed justice will save the blood of thousands, but should the succeeding Government follow the steps of Sir W. Macnaghten, and fear to adopt extreme measures against traitors and rebels, the same scenes of treason, perfidy, and massacre will recur, and these infidels again laugh at our weakness and ignorance as to governing a nation who consider it honourable and praiseworthy to deceive and break faith with those of another creed. Under the orders of Sir William, and official directions from General Elphinstone and Major Pottinger, I made over this fort of Ghuzni to Nuwab Shumsodeen Khan and Naib Rohillah Khan on the 6th day of March, 1842, having made a solemn treaty for our honourable treatment while at Ghuzni, and safe escort to Cabool, after winter. On the 8th they opened the guns on us at one hundred yards distance, leaving no chance of assistance, and being totally without water for six days. I, at the wish of all the other officers, surrendered with about 450 men, on the 18th March, 1842. We (the officers) surrendered under a second treaty, signed by thirteen of the Ghuzni Chiefs, swearing they would escort men and officers in safety to the lower fort, there to reside. This treaty was also perfidiously broken, the officers were separated from the men on the night of the 10th, made prisoners in the Bala Hissur, under the Nuwab, the men were deprived of their arms, stript of their clothes, and taken by the several tribes into slavery. We have heard nothing of them since. We heard on the 2nd of August that we were to be conveyed to Cabool on camels, in the Kujawahs used by women, in two or three days, under

escort of his brother, Nuzur Khan. This, I doubt not, is with a view to convey us to some other place of confinement, or possibly to have us made away with, and the disguise adopted, to pretend that the Ghazees killed us, notwithstanding his trying every precaution to secrete and defend us. If we are not forthcoming, we are murdered by his own special order, and the story he tells of us is as false as hell. Avenge our blood in every member of his family.

T. PALMER,
Lieut.-Colonel commanding.

Ghuzni, 4th August, 1842.

CHAPTER II.

LORD ELLENBOROUGH ADHERES TO HIS RESOLUTION TO WITHDRAW THE ARMIES—OPINIONS OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY OFFICERS —NOTT ATTACKS AKTAR KHAN ON THE URGUNDAB—DESTRUCTION OF FORTRESSES BY COLONEL WYMER—NOTT'S INDIGNATION AT THE WITHDRAWAL RESOLUTION — MURDER OF SHAH SOOJAH— CORRESPONDENCE THEREON—SHAWL AND SEEBEE GIVEN OVER TO THE KHAN OF KHELAT.

LORD ELLENBOROUGH continued for a long time steadfast to his resolution to withdraw the troops as soon as the season should admit of the retrogression. His Lordship's instructions to Nott and Pollock referred simply to the retirement of the garrisons from the outposts and smaller fortresses, the dismantling the works, and the removal of the guns. The improvement of General Nott's position, by the accession of General England's force of 2,500 men, and the treasure, carriage, and supplies, did not seem to the Governor General to furnish any reason for varying the instructions of the 19th of April. Shah Soojah had

been murdered, and the country was divided; but Lord Ellenborough obdurately refused to recognise any one as the new Sovereign. The evacuation of Affghanistan was with him a fixed idea; neither entreaty nor remonstrance seemed to exercise the least influence upon his determination. The events in Jellallabad and the Khyber "in no respect changed his views of the policy to be pursued."

A totally different notion of the duty of the Government and the obligations of honour was taken by all the political officers, and the whole of the army, if a judgment may be formed from the masses of private correspondence which passed through Nott's hands at this time, and the opinions expressed by the greater portion of the Indian Press. It was customary with the politicals in Affghanistan, Scinde, and Peshawur, to correspond very freely, and copies of these letters to each other were invariably transmitted to General Nott; for such was the uncertainty of the dawk communications, that it was only by seizing upon every syllable of every letter that came in his way that anything like a connected and coherent chain of information was obtained by the General. Thus we find Lawrence's letters to Hammersley, Sir Richmond Shakspeare's to Outram, Clerk's to Rawlinson, Macgregor's to Mackeson, and so forth, all finding their way, at some time or other, into Nott's custody. The uniformity of their tone, in regard to the intended retreat, was striking. A few instances may be quoted to the honour of the writers.

Sir R. Shakspeare to Mr T. H. Maddock.

Most cordially do I agree with you in thinking that a retreat *now* would be ruinous. We may try to disguise the matter, but there is no concealing from Asia that our leaving our hostages and our guns is disgraceful * * * To me it appears evident that such a measure would at once cost us the respect and high estimation which we have hitherto enjoyed, and which has certainly gone far to maintain our supremacy in India. To avoid a step so certainly ruinous, would assuredly justify Government in running a considerable risk; and to incur such disgrace without making an effort to escape from it, would be to deserve all the ruin that would befal us * * *

Colonel Sutherland, the British Resident at Ajmeer (one of the most brilliant officers in the Indian Army, a protégé and friend of Elphinstone, Malcolm, and Metcalf), to Major Outram.

If we do anything less than make a triumphant march through Affghanistan, in at one end and out at the other, I shall be bitterly disappointed. I care not whether it is done by General Pollock's or General Nott's forces, or by both. Nothing less than this will satisfy the people of Central Asia and of India that we have the power and means of re-establishing our tarnished honour; and if we retire from our position without this exhibition, we do indeed throw up the cards with the game in our hands.

That is a fine soldier-like letter of Nott's (to General England), and I am most happy to find he turns out a trump.

Colonel (now Sir H. M.) Lawrence to Major Outram.

I lose not a moment in sending you *the best news we have had for many* a day. General Pollock says he will not retire for five months, unless positively ordered.

The sentiments of Outram have been given in a previous chapter. They were continually iterated in all his public and private letters.

Major-General Pollock to Mr. Maddock, Secretary to Government, May 13, 1842.

With regard to our withdrawal at the present moment, I fear it would have the very worst effect; it would be construed into a defeat, and our character as a powerful nation would be entirely lost in this part of the world. It is true that the garrison of Jellallabad has been saved, which it could not have been had a force not been sent to its relief; but the relief of that garrison is only one object, there still remain others which we cannot disregard. I allude to the release of the prisoners.

Fifty similar extracts might be given from the correspondence in the possession of General Nott's family.

But though Lord Ellenborough, for all that appeared to the contrary, did not contemplate a march through Affghanistan, he was by no means sluggish in the direction of measures calculated, as he supposed, to give temporary strength to the Generals, and to maintain their position intact. The observations which had been

made in public upon the conduct of the young political officers had their influence upon his mind. With a stroke of the pen he reduced the number of assistants very materially. He considered their political designation to be inappropriate to the functions they had to perform, and encouraged the entertaining of undue pretensions not advantageous to the public service; and holding these opinions, he reduced their emoluments to an equivalent to the military pay and allowances of regimental officers. In regard to the secresy with which he was anxious that all business should be conducted Lord Ellenborough expressed himself most strongly, as the note in the foregoing chapter demonstrates.

Towards the close of May advices were received from England of the feeling which had been created by the news of the Caubul massacre, and the evident resolution of the ministry. Upon this, new and ardent hopes were excited that Lord Ellenborough would direct an advance upon Caubul or Ghuzni. The Generals panted for the signal; every man in the camps was eager for the fray. The Governor-General had moved to Allahabad to be still nearer the scene of operations: every act was converted into an augury of a more active policy. But no; the "withdrawal" remained uppermost in his Lordship's mind. On the 1st of June, he expressed an opinion that Major-General Pollock might, *while waiting for carriage to effect his retrograde movement*, send out a force to draw the enemy into a position to

receive a blow, or *chappaó* over the Caubul River for the purpose of bringing in prisoners of importance, who might be used in exchange. But nothing indicated the least wish on Lord Ellenborough's part that the armies should advance on Caubul. The month of October was fixed upon as the date of the retirement from Affghanistan both of Nott and Pollock's forces.

Nevertheless, there were officers who could not, after some reflection, divest themselves of the idea that Lord Ellenborough really intended to make a grand demonstration in Central Asia, to which his present measures were merely preparatory. They considered that it was his Lordship's purpose to have the troops well placed and well provided in the first instance; and by recoiling before he made the blow, to render it the more terribly effective. Outram and Hammersley, to judge from their private letters, seemed to hold this opinion.*

* It would appear from what Lawrence has heard of General Pollock's instructions, that they must be very much to the same effect as what you received, and evidently caused by Lord Ellenborough's fears that you are not strong enough now to carry out our objects, and that your advanced positions of Candahar and Khelat-i-Ghilzie would be untenable during winter; but from the circumstance of the defences of these places being ordered to be destroyed, and large reinforcements of cavalry being announced as about to be sent to you at a fitting season, it is evident that his Lordship intends to prosecute the campaign hereafter, when the reinforcements from Europe arrive; but I still hope that late favourable events in Affghanistan, which I presume will be strongly represented to his Lordship by General Pollock as well as his and your assurances, that you can do what is wanted; and the determination expressed by the Home Ministry may

We shall see hereafter how far their surmise was the correct one.

Notwithstanding the repeated thrashings which Nott had inflicted upon the Dooranees, they would not allow him to remain unmolested in his castle. When Wymer had proceeded with a large portion of the force and nearly the whole of the cavalry of the army of Candahar to support Khelat-i-Ghilzie, Ackter Khan, the Chief of Zemindaur, assembled 3,000 men, and joined the rebel force under Prince Sufter Jung and Atta Mahomed on the right bank of the Urgundab. They took pos-

induce Lord Ellenborough to allow you to exercise your own discretion as to whether or not to allow you to prosecute the campaign at once, or to hold on your present position.—*Major Outram to General Nott. Sukkur, 25th of May,* 1842.

It is evident to me that Lord Ellenborough's object in withdrawing to Peshawur and Quettah was merely that our armies might be safe and easily communicated with during the period that would elapse ere reinforcements from England should enable us to enter on the campaign in overpowering force, being impressed with an exaggerated notion of the powers of the enemy, and nature of the obstacles to be overcome, which he did not think the troops now in Affghanistan equal to.

From the determination shown by the English Ministry, we may now rest satisfied, I think, that the last mail brought such instructions to Lord Ellenborough as must insure the prosecution of the campaign ultimately, if not this season; and we may be equally sure that his Lordship will attend to the wishes expressed by General Pollock to move on to Gundamuck rather than retrograde to Peshawur, in the meantime, in which case he will of course approve of General Nott holding all his present positions.

I care not for the campaign being deferred for a while, so long as we do not bate an inch of what we now hold in the meantime.—*Major Outram to Lieutenant Hammersley, 26th of May.*

session of some steep rocky hills, within a mile of the city walls, and assumed a menacing attitude. Nott instantly moved out with a part of the garrison, leaving General England to command the town. He found the Ghazees in possession of the Babawullee Pass, and the roads leading to their camp. He attacked them vigorously, "carried all their positions in gallant style, and drove them in confusion, and with great loss, across the Urgundab River." In Nott's despatch (29th of May, 1842), he makes honourable mention of Brigadier Stacey and Major Rawlinson, the latter of whom gallantly led a small body of Persian and Affghan Horse to the charge.

In fulfilment of his orders to destroy the forts in his neighbourhood, Nott gave a sort of roving commission to Colonel Wymer, who, after his return from Khelat-i-Ghilzie, looked in upon the nests of robbers abounding in the district, routed them out and extinguished their villainous abodes. Wymer, a most excellent officer, carefully attended to the General's instructions for the maintenance of discipline and the avoidance of plunder.

Lord Ellenborough watched the course of events at Candahar with much interest, and it is pleasant to observe at how early a period of his assumption of the Government, he began to correspond freely with Nott *de omnibus rebus.*

Allahabad, June 21, 1842.

GENERAL,

I have heard with great pleasure of the constant success of your troops in the several actions in which they were engaged towards the end of last month.

The resolution exhibited in the defence of Kelat-i-Ghilzie was very gratifying.

I am looking forward with interest to the account, which I hope I shall soon receive, of the evacuation of that place, and of the return of the garrison, together with Colonel Wymer's detachment, to your head-quarters.

From the decided course which has been taken by the Russian Minister at Teheran, in conjunction with the British Minister there, I am disposed to think that you will not be troubled with any demonstration of a hostile character from the side of Herat.

There is no account, on which any reliance can be placed, of the circumstances under which, at Ghuznee, six officers remain alive, and all the soldiers have been destroyed, or carried away as slaves. I should be obliged to you, if you could inform me how that event took place.

I feel great commiseration for the soldiers, if any such there be, who have been carried away as slaves, and I should wish to have any particulars you may be able to procure with respect to them.

Whenever you retire upon the Indus, some portion of the Bengal rtoops will remain at Sukkur, and there may possibly be occasion to employ two brigades against the Ameers of Hyderabad, unless their conduct should be more loyal than it is represented to have been of late.

Curachee will continue to be occupied by Bombay troops. An army of reserve, of 15,000 men, will be assembled in the Sirhind Division in November. It will be necessary to strengthen the force in Bundlecund by two Regiments of

Infantry, and one of Irregular Cavalry, with guns. An additional Regiment will be wanted in the Ganges Division; and there will, in all probability, be a moveable force on the Taptee.

These arrangements may render unnecessary the formation of a Corps at Segowlee. Six Regiments of Queen's Infantry, each 1,000 strong, and a Regiment of Queen's Cavalry, are already far advanced towards the Cape, and three more Regiments of Queen's Infantry are at the disposal of the Indian Government.

The whole of the expedition to China had left Singapore by the 24th ult.: 5,000 Native Infantry, 1,500 Queen's Infantry, and a very large force of artillery, &c.

I have the honour to remain,
General,
Your very faithful servant,
ELLENBOROUGH.

His Excellency Major-General Nott,
Candahar.

The conduct of the sepoys, in the affair with Ackter Khan and Sufter Jung, gave the General another of those opportunities, in which he so much delighted, of saying a word in their favour. Still burning with indignation that he was not to move through Affghanistan, he wrote early in June to the Misses Nott:

I received an *order* from the Supreme Government months ago to fall back. I did not do so, and laid hold of an "*if*" in the letter as my excuse—but now—what now? Well, never mind, murder will out. The keen wind blowing over the bleached bones of our comrades, now in heaps on the

rugged Affghan mountains, will whistle the imbecility and infamy of some high functionaries over Asia, and the thousand petty states, that *did* tremble even at the noble lion's *breathing,* will in future crow in *derision* if he attempt to roar. And now, just like Englishmen, the cry is "sepoys cannot stand Affghans." Not stand Affghans, indeed! 1,000 sepoys, properly managed, will always beat 10,000 Affghans. I saw them do this on the 29th of last month.

Nott in this and all previous letters referred only to the Bengal sepoys. He had never had any Bombay sepoys with him. Hammersley, his *quondam* aide-de-camp, who had been most unjustly removed from his political office in Shawl, referring to the action of the 29th, takes an opportunity of speaking of the "ducks" (as the Bombay people are called), and of paying a just compliment to the General.

I wish you had some of the Bombay sepoys out on that occasion, as they have an idea that you hold them back owing to the reverse at Hykulzye. Depend upon it they only want a proper commander, and an enemy in front, to give the lie to anything which may have been uttered to their prejudice: and by giving them an opportunity of distinguishing themselves you will give the whole race of "ducks" a high opinion of you as a General, and show the world that in the hands of an able workman the tools are well up to their work.

Nearly a month later than the date of the foregoing the General finds another opportunity of writing to his

daughters; and here his anger, at the prolonged inaction of his fine army when so much was in its hands, finds vent.

We are all quiet here at present, and rebellion hath disappeared; yet there are some Chiefs abroad, but they have no followers, and they have offered to come in; but they did dip their hands in my soldiers' blood, and therefore I will never receive them. I last evening received a letter from Pollock, across the mountains. Had not the Governor-General bound me hand and foot, I should now have been in Caubul, without asking for the aid of Pollock. The game was in our hands, and we would not take it. Pollock ought to have marched sharply upon Caubul; had he done so, not a shot would have been fired. Mark me, my children, had I been in his place, with that beautiful army, I would have struck such a blow that the whole world should have rung with it. I am ordered not to do anything. Well, our nation is disgraced. How strange that Englishmen should be so paralyzed!

Pollock's army was not necessary. The troops under my command would have taken Ghuzni, and destroyed the Bala Hissar at Caubul. I told Lord Auckland so in December last; but what is the good of talking of it? I begin to be ashamed of looking an Affghan in the face. I am ordered to *sneak* away, though with my beautiful regiments I could plant the British banner on the banks of the Caspian. I have been unwell, and am still weak; enough to make me, I think, when I see Old England so disgraced. Well, I will bring my army safe off, and then farewell to a red coat. They have behaved most shamefully to me, in not publishing any of my despatches, especially that of the

12th of January, wherein I told them that my noble regiments had defeated 20,000 men. Mark me, the army at Candahar has defeated the enemy in some *sixteen* actions, tranquillized the whole country, made every Affghan bend the knee, never met with reverse, however outnumbered by the enemy—and *no* notice has been taken of it.

From what appears in later letters from Major Outram, it is clear that the despatches had been intercepted by the marauders. They had never been seen *en route*, and Outram justly concludes that if they had come to hand the Government would have published them.

"I have little doubt," says he, "that Lord Ellenborough would be too glad to grace his Gazettes by every military triumph he can lay his hands on; and if you would afford him the opportunity by sending a duplicate of the despatch, together with a detail of all the operations of the army under your command since then, I am very sure the whole would be published with due acknowledgment, and the causes of delay explained."

Outram was quite right in his conjecture.

While Nott was steadily holding his ground at Candahar another act of the Caubul tragedy was performing. The wretched King, Shah Soojah, had been murdered by his own people. The facts have been frequently detailed in the unvarnished form of a European narrative. It will diversify the page of history if an Oriental is here suffered to tell the tale.

(No. 1.)

Translation of a Letter from Koorban Alee Khan Kirmanee to Mahomed Alta Yroz Bashee, dated the 28th of Sufar, corresponding with the 9th of April, Cabool.

After the usual complimentary exordium, the letter proceeds:—

I duly received and understood the contents of the letter you sent me by Taj Khan on the 5th Sufar, and was happy to hear you are all well. I will now give you a short sketch of events in this quarter. On the 22nd of Sufar (3d April) the King had made all his preparations to start for Jellalabad. On that night Taj Khan and the Naib (Umeen Oollah) were dining with me. Taj Khan went away after dinner, and the Naib remained. In the morning I had just finished my prayers, when they brought us word that the King had been killed. I went out to learn particulars, and found that the King had come into the Bala Hissar to sleep the night previously. That Shuja ood Dowla Khan, the son of the Newab (Zuman Khan) had, without his father's knowledge, placed some men on the look-out, close to the gate, while he himself remained with his party in ambush on the road. At the earliest dawn of day the King came out of the Bala Hissar in his litter, with but five or six attendants besides his bearers. The spies at the gate sent on word to the Newab's son, who came down upon the King, and, to make a long story short, they killed him. The Prince Futteh Jung was sleeping in Ahmed Khan's fort, and had mounted in the morning to come and meet his father. The intelligence reached him on the road, and Hyder Khan, who was with the Prince, immediately carried him off to the fort of his father, Mahomed Khan Bizet. The Newab sent his own men and Jazailchees to the fort to demand the Prince's person. Mahomed Khan, however, positively refused to give him up, and conveyed him in safety to the Bala Hissar. The

next day Ameen Oollah Khan and the Populzies placed him on the throne. The Kuzzilbashees and the Caboolees agreed together, and said to the other tribes, We have nothing to do with either of you; do not uselessly set the whole city by the ears. At last the following terms were agreed to:—"That the Newab and his party should go to Jellalabad, and the Dooranees to Candahar, when, if God granted a happy termination to the Feringhee business, they could take into consideration the most eligible person to be elected as King, and they would all abide by the general choice." Having arranged this, they read the "Fatiheh" over the King's body, and on Thursday the "advance tents" were sent outside the city. In four days after that the fugitives came flocking in from Jellalabad, reporting that Mahomed Ackber Khan's force had been entirely defeated, and that the Sirdar himself had fled to Lughman. They gave the following account of the affair:—"When the intelligence of the King's death reached Mahomed Ackber's camp, a division took place among the Chiefs. Several of these Chiefs, among whom were Abdool Mahomed Khan and Khalig Khan, sent to the English, to say, 'the rest of our party are off their guard, come and take advantage of it, and we will assist you.' The English did so, coming out on Thursday morning, the 25th, with all their Infantry and guns, and without allowing Mahomed Ackber time to collect his followers, attacked him in his camp, and entirely dispersed his forces. The Cabool Horse came up at once to the capital, and the others were dispersed, every man, to his home; the Sirdar made the best of his way to Lughman." The intelligence from the Khyber is as follows:—"Sooltan Ahmed Khan, with his followers, had taken up a position at Jubbukee (in the pass between Jumrood and *Ali Masjid*). The Englishman Pollock attacked him there, forced him from his position, and drove him to *Ali Masjid*, to which place he has pursued him. It remains to be seen whether Sooltan Khan

can hold *Ali Masjid* or not. If the English troops once pass *Ali Masjid*, we have nothing to look to but the grace of God. As He wills it, so will it be." For my own part I was always averse to what has happened; but who would attend to me? As matters stand now, nothing remains to me but patiently to await my fate. I have no place to flee to, and no face to remain here. The evils we have done to the English, and for which they will call us to account, are beyond all limit. We have not even spared their Mussulmans. Many of their Syuds and Mussulmans cried for mercy, and repeated the "Kalima." The Affghans said, "If you brought a camel laden with 'Kalimas' we would not spare you"—they were thus all killed. God grant that they (the English) should never be in a position to retaliate, for if they do get the upper hand, they will revenge on us tenfold the injuries they have suffered at our hands.

(No. 2.)

From the same to the same, dated Cabool, the 2d Rabee ool Uwal, corresponding with April 13th.

I have received your letter of the 20th Sufar (1st of April), and am glad to find you have escaped all dangers, and are still in health. May God watch over and protect you! I have before written you full particulars regarding the murder of the King, and the dispersion of Mahomed Ackber's force. My letter I hope safely reached you. The news up till to-day is as follows:—Prince Futteh Jung has been placed on the throne, and is daily increasing in strength and power; the Newab remains in his own house, and both parties have agreed to go down to Jellalabad. Having written thus far, I hear a salute from Mahomed Zumeen's house, and sending down to inquire the reason, the following news is brought me:—The English troops who came into the Khyber have

been defeated, and have retreated from *Ali Masjid;* Macgregor left Jellalabad, and embarked on a raft to go down to Peshawur; the boatmen sank the raft and drowned him. Mahomed Ackber finding Jellalabad empty, came from *Lughman* and took possession. We shall see if this turns out true or not. Up till yesterday the Chiefs of the "Gholam Khaneh" had been in the habit of attending the Newab's house, with the exception of Khan Shereen Khan, who from the commencement is the friend of Naib Umeen Oollah, adhered to the Prince. Yesterday the whole of the "Gholam Khaneh" attended Durbar, and made their salam to Futteh Shah (Futteh Jung). He gave them all "Kheluts," and promised them six months' pay ready money. He also encouraged them to stand by him, saying that he would always pay a due regard to their interests.

(True translation.) H. Rawlinson,
Political Agent.

(No. 3.)

From his Royal Highness Prince Sufter Jung to Major Rawlinson.

My Friend,

What can I write, or what can I say, now that the dreadful news of the King's death has reached me? His Majesty duly kept faith with you till his last hour—it was on this account that the misbegotten son of a dog Mahomed Zumeen perpetrated the foul deed which has ruined my family. This is no time for grief—we should know no other feeling than a bold determination to avenge the King's blood—at present my own blood is in such a ferment that I can think of nothing else but of the best means to obtain this vengeance. Let bygones be bygones—I swear to God that while life is in my body I will attend to no other matter than this—I will either share my father's fate, or I will avenge his death. It has now

become more than ever incumbent on your Government to adopt the King's quarrel, since he has lost his life in consequence of his connexion with you. This business which has taken place has arisen solely from the discovery of the King's attachment to your Government owing to former kindnesses. You ought now to make common cause with us, and let us go hand in hand in avenging the King's death. Write whatever you consider for the benefit of your Government and for my advantage, and be assured that I shall follow your advice. You mentioned to Meer Abdul Hassan Khan that he must endeavour to bring me in. I have thought over the matter, and I see no advantage in this. If you have resolved to adopt the late Shah's quarrel, and make common cause with us in revenging his death, you must support me to the utmost, that I may be able to work both for your good and my own, and bring to a happy conclusion the object of your Government and my own personal desires.

The sequel to the murder is related in a letter from Futteh Jung to Sufter Jung.

Translation of a Letter from His Royal Highness Futteh Jung to his brother, Sufter Jung, received at Candahar, July 3rd, 1842.

Be it signified to my dearly beloved brother, Sufter Jung, that whereas, subsequently to the tragical end of our father, a fierce contest broke out between our party and the Mahommedzyes, I and my friends laboured to the best of our ability in supporting the dignity of our house.

It pleased God that we should be forced to retire into the Balla Hissar, and there stand a protracted siege, and you will have heard that I did my duty well in beating off repeated assaults and in holding out the place till the last. During the progress of these events the party of the Mahommedzyes

frequently wished to come to an accommodation, and at length having satisfied myself that Mahomed Akbar Khan was sincere in his professions of allegiance and service, with the consent and approval of the Chiefs of my own party, who judged that such an arrangement was best for the general interests, I accepted his tender of fealty and appointed him to the high and important post of Minister. Mahomed Akbar has now received from me full authority to direct and control the Government of Cabool, agreeably to certain stipulations and agreements that have been settled between us. He has pledged himself on all occasions to serve me faithfully and truly, and placing a full reliance in his sincerity, I have installed him as my most honoured and confidential officer. I trust by the blessing of God that he will duly observe his engagements, and from the uniform good faith which has characterised his conduct, as well as his general uprightness and honesty, I am disposed to believe that in future I shall find him one of my most trusty and valuable servants.

My dear brother, rest assured of my favour and affection for you. Be careful on no account to disperse your followers, but let them continue actively to prosecute the hostilities in which they have been heretofore engaged;—we urge upon you constant and unremitting warfare with our national enemies, and we engage, with all convenient speed, to support you with reinforcements of Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery, and we will also supply you with whatever ready money may be required for the pay of the troops and the maintenance of the Dooranee Ghazees. You must take care to give us full and frequent particulars of all events that are passing in your quarter.

Dated 1st Jumeid oos Uwal (corresponding with June 11).

(True translation)

H. Rawlinson,
Political Agent.

In a previous page allusion has been made to the treaty entered into with the Khan of Khelat. At this period, as circumstances had materially been changed by the death of Shah Soojah and the intention of the British to evacuate the country, Major Outram entered upon the question of the assignment of the Districts of Shawl and Seebee to Nusseer Khan. He accordingly addressed General Nott upon the subject, at the same time communicating with the Governor General. But as Nott was about to quit the South of Affghanistan he did not go into the matter with Outram, who was thus left to be guided by the decision of Lord Ellenborough. The letter of Outram to Nott, and of the Secretary to the General to Outram, will close the Khelat chapter of the Affghanistan history.

From Major Outram, Political Agent at Scinde and Belochistan, to Major-General Nott, commanding Lower Afghanistan and Scinde.

Quetta, 24th June, 1842.

SIR,

It having been intimated to me by the late Governor General, that I was at liberty to hold out to the Khan of Kelat the prospect of the districts of Shawl and Seebee being ultimately made over to him, I accordingly instructed Captain Pontardent to inform the Khan what was intended; who, in consequence, will expect to be placed in possession before we evacuate the country, but being of opinion that it would be more advantageous in every respect to carry the arrangement into effect now, than to wait till then, I write to ask your sanction to my making over the districts alluded to after the

present harvest has been gathered in, which will be completed here by about the end of this month, and at Seebee about the end of next.

It appears to me, that by now placing the territory in question in the Khan's hands, he will be enabled to secure their possession before the withdrawal of our troops, which, if delayed till that event, he might be unable to effect; and as I can see no advantage to us from holding them, further than merely continuing their general control as at present, but on his behalf, I think that in fairness to the Khan, we should now make them over, and during the remainder of our stay assist him in establishing his government.

Should any treaty be entered into with any of the Afghan Powers, I beg to suggest that the cession of Shawl and Seebee be formally stipulated; otherwise the Khan being in possession of those districts will be a plea for the Afghans making war on him, whom we are bound by treaty to protect against foreign enemies.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

J. OUTRAM,

Political Agent, Scinde and Belochistan.

P.S. Although the late Khan of Kelat was not possessed of Sebee at the time we took possession of the Khanate, and that district, though one in his possession, had generally continued an appanage of Candahar, still as the high road of the Afghans into Cutchee, which the fortress of Sebee commands, as well as being a check on the Hill tribes, who would otherwise find easy access to the plains of Cutchee, if backed by the Khan's enemies occupying that stronghold, and as a natural portion of Cutchee, of which it is a corner, I would most strongly recommend that it be not given up to the Dooranees on any consideration, who, if it were restored to

them, might there assemble their hordes without our having a plea to protest against their descending into the plains, and then could support themselves until a favourable opportunity offered for disturbing Scinde, supported, as they readily would be on such occasions, by the northern hill tribes.

J. OUTRAM,
Major.

From the Secretary to the Government of India, with the Governor General, to Major-General W. Nott, commanding Lower Afghanistan and Scinde.

Allahabad, 13th July, 1842.

(Secret Department.)

SIR,

The Governor General has had under his consideration the letter dated 24th June, No. 36 of 1842, addressed to you by Major Outram, with respect to the giving over of the district of Shawl to Meer Nusseer Khan, the Chief of Kelat.

2. It cannot have failed to occur to you that whatever may have been our views of policy with respect to the Chief of Kelat, while the Government of Shah Shooja, set up and maintained by our arms, existed in Afghanistan, those views may have been materially modified by events which have overthrown Shah Shooja, and leave not a hope to his family of repossessing the throne of Cabool.

3. By the first article of the treaty between the British Government and the Chief of Kelat, concluded on the 6th of October, 1841, that Chief acknowledges himself and his descendants to be the vassals of the King of Cabool, in like manner as his ancestors were formerly the vassals of his Majesty's ancestors.

4. By the law and custom of nations, Sovereigns, acknowledged by a people, claim and exercise all the rights which have been claimed and exercised by the Sovereigns of the

same people of a different family. We, at least, do not admit royalty to be altogether a personal and hereditary right, and whatever may be the house to which a King may belong, we deem him to be entitled to that which his predecessors rightfully enjoyed.

5. No engagement therefore could be more inconvenient to the British Government, or more entirely at variance with the object of the treaty with the Chief of Kelat, than one by which that Chief acknowledges his vassalage to the King of Cabool, at a time when it is most probable, that whoever may be made King of Cabool by the Afghans will be hostile to us, and when there cannot be on our part (as indeed there never has been) the design of forcing upon the Afghans a King, of whom they may disapprove.

6. To us, therefore, the most convenient arrangement would be the total abrogation of the treaty; nor, indeed, could it be otherwise to the Chief of Kelat, for if we are to remain bound to consider him as the vassal of any King of Cabool we cannot assist him, even by good offices, in any step he may take, clearly inconsistent with that acknowledged vassalage.

7. The engagement by which we are bound under the 7th article of the treaty, to afford the Chief of Kelat assistance, or good offices, as we may judge to be necessary or proper for the maintenance of his rights, is one into which it was superfluous to enter while Shah Shooja or his descendants, supported by us, were on the throne of Cabool, and which it is most unadvisable to preserve, when another family, with other feelings and policy, may be placed there.

8. When, upon the retirement of our armies to the left bank of the Indus, we shall resume the policy which had been followed from the commencement of our rule in India, and have no concern with the countries beyond that river; but desire to leave them as we heretofore have wisely done, to them-

selves, nothing could be productive of more serious embarrassment than a treaty with an insignificant Chief, which should apparently compel us, at an enormous cost, and in disregard of all higher interests, to maintain his supposed rights in a country where hardly any right can ever be properly said to exist but that of the strongest.

9. With respect to Shawl, we now hold that country by no right but that to which I have referred, the right of the strongest. Whenever we leave it, we in fact leave it to the first occupant. We may, if we can, afford facilities to Meer Nusseer Khan, whereby he may be such first occupant; but we can do no more. Rights we have none to transfer. The people reject us, and will probably reject him as our creature.

10. In India, guarantees of territory and promises of aid are lightly given. The more cautious policy of Europe avoids such restraints upon the future conduct of a State, and endeavours to leave it open at all times to Governments to take whatever course they may, under ever-changing circumstances, deemed most conducive to the interests of the nations they represent.

11. You are desired by the Governor General to place this letter in Major Outram's hands, and to direct him to act in conformity with the views of future policy it conveys.

12. You will instruct him to place in the strongest terms, before the Chief of Kelat, the embarrassment which may arise to him from our appearing to recognise by treaty his acknowledgment of his vassalage to the King of Cabool, and the little value to him of the stipulation in the 7th article, that we will, by assistance or good offices under certain circumstances, maintain his rights, when, of the relative rights of Sovereign and vassal, we are not, and cannot become, the arbiters.

13. It is much better for the Chief of Kelat, that we should

be perfectly free to regard him as a friend, and aid him whenever we can, in the character of an independent Prince, than that we should be bound by treaty to regard him as the vassal of the King of Cabool, be that King who he may.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) T. H. MADDOCK,
Secretary to the Government of India,
with the Governor General

CHAPTER III.

LORD ELLENBOROUGH'S WELCOME DESPATCH ARRIVES—NOTT'S REPLY—CORRESPONDENCE ON THE FUTURE MOVEMENTS—PRINCE TIMOUR SHAH PROPOSES TO SUCCEED TO THE AFGHAN THRONE IF SUPPORTED BY THE BRITISH, OR TO RETIRE TO INDIA.

THE month of July, 1842, was waning. Two more months were to be spent in dull inaction, and then the army was to beat a discreditable retreat. Pollock was stationary, Nott immoveable. The sanguinary Chief, Mahomed Ackbar Khan, held possession of Caubul, and revelled in his triumphs over British policy, and his possession of the captive English.

Further disgrace to the British name impended; despondency seized upon every soldier in the two camps: Lord Ellenborough remained silent.

The morning dawns upon the 22nd of July; Nott, an early riser, is taking his walk in front of his dwelling.

A cossid * arrives, his wallet is opened, and Nott discovers a package from the Governor General. He opens it listlessly. He anticipates an iteration of the previous orders to retire in October. A curl is on his lip. But his eye brightens as he proceeds with the perusal of the despatch. His lips become compressed. The Governor General, if he has not changed his plans, deems the time is come for a more open declaration of his belief in the feasibility of a movement upon Ghuzni and Caubul! Nott's heart swells—his pulse throbs—the long desired moment has arrived! Let us follow him in the perusal of the animating despatch.

* "Cossid," a native letter carrier. These men sometimes perform incredibly long journies in the shortest space of time imaginable. They are very trustworthy and faithful, and capable of any amount of exertion and endurance of fatigue. Their modes of conveying and concealing secret despatches are very extraordinary. Sometimes they conceal them in a hollow stick, sometimes amongst their hair, or the folds of their turbans or cummerbunds, sometimes in their shoes, or tied under their arm-pits; and if the nature of their duty or employment be very hazardous, and they have to traverse places in the occupation of the enemy, they will then wrap the despatch, generally in such cases written on slips of tissue paper, in a small ball of wax, so that, if attacked or taken prisoners, they may be able to swallow it. Quills are also used for the same purpose. Very little mercy is usually shown to a cossid; I have seen many a poor wretch lying by the road-side, on a morning march, with his throat cut from ear to ear, and his body otherwise mutilated, while the ground, immediately about him, was strewn in all directions with the contents of his dawk or letter-bag, torn in a thousand fragments.—*Captain Mackenzie's 'Zeila.'*

From His Excellency Lord Ellenborough, Governor General of India, to Major-General Nott. Allahabad, July 4, 1842.

GENERAL,

You will have learnt from Mr Maddock's letters of the 13th of May and 12th of June, that it was not expected that your movement towards the Indus could be made till October, regard being had to the health and efficiency of your army.

You appear to have been able to give a sufficient equipment to the force you recently dispatched to Khelat-i-Ghilzie under Colonel Wymer, and since his return you will have received, as I infer from a private letter addressed by Major Outram to Captain Durand, my private secretary, a further supply of 3,000 camels.

I have now, therefore, reason to suppose, for the first time, that you have the means of moving a very large proportion of your army with ample equipment for any service.

There has been no deficiency of provisions at Candahar at any time, and immediately after the harvest you will have an abundant supply.

Nothing has occurred to induce me to change my first opinion, that the measure commended by considerations of political and military prudence, is to bring back the armies now in Affghanistan at the earliest period at which their retirement can be effected consistently with the health and efficiency of the troops, into positions wherein they may have easy and certain communication with India; and to this extent the instructions you have received remain unaltered (*here we can imagine the blank expression of the General's*

fine face); but the improved position of your army, with sufficient means of carriage for as large a force as it is necessary to move in Affghanistan, induce me now to leave to your option the line by which you shall withdraw your troops from that country. (*Nott's eye glistens.*)

I must desire, however, that in forming your decision upon this most important question, you will attend to the following considerations.

In the direction of Quettah and Sukkur there is no enemy to oppose you.

At each place occupied by detachments you will find provisions, and probably as you descend the passes you will have increased means of carriage. The operation is one admitting of no doubt as to its success.

If you determine upon moving upon Ghuzni, Caubul, and Jellallabad, you will require for the transport of provisions a much larger amount of carriage, and you will be practically without communications from the time of your leaving Candahar, dependent entirely upon the courage of your army for the opening of a new communication by an ultimate junction with Major-General Pollock.

Nor, if everything depended upon the courage of your army and upon your own ability in directing it, should I have any doubt as to the success of the operation; but whether you would be able to obtain provisions for your troops during the whole march, and forage for your animals, may be a matter of reasonable doubt; yet upon this your success will turn.

You must remember that it was not the superior courage of the Affghans, but want, and the inclemency of the season, which led to the destruction of the army at Caubul; and you must feel, as I do, that the loss of another army, from

whatever cause it might arise, might be fatal to our Government in India.

I do not undervalue the aid which our Government in India would receive from the successful execution of a march by your army through Ghuzni and Caubul, over the scenes of our late disasters. I know all the effect which it would have upon the minds of our soldiers, of our allies, of our enemies in Asia, and of our countrymen, and of all foreign nations in Europe. It is an object of just ambition, which no one more than myself would rejoice to see effected; but I see that failure in the attempt is certain and irretrievable ruin, and I would endeavour to inspire you with the necessary caution, and make you feel that, great as are the objects to be attained by success, the risk is great also.

If you determine upon moving by Ghuzni, and entirely give up your communications by Quettah, I should suggest that you should take with you only the most efficient troops and men you have, securing the retreat of the remainder upon Killah Abdoollah and Quettah.

You will in such case consider it to be entirely a question to be decided by yourself, according to circumstances, whether you shall destroy or not the fortifications of Candahar; but before you set out upon your adventurous march, do not fail to make the retirement of the force you leave behind you perfectly secure, and give such instructions as you deem necessary for the ultimate retirement of the troops in Scinde upon Sukkur.

You will recollect that what you will have to make is a successful march, that that march must not be delayed by any hazardous operation against Ghuzni or Caubul, that you should carefully calculate the time required to enable you to reach Jellalabad in the first week of October, so as to form the rear-guard of Major-General Pollock's army.

If you should be enabled by a *coup-de-main* to get possession of Ghuzni and Caubul, you will act as you see fit, and leave decisive proofs of the power of the British Army without impeaching its humanity.

You will bring away from the tomb of Mahmood of Ghuzni his club, which hangs over it, and you will bring away the gates of his tomb, which are the gates of the Temple of Somnath. These will be the just trophies of your successful march.

You will not fail to disguise your intention of moving, and to acquaint Major-General Pollock with your plans as soon as you have formed them. A copy of this letter will be forwarded to Major-General Pollock to-day, and he will be instructed by a forward movement to facilitate your advance; but he will probably not deem it necessary to move any troops actually to Caubul, where your force will be amply sufficient to beat anything the Affghans can oppose to it. The operations, however, of the two armies must be combined upon their approach so as to effect with the least possible loss the occupation of Caubul, and to keep open the communications between Caubul and Peshawur.

One apprehension upon my mind is, that in the event of your deciding upon moving on Jellallabad by Ghuzni and Caubul, the accumulation of so great a force as that of your army combined with Major-General Pollock's in the narrow valley of the Caubul River, may produce material difficulty in the matter of provisions and forage; but every effort will be made from India to diminish that difficulty, should you adopt that line of retirement.

This letter remains absolutely secret.

I have the honour, &c.,

ELLENBOROUGH.

There is great caution in this despatch. Critics have said that Lord Ellenborough did not wish to commit himself to an open declaration of what was evidently his desire; and they have added that it was not generous to fasten so heavy a responsibility upon the General. We incline to a different view of Lord Ellenborough's conduct. At the distance at which he was placed from the scene of operations, he could not possibly have judged of all the circumstances by which the Commander of the army of Candahar might be governed; and it therefore became necessary, after expounding his own views, to give that officer a large discretion.

Nott's reply, which is dated 12 A.M. on the very day of the receipt of the despatch, did not disclose the state of his feelings, or his prompt resolution. He simply acknowledged the letter, and said that "he would immediately give to the subject all due consideration, and speedily acquaint his Lordship with the result." But the measures which he instantly adopted show that his mind was made up. He wrote to the officer commanding at Killah Abdoollah, to send him the two howitzers at the fortress, with their ammunition, "also every camel at all serviceable." He ordered that no delay should take place, but that the party should march instantly, and not halt until it met with a detachment, which he forthwith dispatched from Candahar to meet it. To Quettah he wrote for 350 more camels, and rated the commissariat officers, who were slow to pro-

cure him carriage. "Forward!" was his motto; his hour was come, and he was resolved that nothing should stand in the way of his long cherished and noble design.

Giving himself three or four days to ponder the nature of his reply and to advise with Major Sanders, Major-General Nott thus answered Lord Ellenborough on the 26th of July.

Candahar, July 26, 1842.

My Lord,

Having well considered the subject of your Lordship's letter of the 4th instant, having looked at the difficulties in every point of view, and reflected on the advantages which would attend a successful accomplishment of such a move, and the moral influence it would have throughout Asia, I have come to the determination to retire a portion of the army under my command *viâ* Ghuzni and Caubul. I shall take with me not a large, but a compact and well-tried force on which I can rely. Your Lordship may rest assured that all prudence and every military precaution shall be observed; there shall be no unnecessary risk, and if expedient I will mask Ghuzni and even Caubul; but should an opportunity offer, I will endeavour to strike a decisive blow for the honour of our arms.

The greatest difficulty I am likely to experience will be the want of forage in the neighbourhood of Caubul, and thence to Jellallabad, in consequence of the large bodies of horse which have so long consumed and still continue to consume it. I therefore hope that measures will be taken to have

supplies of forage, and a few comforts for the European troops, stored at Jellallabad, to which place I shall endeavour to regulate my march so as to reach it in the first week of October.

I have commenced arrangements for the remainder of the force retiring upon Sukkur, under the command of Major-General England, K.H., who will receive the necessary instructions for his guidance in withdrawing the troops from Candahar and the different posts between this and Shikarpore.

I am most anxious, notwithstanding the conduct of the Affghan Chiefs, that our army should leave a deep impression on the people of this country of our character for forbearance and humanity.

All our guns, also six brass pieces belonging to the late Shah Soojah ool Moolk, and all serviceable ammunition and stores, shall be taken to Sukkur; all unserviceable articles not worth the carriage will be destroyed.

Having now acquainted your Lordship of my determination, I shall not fail to keep your Lordship constantly informed of my proceedings.

I remain,
Your Lordship's most obedient servant,
W. Nott.

Lord Ellenborough could scarcely have dispatched his letter before the conclusion forced itself upon his mind that Nott would only be too glad to avail himself of the option of marching through Affghanistan; and his own wishes operating in concurrence with Nott's

intentions, he addressed himself, with characteristic vigour, to all the measures which appeared to him calculated to impart success to the highly interesting enterprise he had resolved to countenance. Letter now followed letter with rapid succession, each remarkable for its frank familiarity, the reliance of the writer upon the wisdom and foresight of General Nott, and his admiration of the character of the old soldier who alone, during four years of severe trial, had judged rightly, acted prudently, courageously, and patriotically, and had dared to tell the truth. And as if an electric sympathy subsisted between these remarkable men, Nott almost invariably anticipated the Governor-General's words. Lord Ellenborough on the 5th of July (the day after the first despatch), wrote to beg that Major-General England might be sent to India *viâ* Quettah, so that if any circumstance should occur to prevent Nott's continuance in the command of the army Colonel Wymer might succeed. Nott had already ordered England to Quettah. Captain Durand, Lord Ellenborough's Secretary, begs that the General would correspond direct with the Governor-General. Nott had begun to do so.

Major-General Pollock was prompt in communicating with Nott, as soon as he was apprized of the discretionary order vested in the General. A month previously Pollock sent Nott a copy of a letter from Government of June 1st, which suggested his draw-

ing the enemy into a position which might enable him to strike a blow, and he accompanied the letter with one from himself, conceived in a similar spirit to that referred to in the text above.

Camp Jellalabad, June 14, 1842.

My dear General,

I had yesterday the pleasure to receive the original, of which the above is a copy. It is most satisfactory, and will, I trust, enable us to retrieve all our disasters. I cannot of course tell what are your orders from Government, but I trust they will be such as to enable you to co-operate with me. My plans are not quite decided yet, but all difficulties may be said to be conquered, now that Government authorise my acting with energy. A few hours before the receipt of the Government letter, Major Rawlinson's of the 31st, to Shakespear, came to hand, and this morning I had the gratification to receive yours of the 30th ult. Most cordially do I congratulate you on the success of your brilliant little affair, and I trust, ere many months have elapsed, we shall have given these Affghans several similar lessons, for their late successes have made them very bold.

Believe me,

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) G. Pollock.

To Major-General Nott,
Commanding at Candahar.

Anticipating the course which Nott would now take, Pollock wrote a cordial letter to the General,

expressing his conviction that they (Nott and Pollock) would "be enabled to punish those fellows (the Caubul and Ghuzni Chiefs) to their heart's content." He considered that Mahomed Ackbar Khan, the assassin of Sir W. Macnaghten, would be "a capital prize, as would that rascal at Ghuzni, and one or two more." He begged of Nott to inform him of the strength of the force he intended to take, the quantity of wheat and attah that he would require for daily expenditure, the barley for horses, and bhoosa for cattle of every description, as Pollock proposed to lay in a sufficiency at Jugdulluck. He was anxious to be informed of Nott's strength in artillery, and of the number of Europeans with him. He did not anticipate opposition until Caubul was reached, but he expected it on the march homewards again.

At this time Major Outram was unacquainted with Lord Ellenborough's intentions in respect to Nott's movement, but his quickness of perception generally enabled him to judge rightly. In a private letter of the Major, of the 27th of June, we have a striking proof of the sagacity and prescience of that excellent man and able public officer.

Quitta, 27th June.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

I was glad to find, by your official letter of the 22nd, and later accounts received to-day, that the alarms for your

health were unfounded, caused by reports of your illness from "various sources."

Major-General Pollock has some sort of discretionary power to advance to Caubul, if he thinks it feasible, and I am not without hope that you will receive a direct communication from him, requesting you to advance with all your disposable troops, he taking on with him such portion of his army as he finds he can equip, and leaving the remainder at Gundamuck; and that the Government's permission for you to hold on at Candahar till October, is in order to gain time for Gen. Pollock to make the requisition for your support should he consider the enterprise practicable. I have no grounds for this supposition beyond mere conjecture; but I hope such may be the case.

As you have made no requisition on the Commissary here to hire any definite number of camels, but as tenders to supply any number, either for Candahar or Sukkur, are coming in every day, which, perhaps, under the supposition that you do not immediately evacuate Candahar, may not be immediately required, I thought it would be a good plan to keep them in play in the meantime, and at the same time create an impression that we *are* going on to Caubul, which would prove beneficial to our interests, whatever may be done, by refusing to hire any camels except on pledge to proceed to Caubul if required. None, consequently, will engage with that proviso, but all wait in the hope that they will be engaged as far as Candahar. I shall advise the Commissary to keep to the determination until we learn from you exactly what number and from what dates they will be required by you at Candahar.

Truly yours,

J. OUTRAM.

It is impossible, while reading the private and public

correspondence of Lord Ellenborough at this juncture, not to be struck with the vigour and energy which he brought to the duty of vindicating the British name. If he had been slow to decide, there was no delay or hesitation in the execution of the plans he had now marked out for himself and the Generals. He threw his whole soul into the cause; nothing seemed above or below his consideration. He was no niggard of his trust in those whom he deemed worthy of high employment. Once bestowing his confidence he was prodigal of his aid, and generous in the expression of his applause. And Nott merited to the utmost his good opinion, his reliance, and his gratitude.

There was a difficulty at this time about Prince Timour, the son of Shah Soojah, and Governor of Candahar. While Prince Sufter Jung had played fast and loose until he became an open and determined enemy,*

* When the news of Shah Soojah's murder reached Candahar, Sufter Jung, as we have seen, vowed vengeance, and called upon the British to assist him, on the ground of his father's death having been accelerated by His Majesty's attachment to our cause. The following documents written within twenty-four hours of each other, show how ready he was to act with or against the Dooranees.

Translation of a Letter alleged to have been addressed by His Royal Highness Sufter Jung, and the Candahar Dooranees, to their brethren at Caubul.

This is to announce to you that we have sworn to God and by the Prophet, that we have determined to lay all other objects and considerations aside, and to avenge the death of the King upon the accursed tribe of Mahomedzye, (Barukzye) or to slake the thirsty soil of Caubul with the

Prince Timour steadfastly adhered to the British cause. This, perhaps, arose more from the absence of energy

blood of ourselves, and of the whole of the Dooranee population of Candahar. There is no third course open to us. What sort of child's play is this that you are writing about, that you intend to leave your blood enemies in the town of Caubul, and with the King's death unavenged; to go down to Jellallabad, and leave the family of the murdered King in the Bala Hissar? Such an arrangement must end in your ruin, and you will be dishonoured for ever. The King's blood remains as a load on your necks. If you can avenge it of yourselves, so much the better; if not, wait till we join you; but under any circumstances it must be avenged. It remains to be seen what will turn up in the interim.

(True translation.) H. RAWLINSON,
Political Agent.

Candahar, April 28, 1842.

Translation of a Note from His Royal Highness Prince Sufter Jung to Major Rawlinson.

MY FRIEND,

I send these few lines to inform you that the Dooranee Chiefs, hearing that you had sent troops down the road towards Quettah, have come to me and said: "We understand you propose to make up your quarrel with the English and desert us. We cannot permit this. The English have sent troops towards Quettah to bring up treasure. We shall march to attack the convoy, and you must accompany us." I have no resource but to give in to the Chiefs, and I shall be obliged to accompany them on the march. If, however, you will only write and assure me of your support and assistance in avenging my father's blood, I will not remain with these Dooranees; I will openly declare on your side, and mix up my fate with your own. I have written further particulars to Meer Abdool Hassan Khan, who will communicate the same to you. May your days be long and happy.

(True translation.) H. RAWLINSON,
Political Agent.

Candahar, April 29, 1842. [*Abstract*

and decision of character than from any particular attachment to the Christian invaders of Affghanistan. So weak was he, however, that he had entirely failed to form a party even in the city which he governed. When the retirement of the army *viâ* the Bolan Pass and Quettah was in question, the Prince Timour, conscious of his inability to maintain his possession of the Affghan crown, to which he had become entitled, as the heir to the throne, by Shah Soojah's death, had solicited the Government to let him proceed to Loodianah, receiving

Abstract of a Note from His Royal Highness Prince Sufter Jung to Meer Abdool Hassan Khan.

Explain to the gentlemen that I only desire to be perfectly assured of their support and assistance, when I will throw aside reserve and openly espouse their cause. If they desire it I will fly from the Dooranees and join their troops at the Kojuck, when the Affghans will hardly venture to fight against me and molest the brigade returning with the treasure of Candahar. The English, however, have thrown me into a dilemma by sending off troops on this duty before they have answered my application, or come to any arrangement with me, for I shall now be obliged to accompany the Dooranees, and unless a remedy be speedily applied, be again forced into collision with those whom I regard as friends. Pray make instant application to the "Sabib," and send off intelligence of what they wish, and of what I am to do, for my fate hangs by a hair.

(True abstract.)

H. Rawlinson,
Political Agent.

Candahar, April 29th, 1842.

the same allowance and occupying the same position as his father had done.

Here is the letter in which he prefers the request.

My Lord,

In accordance with the feelings of strong attachment which I have ever entertained towards the British Government, I take the earliest opportunity that offers of presenting my congratulations to your Lordship on your assuming the functions of Governor General of Hindoostan, and at the same time I solicit your Lordship's condolence with me on the melancholy occurrence which has taken place in my family, and which has left me no other source of comfort than the mercy of a beneficent Providence, and the confidence I feel in the protection of your Government.

My Lord, you will doubtless have been informed, from the reports of the many British officers who have been associated with me since the commencement of the Afghan campaign, that I have, under every circumstance, adhered unflinchingly to the interests of the British Government, and that I have exerted myself to the utmost to forward the objects which the British Government has had in view, of consolidating an independent monarchy in Afghanistan, and of cementing a close friendship between that monarchy and the Government of British India.

My Lord, I have been influenced to such conduct, as well by a grateful sense of the many benefits which my family has, for a long series of years, received from the British Government, as by a firm conviction that my personal interests would be best consulted, and the prosperity of my country would be alone secured, by the observance of that strict faith in our engagements, and the evidence of that sincere desire to cultivate a friendly connexion, that should induce the British

Government to grant my family its sustained support against domestic faction, and to extend to the Afghans its sustained protection against foreign enemies.

My Lord, I am still under the influence of the same feelings, and in the distressed situation in which I now find myself, I turn to your Lordship with eagerness, for your counsel and consolation. I cannot doubt but that from the demise of my father, Shah Shooja ool Moolk, the right of succession to the Dooranee throne devolves upon myself, his eldest and his noblest son, and I believe that if I succeeded in establishing my birthright, your Lordship would not refuse to recognize my claim. I am not insensible to the glory of wearing the Afghan crown. I am fully alive to the strong feeling of nature which calls upon me to avenge my father's blood; and I would unwillingly believe that, associated with British troops, my rank and character would not be without some value in assisting to vindicate the honour of the British arms at Cabool, and to punish the gross outrages which have been committed at that place, and which I have viewed with equal pain and indignation. But, my Lord, in the present excited state of feeling in Afghanistan, I do not and cannot flatter myself that my assumption of royalty, recognized, but not supported by the British Government, would lead to any results favourable to my personal views or in furtherance of your political interests. As the partisan of your Government I should, under present circumstances, encounter hostility in many quarters where it would not otherwise be offered, and your cordial support of my efforts to obtain the crown would, I think, be indispensable to their success.

Without, therefore, in any way cancelling my birthright, I have come to the conclusion that it would be useless, perhaps injurious, to assert it, pending the result of a reference to yourself upon the subject.

My claim will not suffer by remaining for a while dormant;

whereas its immediate assertion, under your auspices, but without your support, might induce the misguided Dooranees of this province, in the alarm which they at present feel from having been recently committed in hostility with you, to rally round some other pretender to the throne, and thus increase the troubles of my unhappy country.

My Lord, should your Lordship desire to establish me upon the throne of my ancestors, you may rely upon my eager and cordial co-operation with your views, and my firm resolve to use every effort to gain and secure the affections of my subjects, while, at the same time, I pledge myself to the most rigid observance of such friendly engagements as your Lordship may propose, and to a most watchful care over the interests of your Government; but it would be unfair if I did not forewarn your Lordship that, having gained the throne of Cabool by the power of your arms, I should still be unable to maintain possession of it without your efficient and continued support for a very considerable length of time. It would be my anxious and unceasing aim to soothe the irritation of the Afghans, and to lead them to a better appreciation of your disinterested views, and of the benefits which your friendship must entail on them; but after the recent atrocities which have been committed upon their part, and after the severities which it would be necessary to practise both in vindication of the honour of your arms, and in the first establishment of my authority, your Lordship must understand that the strong hand of power, held out to me by your Government for several years, would alone enable me to carry my views into effect, so as to yield a promise of eventual independence, and to render my alliance of any political advantage to British India.

If, on the other hand, your Lordship should demur to this prospect of indefinite and unlimited support, and should propose to withdraw your troops from Afghanistan, either

with or without punishing the outrages committed at Cabool I look with confidence to the well-known generosity of the British Government, to sanction my retirement with the British army, and to grant me the same honourable asylum in India, and the same allowances becoming my situation, as were granted to my deceased father, Shah Shooja ool Moolk. It would be repugnant to my feelings to attempt to receive the throne of my ancestors in any other character than as an avowed friend of the British Government, and my judgment assures me that, in this character, without resources, and relying solely on my hereditary right, the effort would be unavailing. I beg, at the same time, to assure your Lordship of my anxiety to show my sense of the many benefits conferred upon my family by the British Government by accompanying any force that may advance on Cabool, for the purpose of avenging the outrages committed there upon the British troops, during the winter; and I should be proud to exert any influence that I might possess as the heir of Shah Shooja ool Moolk and the surviving head of the Suddozye family, to aid in accomplishing the objects of the expedition; but if the British Government did not contemplate any permanency of occupation, I should trust that, after participating in the exaction of retribution, and being thus irretrievably committed with the Afghans, your Lordship would not propose to leave me in possession of the throne on the withdrawal of the British troops. Under such circumstances I should desire an asylum at Loodiana, and in that situation, after the Afghans had exhausted themselves by internal conflict, and had learnt the value of a consolidated monarchy, strengthened by the political support of British India, I should, as the heir to the Dooranee crown, and with the concurrence of the British Government, be available at any time to the national invitation; and, I should hope, summoned to the throne in such a manner, to be able to show my grati-

tude to the British Government by securing to it all those political advantages which it can desire from an alliance with the Afghans.

I request to be favoured with the communication of your Lordship's views, as soon as you have decided on the points submitted in this letter.

(True translation.)

H. RAWLINSON,
Political Agent.

To the Right Honourable Lord Ellenborough,
Governor-General of India.

Rawlinson, in an able State paper reviewing the position of the Prince, gave it as his opinion, that unless the Government meditated the occupation of Caubul for a permanency, Timour could not expect to hold the crown. "I consider him," wrote the astute political, "from his natural indolence altogether unfitted to wield the Affghan sceptre without our strong and sustained assistance in the present extraordinary period of excitement."

Candahar, April 22nd, 1842.

The Government of India has made a formal exposition of its political views with regard to Afghanistan. It has been shown that the ground of protection to India, upon which the policy rested of the advance of our troops into Afghanistan, in 1838, had ceased to exist. It has been shown that we are exonerated from all obligations to support His Majesty Shah Shuja-ool-Moolk, as well by his questionable conduct in connection with the recent revolution, as by his general unpopularity among his subjects. It has been shown that it is false

to suppose the military occupation of Affghanistan to control the Sikhs, the Beloochees, or the Scindians, and the Government have therefore come to the deliberate determination of withdrawing its troops from the country. A strong desire has been at the same time manifested to see the national honour vindicated previous to retirement, and it is hoped that the withdrawal may be conducted in a dignified manner, which shall reflect no discredit on our arms.

2. There is little reason to suppose that these views, deliberately adopted by the Government, will undergo any alteration from the recent murder of His Majesty Shah Shuja-ool-Moolk. The absence of any political or military advantage, arising from our continued occupation of Affghanistan, would appear to be unaffected by the event, and although the charge of questionable conduct, which was considered to have dissolved our objections to the father, cannot attach personally to the son, still the political forfeiture of the support incurred by the one, will descend with the crown to the other, even supposing, which is doubtful, that our original promise of assistance had been especially extended to His Majesty's heirs and successors. Again, if the unpopularity of his late Majesty among his subjects, arising from his parsimony and haughtiness of demeanour, was considered a valid objection to our perilling our armies in his support, surely the indolent, though amiable character of the heir apparent, manifestly unsuited to the present posture of affairs, added to the concentrated hostility which he must expect to encounter at Cabool, as the avenger of his father's blood, and as the partisan of the English, are not less weighty reasons for our declining to interfere permanently in his behalf.

3. But if the ultimate views of Government thus promise to remain unaltered, how, in reference to this place, is the more immediate object of exacting retribution, and of avenging the honour of our arms, likely to be affected by the recent

tragedy at Cabool? The Dooranees of Candahar will certainly view with the deepest indignation the murder of Shah Shuja-ool-Moolk, and their feelings of hostility to us will necessarily be much softened, but it is still hardly to be expected that they will at once rally round the heir apparent, and cordially co-operate with us in retrieving our military character at Cabool. They would probably, if His Royal Highness were disconnected with us, support him against the Barukzyes, and indeed against any other member of the Suddozye family at present available, but their object in so doing would be merely to avenge their own quarrel, and incidentally alone could they benefit our cause. Our object is to strike a decisive blow against the Affghans of Cabool, not to conciliate, or to lay plans for the recovery of a political influence in the country, and it appears to me, therefore, that beyond adopting measures for the gradual tranquillisation of this province, which may leave us at liberty to employ our military means, if necessary, in the direction of Cabool, the less we have to say to the Dooranees of Candahar the better.

I am thus doubtful if it would be desirable to encourage His Royal Highness in any immediate assertion of his rights. The effect of his proclamation here, under our auspices, and before any negotiations for an amnesty had been opened by the Dooranees, would be to alarm the Chiefs, and to induce them probably to flock to Cabool, in support of Prince Futteh Jung, or to declare at this place in favour of Sufder Jung, the younger brother.

Should the Dooranee Chiefs press forward with their tenders of allegiance to Prince Timour, and should they request His Royal Highness to grant them an amnesty for their past political offences, I can see no evil in His Royal Highness exercising the functions of royalty, and of our recognition of his right, pending instructions from Government; for such an arrangement, without compromising the Government, would

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at any rate tend to tranquillize the province, and to enable us to co-operate, if necessary, with General Pollock in his advance on Cabool. If, on the other hand, the hostility of the Dooranees to us is found to outweigh their political animosity against the Barukzyes, and they stubbornly abstain from addressing the heir apparent in consequence of his well-known attachment to us, undoubtedly it would neither be for his interests nor our own to make an idle display at this time of asserting his hereditary rights.

4. In the event of General Pollock being able to fulfil those conditions upon which his advance on Cabool is made to depend, he will probably expect assistance from this quarter, and it must then depend upon the development of public feeling which may have occurred in the interim, whether it will be desirable or not that Prince Timour should accompany the force. I am inclined to think that, whatever may be the ultimate views of Government regarding the Cabool crown, the presence of the heir apparent with our troops, will serve the temporary purpose of facilitating our exaction of retribution, but I foresee that, if the advance on Cabool does not partake of the character of a popular movement in favour of the rightful claimant to the Dooranee crown, it will be in vain to expect that Prince Timour can maintain his position subsequent to the retirement of our troops, or that we can derive any political advantages from leaving him in possession of the throne. I consider Prince Timour to be warmly attached to us from feeling, from habit, and from principle; but I consider him, from his natural indolence, altogether unfitted to wield the Affghan sceptre, without our strong and sustained assistance in the present extraordinary period of excitement.

H. Rawlinson,
Political Agent.

Before the fact of the murder of the Shah had reached India, rumours of the event had come under the notice of the Governor-General, and in anticipation of being called upon to interfere in the succession, his Lordship caused his views to be communicated to his agent on the North-West frontier (Mr G. Clerk), in the following terms:

"The reports of the death of Shah Soojah are so long continued, and are upon the whole so consistent, that the Governor-General cannot but attach great weight to them.

"The death of the Shah is certainly an event not hitherto contemplated, and which may tend to create new embarrassment in the settlement of the affairs of Affghanistan.

"That country appears to be so divided, that under present circumstances it would be obviously impossible for the British Government to recognize any individual as the successor to the monarchy of Affghanistan.

"In all measures which may be hereafter adopted, for the settlement of that country, the Governor-General is most desirous of carrying with the British Government the willing acquiescence of the Maharajah Shere Singh.

"At the present time, the only reply which can be prudently given to the application of any Chief aspiring to the crown for the recognition of the British Government, is that the British Government is sincerely desirous of seeing Affghanistan permanently settled under a national Government approved by the people. That such has always been its desire, however interested persons may have misrepresented, or others may have misunderstood our views. That we are anxious to be enabled to establish relations of friendly intercourse with any such government, which may seem capable of maintaining them."

In answer to this, the Governor-General assented to PrinceTimour's accompanying the army to India, if General Nott thought proper;* but when Lord Ellenborough had left it discretionary with Nott to go on to Caubul, he apprehended that Prince Timour might wish to accompany him to that capital, and he therefore wrote the following letter to the General:—

(Secret and Confidential.) Allahabad, July 6, 1842.

GENERAL,

In the event of your deciding upon retiring by Ghuzni and Caubul, Prince Timour will probably prefer accompanying your army to retiring with the force you may send to Scinde; but I do not, on consideration, think it advisable that his Highness should proceed with you to Caubul. His doing so would induce parties there to imagine that the British Government adopted him as the successor of the late Shah Soojah, and Prince Futteh Jung might under such circumstances make larger advances of money than he would otherwise be induced to do, to Mahomed Ackbar, and place whatever few troops he might have entirely at that person's disposal.

Certainly to the British Government the most convenient arrangement, that which would most further our future views, would be the establishment of Prince Timour in independent sovereignty, without any aid from us, at Candahar; but your

* In the event of Prince Timour desiring to accompany your army to the Indus, you will permit His Highness to do so, treating him always with the respect due to his misfortunes and his fidelity; and you will assure him that he will be received in the British dominions with distinguished consideration, and the hospitality which the British Government extends to the unfortunate.—*Lord Ellenborough to General Nott, June* 10, 1842.

report of his want of influence there forbids the entertaining of any hope that this can be effected.

Prince Timour will, therefore, retire to Quettah and Sukkur, under the safeguard of whatever force you may send back to Scinde, in the event of your proceeding yourself with the *elite* of your army to Ghuzni and Caubul.

I have the honour to remain,
General,
Your very faithful friend and servant,
ELLENBOROUGH.

As Major Rawlinson has been so much with Prince Timour, you may, perhaps, think it convenient to detach him with the Prince to Quettah, and this you are at liberty to do.

Nott decided to send the Prince to India.

Lord Ellenborough, although he had stripped the Political Agents of power, nevertheless admitted the usefulness of their knowledge of the country in which they had been serving. He accordingly directed that Major Leech should accompany Nott to Caubul, if the General desired his presence. His Lordship likewise kept Nott informed of the arrangements made for increasing the amount of supplies and carriage for General Pollock's army, and these arrangements were in every way worthy of the Government and the object contemplated. Well might Lord Ellenborough have said, as he did say: "I feel satisfied that every exertion will be made, and that if that army (Pollock's) be not on the 21st of September so equipped as to be enabled

to move in any direction, it will be the *result of circumstances beyond human power to control.*"*

Relying much on General Nott's own good sense and information, Lord Ellenborough did not oppress him with voluminous instructions; but there was one letter of the 6th of July, written two days after the memorable letter, conveying the option to advance or retire, that is worthy of selection from the heap of communications, generally brief and confidential, because it not merely in itself characterised the anxiety of Lord Ellenborough that nothing should be omitted that could aid the General, and secure the safety of the army, but it elicited from General Nott another of those letters which every Company's officer should treasure for the good example it sets of reliance on the Native soldiery.

From his Excellency Lord Ellenborough, Governor-General of India, to Major-General Nott, Allahabad, 6th of July, 1842.

GENERAL,

Although I consider that in point of fact if you move towards Ghuzni and Caubul, with the intention of forming a junction with Major-General Pollock, and retiring with him through the Khyber Pass, your only practicable line of retirement will be that which you must open for yourself through the enemy's ranks; nevertheless, as it may be possible that on your arrival at Ghuzni you may see reasons for endeavouring to return to India by a new route untried by our armies, but the accustomed route of armies invading India in distant

* Letter to Nott, July 16, 1842.

times, and still reported to be practicable, I send you enclosed a copy of Lieutenant Broadfoot's report on the Gomul Pass, leading from Ghuzni to Dera Ismael Khan. You ought to have this report with you, but I think it right to provide against the possibility of your not having it.

I venture to suggest that as soon as you shall have decided, if you should so decide, upon moving on Ghuzni, you should instruct Major Outram to take measures for placing an officer at Dera Ismael Khan, and it may be expedient to have one too at Dera Ghaezee Khan, for the transmission of despatches which may be sent by those routes, from the line of your march to the Indus, and for the purpose of executing any orders you may deem it necessary to issue.

These officers must be placed at those points in communication with the Sikh Government.

It is absolutely necessary, in the event of your moving upon Ghuzni, that you should make previous arrangements of the most certain and secure nature for the withdrawal below the Kojuck Pass of the troops you may not take with you. It is impossible for me to sanction the leaving of any force at Candahar, in a position in which it might be surrounded, and require relief by an army from below the passes.

I cannot run the risk of a calamity like that which befell the garrison of Ghuzni; but at the same time it may not be necessary that the troops you may leave behind you should have passed the Kojuck, or should even have quitted Candahar before your movement may be commenced. Your decision upon this point must rest upon circumstances at the time; and I can only caution you, while you take into consideration the advantage which the holding of Candahar for some time after your movement may be commenced, may give to the force under your immediate command, you must likewise consider that no risk whatever must be incurred as regards the secure retirement of the troops to be left behind you; and your orders

as to the movement of those troops should, I feel, be peremptory, and not liable to be acted upon hesitatingly and reluctantly by any officer under the influence of political gentlemen. You must make yourself obeyed as strictly as you have obeyed.

I have the honour to be,
General,
Your most faithful servant,
ELLENBOROUGH.

Candahar, July 31, 1842.

MY LORD,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch under date the 4th instant, forwarding to me Lieutenant Broadfoot's report and map on the Gomul Pass, leading from Ghuzni to Dera Ismael Khan.

Major Outram, Political Agent in Scinde, will be requested to place an officer at Dera Ismael Khan, and at Dera Ghaezee Khan for the performance of the duties noted in your Lordship's letter.

I am well aware of the advantages which would attend a portion of my force holding Candahar for fifteen or twenty days after the movement of the troops towards Ghuzni, and I had accordingly arranged to leave her Majesty's 41st Foot, five regiments N.I., twelve guns, cavalry, &c., for that purpose; but for reasons which it is not necessary to trouble your Lordship with, I soon found that I could not do so without considerable risk, in the event of ever so small a body of the enemy assembling to impede the march of the Quettah column from Candahar. I will venture to make one remark to your Lordship:—unless the commander places full confidence in the troops under his command, no good result can be ex-

pected—this applies to all troops, but in particular to our native soldiers.

I have now determined on seeing the Quettah column in march before I quit the vicinity of Candahar; and as I have thus given up the idea of holding the city, I shall take her Majesty's 41st Regiment with the Ghuzni column.

At present the districts round Candahar are perfectly tranquil, and I really believe that a very large majority of the people deeply regret our departure; yet I think that the moment we march, a scene of the greatest anarchy and cruelty will take place.

I have the honour to be,
My Lord,
Your Lordship's obedient servant,
W. NOTT.

The Right Hon. Lord Ellenborough,
Governor-General of India. Head-quarters.

In the letter of the 4th of July, Lord Ellenborough directs General Nott to bring away from Ghuzni the club and mace of Mahmood of Ghuzni, and the gates of the Temple of Somnath. The importance which Lord Ellenborough attached to them may be judged of by the subjoined letter, written two months later, when they were supposed to be in the General's possession. We go a little out of the chronological order of occurrences in order to dispose at once of a subject which at the period became the subject of much discussion, and not a little ridicule in India and in England.

Simlah, Sept. 24, 1842.

GENERAL,

If the sandal-wood gates of the Temple of Somnath should be, as I trust they are, in your possession, I request you will place them under the guard of one of the most distinguished regiments, employed in their capture, making any arrangements you may find possible, and deem expedient for committing them to the more immediate guardianship of Hindoos.

It is my intention to have them conveyed in triumph from Ferozepore to Somnath, where the ancient temple, which was destroyed by Mahmood of Ghuzni, more than eight hundred years ago, was recently re-built on the original foundation, by a lady of the family of Holkar.

At the frontier of each State the gates will be committed to the peculiar charge of the Chief; but I think it would be desirable that the same troops should be the escort the whole way, and probably the Bombay Cavalry now with your army, and the two guns of the Bombay Artillery, will be selected for the purpose, with some Infantry.

I fear you may not have succeeded in obtaining the mace of Mahmood, as I hear it was taken away before our troops first reached Ghuzni. It may possibly have been taken back since the re-capture of the place by Shum Soodeen Khan, and now forgotten in the confusion. I attach much importance to the possession of this trophy of war, which I could dispose of in a manner most gratifying to your troops, and most useful in its permanent effect, in the minds of every native Chief who may hereafter attend the Governor-General's durbar.

If you should have been fortunate enough to have received it, let it be placed under the guard of a regiment, and let it be received with the same honours as the regimental colours.

I shall receive, I hope, both trophies from your own hands at the foot of the Bridge of the Sutlej.

I have the honour to remain,
General,
Your very faithful friend and servant,
(Signed) ELLENBOROUGH.

To Major-General Nott.

It was natural that Lord Ellenborough should believe in the value of the trophies. He had not been long enough in India to be aware of the great ignorance of the Mahomedans and Hindoos of the history of their own country. He calculated upon working an influence upon their religious antipathies, and he had likewise reason to believe that there was a prophecy chronicled by the Sikhs that they would one day become possessors of the gates. "In any future treaty with the ruler of the Punjaub, these gates might be of the greatest use to Government. They might be induced to make very important concessions on receiving what to us would be almost valueless; but what in their eyes would be invaluable."* Insufficient allowance appears to have been made by Lord Ellenborough's critics for the feelings and impressions under which he acted. He has been charged with a desire to

* I find a memorandum to this effect among General Nott's papers. It is in Major Leech's handwriting. I have not seen it elsewhere.—*Editor.*

give a theatrical and factitious importance to the triumphs achieved under his Government. Something must be allowed to even the wisest of men for acts committed under the influence of exultation; and it is certain that Lord Ellenborough, generally a cool and clear-headed statesman, was, between the date of the resolution to vindicate British honour in Affghanistan and the return of the troops across the Sutlej, strongly moved by feelings of hope, joy, and gratitude. Anything would have been forgiven in a Governor-General who had long been known to the community of British India, but it was the misfortune of Lord Ellenborough that he was personally a stranger to the services—who after all are the public of India—and he had begun his career by disappointing expectations, which were not realised till a later period, when people had become wedded to their prejudices.

CHAPTER IV.

GENERAL NOTT DIVIDES HIS FORCE—RESIGNS THE CONDUCT OF AFFAIRS IN UPPER SCINDE, AND SENDS GENERAL ENGLAND THITHER—DEPARTURE OF NOTT FROM CANDAHAR—THE MARCH TO GHUZNI—NOTT DEFEATS SHUMSOODEEN KHAN AT GOINE—CAPTURE OF GHUZNI—THE GATES OF SOMNATH—TRIBUTES OF APPROBATION—DISPERSION OF THE AFGHANS AT BANEE BADOM AND MYDON—GENERAL POLLOCK ADVANCES ON CAUBUL—THE PRISONERS—NOTT REACHES CAUBUL—REFUSES TO SEPARATE HIS FORCE ON AN EXPEDITION TO BAMEEAN—COMMENTS REFUTED—HALT AT CAUBUL—CHARGES OF PLUNDER DENIED—DEPARTURE FROM CAUBUL—HONOURS AND REWARDS—NOTT APPOINTED RESIDENT AT LUCKNOW.

By the end of July, 1842, Major-General Nott had effected all his arrangements for leaving Candahar. To Major Outram, therefore, he communicated a wish that no more details relative to the affairs of Scinde should be sent him; he had transferred the command of that district to Major-General England. He made two or three field appointments which were absolutely necessary

with ' 'such a column and on a service of so much consequence," and it seems unaccountable that with so heavy a charge as had long previously devolved upon him, the Government should not have volunteered the sanction of as extensive a staff as the General might have considered essential. To Major-General England, Nott consigned a troop of Horse Artillery, a bullock battery (6 guns), a detachment of Poonah Horse, two Rissalahs of Irregular Cavalry, the 25th Regiment of Bombay Native Infantry, several companies of a Light Battalion, and three regiments of Bengal Irregular Infantry. His own division consisted of—

Lieutenant Leslie's troop of Bombay European Horse Artillery.

Captain Anderson's troop of Artillery (late the Shah's).

Captain Blood's 9-pounder Battery.

Detachment of Sappers (Bombay and Madras).

A company of Bengal Foot Artillery, with four 18-pounders.

The 3d Regiment of Bombay Light Cavalry.

Haldane's and Christie's Horse.

Her Majesty's 40th and 41st Regiments.

The 2nd, 16th, 38th, 42nd, and 43rd Regiments of Bengal Native Infantry.

The 3rd or Captain Craigie's Regiment of Irregular Infantry.

Sending Lieutenant Jackson on with Prince Timour, the General appointed Major Rawlinson to accompany his own field force.

In his instructions to Major-General England, directing the withdrawal of all the troops at Quetta and Killa Abdoollah, and the removal of all guns and stores, Nott expressed his hope that any means would be taken to prevent the soldiers and camp-followers from plundering the villages. "Indeed," says he, "as you carry your supplies, no soldier or camp-follower ought to be allowed to enter any village. It is desirable in every point of view that an army should leave a deep impression on the minds of the people of this country of our high character for forbearance and humanity."

Previous to Nott's departure from Candahar, which he delayed until he could see General England's column fairly on the move, he wrote to his family on the 5th of August.

At last they have untied my hands, and mark me, the grass shall not grow under my feet. I wish they had done so two months ago. I have 10,000 things I should like to say, but I cannot. I have a march before me truly, but never mind. Whatever may happen, however, I shall still be with my little army. They *shall* be victorious wherever they go, or I will perish. If I can, I will send you a line during my adventurous march. If you do not get a letter, don't wonder, and don't be alarmed. Well, I have just been nearly sent out of the world. Some damaged powder, ammunition, &c., which we intended to destroy, had been placed in what we

called the Shah's Magazine, where there was much warlike stuff belonging to the late King, also many shells. A fellow must needs take his stinking cigar into the place (I suppose he was drunk), and so set fire to the whole, and a very decent explosion took place. Two doors in my house were knocked to pieces. A shower of shot came rattling against my house, and from fifteen to twenty musket-balls were found in my room. I was involved in smoke and dust, and my escape was most providential. I do not go out until *to-morrow* evening, and hope to march on the 7th instant.

Yours ever,

W. Nott.

To the Governor-General his letter was full and gratifying. Though successes in the field and great honours and rewards awaited him, it may be doubted if at any time in the course of his career, Nott experienced more pleasurable feelings than now reigned in his bosom. He was turning his back upon a city and a province where he had caused his own and the British name to be respected and feared. He had converted a lawless and a discontented people into good citizens and respectful friends. None of the wrongs which had been inflicted on the people of Caubul, exciting them to hatred and vengeance, were visited on the people of Candahar; on the contrary, sure and condign punishment fell upon any one eating the British salt who injured an Affghan. Strict justice, firmness, and humanity had been the leading principles of the good General, and his presence had come to be

regarded as the guarantee of tranquillity and order. We can imagine the honest self-gratulation under which the following letter to Lord Ellenborough was penned :—

Camp, near Candahar, 7th August, 1842.

My Lord,

I have been honoured with your Lordship's letter, of the 16th of July, 1842. It is not necessary for me to trouble your Lordship with a detail of the difficulties I have encountered during the last ten days in arranging for the march of my own and General England's columns. All is now prepared, and I would march to-morrow morning if I were not most anxious to see the Quetta troops in motion before I move. I am not aware that they will meet with anything to impede their progress. There may be a few marauders ready to carry off any stragglers, but nothing more.

I have come to a determination to take the four 18-pounders now at Candahar with me. I have no mortars, which I regret. I dare say I shall meet with difficulties, but our march through the centre of Affghanistan, via Ghuznee, and Cabool, will have a great moral influence throughout Asia even if I should not have an opportunity of striking a blow for the reputation of our arms, and I think I shall accomplish it to your Lordship's satisfaction. The only fear I have is the want of forage in the valley of Cabool, and thence to Jellallabad, in the event of General Pollock's army advancing to the former city. I can only say that I deem my little army fully able to carry into effect your Lordship's views, and I think a larger force would be inconvenient for the reasons I have mentioned, and would perhaps cause the loss of so many animals as to render our retirement difficult. I think if General Pollock were merely to make a show of moving on the city on my approaching its vicinity it would be sufficient,

I could then form his rear guard. However, I am no judge, and shall act according to the state of things at the time.

When General England marched his column from Quetta to Candahar, he brought me only ten of the twenty lacs of rupees I expected, which was not sufficient to pay the long arrears then due to the troops, and, although I have procured some cash from merchants and others, I fear I shall be in want of money, but I must endeavour to manage with the small sum I have.

The surrounding country is apparently in a tranquil state, and, with the exception of the turbulent Chiefs, I really believe the people deeply regret our departure. They were in alarm a few days back under an impression that our army would plunder and destroy the city, but I succeeded in assuring them that no man should be molested or a particle of property touched, and on the troops quitting the city I knew not which most to admire, the fine discipline and forbearance of our troops, or the quiet and respectful behaviour of the inhabitants. I fear that after my next march, different Chiefs will contend for the city, Sufter Jung is now in possession—and as he is a confident and bold young man, I think it probable that he will succeed in securing to himself the government of these provinces.

I shall move forward on the 9th, but it will be a short march, as I must see General England's column clear off.

I and my beautiful troops are in high spirits.

I am, my Lord,
Your Lordship's obedient servant,
W. Nott, Major-General,
Commanding field force.

The Right Honourable Lord Ellenborough,
Governor-General of India,
Head Quarters.

Major-General Nott quitted Candahar, which he had held in his "iron grasp" for three years, on the 8th of August, but he moved away very slowly, and by short marches, as he was desirous of giving General England a fair start. Two days after the departure of the latter, a communication appears to have reached Nott regarding Captain Pontardent, of the Bombay Artillery, who was in political employ in Scinde. We have no means of knowing what was said by Captain Pontardent to excite the General's ire, but it may be concluded that he had raised some question in respect to the possibility of England's getting safely to Quetta. This is to be inferred, from the tone of Nott's rebuke, conveyed in the subjoined letter to General England.

August 10th, 1842.

My dear General,

I was last evening favoured with your note, enclosing a letter from Major Outram, and one from Captain Pontardent, of the Artillery. At present I will only say that I deeply regret that British officers should so far forget themselves as to express such unsoldier-like sentiments. Had I not made over my charge of Scinde, I would immediately have removed Captain Pontardent from his situation, and have reported him to Government.

You have five Regiments and a half, twelve guns, and some Cavalry; there is not a man in arms between this and Quetta; maraudors will of course appear in hopes of cutting off stragglers. Allowing for a moment that a body of villagers will assemble, I am quite sure they could make no impression on your force, and you would give a good account of them. You

are better acquainted with the Bombay troops than I am, and I am quite sure that you have only to place confidence in the three irregular Regiments (late Shah's), and they, or even one of them, will beat anything that can be opposed to them; they have been severely tried during the last four years, and they have never failed. I can only assure you that I would to-morrow march to Quetta, at the head of a single Company. I did so when the country was in a disturbed state. With regard to Europeans, I can only say that I would just as soon go into action with Sepoys.

I last evening returned Major Outram's and Captain Pontardent's letters, because I considered them private, or I would have taken copies and have sent them to Government.

Yours very truly,
(Signed) W. Nott.

You are at liberty to make known these sentiments to the officers in question.

(Signed) W. Nott.

Major-General England reached Quetta on the 26th of August, with very few casualities. He had taken the precaution to seize the heights as he advanced, thus frustrating any attempt on the part of the enemy to capture the baggage, or interrupt the passage of the troops over the Kojuck mountains.

Let us follow Major-General Nott in his more adventurous march; on the 19th of August he writes to the Governor-General.

As yet we have not met with any difficulties, and in consequence of the proclamation which I sent forward before I left Candahar, and subsequently assuring the population of pro-

tection, and of payment for every article and supplies brought in, the people have remained in their villages, and freely send supplies into our camp. I have prohibited our troops entering any town or village, and hitherto there has not been a case of violence or plunder. I therefore hope and expect that I shall find every village between this and Ghuznee occupied, and ready to provide us with whatever we may require. I have full thirty-five days' supply in my camp, and I hope to get a little grain for filling my empty bags at each place I come to, provided I can keep my men under the present state of strict discipline, which I hope to do.

I wrote to Major-General Pollock, C.B., on the 10th instant, and again yesterday, giving him a memorandum of the force under my command, and stating the daily consumption of my detachment. I have received a letter from him, under date the 17th of July, expressing a wish to know on what day I could reach Cabool, but as that must depend on many circumstances, I cannot yet name any particular day. I will endeavour to keep him acquainted with the progress I make.

I continue to receive various reports on the state of affairs at Ghuznee and Cabool, but none that I can rely on, or that would warrant my troubling your Lordship with. I have sent a man or two into the former city, and expect them back in my camp in a day or two.

My troops are in high spirits, and I have every confidence in them.

The road continued smooth until the 28th of August, when the enemy appearing on the General's rear, he detached Captain Christie with a party of horse to drive them off, and the service was per-

formed with the accustomed gallantry of the third Bombay Light Cavalry and the Irregulars.

On the 30th of August, as Nott approached Ghuznee, Shumsoodeen, the Affghan Governor, brought nearly the whole of his army, 12,000 strong, into the vicinity of the General's camp.

About three p.m., writes Nott to the Secretary to Government, from Camp Goine,

I moved out with one half of my force; the enemy advanced in the most bold and gallant manner, each division cheering as they came into position; their left being upon a hill of some elevation, their centre and right along a low ridge, until their flank rested on a fort filled with men. They opened a fire of small arms, supported by two six-pounder horse Artillery guns, which were admirably served; our columns advanced upon the different points with great regularity and steadiness, and after a short and spirited contest, completely defeated the enemy, capturing their guns, tents, ammunition, &c. &c., and dispersing them in every direction; one hour more daylight would have enabled me to destroy the whole of their infantry. Shumshudeen fled in the direction of Ghuznee, accompanied by about thirty horsemen. I enclose a list of killed and wounded, on the 28th and 30th instant, also a return of ordnance, ammunition, &c. &c., taken from the enemy.

The behaviour of the troops, both European and Native, was such as I anticipated, and afforded me complete satisfaction.

I beg leave to bring to the favourable notice of the Right Honourable the Governor General of India, the undermentioned officers, many of them have served under my command for the last three years, and have been conspicuous for their

zeal and gallantry in the various affairs which have occurred with the enemy during that period, and especially in the action of the 12th of January last, and have invariably upheld the reputation of our arms, and the honour of our country.

The officers referred to were Colonel Wymer (acting as Brigadier); Colonel Mc Laren, 16th Bengal Native Infantry; Major Hibbard, 40th Foot; Captain Burney, 38th Native Infantry; Captains Christie and Haldane of the Irregular Cavalry; Major Sotheby and Captain Blood of the Artillery; Major Sanders of the Bengal Engineers; Lieutenants North and Stoddart of the Bombay Engineers, and Majors Leech and Rawlinson. Nott also praised Captains Polwhele, Waterfield, and Lieutenant Tytler, all of the staff; and expressed his admiration of the dashing and gallant conduct, rapid movement, and correct practice of Captain Anderson's troop of Horse Artillery, and that officer and Lieutenant Turner, he brought to the particular notice of the Government, in having on many occasions rendered him essential service. In the same dispatch, the General asked for some mark of the favour of Government, by brevet or otherwise, in behalf of Capt. J. H. Scott, of the 38th, the Brigade Major of Brigadier Wymer, an officer of great merit, who had been with General Nott in four actions. At a later period, the General rectified an omission of which he had been unintentionally guilty, in excluding the name of Captain

Ripley, late Fort Adjutant of Candahar, "a very zealous officer," from whose public services Nott had frequently derived benefit. In the battle of the 30th of August, Ripley (now a Major) attended the General in the field, and received his thanks for his conduct. Two officers of the Bombay Cavalry were killed, and four were wounded in the battle.

On the news of the engagement reaching Simla, Lord Ellenborough seized the occasion for lauding the admirable conduct of the army of Candahar.

"Formed as the troops under Major-General Nott have mostly been, by four years of constant service, and habituated as they have been to victory under their able commander, the Governor-General had anticipated their success against any force which could be brought against them. It is to the Governor-General a subject of sincere satisfaction that the events of the campaign should have opened a more extensive field for that brave army, on which it may make manifest to the world the high qualities he has long known it to possess."

A week after the affair at Goine, General Nott's force was before Ghuznee. He had expected a vigorous opposition, and laid his plans accordingly. Every man in his camp burned for the opportunity of inflicting chastisement on the brutal captors of Colonel Palmer's unfortunate detachment. But the craven hearts of the Ghuznees failed them at the critical moment. The battle of the 30th of August

opened their eyes to the power of a well-organised force in the hands of such men as Nott, Wymer, and McLaren. They fled from Ghuzni before the guns had opened on them. Here is Nott's dispatch.

Ghuznee, 8th September, 1842.

Sir,

My dispatch of the 31st ultimo will have informed you of my having defeated the Affghan army, commanded by Shumshudeen.

On the morning of the 5th instant, I moved on to Ghuznee, I found the city full of men, and a range of mountains running north-east of the fortress, covered by heavy bodies of Cavalry and Infantry; the garden and ravines near the town were also occupied. The enemy had received a considerable reinforcement from Cabool, under Sultan Jan. I directed Major Sanders, of the Bengal Engineers, to reconnoitre the works under escort of the 16th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry, and a party of irregular Cavalry; this brought on some smart skirmishing, in which our Sepoys behaved to admiration. Captain White, of Her Majesty's 40th Regiment, commanding the light companies of the army, was pushed forward, accompanied by Anderson's troop of Horse Artillery, to support the reconnoitring party, and I at once determined on carrying the enemy's mountain positions before encamping my force. The troops ascended the heights in gallant style, driving the enemy before them until every point was gained.

The village of Bullool is situated about 600 yards from the Walls of Ghuznee upon the spur of the mountain to the north-east, and observing it to be a desirable spot for preparing a heavy battery, to be placed 300 paces in advance, I ordered it

to be occupied by two Regiments of Infantry and some light guns, and retired the columns into Camp.

The Engineer Officers, Sappers and Miners, and Infantry working parties, were employed under the direction of Major Sanders, during the night of the 5th, in erecting a battery for four 18-pounders. These guns were moved from Camp before daylight on the morning of the 6th, but before they had reached the position assigned them it was ascertained that the enemy had evacuated the fortress.

I directed the City of Ghuznee, with its Citadel and the whole of its works, to be destroyed. I forward the Engineer's report.

In these operations our loss has been much less than might have been expected from the numbers and position of the enemy, and the fact of the troops having been necessitated to move under range of the guns of the fortress. I enclose a list of killed and wounded.

To T. Herbert Maddock, Esq.,
Secretary to the Government of India.

Camp before Ghuznee, 6th Sept. 1842.

SIR,

I have the honour to report, for the information of Major-General Nott, Commanding the Division, that in obedience to his instructions, I carried the Bulool Heights yesterday morning with the troops he did me the honour to place under my charge, dispersing the enemy in all directions.

I disposed of the troops as advantageously as the nature of the ground permitted, with orders to shelter themselves in the best manner they could from the heavy fire of Artillery from the fortress, and retained possession of the heights till I received the Major-General's final instructions, when I left the 16th and 42nd Regiments, and two Horse Artillery guns in

position, and returned to camp with the remainder of the force.

I was much pleased with the steadiness and gallantry of the troops engaged, and feel that my best thanks are due to the different Commanding Officers of Regiments for the aid and support they afforded me—viz., Major Hibbert, Commanding her Majesty's 40th Regiment, Major Clarkson, Commanding 42nd Regiment Bengal N. I., Captains Burney, Evans, and Craigie, Commanding 38th, 16th, and 3rd Irregular Infantry.

To Captain Scott, Major of Brigade, my thanks are, as usual, due, for the very zealous and active manner in which he performed the different duties intrusted to him, and which have before been brought to the General's notice.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your most obedient servant,
G. P. WYMER, Brigadier,
Commanding 1st Brigade.

To Captain Polwhele, Assistant-Adjutant General,
Camp Ghuznee.

Camp Rozeh, near Ghuznee, 9th Sept. 1842.

MEMORANDUM.

On the morning of the 5th September, 1842, General Nott moved his camp to take up a position before Ghuznee. An advanced party was ordered to protect a reconnaissance of the works undertaken by the engineer department. On the approach of this party to the hills north of the city, it was opposed in force, but was immediately supported by the General, and thus reinforced, cleared the hills of the enemy, and took possession of the village of Bullal, within 400 yards of the city.

The General immediately ordered this important point, with the heights near the village, to be maintained, and they were occupied by two Regiments of Native Infantry and two 9-pounder guns.

While these operations were going on, the Camp was established at Rozeh, two miles and a half from the city. The guards required for the protection and general duties of the Camp absorbed so many men, that but few were available for the duties of a siege. The General, therefore, determined not to invest the place in form, and directed the engineer to concentrate the resources at his disposal in one spot, where protection might be most conveniently afforded to the siege operations.

With advertence to these instructions the engineer proposed to establish a battery on the edge of the hill north of the town, in advance of the village of Bullal, and distant about 350 yards from the nearest point of the walls. From this battery, it was expected that the four 18-pounder guns would lay open the thin flank wall connecting the citadel on the west with the town wall in a few hours. The defences of the citadel could be swept from the same point by the light Artillery, and the lines of loop-holed wall which would bear on the advance of the storming-party, were all viewed in enfilade from the site selected for the battery. The advance of the party to the assault would have been greatly facilitated by the existence of a thick dam of earth across the ditch, immediately opposite the point marked out for the breach.

It was further proposed that the principal assault should be supported by two other attacks; one, an attempt to blow in the water-gate (both the others having been strongly built up, and the causeways in front of them cut through); another, to escalade a weak point, near the Caubul gate, which would have been greatly aided by the fire of the artillery from the hill.

This project met the General's approval, and at dusk on the evening of the 5th September a working party, composed of the Sappers, and 160 men from the Regiments occupying the hill, commenced work on the battery.

By four A.M. on the 6th September cover for the party had been secured across the ridge of the hill, and so much progress made in the execution of the work as to lead to reasonable expectations that the four 18-pounder guns and two 24-pounder howitzers would be established in position, and ready to open their fire during the day.

Early on the evening of the 5th a brisk matchlock fire was kept up from the citadel on the hill, but this gradually slackened, and at ten P.M. had entirely ceased. The enemy's Infantry had been observed at dusk crossing the river near the water-gate, with the intention, it was supposed, of attacking the working party during the night; but towards the morning of the 6th there was ground for believing that the fort was evacuated. At daylight this was ascertained to be the case by Lieutenant North, of the Engineers, who took possession at that hour of the water-gate without opposition, leaving Ensign Newton and twenty sepoys of the 16th Native Infantry in charge of the gateway, and returning to the battery for further assistance. The whole of the working party was immediately moved into the town, of which, and of the citadel of Ghuznee, they were in possession before sunrise.

EDWARD SANDERS, Major,
Engineers.

From Major E. Sanders, Engineers, to Major General W. Nott, commanding Field Force, Ghuznee, dated Camp, Rogeh, near Ghuznee, 9th Sept. 1842.

SIR,

On the occupation of the fortress of Ghuznee by the troops under your command, I received orders from you to take measures for the destruction of the citadel, to as great an extent as the means at command and the time afforded by a halt of two days would permit.

2. I have the honour to report that the engineer department attached to your force has been employed during the 7th and 8th instant, on the work of demolition, and to state the progress effected.

3. Fourteen mines have been sprung in the walls of the citadel, all with good effect. The upper fort has been completely destroyed, the second line of works extensively breached in two places, and the outer and lower walls have their revetments blown down and greatly injured in three places.

4. In several spots remote from the mines, the walls, though they have not fallen, are so seriously shaken by the explosions, that unless immediate and energetic measures are adopted, on the departure of your force, for their repair and security, they must crumble down during the ensuing winter.

5. The gateways of the town and citadel, and the roofs of the principal buildings, have been fired, and are still burning.

I have, &c.

E. SANDERS, Major,
Engineers.

The General had the great satisfaction of recovering about 327 of the sepoys of the 27th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry, who had been sold into slavery, and dispersed in villages thirty and forty miles round Ghuzni, but the European officers had been marched away to the north, and placed with those who had been captured in the Caubul passes. Many stories were current in Ghuzni of the cruelties to which they had been subjected during their prolonged incarceration. The contracted room in the citadel in which they

had been confined was visited by most of the officers with the army of Candahar, and on the walls were read with feelings of mingled indignation, grief, and mortification, the following words:—

26th May, 1842.

Col. Palmer, Capt. Alston, Lieut. Poett, Lieut. Harris, Ensigns Williams, Nicholson and Davis, Dr Thompson, 27th Regiment Native Infantry, Capt. Lee Burnet, 54th Regiment, and Lieut. Crawford, Shah Soojah's Force, prisoners in Ghuznee through the treachery of Sirdar Shooms ood Deen Khan, his brother, Ghool Mahomed, Naib Roohoolah Khan, and Mirzah Mullich Mahomed, in having broken every article of two treaties solemnly sworn to.

If, on the arrival of any British force, the prisoners are not forthcoming, avenge them on the above-mentioned, and on Khan Mahomed Khan, of Killa Maroof, a cousin of the Sirdars, his brother, Faz Mahomed Khan, and Nuzzer Mahomed. They had charge of the prisoners, and treated them most infamously, having once tortured the Colonel, and taken every opportunity of being insolent and oppressive.

(Signed) C. Harris.

P.S. Khan Mahomed Khan is said to have a wife and two children in Captain Mackeson's power at Peshawur.

(True Copy.)

J. N. Allen.

6th September, 1842.

In compliance with Lord Ellenborough's wishes, Nott removed the gates of Somnath from the tomb of Sultan Mahmoud, which detained him for a day or two longer than he had expected. The

tomb is in the village of Roza, in the neighbourhood of Ghuzni, and is held in great sanctity by the priesthood of Affghanistan. The removal of the gates was effected by some of the Europeans under the orders of the Engineer, and Major Rawlinson has recorded in his private journal, that all possible delicacy was observed in not desecrating the shrine further than was absolutely necessary. "The guardians of the tent, when they perceived our object, retired to one corner of the court, and wept bitterly; and when the removal was effected they again prostrated themselves before the shrine, and uttered loud lamentations." These fellows had no tears of repentance for the odious crimes committed by their lay countrymen; it was not, therefore, to be expected that their wailing and weeping over the loss of some rotten pieces of wood, which had been obtained by the desecration of a temple of the Hindoos, would excite the compassion of the despoilers.*

The private letters addressed by Lord Ellenborough to Major-General Nott upon the receipt of the General's report of his having obtained posses-

* The club and shield of Mahomed had been taken away by Lord Keane's Army, but by what individual the General could not ascertain. "Some people," writes Nott, "declare that Lord Keane expressed a wish to see them, and that they were sent to his tent for the purpose, but never returned." Others declare that Shah Shoojah ool Moolk took them to Caubul.

sion of the gates, sufficiently demonstrate the great interest and importance he attached to their appearance in India.

Simla, October 19, 1842.

GENERAL,

Your letter of the 23rd ult. to Capt. Durand, informing me that you had brought away from Ghuznee the gates of the temple of Somnath, only arrived here yesterday.

I had already had a translation made of the letter I intend to address to the Princes and Chiefs, and all the people of India, on the occasion of the restitution of this great trophy of war; and it will be transmitted immediately to the Princes and Chiefs whose territories are situated on the route between the Sutlej and Somnath. I intend that the gates of the temple should be carried in triumphant procession to the ancient site, on which a temple has been recently erected by a lady of Holkar's family.

I shall publish in a few days an extract from your letter to Captain Durand, announcing that you have brought away the gates, my letter to the Princes and people, and some orders relative to the escort.

You will have to select an officer to communicate with the Princes through whose country the gates will be carried, a Captain, Lieutenant, and Assistant-Surgeon for the escort, one hundred privates, and a double proportion of native commissioned and non-commissioned officers, and two native doctors. All these will have double batta during the service, and furlough for a year at the termination of it. The officer who will be selected by you to communicate with the Princes, &c., will have one thousand rupees a month. I believe I shall attach to this escort one of my Aides-de-Camp, and a portion of the Body Guard, about twenty-five troopers. The escort will bear the Queen's colours. The escort will guard the

gates from the Indus. You will select the privates and native commissioned and non-commissioned officers from any Regiment or Regiments present at the capture of Ghuznee.

I should wish a correct sketch (with the dimensions marked) to be made of the gates, if you are not in march when you receive this letter, or whenever you have an opportunity. The officers you select for the escort had better at once take great care of the gates, which, old as they are, may be ill calculated to bear the shaking of a camel. Perhaps the safest course would be to place them between boards tightly bound together. In their progress to Somnath, they must, if possible, be so packed as to be seen, in a sort of frame, and they must be carried by elephants. I believe I shall have an application from the Sikhs, to be permitted to form a procession, with the gates, before they reach the Sutlej, to which I shall accede, and give you due notice of all that is to be done; only guard the gates as you would your colours.

I remain,
General,
Your very faithful friend,
ELLENBOROUGH.

Major-General Nott,
Jellalabad.

Subathoo, 21st November, 1842.

GENERAL,

I received on the 19th, just as I was leaving Simla, the very interesting report you have sent to me respecting the gates of the Temple of Somnath. When I have the drawings and inscriptions, I shall send a copy of the whole to the Antiquarian Society in London, and they will publish it in their Transactions.

Major Smith, of the Engineers, as I suppose, will prepare everything, on receiving instructions from you, for the convey-

ance of the gates in the intended car. Would Major Sanders send a sketch of the car he imagines? The wheels must, I suppose, be taken from gun carriages. I am not sure that the most appropriate conveyance would not be a car, raised upon gun carriages.

You could not, I believe, have selected a better officer than Major Leech, to communicate with the Chiefs.

I have the honour to remain,
General,
Your's very faithfully,
ELLENBOROUGH.

Major-General Nott.

The capture and destruction of Ghuzni was a great feather in the cap of General Nott, because it was the first blow struck in the act of retribution. He received the congratulations of all the officers who were entitled by their position to address him; Major Sotheby, commanding the Artillery division, offered for his selection part of the celebrated gun, Zubber Jung, which, "thanks to the General's prompt movement from Candahar having been so signally prospered by the Giver of victory," would no longer be a terror to the villages around Ghuzni: Captain Macgregor, the political officer with Sir Robert Sale, wrote—

"Our nation ought to feel indebted to the two armies which have contributed to such a result, and more especially to General Nott, without whose soldier-like decision we should have marched out of the country without again seeing Caubul, and have remained a laughing-stock among nations."

But the most agreeable tribute of approbation was that which proceeded from the pen of Lord Ellenborough himself:—

Simla, October 1, 1842.

GENERAL,

I had the satisfaction of receiving yesterday, at three p.m., your despatch of the 8th, announcing that you were in possession of Ghuznee. I sincerely congratulate you on your having achieved a conquest, of all others the most gratifying, even had it not been attended by the recovery of so many sepoys of the 27th Regiment, whom the Affghans had placed in slavery.

I have been considering with the Commander-in-Chief what could be done to mark most strongly the sense we entertain of your services, and of those of your army. All we can do we have done. The printed order shall be sent as soon as it can be printed.

Your higher reward and most valued honour must come from the Queen.

Believe me,
General,
With the greatest respect,
Your very faithful friend and servant,
ELLENBOROUGH.

Neither the Commander-in-Chief nor I have ever received your account of your victory of the 12th of January. You should, as soon as you can, send duplicates of all your letters written after the insurrection.

Major-General Nott,
Jellalabad.

General Nott now continued his march towards Caubul, not, however, without interruption; for,

as he approached Benee Badam and Mydan, he found Shumshoodeen, Sultan Jan, and other Affghan Chiefs, with an army of 12,000 men, occupying a succession of strong mountain positions directly on his road. The troops, under the General's orders, dislodged them in gallant style, and he found much reason for applauding the conduct of Captain Ferdinand White, of her Majesty's 40th Foot, who commanded the light companies of all the Infantry Regiments.*

While Nott advanced towards Caubul from Candahar, Major-General Pollock made good progress through the passes which had been the scene of the bloody massacre of the previous January. At

Camp Urgundee, 16th Sept., 1842.

SIR,

I have the honour to acquaint you that Shumshoodeen, Sultan Jan, and other Affghan Chiefs, having assembled about 12,000 men, occupied a succession of strong mountain positions, intercepting my march upon Beenee Badam and Mydan, on the 14th and 15th inst. Our troops beat them and dislodged them in gallant style, and their conduct afforded me the greatest satisfaction.

The Artillery distinguished themselves; and I beg to mention the names of Capts. Leslie, Bombay Horse Artillery, Blood, Bombay Foot Artillery, and Anderson and Turner, of the Bengal Horse Artillery, and the 38th and 43rd Bengal Native Infantry. I beg to bring under the favourable notice of Government, Captain White, of Her Majesty's 40th Regiment, in command of the Light Companies of Her Majesty's 40th and 41st Regiments, and of the 2nd, 16th, 38th, 42nd, and 43rd Bengal Native Infantry, for the able manner in which he carried my orders into effect, and for the gallantry displayed by him and the Company's troops under his

Jugdulluck General Pollock gained a decided victory over the troops of Mahomed Ukhbar and the Ghilzie Chiefs. Major-General Sir Robert Sale had, on this occasion, "the glory of leading the army on its triumphal return to the capital of Affghanistan." He led up the heights in advance of his own regiment, under a very hot fire.

The communications between Nott and Pollock were frequent and continuous.* There was no vulgar race for priority of arrival at Caubul. Each was animated by a desire, an honourable desire, to do his duty to his country, and to share the distinction which awaited success; but Pollock got first to the city, and placed the British ensign upon

command, in ascending the mountains and driving the enemy from their positions.

I had every reason to be pleased with the conduct of all the troops, European and Native. I forward a list of killed and wounded.

I am, Sir, yours obediently,

W. Nott,
Major-General.

To Major-General Pollock, C.B.,
Commanding West of the Indus.

* It has been said that Nott did not communicate his progress to Pollock, his superior officer; the best answer to this are his letters to Pollock, which are now before us—From Candahar, 29th April, 1842—6th May—30th May—4th June—10th Aug., Kelat-i-Gilzie—26th Aug., Camp Chusham Neushaka—31st Aug., Camp Ghoine—11th Sept., Camp Pultamek—13th Sept., Shakabad—15th Sept., Mydan—8th Sept., Guznie—16th Sept., Urgundie—17th Sept., Kelat-i-Sultan—and 22nd Sept., Camp Cabul.

the heights of the Bala Hissar. Caubul was reached by Nott on the 17th of September. He pitched his tent four or five miles from the city.

After the defeat of Mahomed Ukhbar Khan in the passes, the Chiefs who had charge of the European prisoners fled with them towards the Hindoo Kosh. Major Eldred Pottinger, who was with them, contrived to give intimation to Major-Generals Pollock and Nott of their whereabouts, in the following letter, which is here literally printed from the original. It is a curious document, and exemplifies the value of an acquaintance with the Greek alphabet. The necessity for baffling the inquisitiveness of the innumerable spies and traitors who were in the service of the Affghan Chiefs had rendered a resort to ciphers of all kinds necessary; but as no kind of hieroglyphic had been arranged between the prisoners and the Generals—none, indeed, could possibly have been—Pottinger hit upon the expedient of making Greek letters do duty for the English (Roman) characters, without using a single Greek word.

Ι βεγ το ινφωρμ γου θατ ωε ανε βριεβεδ θε μαν ωho ας chαργε οφ υς ωαμεδ σαλεεμαοωαδκαν = ωε ανε προμισεδ ιμ 20 θουσανδ ρυπεες ανδ ονε θοοσανδ περ μοντθ = θις συμ ωε ανε ραισεδ αμονγ ουρσελυες, σηουλδ θη γοῦερνμεντ ρεφυσε θη chαργε. φρεε παρδον φορ αλλ παστ οφφενσες ις αλσο προμισεδ το σαλεεμαομαδκαν = σομε οφ θη πρινσιπαλ Ηαζαρα chιεφς ηανε ρισεν ιν ουρ φαυορ ανδ προμισεδ νοτ το αλλοω υς το βε τακεν αωαγ = θεσε αρε

βackeδ βγ σενεραλ κυζζιλβασηες ατ Καβυλ ωηο ανε προμισεδ υς ασσιστανσε — Αλιρυζα καν α μαν ωηο ας ον ευεργ οκκασιον δονε ανγ θινγ ή κουλδ φορ υς ις α πριμε μουερ φορ βυσιυεσς and will I όπε βε ονε οφ θη φιρστ το μεετ γου = ανδ ουιλλ γιυε γου ιν δεταιλ what ις αγεντ σγδμυρτυζα shah ις δοινγ = θις λαττερ ας οπενεδ θη νεγοσιατιονς ανδ ις καρργινγ θεμ ον = Σαλεεμαομαδ ας προμισεδ ον θη ρεσειπτ οφ αν ανςωερ το θις φρομ γου, το μαρch το joιν γουρ καμπ = Ωε άνε νο αρμς βυτ όπε το γετ σομε μυσκετς ανδ βαγονετς which υυιλλ εναβλε υς το όλδ ουτ ιν α φορτ τιλλ γου can σενδ σομε λιγητ τροοπς το ουρ αιδ = ιν κασε οφ μαόμαδακβαρ κομινγ θις ωαγ with α φορσε συφφισιεντ το αττack υς = θη πεοπλε οφ Καβυλ αρε νοτ λικελγ το μακε ανγ δεφενσε ανδ ουρ φριενδς αρε very ανχιους φορ γουρ ηπεεδγ αρριυαλ = ιφ γου κουλδ σενδ σομε τροοπς ονδερ ανγ cιrcumstances: φρομ σηεσηγαο ωηεν your καμπ ρεαchες θατ, by road of Jeghaló, which ις α σηορτ ροαδ θεγ would εναβλε υς το μουε σαφελγ = ιφ γου καννοτ σπαρε οθερς σενδ σομε οφ θοσε Ηυζαρας who άνε joινεδ γου ωιθ α φεω European οφφισερς το αστεν θειρ μουεμεντς = θη Ghilζεε παρτ οφ ουρ Guard ας φαεδ παγ θε βεαρερ handsomely = & λετ υς hear from you quickly.

Your very obedient servant,

ELDRED POTTINGER.

14th Sept. 1842.

Σαλεεμαομαδκαν ωροτε το γου γεστερδαγ
viâ Καβυλ ανδ αλσο το γενεραλ πολλοκ.

(For the benefit of the unlettered, a conversion of the characters into English is subjoined.)

From Bamian. Major-General Nott, Camp.

Sir,

I beg to inform you that we have bribed the man who has charge of us, named Doalee Mahomed Kan, who we have

promised twenty thousand rupees, and one thousand per month. This sum we have raised among ourselves, should the Government refuse the charge. A free pardon for all past offences is also promised to Salee Mahomed Kan. Some of the principal Huzara Chiefs have risen in our favour, and promised not to allow us to be taken away. These are backed by several Kuzzilbashes at Kabul, who have promised us assistance. Aliruza Kan, a man who has on every occasion done anything he could for us, is a prime mover in this business, and will, I hope, be one of the first to meet you, and will give you in detail what his agent Syd Mortuza Shah is doing. This latter has opened the negotiations, and is carrying them on.

Salee Mahomed has promised, on the receipt of an answer to this from you, to march to your camp. We have no arms, but hope to get some muskets and bayonets, which will enable us to hold out in a fort until you could send some light troops to our aid, in case of Mahomed Akbar coming this way with a force sufficient to attack us. The people of Kabul are not likely to make any defence, and our friends are very anxious for your speedy arrival. If you could send some troops under any circumstances from Shish Tao, when your camp reaches that by the road of Jighaloo, which is a short road, they would enable us to move safely; if you cannot spare others, send some of those Hazzaras who have joined with a few European officers to shorten their movements. The Ghilzee part of our guard have fled. Pay the bearer handsomely, and let us hear from you quickly.

Your very obedient servant,

EDWARD POTTINGER.

September, 1842.

Salee Mahomed Khan wrote to you yesterday viâ Kabul, and also to General Pollock.

This letter appears to have reached Major-General Pollock before Nott could get to Caubul, and we see in the subjoined note how he had acted upon its receipt:—

17th September.

My dear General,

We have sent 700 Kuzzilbashes to Bamian, and Sir R. Shakespear accompanies them. It is known that Mahomed Akbar has gone towards Kohistan; he cannot have any very great forces, one or two thousand horse, and may possibly attempt to get the prisoners; will you, therefore, send, in the direction of Bamian, a brigade. Instruct the officer that the object is merely to make a demonstration in favour of the party already gone. I therefore wish that the party you send should get into no difficulty, and risk nothing. I feel pretty certain that after what has happened Mahomed Akbar will be very unwilling to advance if he hears that a force is on its way to rescue the prisoners.

Your's very truly,

Geo. Pollock.

To Major-General Nott.

To this note Major-General Nott immediately sent the following reply:

Camp Kellat-i-Sultan Jan, 17th Sept., 1842.

My dear General,

I have been favoured with your note of this date, in which you express a wish that I should detach a brigade towards Bamian. Before you decide on sending it I would beg to state as follows:—

1st. The troops under my command have just made a long and very difficult march of upwards of thirty miles, and they have been continually marching about for the last six months,

and most certainly require rest for a day or two, the same with my camels and other cattle. I lost twenty-nine camels yesterday, and expect to-day's report will be double that number.

2nd. I am getting short of supplies, and can see but little probability of getting a quantity equal to my daily consumption at this place. I have little or no money.

3rd. I have so many sick and wounded that I fear I shall have the greatest inconvenience and difficulty in carrying them, and should any unnecessary operations add to their number they must be left to perish, and if I remain here many days I shall expect to lose half my cattle, which will render retirement very difficult.

4th. I sincerely think that sending a small detachment will and must be followed by deep disaster. No doubt Mahomed Acbur Shumshoodeen and the other Chiefs are uniting their forces, and I hourly expect to hear that Sir R. Shakespear is added to the number of British prisoners. In my last affair with Shumshoodeen and Sultan Jan they had 10,000 men, and my information is, that two days ago they set off in the direction of Bamian.

After much experience in this country my opinion is, that if the system of sending out detachments should be adopted, disaster and ruin will follow.

After bringing the above to your notice, showing that my men require rest for a day or two, that my camels are dying fast, and that my supplies are nearly expended, you should order my force to be divided, I shall have nothing to do but implicitly to obey your orders. But, my dear General, I feel assured you will excuse me when I most respectfully venture to protest against it under the circumstances above noted.

I could have wished to have stated this in person to you, but I have been so very unwell for the last two months that I am sure you will kindly excuse me.

The club and shield had been taken away by Lord Keane's army, but by what individual I do not know. Some people declare that Lord Keane expressed a wish to see them, and that they were sent to his tent for that purpose, but never returned; others declare that Shah Shooja ool Moolk took them to Kabool.

Yours sincerely,
W. NOTT.

It is due to the character and the memory of the worthy and gallant Nott that the contents of the foregoing letter should be pondered, for it has been alleged that his refusal to send a brigade was the result of an indifference to the fate of the prisoners. He was urged, it was said, by Rawlinson and the officers of his own force, to despatch a brigade to the rescue, and he continued inflexible, "declaring* that he had only one object in view, that of marching his force to India viâ Cabul, without turning to the right or left; and that he considered, from the tenor of all Lord Ellenborough's despatches, the recovery of the prisoners to be a matter of indifference to the Government." How far these representations in Major Rawlinson's letter conveyed an exact impression of what Nott said we have no means of determining, but Kaye certainly gives them, by his own remarks, much greater force than his MS. correspondence warrants.

To any one who has marked the power which

* Kaye's Affghan War. Vol. II, p. 615, note.

"humanity" exercised over the actions of General Nott, under all circumstances, it will seem monstrous that the faintest suspicion should ever have been harboured of his supineness when the lives of his own countrymen were at stake. When other Generals would have rushed headlong into expeditions with inadequate means, Nott, with all his well-grounded confidence in his troops, invariably put aside every consideration of professional aggrandizement in the presence of insufficiency of carriage, poverty of supplies, and the state of his hospitals. Not merely the human beings, but the very animals in his charge, were, with him, objects of solicitude. Look back upon his fierce denunciations and severe chastisement of the plunderers of the innocent and helpless—recall his anxious care for the safety of his troops in all his difficult marches—recollect the readiness with which, in the depths of winter, he endeavoured to rescue the garrison of Ghuzni by the despatch of M'Laren's brigade—observe the promptitude with which Wymer was sent, now to relieve Khelat-i-Ghilzie, then to aid England in the Kojuck—and finally cast a glance at Candahar, and behold the people, relying habitually on his justice, his gentleness, his uniform kindness, approaching him familiarly, seeking his counsel and support, and tendering such humble offerings of their good-will as he could accept without a compromise of his inde-

pendent position. Let all these points be allowed due weight, and the imputation of want of feeling will be dismissed with indignation.

But judge the case on its own military merits; without giving General Nott the advantage of a character for humanity, his conduct is still perfectly defensible. His troops were worn and harassed—on the 17th of September he reached the vicinity of Caubul—and *on that very day* he was called upon by the only authority he was justified in recognizing, to divide his army. His answer was just what any General, mindful of the thousands under his command, would have returned. He had seen quite enough of the folly and wickedness of sending comparatively small detachments against an *unknown* number of enemies in a difficult position. The fate of England at Hykulzye, of Wild in the Khyber, of Clibborn in the Nuffoosk, and several more, was quite sufficient to make him recoil from such headlong enterprises. Nothing was *positively* known of the strength of the Affghans between Bameean and Caubul. If they were scattered, the handful of horse under Shakespear would suffice for the rescue —if they were in force, all Nott's army would have been required to wrest the captives from their sanguinary hands. And, as the result proved, there was no necessity for sending any troops at all, for the prisoners had effected their own liberation, in

the manner stated by Pottinger. Shakespear met them on their way to join Pollock's army.

After all, however, Nott did not refuse to despatch a brigade to Bameean. He simply remonstrated against what he considered to be a dangerous and unprofitable measure. General Pollock was his senior, and could have commanded him to perform the duty. But how did Pollock determine the matter? Read his note of the 17th September, after receiving Nott's remonstrances—

MY DEAR GENERAL,

I will pay you a visit to-morrow morning, leaving this at an early hour, and will return again in the evening. *I left it entirely at your discretion to detach a brigade, and as you seem to think it unadvisable, it need not be done.* Shakespear will reach the prisoners to-morrow morning. Till we meet, adieu.

Your's very sincerely,

GEO. POLLOCK.

17th September.

A protracted halt of the army took place at Caubul, for the reasons of which, as Major-General (now Sir George) Pollock was alone responsible, the reader may consult Mr Kaye's History. It was very unfortunate in several respects. It produced irritation among the troops; it caused a rapid consumption of supplies; some plundering took place, and money became scarce among the soldiers of Nott's division. Complaints were made to General Pollock of the

marauding habits of Nott's men. Nott denied that there was any foundation for the complaints, for no proof could be adduced of the facts; and wrote strong remonstrances, first to Captain Ponsonby, Pollock's Assistant Adjutant-General, and then to Pollock himself. If, in these letters, any irritation is apparent, it must be remembered that General Nott, after many months of successful and independent action, was now chafing under a detention which he believed to be quite unnecessary, and for which he was in no degree to blame.

Camp near Cabool, 22nd September, 1842.

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this day's date, and to acquaint you that I conceive that General Pollock must have received some erroneous information—no army ever moved with fewer instances of plunder than that under my command, and not an instance of irregularity has occurred without punishment being inflicted. The persons who have made this compaint ought to be made to prove the truth of what they say. I believe the enemy (I mean Futteh Jung's party and the rest of the people) are organizing a system to bring our men to the same state of starvation to which General Elphinstone's army was reduced, in hopes of the same results. While I think it my duty to state this, I must declare that I will not, to please a few Affghans, who have scarcely washed their hands from the blood of our countrymen, allow my army to be destroyed and my country to be dishonoured. There is grain in the country, and I think it ought to be brought in immediately, the same being paid for.

General Pollock's orders shall be proclaimed through my camp immediately, but I have not heard of a single act of plunder during the last twenty-four hours.

Camp near Cabool, 22nd September, 1842.

My dear General,

I left Candahar with sufficient supplies to take my force to Jellalabad on full rations, but in consequence of the great delay which has occurred at this place, I am now reduced to provisions for seven days, exclusive of the little grain produced yesterday.

The people are not inclined to sell even at the high price offered. I cannot see my troops, who have overcome so many difficulties during the last four years, starve as long as supplies are in the conntry, and I must therefore send parties out to seize what will be sufficient to take my army to Jellalabad, paying for the same; but I cannot properly arrange unless I am made acquainted with the probable day of our march from this place. I know that Futteh Jung and his party will do all in their power to keep us here as long as possible; but what is called his party is really the party of Mahomed Akbar, and while we are delaying here, I have no doubt they are organizing a regular system of opposition in the passes, and unless we act with decision and energy, throwing aside pretended friends, we shall meet with considerable difficulty, and, perhaps, suffer some new disasters from the want of provisions or the severity of the weather, which will soon become too cold for our men, and our cattle will perish.

To enable me to judge of the quantity of supplies which it will be necessary for me to take from this, I could wish to be informed what number of days' provisions I may expect to find in store at Jellalabad for my army.

I believe you must have received a copy of the Governor

General's despatch to my address under date 4th of July last, if not, I will do myself the pleasure of sending it for your perusal.

If we were writing a history of the war in Affghanistan, instead of the biography of the most illustrious actor in that interesting drama, it would be our care to go into an account of all the measures that were taken for imparting to Prince Futteh Jung, and afterwards to Prince Shahpoor, the semblance of kingly authority, that the people of Caubul might be induced to be civil towards the British troops, and assist them to supplies. In all these matters, however, the biographer has been anticipated by the historian, and it would be scarcely necessary to advert to a single one of the incidents which marked the prolonged halt at Caubul, had not attempts been made to give an exaggerated colouring to the conduct of the Candahar army, and to impress the public with a notion that Nott was all for violence and destruction, reckless in his antipathy to the Affghans, and eager to destroy the Bala Hissar and the city of Caubul. For the irritation apparent in his correspondence and conversation, God knows there was cause enough! General Pollock seems to have inhaled some of the atmospheric particles bequeathed by the credulous M'Naghten. He had formed much the same estimate of the Affghans

with the deluded Envoy, and was averse to those prompt and signal measures which seemed to correspond in Nott's view, with the character of a British General, and the instructions he had received from the Government. Amongst other proofs of the readiness to believe the calumnies of the Affghans which marked General Pollock at this juncture, may be cited his invitation to Nott to reply to the charges of the Wuzeer and the Kuzzilbash Chief. Nott could not avoid answering the libels when thus sent to him, but it would have been more just to a General who had always so strenuously endeavoured to check plunder, to have returned the offensive document to the writer.

An Abstract Translation of a Letter from Gholamur Mohammed Khan, the Vuzeer Khan, Shureen Khan, the Kuzzulbash Chief, to the Address of General Pollock, C.B.

A.C.—On the 14th Shahban (20th Sept.), the inhabitants of Aushar and Churdeh were plundered by the Candahar force, and sustained loss of life and property (1); their women were not respected. In the village of Deh Daun Causim, and in Zibah, Timour Khan, and at Churdeh, two persons were killed (2). The Ausharees are employed in your service

(1). This is unfounded, with the exception of a few worthless articles stolen by surwans and grass-cutters, and for which they were most severely punished.

(2). I never heard of two Affghans having been killed, but four Europeans, unarmed, walking at a little distance from camp, were killed by these monsters.

in the rescue of your prisoners; if their houses are plundered, and their people (3) killed, all confidence among the people will at once be destroyed. If it is your intention that protection should be afforded to the people, and to avail yourself of our services (4), redress should be granted.

Under our promises of protection do the people return to their homes. We are satisfied that it is not your pleasure that the troops should behave in this manner (5).

To-day, the 15th Shahban (21st Sept.) the army which was appointed to destroy Meer Hassin's fort, also destroyed the property belonging to people of the neighbourhood; these people should also have redress granted them (6). If the English do not grant them redress, the ryots (7) will fly from their homes, and they will have no longer confidence in us.

Just now, news has reached us that the Candahar force has encamped at Allahabad (8), which belongs to us, and where

(3). What people? The population of this valley had left it before my force arrived, and have not been here since, with the exception of a few individuals.

(4). Why are not these resources brought in when an extravagant price is offered for them?

(5). This is a false assertion, for which the writer ought to be instantly punished. The troops have not behaved ill.

(6). What this man means by this I know not. No army, no detachment, was appointed by me to destroy a fort. I did hear that General Sale ordered one to be burnt, but whether he did so or not I do not know, but if he did I dare say he had good reasons.

(7). I repeat that there are no ryots in the villages. All men capable of bearing arms are with different Chiefs, and there is no knowing the hour we may be attacked by them.

(8). Yes, I have encamped, and I can but admire the extreme insolence of this man in presuming to object to it.

our families are lodged (9). The force has already plundered our grain and fruit (10). If your friends suffer in this way, what may your enemies expect (11). Those people who returned to the town are leaving it again. Redress should be speedily granted, and Sardars should be stationed at each village for its protection (12).

(True abstract.)

(Translation.) G. H. MACGREGOR,
A.D.C.

Mr Kaye ingenuously admits that the Chief of the Kuzzilbashes was anxious to pay his respects to Nott, who refused to receive him. The refusal was no doubt suggestive of the calumnies.

The army lingered at Caubul until the 11th of October. Hearing that Ameer Oolla Khan, one of the hostile Chieftains, was endeavouring to collect a force of Barukzyes, to attack the British on their way from Caubul, and believing, moreover, that the

(9). This is false, there are no families near the place.

(10). This is false, with the exception of fruit in the immediate vicinity of camp.

(11). We have not a friend in Affghanistan, and I know what our enemies ought to expect for their cruelty, treachery, and bloody murders.

(12). What insolence in this man, whose hands are still red with the blood of our countrymen, to dictate how and when we are to place our troops.

I cannot conclude my remarks on this document without offering my opinion that the writer should be instantly seized and punished for sending such a grossly false and insolent statement.

(Signed) W. NOTT,
Major-General.

capture of Mahomed Ackbar was possible, General Pollock had dispatched a force to Istaliff, under Major-General M'Caskill.* On the 7th of October, M'Caskill returned to camp, having dispersed the Affghans, and destroyed Istaliff.

We have here his despatch descriptive of the operations at Istaliff.

From Major-General McCaskill, K.H., commanding detachment in Kohistan, to Captain Ponsonby, Assistant Adjutant-General.

Camp Istalif, 30th September, 1842.

SIR,

I have the satisfaction to acquaint you, for the information of Major-General Pollock, C.B., that the troops under my command yesterday made themselves masters of the strong and populous town of Istaliff, totally defeating the numerous levies collected for its defence, under the infamous Ameen-oollah Khan Loguree, Khaojie Ameer Kotwal, Hazin Khan (an assassin of Sir Alexander Burnes), Hazir Alec Khan, Khuleefa Ibrahim, and many other Chiefs of Cabool and the Kohistan.

The Major-General is aware that the force detailed below †

* Major-General Sir John M'Caskill was afterwards slain in battle with the Seikhs, on the banks of the Sutlej.

† Artillery: Captain Backhouse's Mountain Train; Captain Blood's battery of 9-pounders (Bombay); two 18-pounders.

Cavalry: head-quarters and 2 squadrons of Her Majesty's 3rd Light Dragoons; 1st squadron, 1st Light Cavalry; Captain Christie's (late S. S. 2nd regt.) corps of Cavalry.

Infantry: Brigadier Tulloch's Brigade, with the addition of Captain Broadfoot's Sappers and Miners, and the exception of the 60th Native Infantry; Brigadier Stacey's Brigade.

was placed at my disposal, for operations in these valleys on the 25th; the two Brigades formed a junction near Khowja Rawash, on the 26th; moved to an encampment near Zimuree on the 27th, and pitched their tents within four miles of the place on the 28th. The same evening I reconnoitred the enemy's position; it is impossible to conceive ground naturally stronger. The town of Istaliff, consisting of masses of houses and forts, is built on the slope of a mountain, in the rear of which are yet loftier eminences, shutting in a defile which leads to Toorkistan, and in no way can this place of abode of fifteen thousand people be approached, but by surmounting ranges of hills, separated by deep ravines, or traversed by narrow roads. Its gardens, vineyards, and orchards, fenced in with strong enclosure walls. The whole of them, with the mountain side, and tops of the houses, were occupied by Jezailchies, and the strongest proof is afforded, that the enemy, after this disposition, considered the place unassailable, by their having retained within the town the wives and children, not only of the inhabitants, but of thousands of refugees from Cabool.

The observations which I was enabled to make under a sharp Jezail fire, and the report of Major Pottinger, induced me to determine to assault the next morning the right of the enemy's extensive position, as it was there that I could hope to bring the artillery most effectively into battery; arrangements were made with this view. The troops were formed into two columns of attack and reserve; Brigadier Tulloch's brigade, and the mountain train, composed the right; Brigadier Stacey's and Captain Blood's battery, and the 18-pounders the left; these were supported by the third column, under Major Simmonds, of her Majesty's 41st, consisting of a wing of his Regiment, and the Cavalry, under Major Lockwood; Captain Christie's Corps protected the baggage.

The troops moved soon after daylight, and traversing the

plain in perfect order, passed nearly from the left to the right of the enemy's position. Our light troops, and guns, repressed the occasional attacks of their Jezailchies from the gardens, who were numerous and most audacious; but when the column arrived in front of the village of Ismillah, I resolved to make a combined attack on this point; Brigadier Tulloch's brigade assailed its left, and Brigadier Stacey, making a longer detour, attacked the right.

I cannot express in adequate terms my admiration of the style in which the former column, covered by skirmishers, rushed upon the gardens filled with bold and skilful marksmen. Her Majesty's 9th Foot, the 26th Native Infantry, and Captain Broadfoot's Sappers, vied with each other in steady courage, and their rapid and unhesitating advance soon left the enemy no resources but flight. Very shortly after this assault, the three light companies of her Majesty's 41st, the 42nd and 43rd Native Infantry, covering their own column, got into action, and on their side stormed the village and vineyard with distinguished gallantry: the combination was steadily persevered in, and though I had few opportunities of using the artillery with effect, I had soon the gratification of seeing the enclosures, forts, heights, suburbs, and town successively won by the two columns. The enemy were driven from them, and pursued with a rapidity which left no time to rally, and a singular spectacle was then presented, in the escape up the mountain's side of the women and children from the place, to which no interception was offered; but as detached parties of the beaten Affghans still occupied some very lofty heights, the mountain train ascended them by a dizzy pathway, and dispersed the fugitives by its effective fire. Our reserve was now established on the lower heights, and the whole of the place, filled with property of every description, much of it plundered from our army in 1841, was in the hands of our force: two guns, brass field-pieces, were also

taken, and one of them was seized with such promptitude, that its captor, Lieutenant Elmhirst, her Majesty's 9th Foot, turned its fire upon the fugitives with some effect. I directed the town to be set on fire in several places, after taking out various supplies which might be useful to our troops, and the work of demolition is still proceeding, under the direction of Major Sanders, of the Engineers. Our loss has been trifling, for the advance of our officers and men was too rapid and decisive to allow of the sharp fire of the enemy telling much upon them, and deceived by the direction of the reconnoissance of the 28th, the Affghans had expected the attack on their left, and posted their guns and the elite of their force in that quarter. I have now the pleasing task of expressing the amount of my obligations for their exertions in the field to Brigadiers Tulloch and Stacey, commanding brigades and columns; to Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, K.H., her Majesty's 9th Foot; Major Huish, 26th Native Infantry: and Captain Broadfoot, of the Sappers, commanding Corps on the right, which bore the brunt of the action; Major Simmonds, her Majesty's 41st Foot, commanding the Reserve; to Captain Backhouse, commanding mountain train; and Captain Blood, commanding the battery of nine-pounders; the last was ably aided by Lieutenant Terry. I have received valuable assistance throughout our operations from Major Pottinger, C.B., and Major Sanders, Engineers, and yesterday from Captain Mackenzie, and Lieutenant Airy, her Majesty's 3rd Buffs; and Lieutenant Webb, 30th Regiment, Madras Native Infantry, temporarily attached to me; and since we marched from Cabool, as on former occasions, from my own Staff, departmental and personal; viz., Captain Havelock, Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General; Lieutenant Pollock, Artillery, Aide-de-Camp to the Major-General, who volunteered his services with me; and to Lieutenant Bethune, her Majesty's 9th Foot, my own Aide-de-Camp. Regarding the last-

mentioned officer, I take the opportunity of rectifying an oversight on my part. I ought specially to have reported to Major-General Pollock, Lieutenant Bethune's valuable services in the recent affair at the Haft Kotul, in which I was entrusted with the command of the main column. Brigadier Tulloch mentions in very strong terms the good conduct on the present occasion of Captain Smith, her Majesty's 9th Foot, his Brigade Major. I enclose a return of the killed and wounded, and of the guns captured.

I have, &c.,

JOHN MCCASKILL,

Major-General,

Commanding the Force in the Kohistan.*

* One of the actors in the busy scene at Istaliff was the late Captain Mackenzie, of the 41st Foot, who has left behind him the following record of his impressions.

"The night was bitter, intensely cold; it was scarcely possible to sleep, and many of us were unprovided with either cloaks or posteens. The wind rose high and cutting about midnight; a sharp frost set in, and continued throughout the whole of the following day and night. During the earlier part of tha day, towards the close of the fighting, which had continued for nearly five hours, and when the terrified inhabitants became conscious that their last hope of successfully resisting us was gone, and that the city must inevitably be ours within another hour, they had poured forth in hundreds from the upper part of the town, and begun to ascend the heights in its rear, to seek safety in flight and the fastnesses of the hills beyond. Hundreds of women and children, enveloped in their long white boorkas, studded the side of the mountain, as they plied their rapid and dangerous way toward the summit. Every moment their numbers became more dense, until, at length, the face of the hill appeared almost as if a wide and snow-like sheet had overspread it. The whole of the female population of Caubul, and their families, had been removed, for greater safety, to Istaliff, on the near approach of General Pollock's force,—the impression

The manner in which the retributory visit of the armies to Caubul was to be marked, had for some

obtaining that the "Maiden City," as it was termed, and which was traditionally known never to have been taken, and hence, considered impregnable,—would never, by any possibility, fall into our hands. Fatal mistake! It fell; and throughout that bitter and inclement night the shrieks and wailings of perishing thousands were borne past by every icy gust which howled amid the ruins of the old castle, chanting, as it were, an unearthly requiem over the stark remains of poor Evans, who had been shot through the heart on that eventful day. It was subsequently reported that upwards of 4,000 men, women, and children, had perished, from cold and hunger, among the mountains.

"A mighty woe had indeed fallen upon the devoted city. Its pride was quenched for ever, for, superadded to the thousands which had succumbed to the extermination of cold and famishment among the hills, the purling and slender rivulets which careered adown her precipitous streets and declivities, were deeply tinged with the blood of numbers of her defenders, whose lifeless and mutilated forms, mingled in incongruous heaps with every imaginable description of merchandise, furniture, tents, brocades, velvets, satins, and similar costly articles, choked up every avenue which led to the citadel. The sufferings of these devoted people must have been terrific.

"On the morning of our departure from this scene of slaughter and devastation, even the fear of being shot down by the rear-guard did not deter numbers of famishing wretches from swarming different portions of the encamping ground, which had been but a few minutes before evacuated, and gathering together every rag or piece of clothing they could find, and every revolting particle of offal or bone that was likely to appease their ravenous hunger. This I witnessed with my own eyes, when, as the troops departed, I lingered behind for a few brief and sad moments over the scarce recognisable grave of my poor friend, the youthful, gallant, and ill-fated Evans, and M'Kerriker, the former a brother subaltern with

time been a subject of grave consideration with General Pollock. Mr Kaye says in his history, that had General Nott been in supreme authority at Caubul, he would have destroyed the Bala Hissar, and the city, and marched on with the least possible delay, to Jellalabad. As regards the Bala Hissar

me in the Light Company, and whom I had known as a child: and the latter, also a Light Bob, one of the bravest and most favourite of my men. And yet, as I bent a last look upon that spot, which even I could scarcely recognise, so metamorphosed had it become by the heaps of straw which had been burnt upon it, and the quantity of feathers and rubbish strewn over it, to prevent its being detected by the enemy after our departure, whose invariable practice, whenever they discovered the grave of an infidel, is to disinter the body, mutilate it, and cast it to the four winds of heaven,—yet, as I say, when I looked a last adieu upon the gory resting-place of the boy soldier, thus smitten in the very bud of youth, and hope, and glory, but who had, nevertheless, attained the zenith of affectionate esteem in the hearts of all his comrades, and the veteran soldier that slept beside him; it was a matter of somewhat mournful gratification that, scarce recognised by myself now, that mountain grave would remain undesecrated and unpolluted by the hand of the ruthless and vindictive Affghan, I turned from that dreary spot with a pained heart and an humbled spirit. I gave them all that I could give—a sigh—a parting tear. I went on my way, breathing a prayer for the peace of their mortal ashes, and yet another for the salvation and bliss of their franchised and ethereal-ised spirits, unforgetful also, in all the humility of a genuine grief, of one silent yet soul-felt impulse of homage and thanksgiving to that sole Omniscient Ruler of the universe, who had so long spared and might still spare me amid dangers as imminent, and battle-fields as stormy and blood-dyed as that in which those noble and gallant hearts had fallen."—*Note to 'Zeila.'*

and the onward movement, Mr Kaye is right in his surmise. But Nott would have spared the city.

The Bala Hissar was untouched by General Pollock, because, forsooth, the Chiefs had pleaded that a Suddozye Prince should maintain the appearance of royalty in the Palace of his fathers, and that the people resident in that citadel, had in time of peril, been *faithful to Futteh Jung!* "So," naïvely adds Mr Kaye, "Pollock determined to destroy the great Bazaar," for no other reason than that the mutilated remains of the murdered Envoy had been exhibited there to the insolent gaze of the Affghans. Nott would have spared the Bazaar. He deemed it cruel, unnecessary, and unworthy of the British character, to destroy the marts of the working population. The citadels and ramparts of the Chiefs, are the proper objects of warlike retribution. Public opinion will surely award to General Nott, the palm of humanity and rationality in this view of the case.*

* The halt which the combined armies of Pollock and Nott had made at Cabul was not only much longer than we had anticipated on our arrival at the capital, but was entirely against the wish and advice of General Nott. This long delay was, however, rendered necessary by the march of General MacCaskill's division to Istaliff; an expedition, the judiciousness and expediency of which the gallant commander of the Candahar division did not admit.

Winter was now coming on apace; the snow already appeared on the summits of the distant mountains; and when it was considered that latterly it was, perhaps, more owing to the inclemency of the weather than to the formidable opposition of the Affghans in

The last letters written by Nott to his daughters, from Caubul, bear the respective dates of the 26th

the field, that the number of our unfortunate troops had been reduced, there was a prevalent feeling of anxiety that the day for our departure should be named.

Before leaving, however, it was requisite that "a lasting proof of the British power should be left in Cabul, consistent with British humanity," and on the 9th October commenced the demolition, by order of General Pollock, *of one of the bazaars at Cabul.*

To this work of destruction General Nott was decidedly averse, and he most strenuously urged the propriety of razing the Bala Hissar.

The springing of the first mine was the signal for all the camp followers to rush into the town, and commence a work of the most disgraceful plunder, a result which might have been expected, and which, indeed, was predicted. Guards, it is true, were placed at the different gates, to prevent any one entering while the work of destruction was going on; but there were many points of ingress besides the gates, and all attempts to keep out the followers were futile. It is not to be denied that *several of the soldiers* contributed to the irregularities, but the misconduct of a few men does not criminate the actions of an army.

Exasperated as our troops were, it is a matter of surprise that they practised forbearance to the extent they did, and it must ever be a subject of astonishment, that when an opening for revenge was given, the city of Cabul should have been spared.—*Captain Neil's Narrative.*

"As a last memento of the British invasion, the arched bazaars of the city of Caubul were destroyed, and buried in a confused mass of blackened ruins. This has always appeared to me rather a wanton mode of exciting the hostility of the harmless Bunnists against us, for the insurrection and its concomitant disasters arose not amongst the mercantile community of Caubul, but amongst the warlike mountain tribes. To punish the unfortunate house owners of the bazaars was not dignified retaliation for our losses."—*Captain McKinnon's Narrative.*

September and 7th October. An extract from each will testify to his sentiments.

Cabool, 26th September, 1842.

Why we are remaining here, I know not. In fact, I know nothing, and am not admitted into the State secrets of a set of boys, by whom General P—— seems to be surrounded. I only know that my army marched thus far, through the very heart of Affghanistan, *victorious*, and had I not been superseded, I would have blown up the Cabool Bala Hissar, asserted our national honour, and the reputation of the British arms, and at this moment should have been five marches on my road to Jellalabad—but I have no voice in present proceedings, and only know that as usual, instead of boldly and nobly representing, and upholding the character of our country, we are hourly suffering disgrace. I do not think that any disaster can possibly occur to such an army, but this I *do* know, that if it were possible, the people in power here would accomplish it; whether their want of energy and decision will bring it upon us, a few days will show. Recollect I have *nothing* to do with affairs here. How I do long to hear of your health, and to be with you. Fancy how I feel this unnecessary delay.

Cabool, 7th October, 1842.

What we are staying for I am utterly at a loss to know, unless it be, to be laughed at by the Affghans, and the whole world. I cannot bear to witness such scenes, but recollect, from the moment I arrived at Cabool, I had nothing to do with public affairs. Had I commanded, I would have blown up the famed Bala Hissar, and at this moment should have had my little veteran army at Peshawur. This horrid delay is truly annoying. Fortunately the season as yet, has been unusually mild, or our own men would have suffered greatly; but what man of sense would have run the risk, for the sake

of following at the heels, and dancing attendance on a set of Affghans, whose hands are still red with the blood of our murdered countrymen! Shame, shame!

The duty consigned to Pollock and Nott, having been performed to the entire satisfaction of the Government, the hour of recompense had arrived. It will be seen by the following General Orders, that Lord Ellenborough was no niggard of reward. He was as profuse of substantial honour, as he had been generous in the expression of applause. To the merits of the army of Candahar, he was peculiarly alive. The brilliant operations in the Khyber had not dazzled him. He had read of all that had been done and endured by the force under General Nott,—he saw that to the prowess of that General, under any vicissitude, the retention of the character of Great Britain, in Affghanistan, was entirely owing,—and he resolved that the tributes so often borne by Nott to the valour and steadiness, and unswerving fidelity of the Sepoys, should receive full ratification.

General Orders by His Excellency the Commander in Chief, Head Quarters, Simla, 4th October, 1842.

By the Right Honourable the Governor General of India.

The Governor General, earnestly desirous of evincing the gratitude of the Government of India towards the general officers, officers, and non-commissioned officers and privates, engaged in the operations of the present campaign in Affghanistan, is pleased, after communicating with His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, to declare the following resolutions:

1. All the general officers, officers, non-commissioned officers and privates, serving under the command of Major-General Pollock, of Major-General Nott, and of Major-General England, between Attock and Ali Musjid, and in and above the Khyber Pass, and in and above the Bolan Pass, on the 8th of September, shall receive a donation of six months' batta, payable on the 1st of January 1843.

2. In perpetual commemoration of their distinguished services, the 2nd and 16th Regiments of Bengal Native Infantry shall be hereafter Regiments of Grenadiers, and the 38th, 42nd, and 43rd Regiments of Bengal Native Infantry shall be hereafter Regiments of Light Infantry.

3. The Regiment of Bengal Irregular Infantry, lately known as the third Regiment of Infantry in the service of Shah Sooja, shall, in consideration of the valour, discipline, and fortitude manifested by that Regiment on many occasions, and especially in the defence of Kelat-i-Ghilzie, continue embodied under its present Commandant, Captain J. H. Craigie, and be brought on the strength of the Bengal Army as an extra Regiment, and be denominated the "Regiment of Kelat-i-Ghilzie." The future establishment of the Regiment of Kelat-i-Geilzie, and other details consequent upon this resolution, will be made known in a separate General Order.

4. Major General Nott will communicate to the Governor General the designations of every corps engaged in the several actions with the enemy in the vicinity of Candahar, between the 1st of January and the 10th of August, 1842, specifying the particular actions in which such corps were engaged, and the Major-General will state which of such corps are in his judgment entitled to bear hereafter the word "Candahar" upon their standards or colours and appointments, in commemoration of their services.

To such corps of the Indian army as the Major-General may name, the honour of so bearing the word "Candahar" will be immediately accorded by the Governor General.

5. The several corps of the Indian army which on the 6th of September occupied Ghuznee, and the several corps which on the 16th of September and the following days occupied Cabool, will hereafter bear upon their standards or colours and appointments the words "Ghuznee" and "Cabool" respectively, with the figures "1842" underwritten.

The several corps under Major-General Nott which reached Cabool subsequently to the 16th of September, will be equally entitled with the troops previously occupying that city to the honour of bearing the word "Cabool" with the figures "1842" underwritten, upon their standards or colours and appointments.

6. Major-General Pollock will communicate to the Governor General, the designations of the corps under his command, which were engaged in the operations proceeding the occupation of Cabool, but did not advance to that city, and will name such of those corps as he may deem entitled to bear the word "Cabool," with the figures "1842" underwritten, upon their standards or colours and appointments, as having contributed to the capture of that city by their previous service in this campaign; and to such corps, being of the Indian army, as the Major-General may so name, the honour of so bearing the word "Cabool" will be immediately accorded by the Governor General.

7. To every general officer, officer, non-commissioned officer, and private, present on the occasions above mentioned, in action with the enemy in the vicinity of Candahar, will be presented a silver medal inscribed

CANDAHAR,

1842.

and to every general officer, officer, non-commissioned officer, and private, present with the army under Major General Nott, in the operations leading to the capture of Ghuznee, and the occupation of Cabool, will be presented a similar silver medal inscribed

GHUZNEE,
CABOOL,
1842.

Where the same person shall be entitled to both distinctions one medal only will be presented, and such medal will be inscribed

CANDAHAR,
GHUZNEE,
CABOOL,
1842.

Major-General Nott will transmit to the Governor General nominal lists of the several general officers, officers, non-commissioned officers and privates so entitled respectively.

8. Major-General Pollock will transmit to the Governor General a nominal list of the general officers, officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates, present in action with the enemy in the several operations of his army leading to the occupation of Cabool, and to every person named in such list a silver medal will be presented, inscribed

CABOOL,
1842.

On the reverse of these several medals will be inscribed the words

VICTORIA,
VINDEX.

9. To every officer, non-commissioned officer and private, present within Kelat-i-Ghilzie, and forming part of the garrison thereof during the late investment and blockade of that fort, will be presented a silver medal bearing a mural crown with the superscription of "Kelat-i-Ghilzie," and, on the reverse, the word

INVICTA,
1842.

Captain J. H. Craigie, late Commandant of the fort of Kelat-i-Ghilzie, will transmit to Major-General Nott a

nominal list of the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates, so present in Kelat-i-Ghilzie, and so entitled to the medal above granted, and to every person named in such list, when sanctioned by Major-General Nott, the medal will be given.

10. All the medals above mentioned, are to be worn suspended to a ribbon similar to that which will be given with the Jellalabad medal, which ribbon will be henceforth the military ribbon of India.

11. The regimental colours of the Regiment of Kelat-i-Ghilzie will be composed of the three colours of the military ribbon of India, and in the centre thereof will be inscribed the word "Kelat-i-Ghilzie."

12. The Governor General will, after communication with, and in conjunction with, His Excellency the Commander in Chief, represent to the Authorities in England, the high services rendered by the officers of Her Majesty's and of the Indian army in the operations of the present campaign in Affghanistan, in order that they may be duly submitted to the gracious consideration of Her Majesty.

13. Medals similar to those presented to the general officers, officers, non-commissioned officers and privates of the Indian army, will be prepared for the general officers, officers, non-commissioned officers and privates of Her Majesty's army having, respectively, similar claims to the honour of wearing such medals; but the authority to wear such medals depends upon Her Majesty's most gracious pleasure.

(Signed) J. STUART, Lieut.-Colonel.
Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, with the Governor General.

By Order of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief,
J. R. LUMLEY, Major-General,
Adjutant-General of the Army.

As a further and special mark of his high approbation and gratitude, Lord Ellenborough conferred on General Nott, the exalted and lucrative office of Resident at Lucknow, accompanying the order which contained the notification of the appointment with the following very handsome letter.

Simlah, September 21st, 1842.

GENERAL,

I have the honour to transmit to you a copy of the General Order issued by me to day, on the receipt of the despatches from yourself and Major-General Pollock, announcing your victories obtained on the 30th ultimo, and on the 8th instant.

I annex a copy of a memorandum attached to the General Order, notifying your appointment from the 30th November next, to the office of Resident at the Court of Lucknow.

I rejoice in the opportunity afforded to me by the vacancy of that office, of marking the high sense I entertain of the value of your military services, and of making known to the army and people of India, that the situation of greatest dignity and emolument under the Government, is deemed by me to be the due reward of a successful General.

I trust you may long live to enjoy the honour, which, in the name of the Government you have so long zealously served, I now bestow upon you, and such other and higher honour, as you may probably expect from the gratitude of your country.

I have the honour to remain,

General,

Your very faithful friend and servant,

(Signed) ELLENBOROUGH,

Governor General.

To Major-General Nott, &c. &c.

General Nott acknowledged Lord Ellenborough's generous estimate of his worth in graceful and appropriate terms. It was at Gundamuck, a spot celebrated for deadly strife on the retirement of Sale's brigade, that Nott received the pleasing intelligence of his elevation, and it was from thence that he dispatched his suitable reply.

"It has pleased your Lordship to confer upon me one of the highest appointments in the gift of the Indian Government. To receive so noble and gratifying a mark of your Lordship's approbation of any services I have had the good fortune to perform, fills my mind with feelings of deep gratitude and satisfaction. It is a reward far beyond what I could have expected had my services been of a much more enduring nature in carrying the ideas of Government into effect.

"If I have not expressed my thanks in appropriate language, I trust your Lordship will attribute it to the feelings of the moment on receiving your Lordship's letter communicating the high honour which has been conferred upon me."

CHAPTER V.

THE MARCH FROM CAUBUL TO PESHAWUR—NOTT RESIGNS HIS COMMAND—LORD ELLENBOROUGH REFUSES TO ACCEPT HIS RESIGNATION—CAPTAIN SCOTT APPOINTED PAYMASTER OF PENSIONERS AT LUCKNOW—GENERAL ENGLAND CLAIMS TO SHARE IN THE CANDAHAR MEDAL AND HONOURS—NOTT'S COMMENTS ON THE CLAIM—THE ARMY OF CANDAHAR CROSSES THE SUTLEJ—FESTIVITIES—THE GENERAL IS CREATED A G.C.B. AND LORD ELLENBOROUGH APPOINTS HIM ENVOY TO THE KING OF OUDE—CONGRATULATORY LETTERS AND REPLIES.

NOTWITHSTANDING General M'Caskill's operations in the dispersion of the Affghans, the march from Caubul to the Punjaub was by no means unmolested. The second column of Pollock's army, under M'Caskill himself, was attacked by the mountaineers on its march from Tezeen—the scenes of the opposition were the Hoft-Kotul and Jugdullick Passes. Nott's division was likewise assailed by large bodies on the Hoft-Kotul, and subsequently at Gundamuck. Several officers and

men of both columns were severely wounded in the encounters, in all of which the troops behaved with their accustomed gallantry, and the Generals evinced their ordinary skill. At Ali Musjid, in the Khyber, Nott's column re-captured a gun which had been taken by the Kyberees from M'Caskill.

But warfare with the mountaineers was not the only annoyance to which General Nott was exposed after his troops had formed part of the force under General Pollock. He was continually deprived of part of his carriage cattle, and denied a proportion of that which the Government of India had sent on to meet the retiring armies. Every now and then some complaint came in from some officer that enough had not been made of his services in the General's despatches, and these had invariably to be answered in a courteous and convincing tone. At length, wearied with continued vexations, Nott wrote to the Commander-in-Chief, tendering his resignation. He had brought the force (he might well say he trusted "with honour") out of Affghanistan, and all actual field service having come to a close, he was earnestly desirous of being relieved of his command.

Lord Ellenborough would not hear of Nott's resigning; and, indeed, it would have been a circumstance very much to be lamented that he should have lost the opportunity of sharing in the

public honours with which the Governor General intended to greet the armies on their crossing the Sutlej.* To the public (official) letter, therefore, in which the resignation was declined, Lord Ellenborough gracefully added a private letter, which sufficiently shows the kindly feeling that dictated all his endeavours to render honour to the old soldier.

(Private and Confidential.)

Simla, November 19th, 1842.

GENERAL,

You will see by the public letter of the Military Secretary to the Government that I do not deem it to be consistent with the public service to accept your resignation until you have safely conducted to the British frontier the troops you have led with so much honour through Affghanistan. I deeply regret that any circumstances should have occurred to induce you to wish to resign your command.

I was in hopes that you would have shown me at Ferozepore the brave regiments which have followed you through so many dangers, and have borne so many privations, and encountered so many difficulties, with that unbending constancy which is a soldier's first virtue.

I was in hopes that you would have accompanied my Camp to Delhi, on your way to Lucknow. I shall have a considerable force at Delhi, where I shall probably deliver the gates of the Temple of Somnauth to the Princes of Rajpootana.

I trust you will in any case be able to remain some days in the Camp at Singapore, and I rely upon your dining with

me on the day on which you pass the Sutlej, with the officers of your Staff, and the Field officers or Commandants of the Regiments and Corps which accompanied you to Ghuznee.

I have the honour to remain, General,
Your very faithful friend and servant,
ELLENBOROUGH.

Major-General Nott.

After so marked a proof of the Governor General's good will, Nott could not do otherwise than retain the command.

As the armies moved through the Punjaub, the General received continual proofs of the cordial welcome which awaited him in India, and of the high respect he had inspired. Colonel Low, the ex-Resident at Lucknow, a most able political officer and truly amiable man, sent him papers connected with the state of Oude, that he might have time to prepare himself for his new vocation at Lucknow, and at the same time offered his congratulations on the important services which Nott had rendered during the previous twelve months to "the Government, the army, and, indeed, the whole people of India." Lord Ellenborough wrote to announce that the appointment of Paymaster to Lucknow and Cawnpore was vacant, and offered to give the office to any one Nott would name; and the General, with a grateful sense of Lord Ellenborough's condescension and kindness, and

noble and generous spirit, at once named Captain Scott, of the 38th, Wymer's Brigade-Major, "a talented, high-principled, and most excellent man." Scott was, of course, appointed.

The nearer Nott approached to India the more anxious he became to embrace his children; but as he foresaw a great deal of work and trouble before he could get to Lucknow, he desired them not to quit Calcutta until he should get there. His son Robert was with him. He had joined him at Caubul, in bad health, a circumstance which added not a little to the General's cares. Nott was not quite decided about taking up his abode at Lucknow. He dreaded the expense at starting, for the property which Colonel Low intended leaving behind him was valued at 2,000*l.* or 3,000*l.*

On the march from Peshawur Major-General Nott received a letter from the Secretary to the Government of India, enclosing one from Major-General England, claiming, on behalf of the troops which had accompanied him from Candahar, a share of the honorary distinctions awarded to the army generally. The reply which Nott sent to the reference which the General made to them is characteristic. It is soldierlike and just—

Camp, near Jenedehra, October 24, 1842.

SIR,

In venturing to advert to the Regulations of the 4th inst., for the distribution of the medals intended by the Right Hon.

the Governor General in Council, to commemorate the successes in Affghanistan, I beg, with great deference, to request that the officers and soldiers of the Bombay army who accompanied me in the operations which led to the relief of Candahar, last spring, and who were present at Candahar from the 10th May to the 10th August, and at the Passage of the Kojuck mountains in the subsequent abandonment of that city, may be viewed as claimants for that distinction.

2. The enclosed return, in exhibiting their relative claims, will also show that the numbers are few in whose behalf I make this application, because, as his Lordship is aware, many of the troops belonging to the column which marched with me to Candahar, as above, were added to Major-General Nott's force when that General moved to the northward, and thus became entitled to the honour of a medal by their services at Ghuznee and Caubul.

3. The only action with the army near Candahar, subsequent to our arrival there in May last, took place on the 29th of that month, under its walls, on which occasion the Bombay troops, with the exception of her Majesty's 41st Regiment, were allotted to the defence and protection of the city, thereby enabling the rest of the garrison to repel the enemy outside; but it belongs not to me to say whether those who were thus destined on that day to remain in this defensive position, may or may not be regarded as fair applicants for a medal as arising out of that affair with the enemy.

4. I beg, in presenting this request to the Right Honourable the Governor General, that you will assure his Lordship that I should not have presumed to advocate these claims, did I not truly believe that the services of the Corps, and of the officers I have mentioned, had been sufficiently distinguished in leading to the glorious termination of this war, to entitle

them to be brought within the sphere of his Lordship's favourable consideration in this matter.

I have, &c.

(Signed) R. ENGLAND,
Major-General Commanding.

Camp, 11 miles east of Peshawur,
15th November, 1842.

SIR,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 1075, of 1842, dated the 5th inst., forwarding copies of a despatch from Major-General England, under date the 24th ult., relative to the claim of certain troops to the "Candahar Medal."

I am really at a loss to conceive upon what principle Major-General England, K.H., can for a moment suppose that the troops noted in his letter and return, under date the 24th ult., have any claim whatever to the "Candahar Medal."

In March, 1842, General England, in command of a portion of the Scinde force marched from Quetta towards Candahar, giving escort to treasure and stores for the use of the force serving under my command in Affghanistan, on his arrival at Hykulzye, was opposed by a party of the enemy; his detachment was completely defeated, and he retreated to Quetta.

Having been informed that it was not General England's intention to convey treasures and stores from Quetta to Candahar, I addressed a letter to him, in hopes that he would be induced again to move from Quetta, and pointing out to him that he could do so without the least danger, at the same time promising to send a strong Brigade to convey him in safety over the Kojuck Pass. This was done, and he at length arrived at Candahar. At the date of that letter, I did not

command the Quetta force, and therefore could give General England no positive order.

In the month of August, 1842, it was determined that a portion of the force, then under my command, should march towards Jellalabad viâ Ghuznee and Cabool, and that the remainder should retire viâ Quetta. Under these circumstances, it was my wish that General England, with her Majesty's 41st Regiment, and about five Native Regiments, with twelve guns, should keep possession of Candahar for fifteen or twenty days subsequent to my march towards Ghuznee. However, after some conversation with General England, I reluctantly gave up this plan, but at the same time told him that as he was not to remain at Candahar, I should take the 41st Regiment with my column, and I directed him to move to Quetta with five and a half regiments of infantry, twelve guns, and a detachment of cavalry: he did not think this force sufficient, and wanted the 41st Regiment in addition. I explained to him that there was no enemy to oppose his march, and that I would willingly go over the same ground with a single company of native infantry. This duty is what the General calls "the passage of the Kojuck."

On the 29th of May, I moved out of Candahar to defeat the Affghan Chiefs, who had brought a large force into its vicinity. I left General England in possession of the city, but he had not to fire a shot, nor did the enemy attack or fire a shot at the town; yet he brings this forward in aid of his claim to a medal.

General England states that he was at Candahar from the 10th of May to the 10th of August, but as the troops noted by him were not engaged with the enemy during that period, and as they did not fire a shot, I do not think that the fact of their being in the city, can possibly give them a claim to a medal.

General England notes in his letter of the 24th ult., that "the officers and soldiers of the Bombay army accompanied me in the operations which led to the relief of Candahar," as if the victorious troops under my command, who never met with defeat or the least check, were besieged or in danger. General England brought me stores and treasure at my earnest solicitation and under the circumstances above noted, and for this he claims a medal. I have always supposed that in every army in the world, medals were only granted for gallant conduct in the field; under this conviction I certainly cannot, as commanding the armies of Scinde and Lower Affghanistan, recommend medals being conferred upon General England and the force under his command.

General England has claimed the "Candahar medal"—first, for the "action of the 28th of March," when his force was completely defeated, and retreated to Quetta.

Secondly,—On the 28th of April, in Pesheen, which was a trifling skirmish, of no consequence whatever.

Thirdly,—For being in garrison at Candahar, from the 10th of May to the 10th of August, where they never fired a shot.

Fourthly,—For what is called the "passage of the Kojuck, in August, 1842," where there was no enemy that could possibly have resisted 100 sepoys.

Finally, I deeply regret that any such claim should have been advanced; and, indeed, what value can the soldier, after a long course of victory, attach to honours and medals conferred by an approving Government upon him, if they are at the same time granted to those who have not passed a similar career.

To H. Maddock, Esq.,
Secretary to the Government of India,
with the Governor General.

On the 23d December Nott's army reached the banks of the Sutlej, having marched through the Punjaub without eliciting a single complaint from the people. Lord Ellenborough had, previously to the arrival of the army, issued an order for the formation of an escort for the Somnath gates to Guzerat, and appointed his own Aid-de-Camp, Captain Herries, to accompany the trophies. At the same time he issued a Proclamation to all the Princes and Chiefs, and people of India, announcing the presence of the gates, and endeavouring to impress on them all the importance of the acquisition. On the left bank of the Sutlej the Governor General had assembled a considerable force—an army of reserve formed to meet possible contingencies while Nott and Pollock were yet in Affghanistan;—an immense camp was pitched, hundreds of visitors had arrived from all parts of the upper country, and great preparations were made to render all imaginable honour to the conquering heroes. A bridge of boats had been thrown over the Sutlej of sufficient capacity for the passage of the column, and at its foot Lord Ellenborough, accompanied by several of the Sirhind Chiefs, received the troops. Two lines were formed through which the divisions passed, and bands of music and salvos of artillery announced the moment when Nott again set foot in India. He was most warmly welcomed by the Governor General and the Commander-in-Chief,

General Sir Jasper Nicolls; and Lord Ellenborough, in issuing a General Order recording the occurrence, took the opportunity of adding to the honours he had already conferred, by imparting to the General the new title of "ENVOY TO THE KING OF OUDE," in substitution of the lesser title of Resident at the Court of Lucknow, and directing that he should be called "Excellency" in all communications with his Majesty.

On the day after the fatiguing ceremonial of the passage, Nott wrote the following letter to his daughters:—

Ferozepore, 24th December, 1842.

MY DEAR CHILDREN,

I arrived here yesterday, called upon Lord Ellenborough and his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and dined with Lord Ellenborough last night. I am delighted with him; we had a long conversation in the morning alone, and again in the evening. Some people may laugh at his acts, but he is the keenest Englishman I have ever seen in *this* country, and just the man to deal with Asiatics. He is indeed truly kind, and he last night made a long and eloquent speech in praise of my whole conduct, and declared before this large party, and therefore to the world, that "the safety of all was due to my firmness," and as much more as would fill several sheets of paper. He is a fine speaker, and he spoke frequently last evening, and all were pleased with him. He told me yesterday he was going to appoint me *Envoy* at the Court of the King of Oude, with the title of Excellency. All this fuss I do not like, although I like and admire the man; it will only bring down envy and abuse from little minds. Hollings

is one of my assistants at Lucknow, and Mrs Hollings will receive you kindly should you reach Lucknow before me. I called on Lady Nicolls yesterday, and saw her daughters; they made themselves very pleasant, and spoke of you. The Governor General gives a ball on the 26th; there will be about 700 persons present, all the ladies now at Ferozepore of course; this will be a novelty to me, not having seen any for more than four years. The Governor General will leave this for Meerut and Delhi about the 3d of January, when all will break up. He told me last night that he thought so highly of a public letter I sent him from Candahar, that he sent it just as it was to the Queen, with one from himself. He has also written to the Court of Directors regarding me. We are to have a grand field day on the 26th; there will be 30,000 men in the field. I think it hard upon the Candahar force thus to be called out immediately on their arrival to act playing soldiers with the army of reserve, which has been drilled and drilled daily for the occasion; for although the Candahar army has had much fighting—much more than the world is aware of, they have not been on a *parade* for *many* months; but never mind.

The gaieties at Ferozepore continued for about a week. Reviews of troops, dinners, and balls were the order of the day. Nott was quite overwhelmed with the compliments and congratulations of the people who flocked to the camp; but the good-feeling which dictated their *devoirs* more than atoned for the irksomeness of the homage.

In the midst of the festivities proper to the occasion, the General received this note from Lord Ellenborough.

Camp, Ferozepore, December 28, 1842.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

I shall be much obliged to you if you will prepare a Memorandum for me upon the Carriage Department, showing the defects of the present want of system, and the alterations you would think it advisable to make with a view to efficiency. It is a question, I think, whether the Carriage Department should not be distinct from the Commissariat.

Believe me,

My dear General,

Very faithfully yours,

ELLENBOROUGH.

General Nott promptly met the order of Lord Ellenborough. The paper prepared on that occasion is worthy the perusal of all military men.

"The question of providing carriage for the wants of an Army taking the field in India, and of the best means of rendering the resources of the country available for this object, seems an exceedingly difficult one. To be enabled to offer an opinion on the subject, which would be really valuable to Government, a familiarity with statistical details, and an intimate knowledge of the machinery and working of the existing system of supply in all its branches is required, which few officers have an opportunity of acquiring. On such knowledge alone can a comprehensive practical view of the subject be founded.

"The organisation of an establishment which for all the contingencies of soil, climate, and facilities of transport, shall be best adapted to secure efficiency and economy to the state, in providing carriage for its troops, when employed either within its territories or beyond its frontier, is but a part of the above question. In commenting on this part, it is probable that views founded on observations made in a few localities,

may not bear the test of general application to operations in the field, referred to the numerous provinces or the several frontier states of our Indian empire.

"But, there are many officers who have had opportunities of making remarks on the march of our armies, and on the system now adopted for supplying them with carriage. The professional interests of some of them have been so deeply affected by the efficiency or otherwise of the means of transport at their command, that their comments on the system in force for supplying and maintaining these means may not be without value. It is probable that the inconveniences felt will be prominently presented, while the remedies proposed may often be found adapted merely to circumstances of time and case, but impracticable as forming part of a general system. Still, by collecting opinions from these sources, facts may be elicited which, placed in the hands of those who have made the subject particularly their study, may lead to some improvements and increased efficiency in the working of the existing system.

"It is under a feeling of imperfect acquaintance with the subject which has prompted the foregoing paragraphs, that the following remarks are penned. They relate principally to the system as it bore on the carriage supplied to the armies lately employed in Affghanistan.

"The inadequacy of the means of transport at command in Affghanistan is not fairly chargeable to the system of supply obtaining in the Commissariat Department. The inconvenience thus sustained arose from our carrying on military operations in a country, the resources of which, from the general hostility of its inhabitants, were locked up from us, while the nearest sources of supply over which we could exercise efficient control, lay at a distance of 600 miles. But when the means of moving were obtained, partial failure in maintaining and preserving those means may perhaps be attributed to want of strength in the system established.

"The supply of cattle for the munitions and baggage of the army in Affghanistan, rested solely with the Commissariat Department. A question is raised as to how far it would be desirable or expedient to separate the Commissariat from the Carriage Department of our army, with the view of giving increased efficiency to the latter, by placing it under the control of a separate establishment.

"It may be observed that any such division of the Departments would involve also a division of responsibility. The Commissariat would in such case be dependent on the Carriage Department for its means of transport; the Carriage Department would look to the Commissariat for its means of subsistence. If, to guard against this, the Departments were made altogether independent of each other, their respective agents would meet in the market, and in their competition, the interests of the state might be overlooked. In addition to the difficulty of fixing responsibility, the commanding officer would have an additional department to watch over, and a separate channel through which his orders for the efficient equipment of his force must be conveyed. These disadvantages would probably more than counterbalance the contemplated advantage of increased efficiency that might result from withdrawing the charge of the cattle attached to an army from the Commissariat Department.

"One department of supply for all the wants of an army, would seem the preferable system. Its executive establishment may be strengthened in particular branches to any extent thought necessary, and thus if that branch to which the provision and charge of public cattle is now committed be thought inadequate, its organisation may be modified and improved without separating it from the Commissariat Department.

"Next to the great evils immediately attributable to the necessity of attaching an enormous proportion of carriage

cattle to troops in all their marches in Affghanistan (a necessity arising from causes which it would be irrelevant to the object of these remarks to discuss), the inconvenience experienced in maintaining our means of transport in efficient order may be mentioned. Our failure in this important matter seems traceable principally to two causes—

"1st. Want of proper supervision and attention in the care and feeding of the cattle.

"2nd. Overloading and improperly loading the cattle.

"The first of these was, it is believed, owing to the want of a sufficient number of officers and subordinate European overseers, to whom the duty of watching over the condition of the cattle should have been solely and specially confided. The second arose, in a great measure, from circumstances beyond the control of the Commissariat Department.

"Details regarding the want of proper attention to the feeding the public cattle (camels are particularly referred to) seem unnecessary. It is assumed as a fact beyond dispute, that the mortality and loss of condition among camels, the property of Government, were proportionately much greater than among those belonging to individuals, for the keep of which far less liberal provision was made. The fact is conclusive as to the want of attention, which might have been secured by a greater degree of European supervision. The loss sustained from casualties among the Government cattle employed with the army in Affghanistan, was so great as to induce a belief that had a commissioned commissariat officer, assisted by European overseers, been attached to every brigade, for the sole purpose of seeing the Government cattle properly fed, duly attended to, and not overladen, great increased efficiency at a reduced expense to the State would have been obtained. The charges for feeding public cattle are now, it is believed, almost entirely in the hands of native subordinates; certain quantities of grain and forage

are allowed for their support, which may not always be furnished; efficient check must, at all events, be difficult; and the duty therefore open to abuse.

"The Commissariat officers in Affghanistan had a variety of duties to attend to, many of which related to accounts and other official details, and it was almost impossible that they could devote that degree of personal attention to the public cattle under their charge which would have ensured their being maintained in good working condition. In an Indian Cantonment the charge of the public cattle is comparatively easy, but in a Camp, where the cattle are distributed among regiments, and on a line of march in Affghanistan, where the baggage of an army arrives in sections, and at all hours, the difficulty of looking after them is vastly increased.

"On occasions, therefore, where large masses of public cattle are collected for employment with armies in the field, it may be worthy of consideration, whether officers of the Commissariat Department might not be specially appointed to the charge of the carriage of the army, and held directly responsible for the feeding and condition of the public cattle. It is not a mere compiler of accounts that is required for duties of this nature, but one who should be constantly on the alert, who should look after his charge in person, and by his own activity compel a corresponding attention to their duty on the part of his assistants.

"The overloading the camels in Affghanistan was a great evil; it arose from the disposition of the native soldiery and camp-followers to accumulate property of different descriptions, and to carry it with them on the line of march, on the cattle furnished by Government, for hire, or otherwise.

"This disposition on the part of native troops is so notorious, that even in India, the proprietors of carriage kept purposely for hire will not voluntarily engage their cattle to Sepahies, and the necessary amount of carriage required for

the march of troops is rarely procured, save through the interference of the Civil Power.

"In Affghanistan, camels were furnished for the conveyance of private baggage by the Commissariat Department, on certain stipulated conditions. The cattle thus supplied were generally the property of Government. It may be imagined that of the total number of cattle accompanying our armies, but a small proportion were required for the conveyance of private baggage. But as the cattle made over to the troops failed or became weakened from the effects of overloading, they were exchanged for stronger ones, and it is believed that a very great proportion of the casualties that occurred among the public cattle may be referred to the number employed in the conveyance of private baggage.

"All the burthens of cattle employed exclusively in the carriage of public property, whether provisions, camp equipage, ammunition, or other military equipments, may be easily and strictly regulated; this is also stipulated in the case of private baggage; but, although it is the duty of commanding officers to guard against the overloading public cattle by the troops, their vigilance is constantly evaded, and should Government be again on any occasion compelled to take on themselves the provision of cattle for the private carriage of either officers or men, some very stringent regulations will be needed to prevent an abuse of the indulgence.

"It may be asked why on any occasion Government should interfere in the provision of carriage for baggage of troops merely of a private nature. A difficulty on this question has always existed; but it has been found that troops cannot move at short notice without some assistance being furnished by Government, and unpleasant consequences have more than once ensued where this aid was, or was believed to be, withheld. It is not the less desirable that troops should be encouraged as much as possible to make arrangements for the

conveyance of their own baggage; but the Government has, against the advice of its most experienced officers, weakened the influence it could formerly exercise over its native army, and the provision of carriage for private baggage may be expected to continue a troublesome question.

"Great care should be observed in loading cattle; it is believed that sufficient care was not, and perhaps could not, from circumstances, be observed throughout our late campaign. The proportion of attendants procurable for the public cattle was too small, and many of these servants were inexperienced in the charge. In some regiments the Sepahies were obliged to attend and lead their own camels; a practice which, if general, would detract from the efficiency of the army, and which could only have been winked at as a temporary measure, and one of absolute necessity.

"For foreign expeditions, and particularly in a country like Affghanistan, where the marauding habits of the population are so well known, it might be expedient to enlist, organise in sections, and to arm with weapons of native manufacture the camel-drivers. It is probable that, had such been the case during our recent military operations, the camel-men would on many occasions, when attacked by small bodies of Affghans, have been able to protect their persons and the property entrusted to their charge till assistance was rendered to them. The Bunjarrahs of India and the Sohanees of Affghanistan at all times travel armed, and prepared to resist aggression either against themselves or on their property, and even in military operations within our provinces it might be found advantageous occasionally to arm the attendants on public cattle; but, on the other hand, it should be stated that this class of camp-followers is notoriously addicted to plunder, and to place arms in their hands would be, to a certain extent, to facilitate and encourage this propensity.

"As already observed, the foregoing remarks are intended to

apply peculiarly to our recent movements in Affghanistan. Very great difficulty was in that country experienced in procuring carriage, but the demands made were greater than has ever before been the case, or than may ever occur again. Should an army again enter Affghanistan from India, changes in the system of carrying on the war must, to ensure success, be made, which changes would most materially affect the Department of Supply.

"It would not be fair to judge any portion of the existing system of supply, framed and organised as it has been for operations conducted in Hindoostan, or in those countries adjacent to it, where water carriage was available for the transport of all the munitions of war, because the commissariat was unable to meet the enormous and exhausting calls made on it for carriage in Affghanistan. Is the existing system ill adapted for supplying carriage to armies moving in India, or in the direction either of the Punjaub or of Nepal? and do the records of our campaign in Nepal in 1814, or of the Mahratta war in 1817, 18, and 19, prove that the system of supplying cattle then obtaining, and which it is believed, with some modifications, based on experience, still obtains, was inefficient?—if so, the necessity of an alteration of system may be considered as established, not otherwise.

"The contract system of carriage has always been extensively employed in India, and to this mode of conveying supplies, the partialities of the old officers of the Indian army must be expected to lean, as to its efficient aid many of the early and splendid successes of the army may be attributed. The question of comparative expense between the system of obtaining cattle for public purposes on contract or by purchase, has doubtless been instituted, and to the result of that inquiry the organisation of our existing establishments is probably owing. Constituted as our army at present is, it would be unwise to trust entirely to contract for its carriage, and it must be de-

sirable to maintain all establishments actually kept up on the most efficient footing; but at the same time, if, as seems probable, the influential men among the Bunjarrah and Rahbarree carriers, who have often rendered such essential service to the state, still exist, it would perhaps be of importance to perpetuate the connexion, and to direct the officers of the Commissariat Department, if this is not already the case, to keep up occasional communications with them to prevent them from falling altogether under the influence of wealthy native contractors, and to secure, by any acts of consideration it may be thought fit to grant, their attachment to their best and surest friends, the British Government."

The manner in which the King of Oude was "going on" made Lord Ellenborough very anxious for Nott's presence at Lucknow. He accordingly resigned his military command (succeeded by Colonel Wymer), and, attended by a military escort of thirty sepoys, he proceeded to Lucknow.

Previous to his departure Lord Ellenborough presented the General with a very valuable sword, in the name of the British Government—a gift richly earned, and every way suitable to the incomparable soldier; and Nott bade final adieu to the glorious "Army of Candahar."*

* At length the order was issued for breaking up the immense army which had now assembled at Ferozepore, and the different regiments comprising it moved gradually off to the stations to which they had been ordered to proceed.

Our more immediate comrades of the Candahar division were

General Nott's credentials to the Court of Lucknow were calculated, if anything could be, to give the King of Oude a most favourable impression of the Envoy, and of the respect which the British Government bore to the Sovereign. "He has," said Lord Ellenborough, in the letter announcing the General's appointment, "commanded armies, always victorious, in the neighbourhood of Candahar, for four years, and has now, after taking and destroying Ghuzni, brought back his forces in triumph to Hindostan."

The General visited Kurnaul, after a dreary march, amidst continual heavy rain, on the 28th January, 1843; and here he received intimation by the overland mail that her Majesty had con-

separated from us, and of that army, the 40th Regiment alone remained at Ferozepore.

Our Chief had been rewarded for his services by a high appointment at the Court of the King of Oude, and on the 2nd of January, 1843, previous to proceeding to assume its duties, he issued the following order to his companions in arms:—

"Major-General Nott, having received permission to join the appointment assigned him at the Court of the King of Oude, cannot leave the Candahar force without returning his best thanks to the officers and men composing it, for the assistance he has constantly received from them, which has enabled him, upon all occasions, to uphold the honour of our country and the reputation of British arms.

"It is with feelings of deep regret and admiration that the Major-General now bids farewell to his brave and gallant comrades of the Candahar army."—*Captain Neil's Narrative.*

ferred upon him the distinction of KNIGHT GRAND CROSS OF THE BATH, departing from precedent, and overleaping the earlier grades. A higher compliment could not have been paid to any officer for the most brilliant military services. Nott had been led to expect elevation to the rank of K.C.B., but he was indifferent to all honours of this nature. Often in his private letters he had expressed how slight a value he attached to honorary distinctions, and even now he experienced no particular emotion. "How little are the home people aware," he writes on the 28th of January, "that I would not give a straw for these honours—or what they call honours. Every man I meet comes up to congratulate me on that which I would rather not have. You have long known my dislike of these foolish things, and there is no change in me. I cannot well decline what our Queen has given me, but could I do so with honour and propriety, I would not hesitate."

But if Sir William Nott did not attach the ordinary value to the title and the decoration which proclaimed his great deserts, he could not be insensible to the very kind and flattering letters which reached him from the highest quarters. The President of the Board of Control, the Chairman of the Court of East India Directors, the Commander-in-Chief, and many others, eagerly pressed forward to offer their congratulations in

terms which are alike honourable to their own feelings and to the object of their respect. A few of the letters written by the principal functionaries will fitly decorate these pages :—

From Lord Fitzgerald DeVesci.

India Board, December 5, 1842.

SIR,

It affords me the highest gratification to inform you, that her Majesty, appreciating your distinguished services in the gallant and persevering defence of Candahar, in the capture and destruction of Ghuznee, and in the prosecution of your successful march on Cabul, has been graciously pleased to confer on you the Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath.

Her Majesty has not hesitated to give to you this mark of her most gracious favour, although it is contrary to the usual practice, to bestow the insignia of the highest class of the Order on an officer, who had not been previously decorated with the Cross of Commander.

I cannot refrain from offering my sincere congratulations to you, upon the honour thus graciously conferred by her Majesty, and I beg to assure you of the great pleasure which I have in making this communication to you.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your very faithful, obedient servant,

FITZGERALD D'VESCI.

Major-General Sir William Nott, G.C.B.,
&c., &c., &c.

From Major-General Sir J. L. Lushington.

East India House, 5th December, 1842.

MY DEAR SIR WILLIAM,

Though I have not the pleasure of being personally known to you, yet I feel it quite impossible to permit the mail under

despatch to proceed, without most sincerely congratulating you (both as Chairman of the Court of Directors, and as a brother officer) on your successful march from Candahar to Cabool, your brilliant victory over Shumseddeen Khan, and your re-occupation and ultimate destruction of the citadel and fort of Ghuznee, nor have I less satisfaction in informing you that her Majesty and his Grace the Commander-in-Chief, have most promptly acceded to the recommendation of the Governor General, by conferring on you the Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath.

Being a member of the Secret Committee, I am of course cognisant of all your correspondence with the Governor General, and you must permit me to express the high admiration I have ever felt for the firmness and decision you have manifested in that correspondence, more particularly in the noble determination you came to of withdrawing your army viâ Ghuznee and Cabool, under circumstances and under a responsibility which might well have made you hesitate as to the course you should adopt, but which only served more clearly to show forth the fortitude and courage inherent in your character, of the just confidence you had in the brave troops you had so long served with, and so frequently led to victory.

It has afforded me the highest gratification to find, that the Governor General has taken the earliest opportunity of acknowledging your valuable services, by appointing you Resident at Lucknow, and in which situation I hope this letter may reach you; and that you may long enjoy in health and happiness the honours which you have so nobly won, is the sincere wish of, my dear Sir William,

Yours, most faithfully and truly,

J. L. LUSHINGTON.

Major-General Sir William Nott, G.C.B.,
&c., &c., &c.

From General Sir Jasper Nicolls.

Sirhind, 31st January, 1843.

MY DEAR SIR WILLIAM,

I must not be amongst the last to congratulate you, which I heartily do, on the high honour conferred upon you, for your great and most valuable successes in advancing, when you did, upon Cabool. Long may you enjoy this honour, and all other marks of favour which may be attached to you for your late services—equal to any which you may receive, I estimate the respect which your own army must entertain for you.

Your's very faithfully,

J. NICOLLS.

Major-General Sir William Nott, G.C.B.,
&c., &c., &c.

From Mr Montagu.

Somerset House, London,
3rd December, 1842.

MY DEAR NOTT,

Although ere this can reach you, you will, I dare say, be well nigh surfeited with compliments, I venture to think that under present circumstances, those of an old friend will not be unacceptable, if I can judge from the gratification it gives me to recal myself to your remembrance on so pleasant an occasion, not with a compliment in the usual acceptation of the word, but in the hearty congratulations I have to offer you on the eminent part you have acted in the great drama which has been performing on our Indian stage: my tribute may be deemed insignificant, but I claim to render it from the sort of personal and individual share I feel in the *burra naum* (great name) you have given, not to the Indian service only, but to the corps to whose ranks *we* belonged.

I need not tell you of the intense anxiety in England as to

the result of our Affghan contest, but I cannot refrain from saying how deeply I felt interested in it, from seeing its issue so much dependent, humanly speaking, on the ability of one I have known so long as yourself. I may therefore truly say, that few have rejoiced so sincerely in your success, and on the brilliant page you have added to the annals of our Indian empire, than your old marine companion and friend. I will not trespass on your patience with comments on the vicissitudes of this lamentable war, or on the glorious operations which have brought it to a close, which not many were sanguine enough to anticipate. You will have heard enough on the subject from our politicians at home, as from those around you, and you will learn from the papers the general exultation your exploits have raised through the land, and how the very walls are placarded with your name, and those of your brother Chiefs. But my immediate object is to be among the first of your friends on this side the water to congratulate you on the honours with which a grateful Government has rewarded your services. It quite rejoiced my eyes to see in this day's 'Gazette,' the highest Order of military merit conferred upon your name, and I hope to be one of the first to wish you joy on your "blushing honours." Honour also to the noble Governor General, who has not confined his acknowledgments to "meeta bhaut," but has placed you in that post of eminent distinction, where, after enjoying awhile your *otium cum dignitate* in the sunshine of an Eastern Court, you may realise more speedily the means of retiring to the comforts of your native land. May health be given you to accomplish all you can desire in this respect, and much shall I rejoice whenever the opportunity may be given me of renewing these congratulations in person. I hope your health has not suffered by your prolonged sojourn in India, and particularly by the fatigue and anxiety which you must have undergone during the

last two years. Pray give me at your leisure the gratification of a letter, and tell me all about you and yours, and what prospect you have of coming home, about which you will probably not now be so impatient. The many years which have glided by since I quitted the service have rendered me a stranger to almost every name in it, and I have scarcely a correspondent left, yet I have heard with great concern that you have suffered much from family affliction, and I can sympathise with you, having been severely tried myself by similar trying dispensations.

I am now left alone, with but one daughter, having had the grief to lose my son at Eton, by a most awful accident. You will, however, be glad to hear, that in other respects, I have only mercies to acknowledge. The sedentary life I have led for the last seventeen years here, as a member of the Board of Stamps and Taxes, has, I am thankful to say, not at all impaired my health, though I begin to feel every year rather heavier than its predecessor, and we are both of us carrying a tolerable weight. May yours long seem light, and "your shadow never be less!" Adieu, and believe me, with cordial good wishes for your continued welfare,

My dear Nott,

Yours, very sincerely,

H. Seymour Montagu.

You have just escaped being made an "Irish member." Some days ago, a motion was made in the Corporation of Dublin, to present you with the freedom of the city, as also to Pollock and Sale; but as party-spirit must needs mix itself up in all Irish matters, the motion fell to the ground; but it was so well received, that it is to be brought up again, and will, of course, be carried by acclamation.

Major-General Sir William Nott, G.C.B.,
&c., &c., &c.

From Major Sir William Lloyd.

London, Dec. 5, 1842.

MY DEAR NOTT,

I will not permit the Overland Mail to pass without bringing you sincere congratulations from your old attached companion in arms, upon the honours which have been most graciously bestowed upon you by our dear little Queen; you have fairly won them, and God grant that you may live long to enjoy them; the whole country rings in your praise; nothing is talked of but your gallant conduct and persevering endurance under the most untoward circumstances. All are anxious to glean as much of your history as they can, and I am never tired in detailing what I know of you, and am proud to say that you are my friend, and have come up to what I long ago predicted of you.

Your honours, you are aware, must die with you; it therefore becomes a matter of consideration how to perpetuate the facts of your glorious exploits in your family. Now this can only be done by adding something to your family arms as I have done, and if your family arms are not already recorded, then you should take out a new grant of arms. The least expensive plan would be to take out a new grant at once, which will cost you about 75*l.* or 100*l.*, and, if done well, furnish me with an account of your services from the period of your first entering the army. I will be your agent in the matter with much pleasure. Think seriously of this, and let me know your wishes. Address me at Brynestyn, near Wrexham. I know the officials in the Heralds' College, and may be of use to you.

Yours, always sincerely,

My dear Nott,

WILLIAM LLOYD.

Mr Montagu was an old friend, in whose judgment and influence Sir William had great confi-

dence. We therefore find him writing to that gentleman, to express "his disappointment that some substantial recompense in the shape of a pension had not been granted, as in the case of Lord Keane," who was not a quarter so deserving, "and begging of Montagu to obtain him a grant of land in Tasmania; for Cincinnatus longed to be again at his plough!"

To Sir James Lushington, Sir William wrote as follows:

Agra, 13th March, 1843.

My dear General,

Your very kind letter of the 5th of December, 1842, did not reach me until after the departure of the Overland Mail for the last month.

It afforded me much gratification to find that you approved of my humble endeavours to be useful in Affghanistan. My chief care was to do all that was necessary with the least possible loss of our gallant soldiers. In this I hope I succeeded, as our loss under the circumstances was not as great as might have been expected.

As it would be bad taste in me to refer to the original cause of our disasters at Cabool, or to state how much earlier the reputation of our arms might have been vindicated, I will merely assure you that I deeply appreciate your letter, and will preserve it as one of the greatest honours I have received.

I have to thank you for your kind expressions regarding Lucknow. Lord Ellenborough, from the moment of his arrival in India, has treated me most honourably.

I am, my dear General,

Yours, most faithfully,

W. Nott.

Major-General Sir J. L. Lushington, G.C.B.,
26 Dorset square, London.

CHAPTER VI.

SIR WILLIAM NOTT AT LUCKNOW—RECEPTION BY THE KING—STATE DINNER—NOTT GOES TO AGRA TO BE INVESTED WITH THE INSIGNIA OF THE GRAND CROSS OF THE BATH—THE CALUMNIES OF THE ENGLISH PRESS REFUTED—DISSATISFIED OFFICERS—NOTT'S REBUKE AND RECOMMENDATION—VOTES OF THANKS IN BOTH HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT—LETTERS FROM VERY OLD FRIENDS.

CAWNPORE is a British military station contiguous to Lucknow. To this station the daughters of Sir William proceeded from Calcutta, and here they were received by General (now Sir John) Grey, who commanded the division. The new Envoy arrived soon after them, with his son Robert, who was on sick leave. After a separation of four years, a period of a most eventful and anxious nature, the meeting was truly happy and affecting. Sir William Nott was in health and spirits, apparently none the worse for his toils,

privations, and exposure to the extremes of heat and cold.

Nott took up his residence with Colonel Weston during the two or three days of his stay at Cawnpore; but he was not suffered to enjoy a moment's repose. The house was beset with visitors from morning till night. Colonel Anderson and the officers of her Majesty's 50th Foot called upon him (by permission) *in a body*—a most marked compliment.

With characteristic ardour, Sir William Nott was desirous of entering at once upon his official duties at Lucknow, and would have made preparations for his march accordingly. But he was anticipated by the King. Nott's character had travelled before him, and his Majesty sought every possible means of evincing the pleasure he experienced at having him at the Court. Magnificent royal tents, innumerable servants, elephants, camels, horses, and all that could possibly be required on the march, were sent in charge of officers of state, who vied with each other to do the Envoy and his family all honour. At different parts of the road, bands of music and guards of honour were stationed. Torches lighted the road at night—salutes were passed as the party passed by day—and shouts of welcome rent the air. In truth, it was a right royal progress. It lasted three days. On the morning of the third day the

Prime Minister of Oude came forth to meet the Envoy, and escort him to Lucknow. In the evening, Sir William entered a carriage, which the King had sent for him, and proceeded to Lucknow, honourably accompanied. He did not, however, enter the city, but was conveyed to the "Dil Koosha" ("Delight of the Heart"), a palace and gardens outside of Lucknow, where he was necessitated to remain until the astrologers of the King should announce the date on which the meeting between his Majesty and the Envoy would prove auspicious. In the meantime the latter was visited by hundreds of persons, who had come far and near to witness the ceremonial of the first interview. And when that interview did come off, it presented a scene of the gayest and most gorgeous description. All the riches of the Court of Lucknow were brought into requisition on the occasion. The King had a retinue of three hundred elephants, very handsomely caparisoned, and bearing richly dressed natives of rank, who sat on jewelled howdahs. It is the etiquette on these occasions for sovereigns, and the representatives of sovereigns, to start simultaneously from their respective dwellings, and meet at an equidistant point, that each may enjoy no advantage over the other. The firing a salute was the signal for the King to quit his palace, and Sir William Nott the Dil Koosha. The road and country round,

as well as the tops of houses and walls, were crowded with human beings, among whom were many dancing girls, jugglers, and performers of all descriptions. The Honourable Company's Regiments from cantonments lined the way, and of course the King made a display of all his available soldiery. His Majesty was proudly attired. He was loaded with strings of pearls of immense size, and wore a cap covered with diamonds. His elephant's covering was of mother of pearl, and his *chattah* (or umbrella) had a deep and beautiful fringe of pearls. When the two "suns of splendour" met, the uproar was tremendous. The Nawaub and his party turned their elephants' heads on joining the General, and the latter slipped into his Majesty's howdah, and was thus conveyed to the royal palace, scattering largesse on the road, which the mob eagerly picked up, regardless of the risk of being trampled upon by the elephants' feet. Breakfast was served upon a splendid scale at the palace, and, after sundry ceremonies, Nott drove to the Residency, where he was to take up his abode.

The Residency at Lucknow, all the houses of the assistants, the chaplain, the surgeon, and other officers forming the *corps diplomatique* (so to speak), adjoin each other, are enclosed by a high wall, and are at a short distance from the palace.

Shortly after Nott's arrival at Lucknow, the

King entertained him at a dinner of State. He had on this, as on all other occasions when he visited the King, *carte blanche* to invite all his staff, as well as all European officers, with their wives, who were then residing at Lucknow. There was always a great observance of etiquette when the King and the Envoy had to meet each other. For instance, messengers were despatched from one to the other to announce that each was ready to meet the other; and it would have been a high crime and misdemeanour, if not absolute high treason, if one should, by any inadvertence, be kept waiting for the other even for one single minute. On all occasions when the Envoy or the members of his family visited the King, bearers were sent to the doors of the carriage with tonjons (chairs of State), elaborately ornamented with jewels, to bear them into the King's presence, and they were not allowed to set foot to the ground until they were in the presence of the King in his reception-room. When they arrived there on the occasion of this first State dinner, the Envoy took the right-hand of the King, and the Brigadier commanding the military cantonment the left, and so handed him to his seat in the centre of the table in the banquet-hall, and took their seats to his right and left as they handed him in. The King has always a set of dishes specially prepared for his own use, and it is his practice to send portions

from these dishes to the guests whom he wishes especially to honour, and among such guests the Envoy and his family were of course never overlooked. The parties who were thus honoured must taste of everything which was thus sent to them from the King's dishes. It seems almost needless to observe, that the strictness of Eastern precedence placed every guest at table according to his rank.

During dinner various entertainments were presented. The Nautch girls danced to the strains of Eastern music, and the Rustums, in chain armour, and with their clubs, also exhibited themselves. After dinner, the King, the Envoy, and the rest of the party retired to the verandah. The river, running near to the palace, was enclosed so as to give it the appearance of a lake. Thousands of lamps and flambeaux illuminated the palace gardens and grounds, and gave to the Nautch girls, who again appeared in tents of gauze erected on the boats that were floating on the artificial lake, the appearance of fairies as they executed their light and graceful dances. There was a brilliant illumination exactly opposite the verandah in which the party were overlooking this gorgeous scene, which caused considerable amusement to all the Europeans present, and not the least considerable to the Envoy and his family; it shot out in beautiful jets the following words—"God save Sir William Nott

and the Queen of England." Besides the illumination there was a splendid display of fireworks, such a display as is never seen in England; not that the English may not be equally good pyrotechnists, but because they have not Eastern wealth to furnish them with the means for such a display.

Coronation-day is a great day at the Court of Oude. On each anniversary of that day the King receives his crown afresh from the hands of the Envoy. The ceremony takes place at the coronation room in the palace. The King's throne, which is of the most gorgeous description, is on a dais at the head of the room, and a chair is placed to the right of it for the Envoy. No one is allowed to be seated on the dais or in the room, except the King and the Envoy. The King's relatives and his ministers of state take their stand at the foot of a flight of steps which lead up to the throne. On this day the Chiefs of Oude pay their tribute, and on the present occasion the steps leading up to the throne were piled with money bags. On presenting it the Chiefs make their obeisance to the King by kneeling and touching in succession all the steps leading up to the throne. These bags were used by all who were fortunate enough to gain a place on them, as a vantage ground from which to witness the ceremonies that took place. The crown was handed to the Envoy by the Chief Moolah, and by him was placed on the head of the King. This was

no sooner done than the room rung with cheers, and the cheers within were answered by the firing of a royal salute without. At the same time, dresses of honour were distributed to the principal Chiefs, and officers of state, and also to the King's European Aide-de-Camps. The appearance of the English officers, dressed as they were in uniform, received a rather grotesque addition when they were clad in the loose robe, the shawl, the turban and sash of the East. Money, with seed pearls, and other small jewels were scattered abroad in abundance, among all the parties who were in the room.

After this an adjournment took place to the verandah before mentioned, where a similar scramble of money was made among the populace generally, accompanied by the cheering fun and jollity which is the usual attendant of such scenes. From the verandah the party adjourned to the breakfast room, the King having given to the Envoy the same latitude of invitation with which he had honoured him for his inauguration dinner. After breakfast there were several Elephant fights, and the verandah was again used as the most convenient place for witnessing this Eastern mode of amusement.

The circumstance before particularly mentioned with regard to the illuminations, will have shown that the Envoy was looked on by royalty at Oude, as being himself, little, if at all, short of royal,

and his whole staff and outfit was in full keeping with all revealed ideas of Eastern grandeur. No less than forty Chobdars (silver sticks) were assigned to him, and the rest of his attendance was on a proportionately extended scale.

There is another day at the Court of Oude which is also kept with great observance—the anniversary of the late King's death. The mausoleum is surrounded by beautiful gardens, and in the same building with it are bath rooms, fountains, sitting rooms, &c. The tomb itself was on this occasion most splendidly illuminated, while the entire pile of building in which the mausoleum was, and also the surrounding gardens, were lighted up with scarcely less brilliancy. Festivities of various sorts were indulged in, and the whole was well calculated to recal the 'carpe diem' and death's head and cross bones of a Roman feast. Food was laid upon the tomb, and at its side, the horse and syce of the departed King awaited his resurrection.

Sir William Nott was scarcely installed in his new office, before he began to address himself to its duties with earnestness and zeal. He had two assistants, Captains J. Shakespear, of the Artillery, and Captain George Hollings, of the 38th Native Infantry. The latter officer had been his interpreter and Quartermaster when Nott commanded the Regiment, and he held him in much esteem. At Lucknow also was Captain (afterwards Major and C.B.)

Scott, of the 38th, the Paymaster of Pensions, a man who, as has been already shown, enjoyed Nott's unqualified esteem.*

Before Sir William had been a month at Lucknow, he was summoned to Agra by Lord Ellenborough, to receive the investiture of the Grand Cross of the Bath. He reached the City on the 11th of March, having left his daughters at Lucknow. But his fondness for, and his habitual confidence in them, forbade his allowing many hours to elapse without communicating the fact of his arrival, and the circumstances which followed immediately upon the event.

I am in what is generally called the Government House, which is large enough for a Regiment of Cavalry—horses and all. Lord Ellenborough is some miles off in the fort. He has just come through the sun to sit awhile with me. Well, if he takes so much trouble to call upon a plebeian, I cannot help it. The more I see of him, the more I like him; *how long* we shall agree I cannot say. P—— has not yet arrived, but is expected dawk in a day or two, when I shall be released I told Lord Ellenborough that I wanted rest and sleep. He said, "Yes, but I have a party this evening, and will send my carriage for you. You really must come." When shall I be in my cottage. The ceremony of the investiture is to be one of the grandest affairs that ever took place in India. Neither trouble nor expense is spared in the preparations, and

* Had the Envoy lived he would, no doubt, have exerted himself to provide for the children of this lamented officer, who died prematurely, leaving a large and helpless family.

hundreds of people are daily at work in the fort for the occasion. I am asked why you did not come to see what has never before been seen in India, and what will be worth coming 1,000 miles to see. My answer is simple enough—"I was not aware of such great doings." I scarcely know what I am scribbling, so many visitors, and my eyes closed for want of sleep.

Yours,

W. NOTT.

Miss Nott, Lucknow.

It was Lord Ellenborough's wish that Sir William should remain for some days at Agra, and Sir William was only too happy to yield to one who seemed to take pleasure in his society, and to display his appreciation of the Envoy's excellent qualities.* Nott went four miles every day from Agra to dine with the Governor General, returning in the evening. Lord Ellenborough freely consulted him on many important subjects connected with the army and the administration of India. At this time Sir Charles Napier was preparing to take the field against the armies of Scinde, and Lord Ellenborough took counsel from Nott respecting the appointment of a second-in-command, an office in itself, as the Duke of Wellington has more than

* Sir William seemed very sensible of Lord Ellenborough's kindness. He writes, on the 17th March, expressing his wish to get back to Lucknow, but adds: "But what can I do? He is so kind and treats me with so much warm friendship that I cannot deny him any request he makes. I have much to tell you when we meet about that noble *gentleman*."

once shown in his wonderful despatches, of very little consequence while the chief survives, but demanding in the incumbent great military abilities in case of the death of the principal commander.

We may be sure that Nott's advice was freely given and promptly adopted, but Meanee was won before any special second-in-command could be despatched. Colonel Pattle, who held the office at the time of the engagement, satisfied public expectation.

Among the various matters referred to Nott, was the construction and distribution of the sepoy lines of huts, so as to prevent fires and sickness. The remarks of the General on this subject will be treasured by all commanding officers of sepoy regiments who may read his letter.

Agra, 16th March, 1843.

My Lord,

I am sorry that I was not at home when your Lordship's note of this morning was received.

I have just read the two last paragraphs of the accompanying letter. The number of fires which occur yearly in military cantonments, and the loss of property to our native army is lamentable, and greatly to be regretted; and if any means could be adopted for the prevention of this, without entailing an enormous and undefined expense on Government, it would, on the principle of humanity alone, be desirable; but I think that the Government cannot afford, and cannot be expected to incur such an outlay, and there is a rule applicable to all armies in the world, which, I think, cannot, and must not be

lost sight of; never, on any account whatever, to interfere, by stoppages or otherwise, with the pay granted by the State to the soldier. Our native army in particular cannot, and will not understand the motive, the humanity, or the expediency of such an interference; I trust, with reference to sepoy lines, it never will be attempted.

It is fully and completely in the power of officers in command of Regiments, with the assistance of their staff, to prevent all the inconveniencies stated, with the one exception, of fire. It is the duty of the Commanding Officer, the Quartermaster, and the Regimental Officer of the day, as well as the Captains of the Companies, to see that the men's huts are properly built, and that nothing is done or allowed which can be prejudicial to the health of the men. This is what I would call interior economy, and on which Government ought not to be troubled, as the authority of Commanding Officers is ample, and it is the duty of Generals in command of divisions, to see that all proper precautions and arrangements are carried into effect.

I conceive that the sickness at Barrackpore is not at all to be attributed to the state of the sepoy lines:—

1st.—The climate of Bengal is not at all congenial to the constitution of the natives of the upper provinces.

2ndly.—The very great sickness in the corps stationed at Barrackpore, proceeds from the Calcutta and Fort William duties. About 800 or 1000 men are sent, monthly, on duty to Fort William, where they have not, or had not, at the period I was at the Presidency, proper covering or barracks allowed them; what is generally called the gate, and other duties, were weekly, and the men were constantly on duty, and when relieved from sentry threw themselves down anywhere on the damp ground to sleep and take some rest. In two cases out of five, in the rains, they awoke with fever, and not a day passed without a boat-load of these unfortunate

men being sent back to Barrackpore, and, ultimately, such is the effect of Bengal fevers, for months to their native villages in search of health.

Tiled huts would be a preventive, as far as fire is concerned, but the straw roof is much cooler, and the former will not, without almost daily repair, keep out the rain, and nothing engenders sickness more than this continued leaking of huts.

Surely nothing can be easier than for Commanding Officers to prevent this interior digging of huts below the level of the parade ground, and it is the duty of Generals commanding divisions to see this strictly observed.

These are not the things required to render our native soldiers happy, comfortable, and contented. The sepoy is treated by Government with every indulgence; his pay is ample; if he distinguishes himself in action he is rewarded and honoured as no other soldier in the world is. He has the constant indulgence of furlough, and if he dies on service his family is nobly provided for. What greater hold can a Government have upon the affections of the gallant sepoy, who is fully sensible of these advantages.

What we require to render our native army happy and contented is for Commanding Officers of Regiments, and particularly Captains of Companies, to see to the comfort of their men, to take a real concern in their affairs, and patiently and kindly to listen to their little complaints, however absurd they may be in reality. What a return they would receive in the hour of trial and danger. Nothing can more exemplify and prove that the press is fast undermining the discipline of our native Army than letters, similar to the printed one enclosed. The exaggerated contents of these letters are read to our men, and the nature of man is prone to discontent. My opinion is,—leave well alone, and never touch a soldier's pay.

My Lord, I have scribbled these lines at the moment of receiving your Lordship's note, and I hope you will excuse the manner.

The ceremony of investiture was one of great splendour and interest. It took place at sunrise, in the palace of the Fort of Agra. A considerable number of persons had been invited to witness it. There was a grand public breakfast in the morning, a public dinner, and finally a ball and supper—"all very fine and delightful to the spectators and participators, but somewhat irksome" to such a modest man as Sir William Nott. Sir George Pollock received the investiture at the same time. When required to speak after the conclusion of the ceremony, Sir William, in the presence of assembled hundreds, told the young officers who had been invited, that from seeing him so situated that day they might draw encouragement, and be excited to persevere in their endeavours to gain a thorough knowledge of their profession, for that he, an unpatronised man, the son of a plebeian, that day received an honourable order, which the first nobles in the land, aye, the sons of British Sovereigns, felt pride in wearing. "I stand before you," said Nott, in his earnest manner, "an evidence that in England the road to the highest honours is not closed to any individuals, however humble their original positions, provided that they have

some merit and talent, and *opportunity* for their display."

A day or two after the investiture, Lord Ellenborough sent the General the Candahar and Caubul medals, begging that he would wear them on his entry into Lucknow. His return to the Residency with all his blushing honours thick upon him, was signalised by a cantonment dinner and ball given to Sir William and his daughters by the officers of the station. The scene at the ball was most impressive. Many of the officers who had served with Nott at Candahar paid him short visits at the Residency soon after. Lieutenant-Colonel William Anderson, who had done such good service in command of the Artillery, was there ; and so was Major Rawlinson, the rare "Political," who had happily maintained his position and the regard of the Envoy at the same time, for he knew exactly where the line should be drawn between the administrative and the executive, and never usurped the prerogative of the military chief.

Sir William Nott had not been many days at Lucknow before he was called upon to take a very prominent part in vindicating the character of the troops who had served under him in Affghanistan. The political party in England opposed to the Whigs had, through their organs of the press, indulged in every species of hostility to Lord Auckland's operations in reference to Affghanistan;

but latterly the same press had altered its tone, and rendered all due credit of the measures of Lord Ellenborough, the Tory, who had replaced or succeeded the Whig. Now the Whig press, in its turn, became unscrupulous, and influenced or sustained by the exaggerated representations of *highly imaginative* correspondents, put forth innumerable libels regarding the conduct of the troops under Nott and Pollock, when retiring from Affghanistan. As soon as these vile slanders reached India, the Governor General called upon Sir William Nott and Sir George Pollock to reply to them. The answer of Sir William Nott deserves to be inscribed in letters of gold upon the purest marble. It filled Great Britain with admiration of a man whom the people had learnt to respect and glory in as one of the best soldiers of the State, and completely reassured the public mind :—

Major-General Sir W. Nott's vindication of the honour of his Army.

Lucknow, April 4, 1843.

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 817, of the 29th ult., calling upon me, by directions of the Right Hon. the Governor General of India, to report upon certain excesses said to have been committed by the British troops on retiring from Affghanistan. I will confine my remarks to that veteran, gallant, and highly disciplined army which I had the honour to command for so long a period, and I will leave it to my gallant comrade, Sir George

Pollock, G.C.B., to defend the honour of the troops he commanded.

1. I am called upon to state "upon what private property and upon what private buildings, injury was inflicted by my orders, or under my toleration, at Ghuznee." I answer, upon none.

2. I am desired to state, "whether unresisting individuals were destroyed in cold blood, for mere vengeance, or whether women were either violated or murdered for their ornaments?" I will endeavour to suppress my scorn and indignation while I shortly reply to this charge, or suspicion, or whatever it might be called by the persons from whom it emanated. And this is the return made by the people of England, or rather, I would believe, to a few individuals, to the gallant Candahar army—that army which was for so long a time neglected, but which, nevertheless, nobly upheld our national honour, and during a period of four years acted with the greatest forbearance and humanity to the people of Affghanistan.

Ghuznee.—Colonel Palmer, at the head of a brave garrison, surrendered Ghuznee to various tribes of Affghans. The city was occupied by these people for months; it was vacated by the enemy on the arrival of the army under my command. On its being entered by the British troops, it was found that not a single person was in the city, neither man, nor woman, nor child. There was no property, and I do not believe there was a house left completely standing in the town; the whole had been unroofed and destroyed by the contending Affghans for the sake of the timber, &c. I have said there were no inhabitants in Ghuznee, and therefore "unresisting individuals" could not have been "destroyed in cold blood," women could not have been "murdered and violated for their ornaments." These, I boldly say, are gross and villanous falsehoods, whomsoever they emanated from. I ordered the fortifications and

citadel of Ghuznee to be destroyed. It had been the scene of treachery, mutilation, torture, starvation, and cruel murder to our unresisting and imprisoned countrymen. Look at the contrast—see the conduct of the noble British soldier—and are calumny and gross falsehood to rob him of the honour? They shall not while I have life to defend his fame.

Rosa.—The extensive village or town of Rosa is situate about two miles from Ghuznee, and is lovely to behold. When this city was taken by the force under my command, Rosa was full of inhabitants, men, women, and children; my troops were encamped close to its walls; its gardens and its houses were full of property; its barns and farm-yards were well stored; its orchards were loaded with fruit; its vineyards bent beneath a rich and ripe vintage; the property taken from our murdered soldiers of the Ghuznee garrison was seen piled in its dwellings. Were not these tempting objects to that soldier who had undergone four years of fatigue and privation. Some of these soldiers had seen, and all had heard, of the treacherous murder of their relations and comrades by these very people—but why should I enlarge? Four days the victorious Candahar army remained encamped close to this village, with all these temptations before it, and at its mercy, but not a particle of anything was taken from the Affghans; the fruit brought for sale was paid for at a rate far above its value, no man, no living thing was injured. Much more I could say, but so much for the noble British soldier for Ghuznee, and for the beautiful, rich, and tempting town of Rosa.

I did not command at Cabul. I did not interfere in its concerns. I never was in its bazuars. My division was encamped at a distance, with the exception of one regiment, against which corps I never received a complaint. My division was not in Cabul after Sir George Pollock's troops left it. General Pollock's army and my troops marched the same day. No man under my command was ever detected in plundering without being immediately punished. How am I

to have patience to reply to "whether Affghans were permitted to be wantonly treated or murdered?" Is this a proper question to put to a British general officer, who has ever had the honour of his country uppermost in his mind, and deeply impressed upon his heart? "Permitted," indeed. Is it supposed that I am void of religion, that I am ignorant of what is due to that God whom I have worshipped from my childhood? Am I thus to have my feelings outraged, because a few people in India and England have sent forth villanous falsehoods to the world? I have confined my reply for the present as much as possible to the questions in your letter. I will only further say, that never did an army march through a country with less marauding and less violence than that which I commanded in Lower Affghanistan.

I put down rebellion, and quelled all resistance to the British power, in spite of the fears and weaknesses of my superiors. By mild, persuasive measures I induced the whole population to return to the cultivation of their lands, and to live in peace. I left them as friends, and on friendly terms. On my leaving Candahar no man was injured or molested, no man was deprived of his property, and my soldiers and the citizens were seen embracing. It is on record that I informed the Indian Government that I could hold the country for any time—it is on record that I informed Lord Auckland, as far back as December 1841, that I would, with permission, re-occupy Cabul with the force under my command. There was nothing to prevent it but the unaccountable panic which prevailed at the seat of government. And now I am rewarded by a certain set of people in England taxing me with that which would be disgraceful to me as a religious man, as an honourable gentleman, and as a British officer.

I am, sir, your most obedient servant;

W. Nott, Major-General.

To Major-General J. R. Lumley,
Adjutant-General of the Army.

Letters nearly similar in purport, but wanting in the spirit of indignation which distinguished the above, were written by Generals Pollock and M'Caskill :—

From Major-General John M'Caskill, K.H., late in command of the Force in Kohistan, to Major-General Lumley, Adjutant-General of the Army, dated Camp, Mobarukpoor, 2nd April, 1843.

Sir,

In obedience to the orders of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, conveyed in your letter to my address, No. 816, dated 29th March, 1843, I have the honour to report as follows, upon the several particulars therein specified:—

1. At what hour the action at Istaliff began, and when it terminated?—

The attack commenced between seven and eight o'clock in the morning, and the firing totally ceased in about two hours from that time. The place was completely in our possession by ten o'clock.

2. Whether I gave up the town to plunder for a fixed number of hours, or suffered the troops to wreak vengeance upon it in their own way, and as long as they chose?—

My instructions from Major-General Pollock being to destroy the town by fire, I did not deem it necessary to restrain the troops employed in its capture from seizing such property as they might find in it. The 2nd Brigade was principally concerned in the action, and was not withdrawn to camp till about half-past four o'clock in the afternoon, when it retired, having been relieved by Brigadier Stacey's Brigade. During a part of their stay in the place, all the soldiers, sepoys, and camp-followers took possession of whatever they found in the

houses; but with regard to her Majesty's 9th Regiment, I am enabled to state that, for three hours previous to retiring, Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor assembled the Regiment in a garden, and restrained the plunder as much as possible. The articles chiefly taken by the men of that corps were quilts, nearly all of them having lost their bedding during the advance to Cabool. On the following morning, with a view to the restoration of order and discipline, I took measures for putting a stop to the pillage, by sending Brigadier Tulloch with the 2nd Brigade to relieve Brigadier Stacey's troops. Brigadier Tulloch's orders were to patrol the place, and expel from it all soldiers not on duty, and all camp-followers. The provost-serjeant, with a detachment of Irregular Cavalry, was posted in the town throughout the day, to aid in carrying these orders into effect.

3. To what extent was the town burned, and by whose orders?—

About one-third of the town was destroyed by fire, in obedience to the orders of Major-General Pollock. My instructions were to burn the whole; but not more than the portion above stated was accomplished, the chief attention of the engineers and other officers employed having been directed to the destruction of the better sort of buildings.

4. Treatment of the women?—

A single instance only of the maltreatment of a woman has come to my knowledge. When the troops were finally withdrawn from the place, an officer discovered accidentally that such an act had been perpetrated, but it was not possible to trace the culprit. The conduct of the soldiers and sepoys towards the women was almost universally good.

When the troops first attained the highest point of the town, vast numbers of women and children were making their way up the mountain; several men were interspersed among them

and fired upon our soldiers, who abstained from returning the shots, lest they should injure the women. At the same time, a considerable number of women and children were so far in the rear that our foremost troops, European and Native, were mingled with them, but suffered them to proceed entirely unmolested.

About fifty women (some of them apparently of great respectability) were captured in the town. These were assembled by order of Brigadier Tulloch, and conveyed under an escort, commanded by an officer (Lieutenant Vigars, of the 9th), in safety to our camp, where they remained during the night close to the tent of the Chief, Ian Fishan Khan, contiguous to my own, and were sent next morning to one of his forts.

When the 2nd Brigade re-occupied the town on the day succeeding the storm, Brigadier Tulloch directed that all prisoners belonging to the place who might be found should be brought to the spot where he had established his head-quarters; and during the whole day the sepoys of the 26th Native Infantry were conducting to this place, with care and kindness, aged and infirm men and women, and young children, till a large number were collected.

They were provided with food and warm covering, and were left in safety at that spot. When the troops withdrew next morning, they appeared grateful for the protection afforded them.

5. Whether there were any cases in which Affghans were killed in cold blood after resistance had ceased; if so, by whose order?—

I am firmly persuaded that no such case occurred. Our more advanced troops, in rushing through the streets, were fired upon from some of the houses; they returned the fire, and in this way an irregular discharge of musketry was kept up, by which two or three old men, one woman, and perhaps

two or three children, were killed; but this only occurred at the onset.

The troops on their way through the town found, in two or three places, small parties of the male inhabitants, who begged for quarter. They were in every case protected, and brought along, to insure their safety till opportunity offered of letting them go uninjured.

Scarcely any coercion was necessary to prevent the practice of cruelties. No disposition to it, but the reverse, was evinced by the troops, after the first excitement of the attack had subsided.

While that continued, it is probable that ten or twelve unarmed Affghans may have fallen a sacrifice.

The 2nd Brigade, on withdrawing from Istaliff, formed the rear guard of the force. When calling in the picquets, a large party of Affghans suddenly appeared on the hill just quitted by the furthest picquet. The Brigadier, supposing they intended an attack, ordered one of the mountain-train guns, which he had placed in position, to be fired upon them. The shot did not take effect, and it was immediately afterwards perceived that these were unarmed men, apparently having no purpose but that of picking up the posteens and quilts left by the troops upon the camp ground. The Brigadier ordered that they should not be molested, and they were unhurt, although within a few yards of our troops.

6. Capture and destruction of Charekar?—

On arrival at Charekar, the place was found to have been abandoned by the inhabitants, and all property withdrawn.

Pursuant to my instructions, I destroyed the greater part of the town by fire; and the service on which the troops had been employed, being of a nature to excite in them a disposition to plunder and violence, I issued the annexed orders, dated Charekar, 3rd October, 1842. Its effect was such as I

desired, by repressing disorder and restoring the proper discipline of the force.

I have also annexed a copy of an order issued by me, with similar views, previous to our arrival at Istaliff.

Besides the written instructions from Major-General Pollock, of which I annex a copy, I received the Major-General's verbal orders to the same effect, dwelling particularly on the destruction of Chareekar, which had been the scene of treacherous barbarity towards our officers and troops.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) JOHN M'CASKILL, Major-General,
Late in Command of the Force in Kohistan.

The following is a copy of an Order issued by me restraining a disposition to pillage and violence, which manifested itself previous to the arrival of the Force at Istaliff.

(D. O.) Camp, near Timma, 27th September, 1842.

The Major-General feels himself called upon to notice, in terms of the most marked reprobation, the acts of outrage committed by some of the troops of this force during the two last marches. He is not ignorant of the wrongs of some of our soldiers, and many of their nearest relations have been injured at the hands of the savage people of these villages; but it never can be suffered in any army that troops should take the right of retribution into their own hands. Such scenes would mar the discipline which renders them superior to their enemies, and thus reduce them, first to their level, and finally below it. The Major-General therefore notifies, that he has directed the provost-marshal's assistant to punish summarily and severely any future acts of pillage, and calls upon all officers to put an end to irregularities by a prompt and firm exercise of their authority. This order to be read and explained to the troops before they are dismissed

after their march, and its substance to be proclaimed in bazaars in the usual manner.

(A true copy.)

(Signed) JOHN M'CASKILL, Major-General,
Late in Command of the Force in Kohistan.

Copy of a Morning Order, issued at Chareekar, 3d October, 1842.

Major-General M'Caskill announces to the troops, that in the destruction of Istaliff and Chareekar, the objects of retribution in the Kohistan contemplated by superior authority have been accomplished; no farther example need be made, unless punishment is provoked by any attacks on our columns as they march towards Caubool. Soldiers and followers must therefore understand, that from sunset this evening they are expected to return within the strictest limits of discipline. License and plunder must cease, and property and person be strictly respected; and the provost-marshal's assistants will be instructed to flog severely on the spot any soldier, sepoy, or native attached to the camp, who may be detected in any act of devastation or violence. This order to be fully and immediately explained to corps and proclaimed in bazaars.

(A true copy.)

(Signed) JOHN M'CASKILL, Major-General,
Late in Command of the Force in Kohistan.

From Major-General Sir G. Pollock, G.C.B., to the Right Hon. Lord Ellenborough, Governor General of India, dated Allahabad, 2nd April, 1843.

MY LORD,

I have had the honour to receive your Lordship's letter, dated 23rd ultimo, intimating that disapprobation had been expressed at the destruction of the bazaar and mosque at

Cabool, and of trees; also, that excesses have been imputed to the troops.

It is difficult to grapple with vague and anonymous accusations against the conduct of the troops. Many detailed statements in the newspapers were entirely unfounded, and were got up with the sole object of creating a sensation; but I confess that, if individual and isolated instances of excess had occurred, I should not have been much surprised, composed, as all Indian armies are, of such a heterogeneous mass, comprising all classes and castes, more than two-thirds of whom are either public or private servants and adventurers, who, though nominally following some occupation useful to an army, proceed with it for the sole purpose of plundering when a favourable opportunity offers. Some excesses may, unknown to me, have been committed; but I will venture to assert that no troops ever conducted themselves with more forbearance under such unprecedented aggravations; perhaps no army was ever placed in a more trying situation.

During the whole course of their progress towards the capital they had ocular proofs of the treachery and brutality of a merciless enemy; but still I am unable to call to mind any wanton, deliberate act of inhumanity on the part of the troops, and cannot but regret that the instances alluded to have not been specified, as I may possibly be suspected of suppressing facts. This, however, I beg to assure your Lordship I have no wish to do.

The feeling of the Hindoos against the Affghans was very naturally strong, in consequence of the latter having deprived the Hindoos of their caste whenever they came into their power; but no troops could feel otherwise than excited at the sight of the skeletons of their late brethren in arms, which still lie covering the road from Gundamuck to Cabool; and, as if the more to raise a spirit of revenge, the barricade at Jugdulluck was literally covered with skeletons.

What I have stated above will not be considered as justifying excesses on the part of a British army, but it may be admitted in extenuation of individual cases.

A few days previous to the march of a brigade under Brigadier Monteith, an European was murdered by the Affghans at Jellalabad. The destruction of Ali Bughan by some men under Brigadier Monteith's command was caused by one of those sudden bursts of feeling, which, being wholly unexpected, no precautions were deemed necessary; but it was a solitary instance, and occurred nearly as follows:—Some camp-followers entered the village, and having found parts of the dress of some of our soldiers who had been massacred on the march from Cabool, a number of men proceeded to the village, which was eventually burnt, whether accidentally or intentionally is doubtful. So very soon was the mischief perpetrated that the Brigadier was hardly aware of it till the place was in flames. He immediately took measures to prevent a recurrence of such scenes, and I wrote in strong terms on the subject. Subsequent to that event, during the whole time the Brigadier was detached, I heard of no more excesses. In the instance of Ali Bughan, after a most minute inquiry, I have reason to believe that not a man, woman, or child was injured; and I know the greater part of the property was returned to the head man of the village.

In subsequent engagements with the enemy, in the Mumoo Khail, Jugdulluck, and Teezeen, I neither saw nor heard of any excesses. A report was circulated that an European was burnt alive at Jugdulluck, and that two Affghans were burnt in like manner by our troops, in revenge; the whole of which was an infamous fabrication. I am, &c,

GEO. POLLOCK.

The Overland Mail which brought the papers containing the calumnies of the press, at the same

time brought the 'Gazette,' containing the announcement of Brevet rank and other honours to many of the officers who had been engaged in Affghanistan. Although the just expectations of many officers were realised in the 'Gazette,' others felt that their services had been inadequately requited, and they appealed to Sir William Nott to vindicate their claims to higher reward. Nott had some difficulty in resisting these appeals, for, like his great prototype, the immortal Duke, he felt it did not become a soldier to ask his sovereign for recompense. Lieutenant-Colonel Stacy was one of the number of the malcontents. Ripley and Sanders were likewise (most reasonably) dissatisfied. Ripley was temporarily passed over by the accidental omission of his name in a despatch, which omission was rectified as soon as ascertained, and the Brevet followed as a matter of course. The reply to Stacy's letter was a sort of summary of the General's views. Both the letter of the Lieutenant-Colonel and the reply merit perusal:—

Tritty Ghur,
2nd March, 1843.

My Dear General,

I hope you will pardon me for troubling you in a matter of such great importance to me.

I believe you have both the inclination and power to serve me; and, under this impression, I am induced to ask your friendly consideration and support.

You will have observed in the honours conferred by her Majesty, published in the last Overland, my name with other Companions of the Bath; whilst Wymer, more fortunate, has obtained a Brevet-Colonelcy besides.

Now as I believe Wymer and myself stood equally well in your estimation, may I hope you will write a few lines to Lord Ellenborough in my behalf. If you would so favour me, I am confident the Governor General would instantly back the recommendation; and thus rectify what I am vain enough to suppose has been an accidental oversight.

It is true my name did not appear in the Ghuznee despatch, but you kindly and honourably mentioned me in that of Kandahar.

I conclude you have reached Lucknow. I hope you may keep your health under the sudden transition from a most active to a most sedentary life, and from one of the finest to one of the worst of climates.

I am,
My dear General,
Your's sincerely,
L. R. Stacy.

Dawk Bungalow, en route to Agra,
8th March, 1843.

My dear Stacy,

I have been favoured with your letter of the 2nd inst. I sincerely congratulate you on being appointed, by our gracious Sovereign, a Companion of the Bath. After every action in Affghanistan I, according to the best of my judgment, named in my despatches those officers who had opportunities of distinguishing themselves, or whose corps happened to be conspicuously situated. Having done this, I felt that I had no right, and could not have interfered with the arrangements of Government for conferring honours, nor did I see or hear

of the list of those on whom promotion and honours have been conferred until I saw it in the public papers.

I deeply regret to find so many officers expressing discontent with the honours conferred on the armies lately serving in Affghanistan, and I think that these honours have been carried to a much greater extent than was before awarded to any British army. Compare them with the honours conferred on the gallant troops under Wellington in Spain, after all their great deeds!

I think (this is mere matter of opinion) that great injury has been done to the army by naming in the public despatches from Affghanistan so many officers, merely because they happened to be with the army in the field, though not conspicuously engaged; and I would ask what value an officer can place upon medals and honours conferred by an approving Government, if similar honours and rewards at the same time are bestowed upon those who had not the good fortune to have had opportunities of distinguishing themselves.

I conceive that the Government is the sole judge of what honours ought to be conferred upon its servants, and as a sincere well-wisher to the Bengal army, I deeply regret to find so many of my comrades calling for particular honours and promotions for themselves, instead of receiving, with old-fashioned modesty, and being satisfied with, what is given to them by our gracious Sovereign.

You are not the only one in your regiment who has complained. You are at liberty to say that these are my sentiments. I care not who knows them.

Subathoo, February 26th, 1843.

My dear General,

It is now three days since, on perusing the Delhie Gazette of the 22nd, bringing the Overland news and Gazette for

Affghanistan service, that I found myself omitted amongst the Captains breveted Majors,—sixteen out of eighteen, my juniors, some from six to seven years, and many of whom had been engaged but a short time in the war, which I had served in from its commencement, and whose claims are not stronger or even as strong as my own: in fact, I appear to be the only full Captain mentioned in your despatches who has not received his Brevet.

Nothing I can say can picture to you my feelings, and if I cannot gain redress on what I consider one of the heaviest visitations of injustice and degradation which can befal a Military man, casting slur and reflection on my character as an officer, all I can do is to leave, as quickly as possible, a service, in which, under such unjustifiable supercession and marked neglect, the bitterness of my feelings, never to be overcome, will render me useless. This may be called strong language, but it is the mildest I can use after allowing my mind three days' calm reflection. What can my friends or brother officers think but there is good reason for this treatment which has not come to light?

It is needless to remind you that my name was first mentioned in Lieutenant-Colonel Lane's despatch, detailing the defence of Candahar, a service which I feel certain you will allow was by no means one of the least important of the affairs which took place in Affghanistan. I was again mentioned by yourself in the Ghuznee despatch, and although omitted, by mistake, in the original of the Goaine despatch, you considered it just to me to correct this omission in a handsome note on my behalf to Government, which was duly published. Why then, let me ask, in any fairness or justice have I been omitted amongst a brevet of company's officers, sixteen of whom are long my jnniors, and thus subjected to supercession and degradation?

With the full conviction that, for the three years and a

half I served as your staff in the Affghan campaign, you had every reason to be satisfied with my conduct in all respects, and are aware that I left no exertions on my part untried to give satisfaction to yourself and my Government, as also that I was a volunteer, on all occasions, to be present with you when you left the garrison, though my duties in Candahar, as Fort Adjutant, in some instances prevented your allowing me this boon, I now appeal to you to speak in my favour. I do not ask you to seek honours for me, but justice. I ask you, by your voice, to protect me from supercession and disgrace, as one who, throughout the campaign, served you faithfully.

That you have the power, privately, by a short statement of my case to the Governor General, I feel confident; but should you object to this, you will not, I trust, refuse to forward and back my memorial to the Honourable Court, through the proper channel.

There is, I am aware, the bare possibility that, on the receipt of your correction of the omission in the Goaine despatch, I may, having been again brought to notice, have been recommended for my Brevet, but as I have no means of ascertaining this point I must not delay in doing all in my power to seek redress.

To you, and you alone, can I look for support in this appeal; that you have the power, I again repeat, I feel confident, and cannot but trust, and hope, you have the will. I shall quietly wait a reply to this, preparing, in the mean time, my memorial, and with best wishes, my dear General, for the health and welfare of yourself and family, believe me,

Yours, very sincerely,

J. P. Ripley.

P.S.—You are, I think, aware of my bad fortune in Regimental promotion; twelve years a Regimental Captain, with the certain prospect of remaining one for seven or eight years

more; at the present time every other Regimental Captain promoted to a majority supersedes me.

You will forgive me enclosing you the accompanying note. Times are indeed changed since you wrote it. I have carefully preserved it, and if it can ever be of use to me I feel it will be now. I attach so much value to it that I beg you will kindly return it.

Dawk Bungalow, en route to Agra,
9th March, 1843.

My dear Ripley,

I have your letter of the 25th ultimo, and I can assure you that I felt regret in not seeing your name among those who received Brevet rank for services in Affghanistan, and I sincerely believe that no one deserved it more than yourself.

I, after every action, in my despatches to Government, named those officers who had had opportunities of distinguishing themselves, and I named you more than once. Having done this according to the best of my judgment, I felt that I had no right, and indeed could not have interfered with the arrangements of Government for conferring honours and promotion, nor did I see or hear of the list of those officers on whom honours have been conferred, until I saw it in the public papers. Nothing could have given me greater pleasure than to have seen your name among those who received the Brevet, as I can most conscientiously declare that your conduct, zeal, and activity, upon all occasions, equally deserved the mark of reward with many of those who have received it.

I am, yours very truly,
W. Nott.

Camp near Meerut,
28th February, 1843.

My dear Sir William,

I have been rather disappointed at not being included in the late Brevet given to the field and other officers of the Can-

dahar force under your command. I should suppose it had been an oversight, from the circumstances of my being the only Queen's Regimental Major in either your favour or that of General Pollock who has not been promoted, but I am sure a kind word from you would remove all difficulties on that score, and insure to me some reward for my service in the late campaign in Affghanistan, which you have so successfully concluded.

My being second in command of the 40th during the whole campaign, and having commanded the regiment on two occasions of considerable anxiety and danger (the affairs of the rear-guard between Look-aub and Gundamuk, and between Lundy Khana and Alli Musjid in the Khybur Pass) together with my being present in every action with the enemy in which the 40th was engaged, may plead my excuse for addressing you on the subject, and I am sure, from your recollection of me and the 40th Regiment, you will render me all the assistance in your power.

Colonel Hibbert informed me, before he left the regiment, that he had forwarded a letter to you, recommending me and other officers of the regiment for promotion, but as there had been no answer to that letter, it is feared the recommendation had not reached you.

With sincere congratulations on your late honours,

Believe me,

My dear Sir William,

Yours truly,

J. STOPFORD, Major, 40th Foot.

To Major-General Sir William Nott, G.C.B.

Agra, 11th March, 1843.

MY DEAR MAJOR,

Your letter of the 28th ult. has just reached me. I am sorry that you should feel disappointed regarding the Brevet.

I have letters from many others on the same subject. I can assure you I never saw or heard of the list of officers on whom honours have been conferred until their names appeared in the public papers. You must be aware that I could not possibly have interfered with the arrangements of Government in conferring honours and promotion. After every action in Affghanistan in which the 40th Regiment was present, I performed a most pleasing duty in drawing attention to that excellent and gallant corps, and I felt a pride in doing so, for, in fair truth, a finer regiment, in field and in quarters, I have never seen.

The letter you allude to, from Major Hibbert, regarding promotion, was received and duly forwarded, and I trust will be attended to.

I sincerely hope that both the officers and men of the 40th are in health, and doing well.

The case of Major Sanders, of the Engineers, was one particularly deserving of special consideration. He appealed to Nott in the following very proper terms:—

Camp, Togluk-abad,
21st February, 1843.

My dear General,

Before my letter can reach you, you will have seen the Overland Mail, which will bring to you much intelligence that will be gratifying, much also that will give pleasure to many that lately served under your command. If some also feel disappointment it is not to be wondered at, it is but human nature, and at best we are bad judges of our own deserts; will you then judge mine?

You may recollect telling me you thought I should be honoured with Brevet rank for my services in Afghanistan,

for those especially which passed under your command, and under your eye. You could not know how ardently this was desired by me, but you would not have said a word to raise expectation if you had not thought I deserved this mark of favour.

I may, perhaps, be pardoned for having thought it not improbable that I should be thus rewarded, but I hardly dare acknowledge how deep, how bitter is the disappointment I feel, at finding my name not included in the list of those officers of your force to whom the Brevet rank of Lieutenant-Colonel has been granted.

If this disappointment be in any degree participated in by you, it may be in your power, even now, to serve one of your Majors who has, perhaps, suffered in some degree from the non-publication of your despatch regarding Kulla-i-Ayaz, and the delayed publication of your despatch regarding Kalee-shuk, by writing to Lord Ellenborough, and expressing your regret at the omission of my name in the list of Brevets now published, attended by such notice of my services as you may think they deserve.

I trust there is nothing unsoldierlike in my letter. I write to an officer under whose eye I have, on at least ten occasions, been engaged with the enemy, besides those on which he employed me on detached duties, who is aware that I have suffered in their performance, and who can, better than any other person, estimate the real value of my services. Yet would I rather be understood to hope than to ask for your intercession in my behalf, for reasons that no one better than yourself can appreciate.

My heart is too full to write more.

I am,
My dear General,
Yours sincerely,
EDWARD SANDERS.

Immediately upon receiving Sanders's letter, Sir William wrote to Lord Ellenborough, expressing his disappointment that "although Brevet had been given to many brave officers, it was not bestowed on that noble and scientific soldier."

"It is true," said the warm-hearted General, "that he has been highly honoured in being made a Companion of the Bath—a mark of royal favour which would, and must, have fully satisfied him and his friends, had not other officers received the Brevet. I have always considered Major Sanders one of the best officers in the Bengal army, and his zeal, gallantry, and devotion on the field of battle was such on all occasions as to call for my admiration. Major Sanders received severe wounds while under my command—some of them very severe—and he still suffers from their effects. I have thought it my duty, however late, to record my opinion of so valuable a soldier."

It is scarcely necessary to add that Lord Ellenborough paid instant attention to Sir William's wishes—nay, his lordship had anticipated them, for, fully alive to the merit of Sanders, he had written to the President of the Board of Control, and the Major was consequently soon a Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel. The recognition of Sir William's interference by Sanders is a charming and most honourable letter:—

Camp, Sekundra,
3rd March, 1843.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

If you but knew the pleasure your note had given me you would be gratified; I did not expect so kind a reply, and I am therefore the more sensibly impressed by it. I cannot doubt that your application will be successful, but even should it fail, much of the sting occasioned by, what I have been vain enough to think, the neglect shown me, must be extracted, since your sense of my desert has been evinced in a manner so honourable to myself. Yes! whatever the result, I shall be proud and happy again to strive for the credit of our army and such honour as a soldier may win, under my old successful commander. Perhaps the opportunity may not be far off.

I will write nothing more. A long letter could not better express my feelings, and I am too much wrapt up in the thought of what you have done for me, and its probable influence on my future fate, to add a word on any other topic.

I remain,
My dear General,
Yours sincerely,
EDWARD SANDERS.

The Houses of Parliament did not await the defence and vindication of the armies of Affghanistan, which Generals Nott and Pollock had prepared. On the 20th of February the thanks of both Houses were voted to the Generals and their armies for "the intrepidity, skill, and perseverance displayed by them in the military operations in Affghanistan, and for their indefatigable zeal and exertions throughout the late campaign."

The motion for the vote was introduced in the House of Lords by the Duke of Wellington, who entered at great length into a history of the war, and bore especial tribute to the merits of Sir William Nott. Alluding to the instructions he had received from Lord Ellenborough (and which Sir Howard Douglas in the other House properly declared were founded upon the French military policy—*Reculer pour mieux sauter*) the Duke said emphatically—

"And he must do General Nott the justice to say that he had accepted these instructions most gallantly—(hear, hear)—and executed them to the letter with equal skill, promptitude, judgment, and bravery. (Hear, hear.) He honoured that gallant officer for his conduct. (Hear, hear.) He made no difficulties, he offered no objections, but he executed his instructions to the letter; and he repeated, that the conduct of both parties did honour to them, and he trusted their Lordships would confer upon them (the Governor General and General Nott) their unanimous and hearty thanks." (Hear, hear.)

The Marquis of Clanricarde also referred in particular to the subject of this biography—

"It is impossible for any one," said the noble Marquis, "to read the book (the Blue Book) without feeling that General Nott was entitled to especial admiration for the skill, intrepidity, and firmness, with which he had conducted himself throughout."

It was in the House of Commons, however, where the name of Nott received the highest honour. Sir Robert Peel, who introduced the motion, warmly eulogised the fine qualities of the General, inferring the noble nature of his mind from the heroism, firmness, and simplicity of his bearing. Speaking of all the trying circumstances in which the General had been placed, Sir Robert said—

"During the whole of the time he was employed in these dangerous undertakings his gallant spirit never forsook him, and he dreamt of nothing but vindicating his country's honour. (Loud cheers.) Sir, I do not wish to pay this compliment to General Nott solely on account of his military skill, but I say that the mind which, under such circumstances, could conceive such fine and noble sentiments as are contained in this letter* is one that ought to reflect the highest honour upon the gallant individual, and make that country proud for which his services were employed with such excellent effect."

And again, referring to the letter to the Governor General of 26th July, 1842, in which Nott expressed his opinion that notwithstanding the conduct of the Affghan Chiefs, the army should leave a deep impression on the people of that country of our character for forbearance and humanity; Sir Robert observed that it (the letter)

* The letter to General England.

"reflected the highest honour upon the writer, not merely with respect to his intellectual character, but also his moral character." (Loud cheers.)

The vote of thanks passed *nemine contradicente.*

The public advices from England, gratifying as they were, do not appear to have been the only sources of pleasure to the Envoy at this happy period. Old private friends, from whom he had been severed by time and distance, now reminded him agreeably of their existence, and of their cordial delight at his prosperity. Henry Wood, of the Bengal Civil Service, an old and valued friend, was among the first to offer his sincere congratulations. General Shubrick, an old brother campaigner, recalled to his recollection their younger days, and extolled, with all the warmth of a true soldier, Nott's defence of his army from the calumnies of the English Press. Sir William Lloyd, who had been with the General in the Muckie expedition, in 1804—a right noble Welchman—and Mr Seymour Montagu, of Somerset House, erst 'Captain' Montagu—a title he had dropped for twenty years—were also again among the friends whose remembrance of him Nott especially valued. Their worth had given them an imperishable place in his heart. To Montagu, Sir William had written for the purpose of asking him to apply to the First Minister of the Crown for a grant of land in Tasmania. Nott's services had reaped for him no

pecuniary harvest; and now, deeming that he was too poor to reside in England, and also conceiving that he had established a fair claim to the generosity of his country, he thought that a few hundred acres of crown land would not be refused him. To spend the remainder of his years in a cottage, and follow his old farming pursuits, had always been the wish of the General, and now that he was the tenant of a palace he more particularly desired the early realization of his wishes. Montagu, however, who was most willing to serve his friend, pointed out the difficulties which presented themselves to the obtaining the grant, and suggested a more desirable course than the expatriation sought by the old soldier "tired of war's alarms:"—

"Should I fail," said Montagu (30th October, 1843) "I really think you will not have much to regret, and would soon find in your 'clay-built cottage' in Wales ample amends for the boundless acres in an antipodean wilderness which your rusting sword might plough up into fertility; and moreover these acres would require rather larger funds to stock and render productive, with even doubtful success, than would suffice to cheer the evening of your days in the comforts and society of your native land."

These observations seem to have had their weight, for we do not find Nott recurring to the theme. Circumstances which subsequently oc-

curred in England may have contributed to the abandonment of the idea of a settlement in Van Dieman's Land.

We have seen, at the close of the first chapter, that Nott's old friend, Sir William Lloyd, was solicitous about his choice of a coat of arms. Six months later we find the same good friend and worthy man recurring to the subject, and taking some pains to further a matter which appeared to him to concern the dignity and the credit of the General. There is something touching in the activity of a friendship which had now endured for forty years and upwards undiminished by long absence.

Brynestyn,
July 27th, 1843.

My dear Nott,

I received your letter of the 13th February last, on the 9th May, and was glad to find you still entertained the same feelings towards me as when we served together on board the ships of war sent to convoy the homeward-bound Indiamen south of the line; those were happy, happy times upon which I look back with a painful regret, and a too sure certainty that such cannot come again on this side of the grave. Our spirits are still unimpaired, but the worthless cases which they inhabit are fast decaying, and we must mingle with the dust in a few years,—such is our destiny. I often think I should like to have fallen on the field of battle rather than in a quiet bed. I rejoice more than I can say in the good fortune which placed you in a position to exercise those splendid military talents which have ensured you a name in history as

long as England holds her prominence among the nations of Europe, and with these sentiments I at once set on foot the inquiries, the results of which are contained in the accompanying letters. My opinion is that you should at once adopt the suggestions of my friend Harrison, both as far as respects the grant of arms, and supporters to those arms, by signing and transmitting to me the memorials enclosed in his letters, and if you will do so, and transmit to me the money requisite for that purpose, I will take care to see it done, and should there be any overplus of cash, dispose of it as you may hereafter direct. Instead of the accompanying memorial, I should suggest that you draw one up yourself, and detail all your battles from Muckee to the present time, in order that they be duly recorded in the Herald's College, but don't delay doing so if you should adopt my views in this respect. I would have all the actions you served in recorded *on my Coat* of Arms, or at least those in which you commanded, and may add flags, &c. over your Crest; a Bengal Sepoy and Affghan would be very proper supporters. I wrote to your brother for information, and received a very kind reply, but he was, in respect of health, not able to exert himself in any way. Do let me hear from you soon, and believe me

Always yours
most sincerely,
W. Lloyd.

Herald's College, Doctors' Commons,
July 11th, 1843.

Dear Sir William,

I was truly grieved and sorry to hear so bad an account of yourself, as I had hoped long ere this you had quite recovered that very unpleasant complaint, the influenza. I sincerely hope the fine weather we have lately had will restore you to your accustomed health. With respect to Sir William Nott's

arms, I should suggest a new grant in allusion to his distinguished services, but if you can get his brother to sign the enclosed letter, to have supporters granted to the General; then will come the enquiry as to the right of arms, or if you would prefer sending the enclosed letter to the General (pray do so) for his signature; but I think from his former letter to you, that he meant to go to the expense of having a new grant, and would, if you thought it right, remit you the money to pay the expenses of the patent; at least so I infer from the extract of the letter you sent me. You are of course aware none but the peerage and a very few individuals and the higher classes of the orders are entitled to use supporters, therefore those that may use them should always avail themselves of the privilege; perhaps the Government would, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, allow the supporters to be used by his heirs male; in Sir Hugh Gough's case, the Crown have allowed them to be used by the person that shall succeed him in the dignity of a Baronet. We have two families of Nott, one in Gloucester and the other in Worcester, and I have my doubts, from what I have heard respecting General Nott's family, that it would be difficult for him to connect with either. I enclose you also Mr Nott's letter, and if you can get him to sign the letter on behalf of his brother, it will make a beginning in the business, and be the means of my getting it, as I have no doubt other persons have written to him on the subject.

Believe me,
Yours very sincerely,
GEO. HARRISON BLUEMANTLE.

To Major Sir William Lloyd.

Herald's College, Doctors' Commons.
July 24th 1843.

DEAR SIR WILLIAM,

I have much pleasure in enclosing the best memorial I can make out from the materials relating to the family of Nott,

which I shall feel obliged by your forwarding to the General, together with the letter for supporters I sent you a short time since. You will have the goodness to get him to fix what sort of supporters (an Affghan and a Soldier of his own Regiment would look well) he would like established to him, as well as what additional achievements he would like put in his arms, and I will attend to his wishes; the memorial and letter, when signed, is to be returned to me. The expense of the Grant of Arms is 76*l.* 10s., and for the Grant of Supporters 54*l.* 12s., making a total of 121*l.* 3s., then a painting or so, a few guineas more, so you can tell him 130*l.* will be the outside of the expense, which I think he stated he would remit you if you thought it requisite and proper he should have these honourable distinctions in his arms, and I hear you will say you do think so. With best thanks for the trouble you have taken for me,

Believe me,
Yours greatly obliged,
GEO. HARRISON BLUEMANTLE.

To Major Sir William Lloyd,
&c. &c. &c.

MY LORD DUKE,

Her Majesty having been pleased to nominate and constitute me to be a Knight Grand Cross of the Most Honourable Military Order of the Bath, and the First Class of the said order being entitled to all the privileges which the Knights Companions thereof hitherto enjoyed by virtue of the statutes thereof, among which is the privilege of bearing Supporters to their arms, I have the honour to request that your Grace will be pleased to issue your warrant to Garter Principal

King of Arms, for his granting to me such Supporters accordingly.

I have the honour to be,
My Lord Duke,
Your Grace's most obedient
humble servant,
On behalf of my brother,
Major-General Sir William Nott, G.C.B.
GEORGE NOTT.

To His Grace the Duke of Norfolk,
Earl Marshal of England,
&c. &c. &c.

CHAPTER VII.

SIR WILLIAM NOTT RE-MARRIES—THE DUTIES OF THE ENVOY AT LUCKNOW—STATE OF OUDE—THE KING AND SIR WILLIAM—NOTT'S HEALTH FAILS—HE APPLIES FOR LEAVE OF ABSENCE—LORD ELLENBOROUGH'S FAREWELL LETTER—NOTT PROCEEDS TO CALCUTTA—GRAND FANCY BALL—NOTT GOES TO THE CAPE—AND THENCE TO ENGLAND.

FROM the date of the Envoy's arrival at Lucknow he led a very domestic life. He gave no balls, but once a week entertained from twenty to thirty officers (civil and military) and their ladies at dinner, and occasionally received the King, forty of his relations, and many officers of the station, at breakfast. In June, 1843, he married Rosa Wilson, daughter of Captain Dore, of H.M.'s 3rd Buffs.

The duties of the Envoy at Lucknow were of an arduous and a delicate character. Without absolutely interfering in the details of the Native Government, it is the object of the Indian authorities to persuade the independent princes so to manage

their territories that the people may enjoy all the advantages which are possessed by those who live under the enlightened rule of the East India Company. This is an extremely difficult task. The watchful jealousy of the native ministers renders them keenly susceptible of intervention of any kind. They see, in the slightest innovations upon their understood prerogative, the germ of an encroachment which generally terminates in the extinction of the independence of the native prince, and the absorption of his dominions into the overgrown empire of the British. Yet the apprehension of this catastrophe seldom operates as a stimulus to good government. Corruption, intrigue, chicanery, are so thoroughly rife in all grades of native society that, whether in the management of a principality or the conduct of a small office, it seems impossible for a man possessed of power to exercise it honestly, wisely, or beneficially. Until the year 1819, the Government of Oude was vested in a Vizier, or Minister, who ruled nominally on behalf of the Great Mogul; but at that period the Vizier threw off his allegiance to the Emperor of Delhi, assumed the title of King, and caused himself to be crowned. The East India Company recognised his title, in consideration of the many loans and advances that had been made them from the coffers of Oude, and guaranteed the defence of the rich territory against

all external enemies. The Company further undertook to pay various pensions of the Crown in commutation of the loans, and generally to support the King with its advice and influence whenever they might seem to be required. This state of the relations between the European and native authorities has led to much inconvenience, because, as the duty of the former is limited to offering counsel which the latter may at any time refuse to accept, the painful spectacle is witnessed of a magnificent country going to utter ruin through the utter obstinacy, weakness, prejudices, or cupidity of the *de facto* rulers.

In 1841, notwithstanding the efforts of Colonel (the late Major-General) Caulfield, and his successor, Colonel Low, to prevent, by their advice and entreaties, breaches of faith on the part of the Ammils towards the landholders; to reduce the irregular forces and increase the regular army; to improve the police; to lower the custom duties; to make roads and bridges, and to put down professional Dacoitee (highway and river robbery), the state of things was very deplorable, especially in respect to the administration of justice. To such a height, in fact, had discontent in the kingdom arisen, that Colonel Lowe proposed that the Government should take a portion of the most disorderly districts of the country under its direct and exclusive management, accounting only to the King

for the surplus revenues, or that British officers should be deputed to superintend the revenue settlements, and to see that the engagements to the people were not broken. The government of Lord Auckland, however, was averse to any immediate change, and had determined to allow a further probationary period to develope the practical effect of *interference by advice* on all important measures. From this time to the beginning of 1842, considerable improvements took place in the general management of affairs; but after the accession of the King, in May, 1842, the condition of several of the districts became manifestly worse, owing to the marked inferiority of the King to his father, both in natural talents and in a knowledge of his duties; and again, in consequence of the then ruling monarch having selected as his prime minister a man who had had no previous experience in State affairs.

This state of things rendered the duty of the Envoy onerous and troublesome. Sir William Nott, however, was not the man to be prematurely alarmed. He addressed himself to the task allotted to him with judgment and patience, and had he been spared to acquire that degree of influence which time only can give to the most able men thus circumstanced, there is little doubt that extensive reforms would have been effected under his auspices. An attentive observer of Sir William's

career at Lucknow, and who was in the closest intimacy with him during the whole period of his stay, has recorded that the greater portion of his time was spent in the room he called his office. Captain Shakspeare daily attended to read letters and reports, and to receive directions concerning such matters as required the Envoy's interference. Sometimes quarrels occurred in the palace or the zenanahs, and these, too, had to be settled by the Envoy, as the contending parties invariably appealed to him. In Captain Shakspeare the Envoy had an intelligent, hard-working assistant—one whom he liked, and in whom he justly placed perfect confidence. The King was much satisfied with Sir William, and more than once told him that he appreciated the consideration the Envoy had shown him, and that he regarded him as a personal friend. Perhaps his Majesty would have liked a little more pomp and parade on the part of Sir William Nott, because it more directly accorded with his own tastes. The etiquette of the Lucknow court requires that there should be strict uniformity of *tenue* between the King and the Envoy: the simplicity of the one was therefore a bar to the magnificent display of the other. On one occasion, the King was kept close prisoner to his palace, because Nott contented himself with a carriage and pair, while the condition was imposed upon royalty of never appearing abroad excepting in a carriage

and four. The Envoy, therefore, on hearing the cause of the King's seclusion, immediately adopted the four horses.

The King of Oude either had or affected to have a passion for literature. He had made, or caused to be made, a translation into Oordoo, of Lord Brougham's famous 'Essay on the Objects, Advantages, and Pleasures of Science,' and Nott prevailed on Lord Ellenborough to forward it to Lord Brougham. The correspondence on the subject is curious, as proceeding from two of the illustrious Peers of the time.

Agra, April 10, 1843.

My dear General,

I shall feel much satisfaction in receiving from His Majesty the King of Oude the Oordoo translation of Lord Brougham's Treatise, on the 'Objects, Advantages, and Pleasures of Science.'

I know it would give great pleasure to Lord Brougham to receive a copy of this translation of his work from the King, and as His Majesty is not viewed with particular favour by Lord Brougham, I think it would be well for His Majesty to send a letter to him with the book. If the King is precluded from writing, His Majesty can intimate his wishes through you, and I will endeavour to make the present as acceptable as I can.

Believe me,
My dear General,
very faithfully and sincerely yours,
Ellenborough.

His Excellency the Envoy to Lucknow.

Agra, April 19, 1843.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

I received to-day the King of Oude's letter to Lord Brougham, and the translation of Lord Brougham's book which His Majesty's zeal for science has induced him to direct to be made.

I am sure Lord Brougham will derive great satisfaction from hearing that, through the King of Oude's liberal protection of science, his treatise may become productive of benefit in India.

I forward His Majesty's letter, and the translation of the Treatise, by the mail, which leaves Bombay on the 1st of May.

Believe me, my dear General,
Very faithfully yours,
ELLENBOROUGH.

His Excellency the Envoy to Lucknow.

Three months subsequently Lord Brougham's reply was received and Lord Ellenborough hastens to send it to Sir W. Nott.

Barrackpore, July 18, 1843.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

I enclose a letter from Lord Brougham to the King of Oude, thanking him for the Translation of his book. Will you have the goodness to have it translated and given to the King.

Lord Brougham speaks of having sent some other book, but it is not yet come.

I assure you that an autograph letter from Lord Brougham, *in a legible hand*, is a compliment which I did not think he would have paid to any Sovereign in the world.

Believe me, my dear General,
Ever very faithfully yours,
ELLENBOROUGH.

His Excellency the Envoy to Lucknow.

London, June 5, 1843.

SIRE,

I cannot sufficiently express my grateful acknowledgments of the high and undeserved honour which your Majesty has been pleased to bestow upon the Treatise, and of the gracious letter received from your Majesty.

I have laid the translation before the Useful Knowledge Society, of which I am the President, and which first published the treatise, and I venture to say that I shall receive their commands in their name to thank your Majesty for this gracious mark of your Royal condescension.

Accept once more my personal thanks, and suffer me to lay at your Majesty's feet another similar Treatise upon the Political Sciences, and to crave your Majesty's condescending attention to it.

I have the honour to be,
With great respect,
Your Majesty's faithful and obliged servant,
BROUGHAM.

Lord Ellenborough continued to manifest much regard for Sir William Nott, and a respect for his opinions during his tenure of the office of Envoy at Lucknow. His Lordship seized upon every occasion for saying a kind thing, and seeking the General's advice. When the news of the battle of Meeanee reached Agra, Lord Ellenborough took great pleasure in telling Nott that his old battery (Leslie's, of the Bombay Artillery, which had served at Candahar) with the 22nd Foot, *decided the day*. "I congratulate you," said Lord Ellen-

borough, "on this new proof of the goodness of one of your favourite troops of Artillery," and he ordered that the troop should in future be called "Leslie's," and bear the eagle on its appointments.

It will be remembered that Gwalior occupied a great deal of Lord Ellenborough's attention during his government of India. At the first appearance of the possible necessity for hostilities on a grand scale, His Lordship intimated to General Nott that he should send him at the head of a force, to put an end to the sovereignty of the family of Scindiah, and he even specified the extent and details of the army that would be placed under his command.

Allahabad, June 27, 1843.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

I embark to-day and proceed down the river to-morrow morning.

I do not like the appearance of affairs at Gwalior. Amongst other things, the Artillery have turned their European and Eurasian officers out of camp. The force of the Dada Khasque Walla is now directed against Colonel Baptiste, who has two battalions, and will then be directed against Colonel Jacob, who has ten battalions and the palace; but as the Dada Khasque Walla seems to be the only man of courage in Gwalior I dare say he will succeed against Jacob as well as Baptiste.

Our minister I have withdrawn to Dholepore.

At Gwalior they are augmenting their troops, and calling in bad characters. Some say, in order to attack Jacob, others, because they fear an attack from us. They can hardly

be mad enough to *make* an attack upon us; but everything that is possible ought to be provided against.

If they commit any act of hostility I am determined that they shall cease to reign, and that you shall go to Gwalior to put an end to the sovereignty of the family of Scindiah.

You should have at your disposal the Bundlecund Legion.

The Sipree Contingent.

The Nowgong Brigade (39th, 74th, and 8th L. C.) and the 67th from Banda.

The Garrison of Agra, the 16th, 42nd, 43rd, 48th.

The 16th Lancers.

Two squadrons 9th Lancers.

Body Guard.

1st Cavalry from Muttra.

10th from Meerut, and either the 40th Queen's or the 50th.

You should besides have all the guns you desired.

Have the goodness to look over the Army List and tell me whether you would desire to make any other arrangement. You would be weak in cavalry. I suppose the Chumbul will in a few days rise so as to cut off the Gwalior people from our country.

Bundlecund and Saugor would be on fire if the Mahrattas moved or were moved against. We have no cause whatever for moving at present, even if it were now practicable.

Believe me, my dear General,

Very faithfully yours,

ELLENBOROUGH.

Major-General Sir W. Nott, G.C.B., Lucknow.

It may be conceived that Nott declared himself perfectly ready to draw the sword again whenever he might be bidden. So when the Oude frontier was threatened by the Nepaulese, to Nott Lord

Ellenborough turned for judicious hints and active co-operation, and he found both the one and the other.

Barrackpore, July 12, 1843.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

I only received your letter of the 30th on my arrival here to-day.

I knew you would be ready to serve the country whatever might be the domestic comforts you would renounce by leaving home. I sincerely hope that your marriage will conduce to these comforts.

The worst thing about the Gwalior affair is the conduct of the troops towards their European and Eurasian officers, whom they have ill-used and turned out of the camp.

The last accounts I have received give me reason to apprehend that the Gwalior government may be weak enough to send troops into the territory of Seronje, in order to seize or expel the Mama Sahib, who has taken refuge there. This would be an act of hostile aggression against our government, as we must treat as such any attack upon an ally. I shall exact a severe penalty if this aggression should occur.

I feel the deficiency of Irregular Cavalry, and I must find it somewhere or other if we should be obliged to move.

Believe me, my dear General,

Your's, very faithfully,

ELLENBOROUGH.

His Excellency Major General Sir W. Nott, G.C.B.

For some time after his arrival at Lucknow, Sir William Nott enjoyed good health, but about the beginning of October, the illness which he had contracted in Affghanistan, began to tell upon his

constitution, and his medical adviser assured him that a trip to sea was "his only chance." He therefore reluctantly applied to Lord Ellenborough for leave of absence for some months.

Lucknow, 2nd November, 1843.

My Lord,

It is with much regret I have to acquaint your Lordship that the illness which I contracted two years ago in Affghanistan has never left me, and that it has lately become so troublesome as to oblige me to think of leaving Lucknow for some months in search of health. My medical friends have long endeavoured to persuade me to try a trip to sea, and they now tell me it is the only chance I have. Under circumstances, this is truly a hard case, but I must submit with all the patience I have.

I intended to forward a public application in a day or two to be laid before your Lordship, for permission to proceed to sea.

Allow me to avail myself of this opportunity to offer my most grateful thanks for the great kindness I have ever received from your Lordship.

I sincerely hope your Lordship's health is good.

Lord Ellenborough immediately sent him the subjoined handsome reply:—

Barrackpore, November 8th, 1843.

My dear General,

I cannot express the regret which your letter has occasioned to me. I was in hopes that you would have had no return of the illness you suffered from in Affghanistan, and I even now hope that as the season becomes cooler you may get rid of it

and be able to remain long at Lucknow, where you are doing so well. I considered you to be there in reserve for active service whenever there might be such as would justify me in calling you into the field, and I cannot but feel that your going away weakens the Government. However, do whatever is necessary to preserve your valuable health, and be assured that wherever you may be, or I may be, you will have my warmest personal wishes for your health and welfare.

Believe me ever,
My dear General,
Very sincerely yours,
ELLENBOROUGH.

His Excellency Major-General Sir W. Nott, G.C.B.

Before Lord Ellenborough could have received the General's application of sick leave of absence, he had again written to him upon the subject of the Gwalior affair, and he continued to do so up to a late date in November, because, as will be seen, he apprehended the necessity of the movement of the troops of the King of Oude. The frequency of the communications addressed to Sir William, gives us an insight into the nature of a Governor General's cares, and throws into strong light the activity of Lord Ellenborough's mind.

Barrackpore, November 2nd, 1843.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

A large number of the troops at Gwalior are natives of Oude. Do you think that in the event of its being necessary to march upon Gwalior (which I do not expect) that any advantage would be derived from issuing a Proclamation in the name

of the King of Oude, recalling his subjects from the Gwalior service? Could the King in any manner make it the worse for them if they did not leave that service? If you think the issuing of such a Proclamation would do any good, it would be right to have it issued at Lucknow as well as in our camp; but there is time enough before us yet, and it is not necessary to open the matter to the King till we see our way a little more.

Believe me,
My dear General,
Very faithfully yours,
ELLENBOROUGH.

His Excellency the Envoy to Lucknow.

Barrackpore, March 8, 1843.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

Major Lawrence, appointed to succeed Mr Hodgson, in Nepaul, will wait upon you on or before the 18th instant, on his way to Katmandhoo. I had desired him to do so when the inroad of Rajah Nurohur Singh was first known to me, and bore a serious aspect. Still it may be very convenient that you should see him.

The Nepaul Court seems to have been gratified by my immediate notice of the aggression upon the Nepaul territory; and, on the punishment of the offender, to be ready to take more energetic measures than they have hitherto adopted for the suppression of Dacoitee.

Anything that will satisfy the honor of the Nepaul Government will be of much use in placing our relations upon a good footing.

I want to place our relations with all States upon a footing of confidence, and I do not by any means despair of doing so.

By the bye, a curious fact is just come to my knowledge.

Your army halted for a day or two last year upon the

Jelum; and Dhian Singh, thinking it indicated an intention on our part to attack the Sikhs, proposed to take the initiative by attacking you or any other part of our scattered forces he could pounce upon. His advice was overruled by the other advisers of the Maharajah.

Had Dhian Singh's advice been taken, we should have passed our Christmas yet more gayly than we did, and at Lahore instead of at Ferozepore.

Believe me,
My dear General,
Ever very sincerely yours,
ELLENBOROUGH.

His Excellency Major-General Sir W. Nott, G.C.B.

(Private.)

Doomsee, November 28, 1843.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

I am not inclined to attach much credit to the rumour of the assemblage of so large a force of Nepaulese troops on the Oude frontier; but I know you will, under present circumstances, stay, if you can, to give good counsel to the King.

I am afraid there is a disposition amongst magistrates to withhold efficient cordial co-operation from the Oude authorities. This will never do. It is quite impossible to expect the Oude authorities to keep their country in good order if Oude is to be a land of refuge to criminals.

I shall be at Allahabad on the 3rd of December, and at Cawnpore on the 7th.

Believe me,
My dear General,
Yours, very sincerely,
ELLENBOROUGH.

His Excellency Major-General Sir W. Nott, G.C.B.

The only note of Nott's which we find among the correspondence is the following:—

Lucknow, 25th November, 1843.

My Lord,

With reference to my official letter of the 23rd instant, relative to a rumour of an inroad of a body of men from the Nepaul territory into the kingdom of Oude, the truth and particulars of which I am endeavouring to ascertain, I beg to mention that I have requested of his Majesty to have his regiments, such as they are, in a state of readiness to move at a moment's warning. Should the body of men, said to have assembled partly within the boundary line, increase in numbers or advance into Oude, it is my intention to request of his Majesty to have troops stationed at Baraitch, Secrora, Fyzabad, Sulunpore, and a body of reserve at Nawabgunge, so that should an enemy advance through Bulrampore these detachments could form a junction at Secrora or retire and concentrate at Newabgunge for the protection of the capital until troops arrived. Your Lordship will perceive by the enclosed sketch that I have pitched upon positions so considerably retired from the Nepaul frontier as to prevent the posibility of the Nepaul Durbar, taking the least offence. On looking round me, I find that there is not a troop of Horse Artillery between Dum-Dum and Agra, and very little Cavalry. There are only two of our native regiments in Oude, and one of them (the 30th) chiefly composed of recruits.

I cannot believe that the Court of Nepaul has sanctioned this inroad, but looking to the ignorant and reckless haughtiness of that people, it would not much surprise me if they have taken up an idea that we are so much engaged with the Punjab and Maharatta affairs as to be unable to look to this frontier, and that for the sake of a little plunder they would run the risk of seeing the British banner float on the walls of Lucknow.

Norungabad, Nov. 30th, 1843.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

I received, during the night, your letter of the 25th. I have communicated the substance of it to the Commander-in-Chief. What you propose doing, in the event of the reports being well founded of an aggression from Nepaul, seems to be quite right. I have halted here a wing of the 13th, which I found marching on Barrackpore, and I have requested the officer commanding the 52nd (now near Gya), to march on Benares instead of marching by Patna or Goruckpoor.

I send you copies of the letters I have written to the officers commanding at Cawnpore, Allahabad, and Benares. I have written to inform Sir G. Pollock of the reports.

You will address your requisition to the officers at Cawnpore, Allahabad, and Benares, should there be, in your opinion, a necessity for the movement of troops upon Cawnpore. Everything possible shall be done to save Lucknow, and so you may tell the King, but I am disposed to think it is an unauthorised movement, and commenced before it was known that Rajah Durehan Singh had been dismissed for his aggression on Nepaul, and that the Nepaulese troops will not advance.

Your's, very sincerely,

ELLENBOROUGH.

His Excellency Major General
Sir William Nott, G.C.B.

Allahabad, Dec. 3rd, 1843.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

I have no letter from you of a later date than the 25th. I conclude, therefore, that the report of the assemblage of Nepaulese troops turned out to be untrue.

The wing of the 18th, which was here, is gone on to Cawnpoor by long marches. The 65th is arrived; that regiment also could go on.

Not hearing from you I have allowed (by to-day's post) the wing of the 13th to move on towards Barrackpore.

The 52nd will be at Sheergotty to-day, *en route* for Benares. Benares could give no Cavalry. There are but two sick horses left at Sultanpoor. However, I trust you will want no aid.

Tell me whether the army from Agra could well cross the Ganges, near Nobulguage, and march directly on Lucknow.

The whole force at Agra, and in Bundelcund will be fully equipped and moveable by the 12th, that at Agra could move at once without the battering train. It is that alone that detains it.

Sir G. Pollock will officiate for you if you must leave Lucknow.

Believe me, my dear General,
Your's ever sincerely.
ELLENBOROUGH.

H. E. the Envoy to Lucknow.

It is evident that Lord Ellenborough believed and hoped that Nott's illness had subsided.

The best wishes, however, of Nott's best friends, could not loosen the remorseless grasp of disease. His departure from Lucknow became inevitable.

The Envoy proceeded to take leave of the King. His Majesty expressed great regret at losing him, and spoke frankly of the kind and considerate manner in which Sir William had always met his wishes. He begged the General's acceptance of a jewelled *tulwar* (Indian sword) but the Envoy could not accept it; the King then pressed a splendid ring upon him, and this was equally declined. It is imperative upon the British officers

at native Courts, to decline all personal presents, as they are too frequently used as the foundation for requests, with which it is impossible to comply, and which it might seem ungracious to refuse. Sir William regretted the obligation he was under to refuse a gift tendered in a kind and disinterested spirit, for he feared to hurt the King's feelings, but there was no alternative. His genuine integrity would have received a lasting shock had he yielded to the temptation, even though it had never reached the ears of the Government. He was all purity, and valued a good conscience above all earthly gifts. Had he been made of the easy stuff which had rendered other political officers rich, his opportunities were sufficiently numerous. And not alone did he stand aloof from temptation. He would not permit any of the ladies of his family to visit the Queen Mother, or any of the female members of the Royal house, that they should never be suspected of receiving presents. When it became known that he was going to be married, a message was sent from the Palace to the Residency with Company's paper, as the promissory notes of the Government are called (a species of Exchequer bill) to the amount of a lac of rupees,* as a present for the bride elect. And it was adroitly suggested that the money would not be received by the Envoy,

* £10,000.

but that the lady might have it before her marriage, so that it would, in fact, be a gift to Miss Dore, rather than to Lady Nott. The message aroused Nott's indignation—the offer was treated as an insult, and the bearer of the Company's paper was sent back with an intimation that if he dared to show himself again, the whole affair would be reported to the Indian Government.

The highest public honours were paid by the King to the departing Envoy. Nott went dawk to Cawnpore, and thence took boat to Calcutta. On reaching Dinapore, he had the satisfaction, during a brief halt, of receiving a visit from Lord Ellenborough, whose cheerful conversation revived him. He here also learnt the movements of the army upon Gwalior, and when he arrived at Calcutta, was greeted with the sorrowful intelligence that Lieutenant-Colonel (late Major) Edward Sanders, who was now military secretary to the Governor General, had fallen at the battle of Maharajpore. Only a few days previous to his embarking for Calcutta, Sir William had received the following letter from Lieut.-Colonel Sanders:—

Calcutta, 25th Nov., 1843.

My dear General,

The Overland Mail, just in, brings a 'London Gazette' of the 12th September, promoting me to Lieutenant-Colonel in the East Indies; thus your letter to Lord Ellenborough, which he sent home, has, though long overlooked, in consequence of

the death of the high functionary to whom addressed, at length had its desired effect.

Perhaps the interest you have taken in the matter will be replied to in a manner more gratifying to yourself by my writing thus early to give you the first intelligence of the event, than by any laboured thanks with which I might fill my paper.

The date of the Gazette is the 12th September, but I indulge a hope that the back rank will be granted to me, and that I may not see the Captains who served with me under your command, senior Lieutenant-Colonels to me in the Army, for services subsequently performed.

The same Gazette makes Colonel England a Knight Commander of the Bath, and Lieutenant-Colonels Browne, Simmons, and Huish, Companions, as also some others whose names I had not before heard. If my rank is to be from the 12th September instead of the 23rd December, 1842, I shall be twenty-one steps in the Indian Army, and thrice that number lower down in her Majesty's service.

I hear with deep regret that you are unwell, and have applied for leave to proceed to sea. The Governor General told me he had written to you to ask if you could not remain, and expressed himself as exceedingly sorry to lose you, for that your influence had proved very serviceable at that Court.

I would not wish you to risk your health unnecessarily by any prolonged stay in an uncongenial climate, but it would give me great pleasure to learn that your health had so far improved as to admit of your continuing in your present position; however, this is a question you alone can decide.

Generals Alexander and Gilbert are on their way out. I am assured Lieutenant-General Cunningham is dead; that he died early in May last, but we have no official intimation of the demise from any quarter.

The Governor General left Calcutta to-day, I leave on the 27th; we go up rather fast; travelling sixty-six miles the first, sixty-four the second, sixty-three the third day, and so on. The Governor General halts one day at Allahabad, and purposes to be at Agra on the 11th December; from Allahabad to Agra, I think he takes six days.

I will only add, my dear General, that if you have time to favour me with a line I shall be glad to hear that your health has not seriously suffered, a man so moderate as yourself has no right to be ill, and to say how truly I am,

Your obliged,

EDWARD SANDERS.

Lieutenant-Colonel.

Although seventeen years had elapsed since Sir William had visited Calcutta, and very few old friends consequently survived to welcome him, the society of the then gay and hospitable metropolis was only too glad of the chance which had brought him temporarily to the City of Palaces. His rooms were the scene of daily and all-day-long levées; every man of rank invited him, and a grand fancy ball was given to Lady Nott at the magnificent Town Hall. Six hundred persons were present on this occasion. Nott was still very weak and ill—so much so, indeed, that he was assisted up the noble flight of stairs by Colonel Anderson, of the Candahar Artillery; but his dominant self-will nerved him for the task of being fêted, and when Mr Charles Prinsep, the standing counsel of the Government, who was chairman at

the supper-table, proposed his health, Sir William replied as follows:—

"LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

"I can assure you I never in my life felt greater emotion than I do at this moment in rising to thank you for the honour I have this evening received—and for the manner in which you have been pleased to drink to my health.

"Believe me I deeply feel, and highly appreciate the compliment which has been paid me—but were I capable of culling the fairest flowers of the English language in which to return thanks, I should still fail fully to express my feelings. When I look round on this large assemblage of my fellow-subjects, where I see so many brave, talented, and generous spirits, and behold so many of my beautiful countrywomen—where I see so many smiling and lovely lips kissing the sparkling wine to my health and welfare—I should indeed be wanting in the finer feelings of human nature did I not feel proud, greatly proud of the honour I have this evening received from the inhabitants of one of the first cities in the world. Gentlemen, it is nearly twenty years since I left Calcutta—and I now return among you almost an entire stranger. I must therefore attribute the honour conferred on me, as a mark of your approval of my conduct during the wars in Affghanistan. I cannot now enter into the particulars of the difficult scenes in which I found myself engaged—I am convinced that when the conflicting opinions which now exist shall have subsided, history, impartial history, will inform the world who it was that in spite of opposition, in spite of that despair, and the unaccountable panic which pervaded India, upheld the honour of old England, and asserted the reputation of our arms. In the mean time, Gentlemen, believe me I am fully sensible of the generous manner in which you have this night come forward to do me honour—and what

greater honour can a soldier, an unpatronised soldier, receive, than the approbation of his fellow-citizens? That I have received that approbation, the scene now before me fully proves. My friend, now beside me, in proposing my health, has alluded to my services in Affghanistan, but I fear he has allowed his kindness to give me credit for more merit than I can possibly claim—but, Gentlemen, one thing I can freely declare, that I never led my columns into the field, never gave the word which turned the tide of battle in favour of old England, never saw victory crown the noble efforts of my brave and gallant soldiers, without my mind on the instant referring to the people of this splendid city—without feeling a fond hope that I should receive your approbation. I do indeed this night, feel an honest,—a British soldier's pride, and believe me, that wherever I may go, whatever may be my future lot, whether the remainder of my life be spent in some dull cantonment—or passed amidst the more busy scenes of the tented field—wherever, or whatever it may be, I shall ever look back on the festive scene of this evening with heartfelt pleasure and delight. Once more, ladies and gentlemen, I thank you."

Sir William took his passage for the Cape of Good Hope—which he intended should for the present be the limit of his voyage—in the Earl of Hardwicke, Captain Henning. There were many cabin passengers, many soldiers, and many children on board. The sea air revived the General. Everybody treated him with marked respect, and the good old soldier took great delight in the society of the children. Many opportunities present themselves on board ship for the exercise of

kindness towards the poor tenants of the orlop deck and the forecastle, and the General did not suffer them to pass without exercising the habitual benevolence of his character. At the Cape, General Nott received distinguished attention from the ex-Governor, Sir George Napier, and the new Governor, Sir Peregrine Maitland—soldiers of the Peninsula and Waterloo, who could appreciate the soldier-like qualities of the COMPANY'S SEPOY-GENERAL.

Sir William had been but a few weeks at the Cape when he became so much worse that it was necessary he should at once leave the colony for a more southerly or more northerly climate. His passion for Van Dieman's Land now revived, but the medical men strongly urged a visit to England, and their suggestion was earnestly supported by the Misses Nott. The General, however, made it a condition with his daughters that he should take up his abode in a quiet, sequestered part of Wales, and that they should not, on arriving in England, endeavour to persuade him to dwell in a fashionable locality. They unhesitatingly consented to the stipulation, for their love for their incomparable father would have surmounted every other consideration even if they had not cherished a wish to reside in the localities which were replete with reminiscences of their happy childhood.

CHAPTER VIII.

SIR WILLIAM NOTT ARRIVES IN ENGLAND—EAST INDIA DIRECTORS' DINNER—SPEECH OF SIR GEORGE MURRAY—RECEPTION AT CARDIFF, NEATH, AND CARMARTHEN—GRANT OF A PENSION FOR LIFE—FREEDOM OF THE CITY OF LONDON—LAST ILLNESS—SYMPATHY OF THE PEOPLE OF CARMARTHEN—DEATH—FUNERAL—POSTHUMOUS HONOURS.

Sir William Nott reached England in the summer of 1844. Landing at Falmouth, he proceeded to London by railway, a mode of travelling new to him, and full of interest. Wherever he was recognised, or that his name was known, he was treated courteously; and when at the Custom House at Falmouth, the sword given to him by Lord Ellenborough in the name of the Government was passed free of duty, as a compliment due to his great military merit. He had hardly arrived in London, and taken a house in Baker street,

before he was waited upon by herds of old Indian friends, including not a few who had served under him in Affghanistan. The Court of Directors immediately invited him to a public dinner—for Sir Robert Sale was now in England, and the Court was anxious to do honour to both Chieftains on the same occasion. The late Duke of Wellington sent to invite Nott to Apsley House, and HER MAJESTY commanded his presence at Windsor; but his health had now so failed him, that he was unable to accept any of the honours the highest in the land were desirous of showering upon him. He had, however, the felicity of reading the speeches made in his honour at the dinner of the Directors, where General Sir George Murray and Sir Robt. Peel were eloquent in his praise. Sir George Murray's sentiments, proceeding from one of the most distinguished of Wellington's Lieutenants, was peculiarly acceptable to Nott, and those of the Chairman of the Directors scarcely less so, for they comprehended the tribute of Nott's Honourable Masters. Sir George Murray, eloquently deploring the unfortunate indisposition of Sir William Nott, said—

"He regretted very much that he had not the satisfaction of seeing the other gallant officer who, along with their brave guest, had distinguished himself in the campaigns of India, because the admiration and gratitude of the country was due to one as well as the other, and because he would have been

gratified to make his acquaintance. But the exploits of these two gallant officers, as recorded in their despatches, would be read with the highest satisfaction, and the more so as they contained the most admirable practical lessons in strategy and the general art of war which had been recently given. He (Sir George Murray) recommended them strenuously to the perusal of all military men, for they would show every individual not alone how to think, but how to act, in a situation of equal danger and equal responsibility. (Cheers.) Surrounded by hostile nations and adverse people, remarkable for their personal courage and intellectual power, but more remarkable still for their skill in strategy—separated, too, from all hope of succour and support, and loaded with the heaviest possible responsibility—nothing could daunt the constancy of Sir W. Nott, or subdue the determination of Sir R. Sale—(great cheering)—who, duly appreciating the advantage of a disciplined force over hordes of barbarians, only thought of the one object they had in view, the accomplishment of the end of their labours—the honour and glory of their native country. (Cheers.) But these brave and gallant men had been distinguished not alone for their military virtues and their military successes, they had also been distinguished for the traits of feeling and the virtues of peace they exhibited in conjunction with their heroism. (Great cheering.) Their conduct in that disastrous war had elicited the universal approbation of their countrymen; for could anything be more worthy of applause than the respect they had shown for the softer sex?—a respect which exalted the lustre and dignity of these most eminent men. (Cheers.) Their conduct in these instances were facts engraven on the hearts of nations, and therefore printed on the page of history. They re-echoed from India and China the glories of the war of the Spanish Peninsula."

The Chairman next introduced to the company the health of Sir William Nott :—

"He was sorry to find that Sir W. Nott had returned from India with his health so impaired that he could not be present on that occasion; but that should not prevent them from paying that compliment to his eminent services which was their due. (Cheers.) Whoever read the account of the splendid march of that brave officer from Candahar to Ghuznee would at once recognise all those qualities in him which distinguished the great General. (Cheers.) He had, moreover, the high honour of vindicating the national honour after the temporary reverse it had sustained, and of rescuing from the hands of their foes our fair countrywomen made captive by them. (Great cheering.) It was only necessary, however, to mention Candahar and Ghuznee to excite the utmost enthusiasm in favour of that gallant officer and his companions-in-arms; and he (the Chairman) hoped that in the midst of their regrets the object of their good wishes would still live to serve his country as well as he had done heretofore."

The toast was received with great enthusiasm.

From London Sir William Nott proceeded to Wales. The journey from Bristol to Cardiff, and Cardiff to Carmarthen, was distinguished by extraordinary demonstrations of public respect. The church bells rang out a merry peal as he approached Cardiff, and the Mayor and Corporation presented an address. On the 9th of September he reached Neath, the scene of his boyhood. This town, as early as eight o'clock in the morning, was full of

life and activity, placards having been freely distributed about, announcing that Sir William Nott, G.C.B., intended arriving in the course of the day, on his way to Carmarthen, and that it was the intention of the Town Council to present an address to him. The Council met at ten o'clock, when an address was moved by Mr Gwyn, and seconded by Mr Grant. It was as follows:—

"*To Major-General Sir William Nott, G.C.B.*

"We, the Mayor, Aldermen, and Councillors of the Borough of Neath, desire to offer our warmest congratulations on your arrival in your native country, and to the home of your early youth, and to express our warmest wishes for your restoration to perfect health.

"We rejoice, in the opportunity afforded us, of expressing to you, in person, the high sense we, in common with the rest of the country, entertain of your illustrious achievements and gallant exploits, while engaged in vindicating the national honour, and maintaining the supremacy of British arms, under difficult and painful circumstances, and in a situation of responsibility, which, to the utmost extent, required the energy, bravery, and self-reliance, of an intrepid and experienced commander.

"With feelings of pride and satisfaction, we contemplate the honourable career of a countryman so highly distinguished, which cannot fail to be useful to the nation, as a brilliant example of the success which may be acquired by professional knowledge, unwearied perseverance, patient endurance, and indomitable courage.

"R. P. Leyson, Mayor.
"H. S. Goke, Town Clerk.

"Neath, 9th September, 1844."

About two o'clock, the hour at which the General was expected, the town presented the most lively appearance. Triumphal arches of oak and laurel, interspersed with wreaths of flowers, were suspended over the road at the entrance of the town. Flags and banners of various descriptions were waving from several houses, which were ornamented with wreaths of oak and laurel in numerous devices. Indeed, be it said to the credit of the tradespeople of the town, they even closed their shops, and made the day quite a holiday, for the purpose of evincing every mark of respect in their power to their distinguished countryman. The Council having sent a special messenger to ascertain the exact time the General would arrive, were enabled to meet him at the Ropewalk gate, without any delay or inconvenience. The Mayor, R. P. Leyson, Esq., and several of the members of the Town Council, with their Town Clerk, Mr Coke, formed into a procession, accompanied by several gentlemen and tradesmen, headed by banners, &c. Upon the General's arrival at the gate, the horses were taken out of his carriage, and the populace, with cheerfulness and good feeling, and amidst as hearty cheering as ever was heard, drew the carriage which contained, besides the General, Lady Nott and his two daughters (who received their education at Ty'nyrheol, near this town), to the front of the Castle hotel. The Gene-

ral, who was in very delicate health, received the Mayor, who was accompanied by several of the members of the Town Council and respectable inhabitants of the town and neighbourhood, in one of the rooms of the hotel. The Mayor having read the address, the General, who seemed evidently overcome by the mark of respect shown to him in the home of his early youth, addressed the deputation, but in a low tone. He commenced by saying—

"MR MAYOR AND GENTLEMEN,—

"I can assure you all that it is one of the happiest days of my life to have received the great mark of respect thus shown me. It was unexpected, and not being in the possession of good health, I am unable to express myself in the manner I could wish. I shall accept this address, and treasure it to the last moment of my life; and having children and grandchildren, it shall be handed down to them. I really feel this mark of respect more than I can in any way express. Nothing can be more gratifying to a soldier upon his return to his country than to receive from his countrymen their good feelings and marks of approbation. Although suffering from illness, it was indeed gratifying to witness the good feeling of the inhabitants of this town, and to hear the cheers given me, for they seemed truly to come from the heart. Allow me again to thank you, and to state how proud I feel of the honour you have this day conferred on me."

The General was warmly cheered throughout his reply, and immediately afterwards he proceeded to

the front of the door of the hotel, and addressed the thousands there assembled. He said—

"FELLOW COUNTRYMEN,—

"I am sorry I cannot address you in your native language —I have been so long from Wales that I have nearly forgotten it; but I hope that now as I am come to live in Wales I shall be able to learn it and have an opportunity of thanking you in Welsh for the good feeling you have this day shown me."

The gallant General was greeted with cheers, which continued for some time, after which the crowd dispersed. The Mayor, and several of the members of the Council and respectable inhabitants, then retired together and drank the health of the General in a bumper, as well as the health of his amiable lady and daughters, the latter of whom spent so many of their early days there.

For an account of the reception of Sir William at Carmarthen we must draw upon the columns of the Carmarthen Journal:—

Triumphal Entry of Major-General Sir William Nott, G.C.B., into Carmarthen.

It having been notified to the Mayor of Carmarthen that Sir W. Nott would enter this town on Wednesday at one o'clock, from Kidwelly, at which place he slept the previous night, every preparation was made to receive him with due honour. A committee of gentlemen had been previously formed, by whom the arrangements were made. The morning

was ushered in by the ringing of the bells of St. Peter's Church, and the streets gradually filled with people from the surrounding country, their faces full of importance and cheerful expectation. Twelve o'clock had been appointed, by large placards having been stuck up in various places, inviting all persons who desired to join the procession to meet the General, to repair to the Town-hall at that hour, and announcing that the procession would be on foot. Some time before the arrival of that hour, the Mayor, Aldermen, and Town Council were at the place of rendezvous, and soon after twelve, the Hall and its environs were filled by the most respectable persons of the town. At this time the streets were crowded, and all was joyous bustle. Each street had its festoons hung across it, composed of garlands of flowers, ribbons, and boughs of trees. About a quarter past the hour, the procession left the Hall, under the able direction of Mr Geo. Goode, preceded by the societies of Odd Fellows and True Ivorites, decked out with showy scarves, and knots of ribbons and flowers, with their curious and splendid insignia, which contributed much to the show, and accompanied by bands of music and numerous banners; these were followed by the Mayor and Aldermen in their scarlet gowns, the Recorder, and the Town Council; then came the gentlemen of the town and neighbourhood, four abreast, and thus the procession proceeded about three-quarters of a mile out of the town, when a halt was called. The Pensarn Turnpike Gate was very prettily ornamented with a pendant wreath and festoons of boughs of trees and flowers. Soon afterwards the Swansea mail came up, and brought the news that the General would arrive in about half an hour. In rather less than that time the hero came, and was greeted with loud and joyous acclamations. His horses were immediately taken out, ropes were attached to his carriage, and a number of sturdy fellows were prepared to draw it into the town. Sir

William was in plain clothes, but with a military undress cap on his head; he looked fatigued and ill, and scarcely able to bear the excitement of the scene. The following address, prepared for the occasion, was here read to him :—

"*To Major-General Sir William Nott, G.C.B.*

"We, the Mayor, Recorder, Corporation, and Inhabitants of Carmarthen, beg to offer you our warmest congratulations on your arrival in your native country, and our ardent wishes for the speedy restoration of your health.

"We have witnessed with feelings of pride and gratification the splendid achievements which have obtained for you the highest military distinction it is in the power of your Sovereign to bestow, the thanks of both houses of Parliament, and the admiration and gratitude of your country.

"We pray that a gracious Providence may long preserve your valuable life to enable you to enjoy the honours so nobly won by your consummate skill and undaunted bravery, and which have shed a brilliant lustre on the country of your birth, and established your distinguished military fame.

"WILLIAM MORRIS, Mayor.

"Carmarthen, September 11, 1844.

The veteran was so overcome that his reply was scarcely audible. The tears gushed from his eyes as he told them that "he could have faced an army of his country's foes with much less emotion than he could his native townsmen's kindness, but that he hoped soon to have another opportunity of thanking them with more calmness." Several by-standers cried "Enough, enough; sit down, General." An affecting incident here took place,—a soldier of the 41st Foot, which regiment was at Candahar with him, stepped up to the carriage,

and said, "Welcome home, General;" the veteran gazed at him a few seconds, saw the Affghan ribbon in his button-hole, and then said, "Give me your hand," and the General and the private soldier grasped each other's hands as friends. It may be questioned if this simple welcome did not thrill to the heart of his old commander even more than the general acclaim of the assembled thousands. The procession, as nearly as could be guessed, about a quarter of a mile in length, now retraced its steps, the General, who was accompanied by his wife and daughters, following immediately after the corporate body, and so amid the booming of cannon from the old Castle Green, the cheering of the multitude, and the waving of handkerchiefs from crowded windows, the old soldier paraded through Carmarthen. Guildhall square and Lammas street had a most animating appearance, and the General stood up, and turned from side to side, observing and observed of all. Truly it was a glorious hour for the hero; but when he arrived at his brother's residence at Picton terrace, he lingered on the steps of the carriage as though desirous of addressing the multitude, but it would not do—he was quite overpowered—and he was assisted from his carriage and up the steps to the house by the Mayor and Recorder. The General's age appears to be about sixty-five, his head is perfectly white, and his countenance is not unlike that of the Duke of Wellington, having an aquiline nose Many of his old companions in arms caught his eye in his passage through the streets, and had signs of recognition. One of them observed to a comrade, "He looks very natural, don't he." An old woman in Lammas street was waving a large flag from a window, which it required her utmost strength to do; the General observing her smiled and nodded, and the old lady curtsied again and again in evident confusion. It has been arranged to give a grand dinner in commemoration of

the arrival of the Carmarthen hero; but it is entirely dependant upon his health, which at present appears to be in a bad state, although it may be hoped that the appearance was worse than the reality, in consequence of the overpowering excitement of the day.

The mind of Sir William Nott was not much disturbed after his arrival in England regarding the means of existence on a scale suited to the wants of his family, for the East India Proprietors voted him a pension for life of ONE THOUSAND POUNDS per annum from the date of his departure from India. The Court of Directors had passed a resolution on the 21st of August, granting the annuity, and a special Court of Proprietors was held to confirm the grant. The scene presented at this latter Court was of a most animating nature. In a general way, a Court of Proprietors is merely the arena of dispute, but here was no difference of opinion—every one was eager to render justice and honour to great military merit. Mr Sheppard, the chairman, opened the business, and told the whole story of Sir William's services from first to last—from Muckie to Ghuznee. He was followed by Sir Henry Willock, the deputy-chairman. Sir Henry said—

"He might be allowed to observe, that Sir William Nott had not only shown himself great as a military commander, but

great also as a *civil governor*. He had governed wisely in a hostile country, where the great desire of the chieftains was to exterminate every individual connected with the British that could be found within their territory. At that critical moment Sir William Nott, by conciliation and firmness combined, preserved peace, not only in that territory but throughout the neighbouring country. He had, by his conduct in Candahar, and in his wonderful march to Cabool, fully and imperishably established his fame as a military man. He had never met the enemy but he conquered, however great the disparity of numbers, however great the disadvantages with which he had to contend. Let the court look at the perilous situation in which he was placed, a situation which might well have appalled the bravest heart.

"His army were four months in arrears of pay, his military chest was empty, his ammunition nearly expended, his medical stores exhausted. How had he then the power to pursue military operations? He had resources in his own mind, and under all difficulties he still preserved that undaunted spirit which enabled him finally to surmount them all. His own expressions at that particular moment, when beset with perils, were worthy of him, he said: 'When difficulties accumulate it is our first and only duty to endeavour to overcome them, when the national honour is at stake, and nothing can be gained without strenuous effort and constant perseverance. I have not yet contemplated falling back.' Such was the inspiriting language of this gallant man. He (the deputy-chairman) was proud to say that similar grants to distinguished officers had been voted from time to time in that court, but this he would confidently affirm, that never was there an occasion more appropriate than the present; he must here remark, because it reflected great honour on their honourable chairman, that when he introduced this subject to the Court of Directors,

he did so quite independent of any application on the part of Sir William Nott. It was the chairman's own spontaneous act. Learning, accidentally, that Sir William Nott's means were not such as his merits deserved, or his rank in society demanded, the chairman determined to propose to the Court of Directors, that such remuneration or grant should be given to Sir William Nott as would enable him to maintain his proper position in society. (Hear.) And here he may be allowed to say, that Sir William Nott had always acted with a true and independent spirit. He never was a party to making known his wants to the East India Company. He never made any statement on the subject, nor did he know that such an honour was contemplated, until it had received the sanction of the Court of Directors. He (the deputy-chairman) was proud of his position that day, because it enabled him to do honour to this much respected officer. Well did he deserve it; and sure he was that this proceeding would give the greatest satisfaction to the whole army in India. With these few, but sincere observations, he begged most cordially to second the motion."

Mr Weeding said, "He had no wish unnecessarily to prolong a discussion were all appeared to be unanimous, still he could not give a silent vote on this occasion. He cordially concurred in the resolution that had been proposed by the Court of Directors for the approbation of the Court of Proprietors. A perusal of the documents that had been referred to, a recollection of the brilliant achievements of Sir William Nott, and a knowledge of his early military life, impressed him (Mr. Weeding) with the highest admiration of that gallant officer's character. He believed that the Company was most deeply indebted to the prudence of Sir William Nott, but he was sure that no person was more indebted to this prudence and sagacity than the late Governor General of

India. They all recollected the deep feeling which prevailed, the anxiety which they all experienced, the agitation which pervaded the public mind, to know what was doing in 1842 to remedy the misfortune which had occurred in the latter part of the preceding year. The army was especially called on to vindicate the honour of the country, and to repair those disgraces and misfortunes that had been inflicted, not by open war, but by perfidy and treachery. The late Governor General, at that eventful moment, wavered; he hesitated to order the army to advance to the relief of the unhappy captives at Cabool. General Nott viewed the subject in another light; he determined to vindicate the honour of his country, and he did so. He inspired confidence in his troops, and, on every occasion, he led them to victory. The court would remember, that in the month of March the orders of the late Governor General to retire were known; General Nott, nevertheless, maintained his own opinion, the retreat, as pointed out to him, would be disastrous. In answer to the communications of the late Governor General in answer to the fears, the discouraging fears, which that command displayed, and which might have appalled a man of less firmness, Nott said, 'I have not come to the determination to retire; I must have a great opportunity to try my strength. I am sensible of the difficulties by which I am threatened, but I shall trust to the resources, such as they are, that I can command.' They must all recollect how gratified they were in this country when they found that General Nott, with a much smaller force than that which was destroyed at Cabool, overcame a resolute and determined enemy. Their exultation was so much the greater when they recollected, that but for the course taken by Sir William Nott, his army too might have been dispersed and destroyed. A great deal had been said about the capture of the gates of Somnauth, but the name of Sir William Nott

was connected with other distinctions of a more ennobling nature. In whatever situation Sir William Nott had been placed it was impossible to entertain any other feeling towards him but that of admiration for the acts which he had performed. The Court of Directors had shown the high sense they entertained of the merits of Sir William Nott, and he hoped that the Court of Proprietors were prepared to manifest a similar feeling, by unanimously agreeing to the resolution then before them. It was a mark of respect honourably earned by this distinguished man."

In December, 1844, the City of London did its part in honouring the hero of Candahar. A Common Council was held on the 12th of the month, in the Chamber of the Guildhall, during the mayoralty of Mr Alderman Gibbs, when it was resolved:—"That the freedom of this city, with a silver cup of the value of one hundred guineas, be presented to Major-General Sir William Nott, G.C.B., in testimony of the estimation entertained by this Court, in common with their fellow-citizens, of the many distinguished military services rendered by him in Affghanistan, particularly for his undaunted bravery and successful operations in the defence of Candahar, and the recapture of Ghuznee and Caubul, thereby upholding the reputation of her Majesty's Arms, adding increased security to the British dominions in India, and maintaining the honour of the British

Empire." The cup was not absolutely presented until after the death of the General.

Sir William, soon after his arrival at Carmarthen, occupied a private house while a residence was being built for him on his little estate called Job's Well. His health for a time seemed to improve under the united influences of pure air, the devoted attention of Lady Nott and his daughters, and the exquisite feeling arising from the assurance that he was again amongst the scenes of his youth—scenes doubly endeared to him by the powerful recollection Nott loved to cherish of his exalted father. It is recorded that, as the carriage passed the little cemetery on the entry into Carmarthen, the General, overcome with emotion, pointed to the spot where the "rude forefathers of the hamlet" slept, and ejaculated—"My Father!" The fame of the General, however, forbade his enjoying uninterrupted tranquillity. His visitors were frequent, and the communications which he received innumerable. Many persons sent letters of congratulation—others addressed poetic effusions to the General—not a few sought his autograph—and very many were the petitioners for his "powerful influence" in reaching some personal object which the writer had at heart.

As winter approached the disease which affected the General—a disease of the heart—assumed an

aggravated form. The difficulty of breathing became intense—the pains excruciating; no position, no remedies, gave him relief. He moved from room to room and from chair to chair, but nothing seemed to mitigate the anguish he endured. So great were the efforts which he made to respire, that although the snow was on the ground he was thrown into violent heats, and felt relief when his wife and daughters fanned him. Yet his admirable patience and beautiful resignation to the Divine Will never forsook him. His chief anxiety regarded his children, for whom he had been unable to make an adequate provision; but even in this matter he trusted to the generous interposition of Heaven. Among his last words were "God will make it all right."

Sir William Nott was attended throughout his illness by Dr Bowen, of Carmarthen, a very skilful practitioner, who was indefatigable in his attendance; but Bowen did not, from the first, anticipate a perfect cure. On the morning of the 1st of January, 1845, Dr Bowen announced that the pulse of the invalid was failing, and that he could not survive many hours. Though for some time apprehended, the announcement did not the less affect the mournful auditors. They could *but look at him to the last,* for nothing now was needed for his comfort. His daughter Letitia had long been holding his hand, when she felt him slightly

move. His head which had been propped up, now fell forward. She hastened to support it; but the last moments had arrived. With one or two gentle sighs, the spirit of the gallant Nott left its earthly tabernacle.

Wide-spread and sincere was the grief of Carmarthen when the melancholy tidings went forth that the last debt of nature had been paid. The inhabitants were not taken by surprise, for the life of the lamented General had, as they knew, been for many days one unbroken struggle—an exemplification of that vicissitude in illness which faintly encouraged hope, whilst it forbade the expectation of ultimate recovery. But the lamentations were not the less deep and universal. The first impulse, when the shock was over, was to decree a public funeral, and an interment within the church of St Peter's. It was, however, understood to be the earnest wish of the General that his vault should be made as close as possible to those of his father and mother, in the churchyard, and the place pointed out by such wish was made his last resting place. Many admirers came from remote localities to be present at the last ceremonial; and the men of the 41st Regiment, who had served under Nott in Affghanistan, sought every possible means of rendering honour to the remains of the brave soldier who had led them to victory. Long previous to his death they

had sent one of their number each day to enquire after his health.

The funeral took place on Tuesday, the 6th of January.

Every demonstration of respect was paid to the deceased hero, and the largest funeral procession ever seen in the Principality accompanied his remains to their last resting place.

Every shop in the town was closed, all business was suspended, and throughout the day manifestations of the deepest sorrow were visible.

The procession left the deceased General's residence at about one o'clock, and proceeded through Guildhall square, Queen street, Spilman street, and Church street, to the Church, in the following order:

The Mayor and Corporation of Carmarthen, three abreast, with satin hatbands and scarfs.

Inhabitants, three abreast, in deep mourning.

The Lord Bishop of St. David's carriage, containing Thos. Thirwall, Esq., as representative of the Bishop.

Carriage containing the Ven. Archdeacon Bevan and the Rev. D. A. Williams.

Carriage containing Dr Bowen and Mr E. Williams, physician and surgeon to the deceased General.

Carriage containing Colonel Love and Col. Trevor, M.P.

Carriage containing D. A. S. Davies, M. P., and Sir John Mansel, Bart.

Carriage containing D. Morris, Esq., M.P., and Capt. J. G. Phillips, R. N.

Carriage containing D. Pugh, Esq., Chairman of the Carmarthenshire Quarter Sessions,
and John Wilson, Esq., Recorder of Carmarthen.
Carriage containing Major Scott and Capt. Pinkney.
Carriage containing Col. Brown and Lieut. Pratt.
Carriage containing Major Bowen and H. Lawrence, Esq., M.D.
Carriage containing Capt. Edwardes and Capt. Butler.
Carriage containing J. Banks Davies, Esq., and the Rev. Jeremiah Owen.
Carriage containing Captain Gwynne, and Captain Lewis Evans.
Carriage containing J. W. Phillips, Esq., and David Davies Esq.
Carriage containing C. Morgan, Esq., M.D., and Captain James Thomas.
Carriage containing Dr Prytherch, Esq., and — Longmore, Esq.
Carriage containing T. C. Morris, Esq., and W. Morris, Esq.
Carriage containing J. E. Saunders, Esq., and R. Maliphant Esq.
Carriage containing F. Green, Esq., and Valentine Davis, Esq.
Carriage containing W. Williams, Esq., Kidwelly, W. Chambers, Jun., Esq., and J. Biddulph, Esq.
Carriage containing T. Jones, Esq., M.D., and the Rev. Jas. Griffiths, Llangunnor.
Carriage containing Lewis Morris, Esq., and the Rev. H. Griffiths, Kidwelly.
Carriage containing George Hughes, Esq., Tregib, and Rev. Mr Nicholls, Ystradwrallt.

THE HEARSE.

Carriage containing R. W. Nott, Esq., Master Charles Nott, and Jas. Dunn, Esq., late Secretary, R.N.

Two carriages containing the domestics of the late GENERAL NOTT.

The soldiers of the 41st Regiment, decorated with their Ghuznee ribbons, which were covered with crape.

The soldiers of the 13th Regiment of Light Dragoons.

The order of Odd Fellows.

The Ivorites.

In this order the procession entered St Peter's Church. The beautifully impressive burial service was read by the Venerable Archdeacon Bevan. An anthem was ably sung by the choir, and the coffin, made of polished oak, and covered with black velvet and gilded trimmings, was conveyed to the grave on the North side of the churchyard. The body was lowered to the grave by the veterans of the 41st, who had fought under the gallant General in Affghanistan, and at this really interesting portion of the sadly solemn ceremony, many of his old companions in arms were visibly affected. Several of them threw dust into the grave, and turned away, sobbing audibly.

The whole procession then filed past the grave, and each individual present had an opportunity of casting a last look at the lonely resting place of one of our greatest British Heroes.

The grave had hardly closed on the remains of the illustrious veteran, when all orders of society sought to perpetuate the recollection of his virtues and his triumphs by decreeing monumental honours. Although his ill-health made it irksome, and even painful for him to sit for his portrait, he had nevertheless done so on two occasions since his arrival in England—once to gratify the

public desire to possess the effigies of one who had rendered such signal services to his country, and once at the request of Mr Henry Wood, who has been before mentioned as one of his oldest and most valued friends.

Mr Brigstocke, an eminent Welsh artist, and himself a native of Carmarthen, knowing and joining in the public desire expressed through the corporation of Carmarthen, at once offered his gratuitous aid to that body to paint a full-length portrait of the gallant General. That painting is now suspended in the Town-hall of Carmarthen. Simultaneously two other full-length portraits were painted by the same artist, one of which was subscribed for by the inhabitants of Calcutta, and now adorns the Town-hall of that noble city; the other decorates the walls of the Oriental Club. Mr Faulkner was the artist selected by Mr Wood, and the painting thus taken was presented by Mr Wood to the College at Addiscombe, where we trust it may act as an incentive to many a noble-minded youth to follow in the train of such an illustrious exemplar. From the pictures it was not difficult to cast a statue, and for the attainment of this object Mr Brigstock's picture was used, and a liberal subscription was at once opened. Her Majesty the Queen, in gracious evidence of her admiration of the distinguished General, contributed two hundred pounds; the East India

Company gave one hundred; Lord Ellenborough subscribed a similar sum; the late Lord Auckland added thirty pounds; Lieutenant-Colonel Hibbert, of the 40th Foot, gave forty pounds, and so on. In order to procure a proper site for the erection in Carmarthen, several houses near the Town-hall were pulled down, and a square formed which has been called "Nott square." It was resolved that the statue should be of bronze metal, and to this end several of the guns captured at the battle of Maharajpore, in the Gwalior State, were presented by the East India Company. In a few months the work (by Davies) was completed; and now, on a pedestal of granite, on a rising ground, stands the noble offering of a country's love, bearing this simple inscription—

NOTT,
BORN 20TH JANUARY, 1782,
DIED 1ST JANUARY, 1845.

The most elaborate epitaph could not better have told the story of a life rendered brilliant by military skill, undeviating virtue, and exalted patriotism.

It is almost superfluous to attempt to sketch the character of the late Major-General Sir William Nott in a work which abounds in illustrations of its main features. Undaunted, when all around were "panic-struck"—never "despairing for the common-

wealth" when all were clasping their hands in despair, we have traced him with a gallant little band—well known to their General, and he well known to them—holding with firm grasp the key-stone on which British rule still planted her flag in Affghanistan—we have seen him sternly and resolutely maintaining his ground, urged though he was by superior military and political authority combined to resign a seemingly hopeless struggle—and all this he did by his own unsupported energy alone. When " his country's honour was at stake, he felt it his duty to overcome difficulties, not to know dangers." The treachery of the enemy had never for a moment escaped his penetrating eye. Faithless from the first, as their promises had been, for the safe-conduct of the army which evacuated Caubul—faithless as he had *always* known their promises to be, he ever thought that what could not be obtained from their good faith, must be wrested from them by the strong hand. He estimated valour at its highest meed, but at the same time often said that it was comparatively worthless, unless united with science to direct its course—" that fighting was the least part of a soldier's duty." On this basis he had erected his own superstructure. We have seen him, for years and years before the din of war commenced, cultivating Torrens as his authority for the details of military training, and Wellington's despatches as his text-book for mili-

tary practice. Here we find the key to his subsequently brilliant career—a career unchecked, from first to last, by one single reverse, and crowned at last by placing in the British power that very Caubul which but a short time before had been the scene where the reputation of our arms had lost its long established prestige. In his ordinary intercourse with Anglo-Indian society, in which every word is weighed, and not always interpreted advantageously, the General was usually reserved, but he was singularly communicative to his children, because he knew that reliance might be placed in their discretion and affection. From his letters to them we gather innumerable proofs of the warmth of his heart and the simplicity of his nature—his scorn of chicanery—his detestation of duplicity—his lively appreciation of kindness. Never inflated by a sense of his own worth, he received the attentions of others with an air of surprise, and rendered grateful thanks for the homage he had earned. "What have I done," he often exclaimed, "to be so kindly treated!" He had done much, but he did not know it. At the head of every regiment with which he had served he had enforced the performance of duty, because he considered the obligations of the soldier to the State sacred and imperative. Himself an abstract and impersonation of "duty," he was intolerant of its neglect in

others; and he demonstrated in the admirable discipline and harmonious state in which he left each successive regiment (some of which he had been expressly deputed to restore to order), that the strict observance of his system ultimately brought its own reward. That no undue severity—none of the torture of martinetism—no frivolous interference with trifles—nothing, in short, but a close attention to regimental economy and parade steadiness—marked his rule, is clear, from the great regard with which he inspired all who had the good fortune to be commanded by him. The conduct of the 38th Regiment, N.I., after the death of Mrs Nott, at Delhi, and the departure of the General (then Colonel) for Affghanistan, evinced the lasting respect and regret of the officers and men of the corps. While at Delhi, the 16th N. I.—another corps which Nott had commanded—were cantoned at the station; and to show how deeply they valued the recollection of his excellent government of the regiment, the Native officers used to call upon him in a body, and were received in the dining-hall, where they laughed and chatted without restraint. The sepoys of the 16th, most of whom had been recruited by Nott (who was always particular about the caste, height, and appearance of his men), continually made *poojahs* (religious cere-

monials), and offered up prayers for his return to the regiment. How the 41st Foot esteemed the General who led them from Candahar to India has been set forth in the description of his last hours. No severe Commander could thus have won the love of his subordinates. By his officers, Nott was sometimes deemed cold and apathetic, because he was not profuse of his commendations. They did not, in this conjecture render justice to his exalted motives. It was an axiom with Nott that in the utmost devotion of his service an officer only did his duty to the Government, and as the fulfilment of duty was the proper acquittance of the pay received and the honours bestowed, thanks and commendations were a superfluity in the compact. Nevertheless, when he considered the occasion to call for an expression of approbation, he was not slow or niggard of his acknowledgments. We can count fifty names which received honourable mention in Nott's despatches and orders—Wymer, Sanders, Anderson, Scott, Ripley, Stacey, M'Laren, Hibbert, Polwhele, Chamberlain, White, &c., are cases in point.

In the exercise of all the duties of private life no man was more exemplary than General Nott. The pure tenets of Christianity formed the basis of all his actions, but his religion was always unobtrusive. His charity was boundless—no better

proof of it can be given than his instructions to his daughters to follow his example in society, and pay the greatest attention to those, if worthy, who were the most neglected by others. Children loved him—the poor followed him with their prayers. The rude Affghans, who abhorred the Christian abstractedly, reverenced the just and simple-minded soldier, who, at the head of ten thousand men, held their provinces in subjection. He was a just man in all his dealings, but he ever tempered justice with mercy. He loved Truth for its own sake, and he held Honour to be "above life." With him it was, in very truth,

> "The noble mind's distinguishing perfection,
> That aids and strengthens virtue where it meets her."

His occasionally strong and bitter denunciations of the political and military authorities who misdirected the affairs of the British in Affghanistan, were not the effusions of a warm and angry temper, but the overflowings of a heart which recoiled from the oppressions, follies, and dangers which marked the whole course of their policy, and the injustice to his own branch of the service of which they were the frequent authors. In long after-years the descendants of the General will cherish his memory for his many noble

public acts, and his private worth, and in British military annals he will live for ever as one of the best and finest specimens ever produced of

THE COMPANY'S OFFICER.

Sir William Nott having enjoyed for so very short a time, the pension conferred upon him, it was supposed that the Government would have generously continued to his family the reward he had so thoroughly earned. In this the family were disappointed. The only favour shown by the Government of Lord John Russell, was in the conferment of the living of Satterton, in Leicestershire, on the General's eldest son, the Rev. W. G. Nott, B.A., and this was done at the instance of Mr Morris, the M.P. for Carmarthen. Much more generous and considerate was the Honourable East India Company. The family had soon to acknowledge with gratitude, a pension of 200*l.* to Lady Nott, while she continued the General's widow; 100*l.* to each of the unmarried daughters of the General, to cease on their marriage; and a cadetship and 300*l.* for outfit to Mr C. D. P. Nott, the only child of the General's eldest son, Charles Nott, L.L. B. Barrister at-Law.

The other surviving members of the General's family, are Robert Murray Nott, his youngest son, a Lieutenant in the H.E.I.C.S., and his second daughter Maria, the wife of Charles Nicholletts, a Lieutenant in the H.E.I.C.S. and Political Assistant at the Court of Nepaul. C. A. Nott had only one child; W. G. Nott has now five children; Robert Murray Nott, four children; Mrs C. Nicholletts, six children; Mrs Bower, four children.

APPENDIX.

[The documents which form the Appendix to this volume are all of material importance to a complete history of the life, character, professional capacity, and habits of thought of the late Sir William Nott. The introduction of such documents into the body of the work would have interfered so much with the narrative, already much broken by masses of correspondence, that it has been deemed preferable to assign them this separate position. The report of the state of Oude will give some idea of the heavy duty which devolved upon Sir William as Envoy to the King, and which he would doubtless have executed in his usual masterly way, had he been spared to his country. The Standing Orders of the 43rd Regiment of Bengal N.I., drawn up, it is believed, by the General himself, may be accepted as a model by Indian Commanding Officers—allowances being made for the changes in regimental economy which time has wrought; and the Common-Place Book illustrates the character of the General's studies when a subaltern of Native Infantry.—J. H. S.]

NARRATIVE OF THE CAPTIVITY OF THE OFFICERS AT GHUZNIE.

BY LIEUT. CRAWFORD, OF THE BOMBAY ARMY.

I left on the 30th October last year (1841), having under my charge three state prisoners and seven hostages, to be escorted to Cabul, and for the safeguard of the same, I was accompanied by a troop from my own corps, and about forty Affghan horse, under a Chief called Guddoo Khan. It was on the 7th of November we reached Oba: we had marched rapidly, but in perfect peace, and as little expected to be attacked on the road, as I do at this moment. You may imagine, therefore, how thunderstuck I was, when Guddoo Khan entered my tent, bringing with him a native official of that part of the country, styled Urz Beggie, who gave me an account of the disasters in Cabul on the 2nd of the month, and, as I afterwards found, bad as matters really were in the capital, he made them out to be much more so. He strongly pressed my returning to Khelat-i-Ghilzie, saying, that there were 20,000 men round Ghuznie, and to go on would be to certain death. I considered, however, it would never do for an officer to turn back on a mere rumour of danger, and that should the man's story really be true, still I had a better chance of reaching Ghuznie, which was only fifty-four miles off, than Khelat, which was ninety. Tired though my horses were, they might make Ghuznie in one forced march, but they would not be able to get to the other station under a couple of days. The road lay through the barren and hostile country of the Ghilzies, and, as I subsequently discovered, it proved that Urz Beggie was a traitor; he wished to get me back through the Ghilzie districts, as he himself was a man of that tribe, and would have raised the whole country about my ears; not a man would have escaped to tell the tale.

After duly considering all the pros and cons of the case, I mounted my detachment at eight, p.m., and moved on towards Ghuznie. We marched rapidly the whole night, and at daylight had reached Nance, about thirteen miles from Ghuznie, but the first streak of dawn showed us that the people were on the alert, there were videttes on every hill, and in a very short time, word was passed from fort to fort, and their inhabitants turned out hanging on my flank and rear, and firing with their rifles at us. Their horsemen were bolder, they swarmed round us like wasps, riding up, firing their pieces at our troops, and galloping off to reload. We were nearly helpless against such a foe, twice we charged and cut up a few, but the rascals always sought shelter near the numerous forts that covered the plain, and then laughed at us. In addition to not being able to catch the villains, we found that every time we charged or halted to show a front, it only gave the enemy time to circle round our flanks and head us; and their footmen also came up from the rear.

Accordingly, we left the high road altogether, and turned out into the plain, where the foot would scarcely dare to follow us; and indeed, by proceeding at the trot we pretty well shook off these gentry, but the horsemen still followed, and to add to our troubles, I found that the ponies on which the prisoners were mounted, were exhausted and could proceed no further. As they knocked up, I doubled the riders on the other animals, but one after another they gave in. One prisoner was cut down by a horseman of the enemy (plainly showing there was no collision between them), two others rolled over in a ditch, where with their horse atop of them, and their legs chained under his belly, I left them; indeed I now found it was impossible I could ever get my charge into Ghuznie alive, and I had only to decide on putting them to death or setting them at liberty. My instructions would have justified my pursuing the former course, but the poor wretches had clearly made no attempt to escape, they were in no manner answerable for the attack made on my party, as was evident from one of their number falling by the sword of our adversaries; and I conceived then, and do now conceive, that in letting these men go with their lives, I was only acting according to the strict letter, but that justice and humanity required I should not slay them in cold blood.—Had I put them to death, then Shumsoodeen, or Mahomed Akbar would have been equally justified in taking our lives (the lives of all their prisoners) on the advance of Pol-

lock and Nott on Cabul. I may add, that the Court of Inquiry which I called for, after investigating all the circumstances, decided that I had acted perfectly right. But to return to my story.

After following and harassing us for miles, the enemy drew off, when we got near Ghuznie, and I reached that place about 10 a.m., on the 8th, with the loss of all my baggage and prisoners, and fifteen men and twenty horses killed, and several wounded out of my little party.

Every day now brought us bad accounts from Cabul, and the infatuation that appears to have seized the chief authorities there, not only hurried them on to ruin at the capital, but also paralyzed us at Ghuznie. Can you imagine that the necessary repairs and alterations in the citadel were not sanctioned, nor was Palmer permitted to lay in provisions? At the eleventh hour, the Colonel took the responsibility upon himself and set to work; but most invaluable time had been suffered to pass unimproved; and when the enemy made their appearance under our walls, they found us but ill prepared for a siege, especially when it was not man alone we had to combat with but the rigours of a winter as intense as that of Canada.

The enemy and the snow made their appearance together; on the 20th November the town was surrounded with the one, and the ground covered with the other, but in a week afterwards, the insurgents broke up their investment of the place, on a report of McLaren's brigade advancing to our relief. This permitted our destroying the villages and buildings within musket shot of the walls, and also afforded us a week's skating on the ditch; but on the 7th December, the enemy returned in increased numbers, and we were then closely confined to the walls.

The necessity and advantage of turning the inhabitants out of the town was not lost sight of, but unfortunately for us an idea had got abroad that the town people were strongly attached to us, and that the sending out so many poor people to perish in the snow was an act of cruelty too great to be dreamt of. The consequence was, that the townsmen entered into a correspondence with their countrymen on the outside, and on the night of the 16th December, having dug a hole through the town, they admitted their friends, who poured in by thousands, and compelled us, after fighting all that night and next day, to retire into the citadel. It so happened that from this day the winter set in with increased severity, and its effects soon told fearfully upon the men. The whole garrison, officers and men, were told off into

three watches, one of which was constantly on duty, so that every one in the place was eight hours on duty out of the twenty-four, and you may imagine, that such constant work and exposure to the intense cold, very soon rendered the sepoys useless. The snow lay deep, very deep, and often in the course of a single night would fall to the depth of a couple of feet.

The thermometer sunk to ten, twelve, and even fourteen degrees below Zero (!!) and to such weather were the natives of India exposed, day and night, with no prospect of relief, and with no comforts to enable them to support their sufferings. We were reduced to half rations of bad flour and raw grain, on alternate days, and a seer of wood per day, each man, was all that could be allowed, either for cooking or warmth. The sepoys were constantly soaked, and unable to dry themselves, got sickly, and the hospital was crowded with men, whose feet had ulcerated from frost bites. I do think, that if the enemy had pluck enough to have made a rush upon us, they could, at any time after Christmas-day, have carried the works with very little difficulty. As it was, however, they contented themselves with keeping up a smart fire with their rifles, and not a man could show his head above the walls for a moment. Up to the 15th January this work continued, and we lost three or four men daily, from the fire of their marksmen, but, on the day mentioned, some sort of a truce was entered into, and active hostilities ceased, it being understood we were to evacuate the place on the arrival of Shumsoodeen Khan. This worthy did not arrive till the middle of the following month, and then the Colonel managed to keep him in play till the beginning of March, but, at last, he and his Chiefs would stand it no longer, and said, that if we did not give up the place immediately, they would recommence hostilities, and we, being utterly hopeless, having no water in the citadel, and the snow, on which we had depended for a supply having all vanished, our provisions being exhausted, and there being no prospect of the arrival of succour, we had no resource but to make the best terms we could and trust to providence that the enemy would abide by them. On the 6th March, we marched out from the citadel, under a treaty, signed and solemnly sworn to by all the Chiefs, that we should be escorted in safety and honor to Peshawur, with our colours, arms and baggage, and fifty rounds of ammunition per man. There was still some snow

in the Passes between Ghuznie, and till that should melt, and the necessary carriage could be procured for us, we were quartered in a portion of the town immediately below the citadel. Scarcely had we entered our new abode, when our enemies flung off the mask, and showed how much they valued oaths made to Infidels.

At noon on the 7th, whilst nearly every man of ours was cooking and we were totally unprepared for an outbreak, the Ghazees rushed upon our lines, and succeeded in carrying the houses in which my squadron had been placed. I was in the next house, with Burnet, of the 54th, and Nicholson, of the 27th, there being no decent room for me in my own proper quarters. On hearing the uproar I ran to the roof, to see what was the matter, and finding what had taken place among my men, and that balls were flying thick, I called up Burnet; he had scarcely joined me, when he was struck down by a rifle ball, which knocked his eye out, and, as he was then rendered *hors de combat*, I assumed command of the two companies of the 27th, that had been under him, and Nicholson and myself proceeded to defend ourselves as well as our circumstances would permit. We were on the left of the mass of houses occupied by our troops, and the first and sharpest attacks were directed at us. The enemy fired our house, and gradually, as room after room caught fire, we were forced to retreat to the others, till at last by midnight of the 8th, our house was nearly burnt in halves. We were exhausted with hunger and thirst, having had nothing to eat or drink since the morning of the 7th, our ammunition was expended, the place was filled with dead and dying men, and our position was no longer tenable, but the only entrance in front of the house was surrounded by the enemy, and we scarcely knew how to get out and endeavour to join Colonel Palmer; at last we dug a hole through the wall of the back of the house, we had only bayonets to work with, and it cost us much labour to make a hole sufficiently large to admit of one man at a time dropping from it into the street below, but we were fortunate enough to get clear out of our ruined quarters in this way and join the Colonel unperceived by the savages round us. As soon as day broke on the 9th, they occupied our abandoned post, and shortly afterwards attacked and carried the next house, in which were poor Lumsden and his wife and thirty sepoys, every one of whom and their servants were put to death. On the morning of the 10th, Poett and Davis were obliged to retire from their posts, and the survivors

were now assembled in the two houses held by Colonel Palmer and the head quarters of the corps. You cannot picture to yourself the scene these two houses presented: every room was crammed, not only with sepoys but camp followers, men, women, and children, and it is astonishing the slaughter among them was not greater, seeing that the guns of the citadel sent round shot crashing through the walls. I saw high caste men groping in the mud, endeavouring to discover pieces of unmelted ice that by sucking them they might relieve their thirst that so tormented them. Certainly when that morning dawned I thought it was the last I should see on earth, and so did we all, and proceeded to make a few little arrangements ere the final attack on us took place.

The regimental colours were burnt, to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. I destroyed my watch, and flung it, and what money I had, over the wall of the ditch; I also burnt my poor wife's miniature, first cramming the gold frame of it into a musket, being determined that one of the Ghazees should have his belly full of gold ere I died. Hour after hour passed on, and still we sat expecting every minute to hear the shout of the final attack, but it came not; from our loop holes we saw the enemy swarming all around us in every lane and house, and on the hill of the citadel; the place was black with their masses, and as they themselves afterwards told us, there were not less than ten thousand men thirsting. But it appears that Shumsoodeen had been afflicted with qualms of conscience, and had held a council of his Chiefs, on the subject of admitting us to quarter. I should tell you, that during the three previous days fighting, Shumsoodeen had repeatedly offered us terms, but they were such as we could not accede to; inasmuch as they commenced by desiring us to surrender ourselves to him, and abandon the sepoys to the fury of the Ghazees. The sepoys, it appears, had held a consultation among themselves, and believing that they had no chance of their lives, determined on forcing their way out of the town and endeavouring to get to Peshawur. When we first heard of this mad design, and spoke to the men about it, they denied it, but on the 10th, two native officers came forward, and told us that they had made up their minds to go off that night; that if we chose to accompany them, they would be exceedingly glad; but if otherwise, they would go alone; it was in vain that we pointed out the utter impracticability of their plan; they had got an idea among them that Peshawur was not above fifty or sixty miles off across

the country, and that there was a short cut to it across the mountains, They immediately commenced digging a hole through the outer wall of the town, by which, as soon as it got dark, they might march out into the country. Seeing that our men had now thrown off all authority, and were about to desert us, we had nothing further to do, but to make the best bargain we could for our lives. Shumsoodeen and all his Chiefs again swore by Ghazee, all that was holy, that if we laid down our arms, we should be honourably treated, and sent to Cabul to the Shah, as soon as possible. At ten p.m. we surrendered. The Chief sent and begged the officers to come into the citadel immediately, as the Ghazees were yelling for the blood of the Feringee Kaffirs, and he could not answer for our safety if we delayed till daylight; accordingly, we went up to the citadel and gave up our swords, the Chief placing bodies of his men around our late quarters, to keep the Ghazees from molesting the sepoys; a large party of these latter, however, during the night, endeavoured to put their ridiculous plan of flight into execution, and made their way about two or three miles from the town; it came on to snow heavily; they got bewildered in the fields, and in the morning were all cut to pieces or made prisoners. For the first few days after we had surrendered, we were treated pretty tolerably; the Chief and his brother used to visit and condole with us on the change of fortune we had experienced, and expressed their sorrow at the violence of their fanatical followers, not having permitted their strict observance of the treaty on which we had yielded up the citadel to them; but gradually they discontinued their visits; every littte thing we had managed to secure, such as watches, penknives, money, &c., was taken from us, and we were strictly confined to a small room, eighteen feet by thirteen. In it were ten of us, so you may imagine we had not much room to spare; indeed, when we lay down at night we exactly occupied the whole floor, and when we wanted to take a little exercise, we were obliged to walk up and down (six paces) in turns. Few of us had a change of linen, and the consequence was, we were soon swarming with vermin, the catching of which afforded us an hour's employment every morning. I wore my solitary shirt for five weeks, till it became literally black and rotten, and I am really surprised that none of us contracted any loathsome disease, from the state of filth we were compelled to live in. On the 7th of April, we heard of Shah Soojah's

murder and from that date the severities of our confinement were redoubled; they shut and darkened the solitary window from which we derived light and air, and they also kept the door of our room constantly closed, so that the air we breathed became perfectly pestiferous. On the 21st of the month, they tortured Colonel Palmer with a tent peg and ropes, in such a manner that it is wonderful he ever recovered the use of his foot. I cannot, in a letter, explain the process of the torture; we all witnessed it, and it was something on the principle of the Scotch boot, described in "Old Mortality." We were told we should each be tortured in our turn, unless we gave up four lacs of rupees, which the rascals swore we had buried, and that if we continued obstinate, they told us we should be blown from guns, beginning with the junior. This was a pleasant sort of life to lead, never being certain of that life for twenty-four hours together. In the end of April our guards suddenly became particularly civil to us for a few days, and we found out they had a report of the advance of our troops; indeed, up to the period of our actual release, we could always form a pretty shrewd guess of what our troops were about, by the treatment we experienced at the hands of our captors. If there was any forward movement among our people, any arrival of reinforcements at Jellalabad or Candahar, &c., then we were treated well for a few days, and we got better food, but if our people appeared to be idle, and things remained *in statu quo* for a week, then our guard taunted us on the unwarlike spirit of Feringee armies, and boasted how they would exterminate them if they advanced. Gool Mahomed Khan, the brother of Shumsoodeen, who had always behaved more civilly towards us than the big Chief, was, unfortunately for us, despatched to Cabul on business, about the middle of April, but I believe it was owing to the receipt of a letter from him, that on the 12th of May, we were permitted to quit our prison room, and walk on the terrace of the citadel for *one hour*, and we were told that similar kindness would be shown to us *once a week* (!!!) viz., on Friday, when Shumsoodeen was to make a religious pic nic to a neighbouring shrine. Even this we thought a great blessing, and used to count the days and hours to each succeeding Friday, anxiously expecting the moment when our guards would tell us we might breathe God's fresh air, and look on the green fields for the allotted period. I thought I had always been an admirer of the

beauties of nature, but I never imagined that the time would have come, that the sight of a few ordinary fields of clover and wheat would have caused me such delight in their contemplation.

On the 15th of June, Gool Mahomed returned from Cabul, bringing with him some of the ladies of his brother's family; on their account we were told we should be removed to other quarters, and of course we expected a change for the worse, but, as it eventually proved, we were agreeably disappointed. Just at this period, one of our number, Lieutenant Davis, 27th Native Infantry, had sickened with typhus fever; we had no medicines, no comforts for him, and he lay on the ground delirious, raving about home and his family, and every hour proving worse, till on the 19th death put an end to his sufferings. We read the burial service over him, and then made his body over to the guard to bury, but I am afraid they merely flung the poor fellow into a ditch outside the gate. It was a melancholy ceremony, that burial: few among us, I imagine, but thought it might be his turn next, especially now that sickness had broken out in such a shape. However, on the following day we were removed to another building, where we had three or four rooms to ourselves, and a court-yard to walk about in, and our guard was replaced by a more civil set.

This was a delightful change, and being greedy of fresh air after so long a deprivation of it, we made the most of our new berth by always sleeping in the open air in the court-yard. It is true it was utterly impossible to get a minute's rest in any of the rooms allotted to us, as they were swarming with the foulest vermin; so we thought it no hardship to have the stars for a canopy, and for three months we never slept under a roof, or, with any other covering beyond our sheepskin cloaks.

From this date, the conduct of Shumsoodeen towards us improved greatly; he came to see us frequently, and chatted in a kind manner, always telling us we should shortly be set at liberty in exchange for Dost Mahomed, who was returning to Cabul, having been freed by our government. This gave us renewed hopes of soon again becoming free agents, and as our circumstances were improved, and our guards more friendly towards us, or captivity was more easily borne, but still as time wore on, and nothing definite was learnt regarding our release, we again began to despair, especially when the middle of

August arrived, and we seemed as far as ever from the attainment of our wishes.

It was on the 19th August, we had as usual wrapped ourselves up in our cloaks, and taken lodgings on the cold ground for the night when the Chief suddenly entered the yard, and told us we were to march immediately for Cabul. And sure enough, in half an hour afterwards, we found ourselves going along in pairs in Kujiawars on each side of camels, and moving towards the capital. How delighted we were to bid adieu to the walls of Ghuznie. I do believe, if we had known we were going to execution, the change would nevertheless have gladdened us. We reached Cabul in three days, without meeting any adventure on the road; but we were abused most grossly by the populace as we proceeded through the streets of the city; fortunately, it was in the dusk of the evening, and but few people witnessed our arrival, otherwise they might not have confined their ill-treatment to words. We went direct to Mahomed Akbar's quarters in the Bala Hissar, and from him we met with the kindest reception. I could not bring myself to believe that the stout, good-humoured, open-hearted looking young man, who was making such kind inquiries after our health, and how we had borne the fatigues of the journey, could be the murderer of Macnaghten, and the leader of the massacre of our troops. He told us, we came most unexpectedly; that though he had written repeatedly to have us sent to him (as he had heard we were ill-treated by Shumsoodeen), yet no attention had been paid to his orders, and now that we had come, it was without any intimation of our approach; he bade us be of good cheer, as our future comfort would be his care, and we should find ourselves treated like officers and gentlemen.

After many similarly civil speeches, he ordered dinner, and sent for Troup and Pottinger to see us; when they arrived, the whole of us, Mahomed Akbar, his Chiefs, and ourselves, all sat down to the best meal I had had for many a month. The Wuzeer (as he always styled himself) chatted and joked away on different subjects during the meal, and shortly after its conclusion dismissed us, saying he would make us over to the care of Pottinger and Troup for the night, and we might go and have a chat with them in private, as doubtless we were anxious to do so. On the following morning, the *arch-fiend* sent us an excellent breakfast, and horses to carry us out a few miles to the fort,

where the other British prisoners were living, and he desired a list of our wants, regarding clothes, &c., might be made out, and they should be furnished. We found our countrymen living in what appeared to us a small paradise; they had comfortable quarters, servants, money, and no little baggage, and a beautiful garden to walk about in. To our great regret, we had only been four or five days in this elysium, when we were sent off to Bamean; being thus away from the immediate care of Mahomed Akbar, we soon found ourselves called on to rough it once more. Tents had been sent for the use of the ladies, but our guards would only pitch them when it suited their convenience, and consequently the poor women and children had frequently to bivouac with us men, and that too in the nipping night air of the mountains; none of them, however, I am happy to say, suffered in the least, and they, one and all, bore their privations most admirably.

THE DEFENCE OF KHELAT-I-GHILZIE.

We marched into quarters at Khelat-i-Ghilzie in November, 1841. Our barracks were excellent, but the fortifications of the place were little more than commenced on, and along some hundred yards of the works there was neither wall nor ditch. Directly we got news of the insurrection at Cabul the sepoys were set to work to strengthen the defences of the post—scarps, palisades, parapets, and a ditch at the most accessible parts of the works were commenced on, and both officers and men continued to work at them until the winter set well in, and the frost rendered the ground so hard, that there was no longer any working it. On the 9th December about fifteen hundred Ghilzies made their appearance, with the intention, as they said, of besieging us. They took up their ground about two and a half miles off, but their warlike efforts were confined to firing a few shots into the place at night, and an attempt made by a party of their horse to cut off some of our men who were cutting bhoossah for fuel, in which they were foiled by the sepoys of the guard.

A fall of snow compelled them to decamp after nine days, and the only damage they did us was to make all the Chiefs in our neighbourhood "yagee."* Of all the Chiefs whom we had paid and supported only one man adhered to us, and he a person of no great influence. The winter now set in with severity, and the cold soon became excessive. We had no doors for the barracks, and neither doors nor glass for the windows of our quarters, which were large and lofty rooms, some 36 feet long, and our supply of firewood we were obliged to husband, so that we never could keep our rooms warm. You must recollect Khelat-i-Ghilzie; its situation is a very exposed one, situated in

* Mutinous, troublesome.

the throat of a funnel: high winds prevail throughout the year, and in winter the lower the temperature sunk the higher blew the north wind. Snow lay for two months on the ground, and the thermometer fell as low as forty degrees below the freezing point. With no doors to the barracks, and only such rough purdahs as grain bags, which were all we could get, you may conceive how much our men suffered; a gale of wind always blowing when the temperature was below zero, and usually, too, blowing most strongly at night. I have never experienced a winter so continuously cold. When we entered the garrison we had provision in flour for the troops for upwards of six months; but as we got an increase of three hundred men to the post, when Colonel Maclaren's brigade passed us on its return to Candahar, we had many additional mouths to feed, and we knew not how long we might be required to hold the post. We had a quantity of wheat in store, but with the country all round "yagee," we had not the means of grinding it. We got possession of some millstones, and tried to get up mills, but after getting all the machinery in order, we found that all the water we could command was not sufficient to keep the machinery in motion. We then tried a bullock-mill, which also failed from our not being able to fabricate the iron-work of sufficient solidity, and we should have been utterly nonplused, had not an officer in the garrison possessed a book on mechanics, in which was contained a description of a vertical hand-mill, capable of grinding some sixteen maunds daily. This we succeeded in constructing, after two months and a half's labour upon mills, and no little anxiety as to the result. We were now easy in our minds, for this with some small hand-mills gave us the means of supporting our garrison for some two or three additional months, and we knew our men would fight and hold the post against all the Affghans in the country as long as our provisions lasted. We had occasional communication with Candahar by means of highly paid cossids, and we thus learned the disastrous fate of our Cabul comrades. The tedium of the winter was excessive, but it passed at last. With the spring our labours on the defences recommenced, and as soon as the weather became mild, the hostile Chiefs of the two great Ghilzie tribes in our neighbourhood made their appearance. These gentlemen had spent the winter in a more sheltered locality, and, as long as they were not near us, the villagers brought in commodities for sale; but with their appearance all supplies ceased. On two occasions we were obliged to

*chappow** sheep—the first was a peaceable affair, we secured a whole flock without let or hindrance, but, on the second occasion, we had to fight for them, and had a few men wounded. We had forty-three *European* artillerymen in the garrison, and it was chiefly for them that the animal food was required. The supply of all their necessaries ran out in winter and on two different occasions they were for some days on bread and water, yet they never grumbled, worked as well as if they had been highly fed, and bore all their privations with the most admirable good humour. The hostile Ghilzie Chiefs at first brought only a few hundred men with them, and took up their quarters at a safe distance of some miles from us; but during all April they were receiving accessions to their force, and with these accessions their boldness increased, until they diminished their distance to less than a mile to the place. As they approached, our range necessarily became more limited, and we had neither cavalry nor the means of moving a gun, and the country round Khelat-i-Ghilzie is full of ravines, and exceedingly favourable to the skulking mode of fighting which these gentry most approve of. We were latterly, as the investment became more close, obliged to confine ourselves to the narrow space within our defences; these by the continued labour of our men had become very respectable, and such as we deemed no Affghan without the aid of guns, would have attempted. In this, however, we were agreeably disappointed. Towards the middle of May the enemy commenced to dig trenches round the place, working at them all night. By the 26th they had completely surrounded us with them, the nearest being within two hundred and fifty yards of our defences. These were all loop-holed, and afforded the enemy perfect cover; they were constructed, too, with some skill as to position, as the advanced trenches were invariably protected by two or three trenches in their rear, and they were uniformly placed, so as to have the advantage of any natural cover afforded by the ground. From these trenches the hottest fire any of us had ever seen Affghans keep up was poured upon any one who exposed himself; obviously picked marksmen were selected for the duty, for they fired exceedingly well for Affghans, and at ranges of from 600 to 700 yards, their long jezails threw balls with great accuracy. They were so completely sheltered in these trenches that we seldom had an

* *Chappow*, a foray, or plundering excursion.

opportunity of firing at them excepting when parties were relieving each other, and then the double-barrels and rifles of the officers came into play. Such had been the monotony of our previous existence that it was a matter of great amusement firing at these gentry, and it was seldom that any fellow got into the nearer trenches in daylight, without running the gauntlet of a few double-barrels. On the evening of the 20th of May the enemy were unusually quiet, and so few of them visible, that it was a matter of doubt whether the greater number of them had not decamped. A few of them were observed, by means of our telescopes, at a distant fort practising escalading with scaling ladders, and this was the first intimation we had of their having constructed these articles.

Officers and men had, for several nights previously, kept at their posts; there was bright moonlight, and the night passed with unusual quietness, until towards morning the moon went down. The attention of the officer on duty was then suddenly arrested by the clatter of horses' feet, indicating the close presence of a large body of horse, and the word was passed round to get ready. Shortly afterwards the whole face of the works was assaulted by dense bodies of the enemy. The morning was so dark, that they were within a hundred yards before they were observed, though we were on the look out for them, and they came on with great boldness, shouting "Allah! Allah!" They were received with discharges of grape, and a hot fire of musketry, which must have done heavy execution among their dense masses; still they pressed on, pushing their attack with the greatest vehemence at the north-east and north-west angles of the works, where the ascent was most easy, and the defences apparently most accessible. At the north-east angle the defences consisted of a ditch, scarp of some seven or eight feet in height; a slope of some eight feet between the top of the scarp and the parapet, the latter consisting of sand bags. The enemy, by the aid of scaling ladders, crossed the ditch, ascended the scarp and sloping bank, and endeavoured to get over the parapet: here they were resolutely met with the musket and bayonet. Thrice they came boldly on to the assault, planting one of their standards within a yard of the muzzle of one of our guns, and thrice they were driven back; only one man succeeded in getting into the place, and he was shot with his foot on the axle of this gun. Two guns were in position at this part of the works, and the attempts of the enemy to get within the works through

their embrasures, and over the parapets on either side, were so determined that the artillerymen for some minutes were obliged to quit their guns, and betake themselves to the musket and bayonet, with which they did good service; the sepoys, too, fought well; one of them was observed by the artillerymen to bayonet four men. The principal annoyance suffered by the garrison was from showers of heavy stones; these were thrown into the works in great quantity to cover the escaladers, and several of our men were knocked down and smartly bruised by them. During the height of the assault, the enemy fired little; they had apparently slung their matchlocks and came on sword in hand, but they were met by a fire so deadly and well sustained that they had no chance of success. The officers of the garrison were all surprised at the boldness and determination of the attack, but we understood afterwards that, trusting to their numbers, and emboldened no doubt by their previous successes at Kabul and Ghuznie, they reckoned so confidently on taking the place, that many of their women were waiting in the ravines close at hand to share in the plunder of the garrison. The assault lasted from twenty minutes to half an hour, and at day break they drew off, carrying away all their wounded, and many of their dead.

A party of them took refuge behind some rocks at the N.W. angle of the works, and just under the barracks, popping their heads out occasionally; they fired a few shots at us, but they fired so seldom, that their numbers were supposed to be few. Two companies of sepoys sallied out to unearth them, and to the surprise of all, at least 300 men broke cover and bolted for the neighbouring ravines faster than we ever saw Affghans do before. A heavy fire was poured into them, but they ran so fast, and cover was so close, that few of them fell. The greater part of the enemy retired into the ravines, into which they had dragged their dead and wounded, and from day light until half-past two p.m. they were employed in carrying them off. From their trenches on the north face of the works, which were filled with men, they kept up a pretty constant fire to cover this process. Had we possessed a few good cavalry we should have inflicted a heavier loss on them, but they were strong in horse, having about 800 in the field, while we had not a mounted man, and so it was judged prudent, as the ground afforded excellent cover for their mode of fighting, to rest satisfied with the thrashing we had given them, and to permit them to carry off their wounded without incurring the loss of our own men in moving on to attack them.

They left 104 dead bodies at the foot of the defences, and within a few days after the assault, the Political Agent ascertained that the number killed, and of wounded men, who died within a few days after the action, considerably exceeded 400. On the dead bodies were found quantities of our own magazine cartridges, supposed to have been procured at Ghuznie, and which accounted for their unusual expenditure of ammunition. Computed by themselves the lowest number of assailants was stated at 5,500 men, the highest at 7,000. On the body of the Nazir of Meer Allum, Chief of the Hotuck tribe of Ghilzies, who fell in the assault, was found the number roll of his contingent amounting to 2,000 and odd men; he furnished about a third part of the force, so that the number of assailants must have been about 6,000 men.

By sunset on the day of attack not an enemy was visible, and it was a source of honest gratulation to the garrison, that we had driven off our enemies and inflicted a heavy loss on them by our own efforts. The garrison consisted of about 900 men, about 500 of whom were actually engaged. When we took possession of the place it consisted of little more than three ranges of barracks for the troops, built on a commanding position.

By the assiduous labour of the sepoys, and the constant supervision of the engineer and officers, it had been converted into a post of such strength, as, if well defended, would have puzzled regular troops unfurnished to take, and did defy Affghans. It must have been a source of honest pride to our excellent Commanding Officer to find, that when positions of greater strength had submitted, he had not only fortified his own post, but maintained it, and signally defeated the enemy before it.

Troops in quarters in this country have seldom suffered more from the severity of climate, and the privation of accustomed necessaries, than those at Khelat-i-Ghilzie. During the more severe days in winter, the Hindoo sepoys did not cook for two days together, and even the Europeans, so bitter was the cold, were glad to keep their barracks, and even their beds, to keep themselves warm. Our bazar was latterly destitute of everything excepting the usual commissariat rations issued from the godown,* and for some months these were served out to the sepoys on a reduced scale. As for the officers they

* *Godown*, storehouse, cellar, warehouse, or storeroom.

laughed at their own privations, but they will not soon forget the dreary winter days, their shivering meetings at mess table, their tiffins of bread and water, and their nights at mess to discuss their scanty fare, to which hunger was an excellent sauce, and the only seasoning. Two days after the defeat of the enemy, we heard of the advance of Colonel Wymer's brigade to relieve us, which arrived on the 26th of May. We moved into camp, the barracks and defences of Khelat-i-Ghilzie were destroyed, and the 7th of June saw us safe at Candahar.

ATTACK ON, AND CAPTAIN FERRIS'S ESCAPE FROM, PESH BOLAK.

Pesh Bolak is situated half way between Lallpooroh and Jellalabad, and there is a cantonment there for one of Shah Soojah's regiments the Jezailchees or Rifles, commanded by Captain Ferris.

The officers attached to this corps were Captain Gerard, second in command, Lieutenant Lukin, Adjutant, and Dr Ritchie.

Captain Gerard, with 300 men, had been detached to succour Captain Burn's post at Gundamuck; this, with various demands upon his regiment, left Captain Ferris but 250 men to defend his post, keep open the communication and guard treasure to the amount of 50,000 rupees.

Near the cantonment is an old fort, ill-calculated to stand a siege; indeed you might have marched a section through a breach in one of the curtains, and his Majesty's regiment of Jezailchees, or that portion of them at Pesh Bolak, would, ere this, have had their quietus but for some slight suspicions respecting the fate of the surrounding country, which induced Captain Ferris to stop the gap in the wall, and he was enabled to do so with a number of bricks which lay close at hand.

In the early part of October, Captain Ponsonby, Assistant Adjutant-General, Lieutenant Harrington, 5th Light Cavalry, with twenty-four troopers, and Dr Stiven, Superintending Surgeon, halted at Pesh Bolak, at the recommendation of the Political Agent, Captain Mackeson, as the country a-head was said to be in a state of insurrection. A Parsee merchant, with a large and valuable investment, also took refuge at Pesh Bolak.

Matters continued tranquil until the 13th November, when, at half-past ten at night, the picquets were attacked, but without sustaining any loss; a bearer of Dr Stiven's was killed, and a troop horse wounded; the enemy were driven off. We the next day endeavoured to discover who were our foes, and we had just come to the conclusion that they were common thieves, when, about three o'clock, P.M., there issued from the Golahi forts, close to the cantonments, some two hundred men, who opened a sharp fire and advanced upon the officers' bungalows.

To repel them, the troopers of the 5th Light Cavalry (late of the 2nd), and a company of Jezailchees turned out, and a very pretty affair commenced in skirmishing order. Although the ground was not favourable for cavalry the troopers behaved well, and one man, Ram Singh, a Rajpoot, displayed signal intrepidity. He was met, with equal courage, by two Affghans on foot, one of whom shot him through the body. The moment he fell from his horse, a Jezailchee, a mere youth, mounted the animal, and, taking a deliberate aim at the two Affghans who were quenching their thirsty swords in the blood of the trooper as he lay on the ground, shot one of them dead on the spot.

The enemy being compelled to retire by the superior fire of the Jezailchees, we commenced our work to render the ricketty old fort defensible; there were neither loop-holes nor banquettes. To remedy the first deficiency, moorchus of loose bricks were constructed, and a portion of the inside of the wall, cut away, served for the latter.

The officers were enabled to get most of their baggage out of the bungalows into the fort; the Parsee's investments had been lodged there some time before.

Our enemies were rapidly increasing in numbers, and soon returned, filling the air with horrid yells, brandishing their swords, and cutting all sorts of war capers and antics, a mode of horrifying their enemies, generally adopted by Eastern nations.

During the remainder of the day and the whole of the night a continued fire was kept up on the walls, and well replied to by our men, who were enabled to pick off a number of the enemy by the strong light of the bungalows and lines which they had set fire to. On the 15th, the Shinwarries, the Sungoo Kail, Deh Suruk men, and Pesh Bolakhees, besides a numerous body of Kochees or wandering Ghiljies,

joined the Golahi men, comprising altogether a force of 5,000. They surrounded the fort, and became bold, even to rashness.

To cool their ardour we contrived, with immense labour, to raise the only gun we had, a six-pounder, and getting it into a position on the centre bastion, at the west side of the fort, a few round shot from it caused them to approach with more caution in that position. Our men behaved nobly, poor fellows; obliged to work, day and night, they had no rest; they seemed, however, to consider it good sport, and when any of the enemy were knocked over they crowed amazingly.

At length the miserable intelligence was communicated to us by the Adjutant, that we had but one day's supply of ammmunition in the magazine! Captain Ferris had sent in his indents to Cabul six months before. Comment is unnecessary; he had represented the state of the fort too; but who cares for an outpost?

In this most depressing state of things we tried negotiation, but the villains knew we were in need both of men and powder, and swore they would give terms to none, except the ladies.

Here I must pause to implore my fair countrywomen in India never to place themselves in the situation of these poor ladies at Pesh Bolak.

To attempt a description of the sufferings of Mrs Ferris and her sister would require an abler pen than mine. We, in contemplation of them, felt our very heart strings wrung, and were compelled to seek relief from such torture by resorting to the stern work before us. And we did serve out the "turbaned warriors;" they went down one after another like nine pins, and a round of grape, judiciously pitched into a lump of them, sent a dozen by the shortest route into Paradise.

The Adjutant, Lieutenant Lukin, deserves the credit of that shot, and his Addiscombe education taught him to lay the guns as well as any of our artillery officers could have done it.

We now made a discovery calculated to appal the stoutest heart; we had enemies inside the fort as well as out. Treachery was at work, and the knowledge of the fact threw a dismal gloom over the spirits of officers, already low enough. Captain Ponsonby, on going to his post at night, called for the native officer under him; he was replied to by the snap of a pistol, which fortunately missed fire. Seeming not to

observe the circumstance, Captain Ponsonby ordered the man to mount the wall, which he did.

The following day the native officer reported that one of their number was corresponding with the enemy. They undertook, however, to manage him in their own way—they harangued him, taunted him with perfidy, and succeeded in making him ashamed of himself, and finally made him swear upon the Koran to be true to his salt. His conduct eventually proved his sincerity, for he exerted himself most strenuously against the enemy.

On the morning of the 16th we were informed the enemy were preparing mines. They had previously made an attempt to place dried bullrushes at the gate, in order to burn it, but were compelled to "leave that."

We had sent letters for assistance to Jellalabad, to Tora Baz Khan, the Mohumudan Chief at Lallpoorah, and to Captain Mackeson, at Peshawur; but it was evident none of them had been received. We had, in vain, tried negotiation, and having only twenty-five rounds per man left, we held a council of war. Our deliberations were brief enough; we decided upon cutting our way through the multitude around us—better to die like men, than like rats in a hole.

Meantime we plied the gun, and gave no indication that could lead the enemy to guess our intentions. Our own men, however, had observed the failure of the ammunition, or apprehended something had gone wrong, and several of them threw their bundles over the wall, preparing to desert; five of them led the way, jumped into the ditch and ran off to the enemy, who at once cut them in pieces before the eyes of the garrison, upon whom the lesson was not lost, as no more tried the experiment.

The shades of evening fell upon friend and foe alike, and the tired and war-worn garrison of Pesh Bolak prepared for a still greater trial than any they had yet been put to.

It was decided that not a particle of baggage should be taken, indeed there was no possibility of doing so.

The two ladies were placed on horseback behind two of the native officers, the garrison was disposed so as to render their fire effective in front, to both flanks and to the rear, and the camp followers were securely placed between the main body and the rear guard.

Everything being arranged, the gates were opened, and a few of the rear-guard continuing to fire from the walls to lull suspicion, the word to march was given, and at about half-past six or seven we issued forth. On we moved and silently, until clearing the lines, we were challenged; the answer was a bullet, and in a moment all was a blaze of fire, the balls whistled from every quarter, while above the universal din of fire arms were heard the shrill cries of the Affghans, who charged sword in hand up the column.

Ferris's orderly was cut down, and his horse shot in the mouth. Blows fell hard and fast, and many of our men fell under them, but still we fought the good fight and pressed on.

I know not how the guides managed to lead the way, for there was thick darkness caused by a cloud of dust and smoke, through which the flashing of jezails was alone visible.

The enemy not relishing the unexpected entertainment we carried out for them, began to sheer off, probably attracted by the plunder of the fort; where they were well rewarded for their labour, but it is to be hoped they cut each other's throats while squabbling over the spoil.

We had yet to sustain the fire from the fort that lay in our road, but we passed it unhurt, and had the satisfaction of continuing our march without interruption, until we reached the Pass above Huzar-now, when about forty men attacked the rear guard, but were beaten off.

The Huzar-now people were lying in wait for us on the high road; but as we proceeded by a different route, they were disappointed. At three o'clock on the morning of the 17th, we reached Girdee, where we found Tora Baz Khan, who received us hospitably, and at day light conducted us to Lallpoorah.

A large body of Momunds were assembled here, and indicated by their looks what infinite pleasure it would afford them to pounce upon us, and they even solicited their Chief to hand us over to their tender mercies, or at all events to seize and send the Feringees to Azerz Khan. This latter bit of humane advice originated with Khaled Khan, the Chief of Ghoshtah.

We heard, too, there were 4,000 Kockees on the watch, and Tora Baz Khan frankly declared that Lallpoorah was no place of safety for us. The Kyber was closed too, and the Kybeeries at that moment surrounding Ali Musjid. What was to be done? We possessed nothing

but our arms and the clothes on our backs, and it was necessary, to better ourselves, to quit a land where we had but one friend, and he unable to assist us for any length of time.

In this juncture we offered the Khan the sum of 3,000 rupees on reaching Peshawur, if he would conduct us thither, being aware there was a road through his country leading to Tatterah, which lies East of Kyber.

He consented, and ordered his nephew Hyder Khan to go with us.

The road was stated to be such as a goat might, with tolerable ease to himself, travel over; and on the evening of the 18th, the ladies being provided with doolies, we crossed the river, and marched about six miles.

On the morning of the 19th we commenced an ascent of the utmost difficulty, which occupied us all day, and, during our progress, we had to clamber, with hands and feet, on the sides of the most stupendous precipices.

How our horses managed to get along was matter of astonishment to us all. They threw their shoes, poor creatures, and were dreadfully bruised in the feet and swollen in the legs.

We bivouacked at night in a most villainous looking spot, where the Khan's men entreated, once more, to be allowed to put an end to our troubles, and Hyder Khan had to use threats before he could silence them.

On the morning of the 20th we were told, that the road we had come over was a bowling-green compared to what we had yet to pass, and it was so.

As I feel quite sure that no written account can convey an adequate idea of its nature I shall not attempt to describe it; let it suffice to say, it was all but impossible, and that after a march, which continued from daybreak until nightfall, we bivouacked on the plain of Peshawur and next morning marched a distance of twelve miles into Peshawur.

Most of us were compelled to wear native costume, as Peshawur contained few means of supplying our wants in the way of clothing and equipment; we were, in fact, destitute of everything, even the commonest necessaries. But our escape was a miraculous one, surrounded as we were by a host of enemies.

Our loss in killed and wounded was not so severe as might have

been expected, yet, in proportion to the number of our force, it is considerable.

Cavalry.—Killed: four troopers, two Syces, three horses. Wounded: two troopers, four horses.

Infantry.—Killed: eighteen. Wounded: twenty-four.

A number of the camp followers were cut up, each officer having lost three or four servants.

THE STATE OF OUDE, WHEN SIR WILLIAM NOTT BECAME ENVOY AT THE COURT.

Lucknow, October 29th, 1842.

My dear Sir,

As you must naturally wish to know something of the condition of the Oude Government and country, it has occurred to me to send the enclosed papers to you, as I think that a perusal of them will give you more correct general notions of the state of things than you could otherwise obtain, unless you were to read a great many more of the records of this office, which would be inconvenient to you to do till after two years' arrival here.

I may as well add, however, a few observations as to what has occurred in this state since the last date in the enclosed copies of official correspondence. During the ten months which followed, July 1841, considerable improvements took place in the general management of affairs, but since the accession to the throne of the present king (May last) the condition of several districts has very manifestly become worse, owing to his present Majesty's marked inferiority to his father, both in natural talents and in knowledge of his duties, and again in consequence of the present king having selected as his Prime Minister a man who has had no previous experience in state affairs. You will observe that the last letter now enclosed from the Secretary to Government apprized me that my General Report had been sent to the Court of Directors, and therefore I may as well mention that up to this time no answer has arrived from the Court, hence there is no difference in the duties of the Resident, which duties, although very constant in a variety of petty matters connected with guaranteed families, complaints of our sepoys, training matters, and alarms, all connected with the apprehension and trial of Thugs and Dacoits, have

nothing to do with the interior management of the Oude territories beyond the giving *advice* to the King and his Prime Minister, which is seldom attended to by the present administration, excepting when cases occur in which the British Government has an *immediate* and *direct* interest, such as the settlement of boundary disputes, or the seizure of escaped criminals from our own provinces, or providing supplies for our troops. In all cases of that nature the Oude Durbar co-operates with us more willingly and efficiently than any other native Indian Government that I have ever been connected with.

I shall write to you again before I leave this for Calcutta, and in the meantime I hope that this letter and its enclosures will, *pro tanto*, be acceptable to you.

I beg leave to offer to you my sincere congratulations on the most important services that you have rendered during the last twelve months to our government and army, and indeed I can truly add, to the whole people of India.

I am, my Dear Sir,

Your's, very faithfully,

J. Low.

To Major-General W. Nott, Camp.

(Copy.)

Sir,

I have now the honour to submit, for the information and judgment of the Right Honourable the Governor General of India in council, my opinion as to the present state of the administration of Oude, the degree of progress that is being made by the King towards improving it, and the most proper measures to be adopted on the part of the British Government for its amelioration, in the event of the native ruler proving, after due trial, unable to bring the country to such a state as to satisfy the paramount power. I shall also briefly state those points on which I have chiefly dwelt in my advice to the King, and his ministers, since my return, on February *last*, to his Majesty's court, and I shall enclose, likewise, a memorandum* drawn up by Lieutenant G. E. Hollings, which contains his observations on the general condition of the people in some of the most disorganised districts of this kingdom. *

* This memorandum is not among the General's papers.—J. H. S.

2. I am very sorry to say that I have the painful task of presenting a sad picture of the actual state of Oude, or at least of a large portion of it.

3. The improvement which took place in every branch of the administration of the kingdom, upon his present Majesty's accession, was most striking. The steady habits of business exhibited by his Majesty, his great regularity in the payment of all establishments, both at the capital and in the country—the fact of his having had former personal experience in government affairs, being generally known to the elder Aumils and Talookdars, and then his nomination of Hukeem Mahdee Alee Khan to be prime minister, whose talents and vigorous mind were still better known to all parties, combined to produce a spirit of activity in every department of the state, the beneficial effects of which were felt throughout the whole kingdom.

4. Hukeem Mahdee unfortunately died in the sixth month of this King's reign. He was succeeded, however, by a highly respectable man, Zuhmooddowlah, and the general state of things continued to improve during the time he held office, but he was (to the great injury of the public interests) suddenly carried off by cholera in March 1838, when the office of prime minister was bestowed on Moonowurooddowlah, a man who, in spite of possessing the very rare good quality (in any native Indian state) of unimpeachable personal integrity, proved to be very unfit for the difficult duties of prime minister at this place. From the time that the latter appointment took place, the real power for good or for evil at this Durbar, gradually fell chiefly into the hands of four or five individuals, none of whom had any responsible office, and in consequence of these circumstances, it would appear that bribery and corruption, in all appointments, down to those of sebundy sepoys on three rupees a month, spread over the land the last two years of Moonowmooddowlah's ministry, fully to as great an extent as existed in the time of the late King. Some check to this sad state of things appears to have taken place by the appointment, in July last, of the present prime minister and his deputy, and by the zealous endeavours of Colonel Caulfield to induce them to exert their energies to improve the administration of affairs; but supposing, for the sake of argument, that both of those officers shall really do their utmost for the advancement of the public interest, I fear that at least two years must elapse before the general state of the Oude Government and country can be

in so respectable a condition as they were during the greater part of the first year of the present King's reign.

5. Nevertheless, I think that Colonel Caulfield's zealous endeavours to improve the state of affairs by constant advice or remonstrance to the King and the present ministry, have laid the foundation for considerable improvement, and that some further progress has been made of the same sort since my own return to this Court in February last.

6. To enable the Governor General in council to form a correct judgment as to the difficulties which the King must experience in introducing those extensive reforms in the management of his country, which we should wish to see realised, it is of course essential that the characters of the most influential persons about the Court should be known to his Lordship in council, but I need not say much on those points on this occasion, because I find that my predecessor, Colonel Caulfield, has done so very fully, and because, in my opinion, he has described their characters, generally speaking, and their power respectively for good or for evil, with great accuracy—the only case of that description in which my opinion differs a little from that of Colonel Caulfield is his opinion of the deputy minister, Shurfooddowlah, who is virtually far more the *real prime minister* than the heir apparent. Colonel Caulfield latterly seemed to think that, if fully supported by the Resident, Shurfooddowlah was not only willing, but perfectly capable of effecting all the reforms that could be desired. My opinion of him, especially as to his power of effecting great reforms, is not quite so favourable, for he is in fact at this moment very fully supported, both by the King and the Resident, yet he has hitherto been unable to effect any improvements. This I conceive to be partly owing to his youth, his want of weight in the community, either from high family connexions or public services previous to his elevation to his present office, and partly to a little want of courtesy in his manner towards his countrymen, which exposes him to some serious enmities, and causes a degree of secret counteraction to his measures that might be probably warded off, if he were possessed of more tact, and more extensive knowledge of human nature. Nevertheless, Shurfooddowlah seems to me to be so willing to do his best, and to have such good intentions towards his King and his country, and also to have such good intellect and good natural talents for business, that I should be very sorry to see any other man of Lucknow, that I know, or have heard of, put into his

place. I consider him, even now, better fitted for it than any one here that I know of. I think that he has already proved his qualifications, for his difficult duties, since February last, and it may fairly be presumed that his general knowledge of business, and fitness for the office which he holds, will increase with his further experience in public affairs.

7. Having learnt by letters from Colonel Caulfield, while on my journey from Calcutta, and also from the deputy minister, who met me some stages to the eastward of Lucknow, that there had been but a short time before an open quarrel between the prime minister (viz., the heir apparent to the throne) and Shurfooddowlah—one of the first pieces of earnest advice that I gave to both of them was, that they should never be guilty of such conduct again, saying that the exhibition of a discordant ministry, at the capital, could not fail to be very injurious to the reputation and interests of the government, which they were both bound in honour to uphold and improve to the utmost of their power. I had a favourable opportunity of giving this advice on my arrival, in presence of the King; his Majesty, and the other two, were all expressing their happiness, in oriental style, at seeing me back at Lucknow, and professing their desire to give me satisfaction in every way in their power. I told them that it was in their power to give me great satisfaction in one matter immediately, viz., that they would eschew all petty jealousies of each other, and act cordially together for the benefit of their King and their country, entering into the subject of their late quarrels fully, and pointing out their evil consequences. The King was much pleased at my speaking on this subject; he joined me by giving strict injunctions to both parties to do as I had pointed out, and they both solemnly promised strictly to obey those injunctions in future. I am happy to add that they both ever since, generally speaking, adhered to their promise, which they then made to his Majesty and to myself. The heir apparent has indeed made two trifling attempts to disturb that cordiality of co-operation which has apparently existed ever since between him and his deputy, by suggesting to me the expediency of his appointing a Vukeel to attend me, in order, as he said, "to tell me his real sentiments on different affairs as they arose;" but feeling sure, if such an appointment took place, that it would only tend to intrigues, either to oust Shurfooddowlah, or to produce the same discordant ministry that had occurred before, I warded

it off by saying that I thought the best way I could learn his Highness's real sentiments on all occasions must be "viva voce"—that I had frequent private interviews with him, no one else being present, and that I was willing to hold those private interviews, as often as he pleased—he replied, "that is very true," and said no more on the subject, and during the last three months he has never again adverted to it.

8. The chief points that I have constantly dwelt upon, in my advice to the King and his ministers, were the following—

1st. To prevent, as much as possible, the Amils of the districts from being guilty of "bud cowlee" as it is called, that is to say, from breach of faith towards the landholders in their engagements for the assessment of their lands, to punish severely those who may be found guilty of it, and to encourage those who do exhibit good faith by improving their situations.

2nd. To go on increasing the disciplined portion of the Oude army, and to pay off the disorderly Nujeebs and Sebundees, the moment that the disciplined troops are sufficiently numerous to do the duty of the country.

3rd. To improve and strengthen the police department throughout the country.

4th. To lower the duties on merchandise brought into the country, and to abolish the transit duties altogether.

5th. To construct bridges where they were wanted, and good roads through all the principal parts of the country—and,

Lastly. To use the most strenuous and unremitting exertions to put down professional dacoity throughout the kingdom, and to apprehend or expel from the kingdom several of the Zumeendars, who have for some years been notorious freebooters, such as Gungaram, Saee, and Hurpaul Sing, &c.

9. On all those points some improvements have been introduced, some Aumils have been punished for bud cowlee, and the original agreements with the Zumeendars ordered to be adhered to.

10. The drilling of a new and strong battalion under Captain Barlow is going on satisfactorily, and their arms have been delivered to that officer. New establishments of police have been organized and stationed in three districts, namely, Suffeepore, Pertab-Gunge, and Sidhour, and on several roads where none at all existed last year, and

the King assures me that at the commencement of the new year, viz., near the end of the next month, several other districts are to be furnished with police establishments, and that the whole of the transit duties in the interior of Oude are to be abolished. Two notorious freebooters have also been apprehended without any aid from the British Government, viz, Hurpaul Sing and Ichangeer Buksh, and a third named Guynd was killed in an attack upon him; and I may also here state the fact, that a road has been completed from Seetapore to Shahjehanpore. It is not indeed a metalled road, but it is a broad one, and has three good bridges on it, and, therefore, though not what I could wish to see it, it is still a great improvement from the old one, which was almost useless during the rainy season.

11. I urged advice on the several points above noticed, because there could not be a doubt that good would result if it were attended to, because the King and his ministers could not, and did not, deny either the glaring necessity that existed for improvement in all those particulars, nor did they propose any other mode of effecting the improvements required than those which I suggested, and therefore there could be no doubt that the urging of such advice verbally and earnestly, and at the same time in a perfectly friendly manner, could not fail, if attended to, to produce beneficial effects, more or less; but I may take this opportunity of observing, that anything like *extensive improvement* in Oude, in any branch of the government, *must* of necessity take a long time to effect, from the absolute impossibility of finding many honest men to carry the orders and good intentions of the King into execution.

12. In the above items of advice, it will be observed that I did not include that of extending the Amanee system, though I have tried hard to cause improvement as to the mode of managing those districts which I found to be on that footing on my return to Lucknow; the latter point shall be adverted to more in detail in the sequel of this despatch.

As the Government of India and most of our residents here have often advocated the expediency of extending the Amanee system, perhaps it may, in the first instance, occasion surprise that I have not done so now: I beg to say that I have avoided it on mature deliberation, and with reference to my former experience in Oude, adverting also to the extremely injudicious mode hitherto practised by this Court of managing an Amanee district, and above all with reference also to the impossibility of finding men of sufficient integrity to give the Amanee

system a fair chance of success, upon the very small salaries that have hitherto been allowed to the Amils. The reason given by the King for such small salaries is, that the Amanee Amils are not considered as personally responsible for the amount of revenue realised by them. In short, my past experience has fully convinced me that we have at different times caused mischief by merely urging the adoption of the Amanee system (without knowing how it was to be carried into effect), especially when applied to large provinces, such as Sultanpore and Pertabgurh. The two last-mentioned provinces were formerly farmed by Raja Durshun Sing; they were in 1839 divided into two Amanee districts, but both of the Amils so entirely failed to realize the legitimate amount of revenue, or to maintain order in the country, that they were dismissed, and those provinces were subsequently divided into four separate districts, with an Amanee collector (Amil) in the management of each. No improvement, however, has occurred from that change, and I have no hesitation in declaring it to be a fact that those two provinces were never, during the whole time I have been in Oude, in so disorganized a condition as they are at this moment, and as they have been from the first few months after Durshun Sing's removal from his office (that of farming them) in 1839. This may be relied on as a positive fact; my evidence on the subject comes from a great variety of quarters, all agreeing in the main points. I have it from numerous natives, with whom I conversed in travelling through that part of the country; from Captain Mackenzie and other officers at Sultanpore; from Colonel Roberts and his officers encamped in that district; and it is fully admitted by the King and his ministers. The natives generally expressed themselves to me to this effect, that they would be delighted to get Durshun Sing back again over them, that he was occasionally a "Zalim" (a tyrant) when there was any delay in paying up the revenue; but that now the Amils were as bad as far as their power extended; the Tuhseeldars were as bad, the Mootsuddees were as bad, the troops were *more lawless* than Durshun Sing ever allowed them to be; and all the Tulookdars were Zalims, and did whatever they liked, whereas Durshun Sing allowed no one to be tyrannical but himself, and that the people were far more happy and far less molested under Durshun Sing than they are now under the Amanee system. Such is assuredly, at present, the state of things in the provinces of Sultanpore and Pertabgurh, and I may add the fact, that the revenue,

though all taken from those who really produce it, is nearly ten lacs of rupees in arrears, in two years, whereas it was all paid regularly by Durshun Sing.

14. The King, in speaking to me of his grief at this state of things in Sultanpore and Pertabgurh, told me that he had great doubts at the time of any one being so capable of keeping in order the very turbulent and numerous Rajpoot Zumeendars in that quarter, as Durshun Sing was; but that the system was changed to Amanee by the advice of Colonel Caulfield. This circumstance is stated not with the least intention of expressing either blame to Colonel Caulfield, or surprise at his having advised the removal of a farmer, against whom there were many complaints, and the adoption of a measure which has often been recommended by the Government of India. But I mention it merely to show that by interfering as to the mode of managing particular districts, we may sometimes do mischief, because we have no means either of seeing that honest men shall be appointed to carry through the change of system we recommend, or of at all superintending their conduct, after their nomination to the new offices.

15. I have said that I do not mean to impute blame to Colonel Caulfield for the advice that he gave on the occasion alluded to, and my candour in making this declaration will not be doubted when I state this fact, viz., that I committed the very same error myself in 1834, with respect to the same individual. There were so many complaints against Durshun Sing's alleged tyranny, especially from our sepoys, that I advised the then minister to remove him, and to make the Sultanpore district Amanee. He did so—the district immediately fell into confusion, and I was glad, eighteen months afterwards, to get Durshun Sing reappointed to his farm, and he soon restored it to an infinitely more thriving position than it was under the Amanee system, during the eighteen months alluded to, or than it is at this moment. That Durshun Sing is tyrannical I have no doubt, but he is a man of courage and resolution, and activity of mind and body, and he allowed no one to be a tyrant but himself, whereas now there are twenty or thirty Talookdars and Zumeendars, all tyrants.

16. Having described the state of confusion in Sultanpore and Pertabgurh, under the Amanee system, it is right that I should state a fact of a different sort, viz., that the very large district of Bahraitch, *which is under a farmer*, is at present even in a worse condition

than the other two above named. In this case the wretched confusion that exists seems to me to be caused, not so much from the tyranny of the present farmer, as from his want of sense, and want of courage, though partly also from the want of sufficient troops being allowed him, to coerce the very powerful Rajas in that district. It is chiefly in that large district, and in Khyrabad that Lieutenant Hollings has travelled so much, and to which most of his observations, in the enclosed paper, refer.

17. But to return to my description of the Amanee system. In quiet and small tracks of land, where prompt and vigorous measures are not often required on the part of the Amil, the system, even with its present defects, has often worked pretty well, and the Hoozoor Tuhseel system has succeeded still better; but in *larger* districts, where there happen to be powerful Zumeendars, and a well armed and turbulent population, the farming system has some advantages, provided that the farmer be an intelligent and active man, without even giving him credit for being a *good* man, and as those advantages have not, I believe, been hitherto pointed out to Government, from this Residency, I proceed to state them: one is, that the farmer not being *at all interfered with* by the Durbar, has thus the requisite power in his own hands, to keep the disaffected and turbulent part of the population in order, to the very great benefit of the peaceably inclined inhabitants of his district; another is, that if the farmer have faith in the Government allowing him to retain his farm during the lease that has been granted to him (and if he pays regularly, he may really feel confident on that point with the present King) he knows that it is his *own interest* not to apply the revenue screw too tightly, or to allow others under him to do so. Another advantage is, that in scanty seasons of rain, a wealthy farmer will always make advances to the Zumeendars, to enable them to dig wells, or in other ways irrigate a portion at least of their lands, that they may be enabled to live, and to raise more revenue for the farmer's own benefit, in the following years. Some striking instances of this kind occurred during the famine of 1837, '38. The then farmers in the district of Russoolabad, and Sandee Pallee, on the banks of the Ganges, made large advances to the Zumeendars and Ryots, and secured the continuance of the latter at their homes, and when the Governor General's camp passed up, forage was consequently procured from

Oude, while at Cawnpore, and all the way to Futtehgurh none was procurable in our own territories, and neither could have any been procured from Oude, if the district I have mentioned had been under the Amanee system, since the collectors could not have had any means of making advances, and could have had no *personal* interest in doing so. The native Government would not have made advances, and the consequence must have been that far the greater part of the lands must have remained uncultivated, and the greater part of the population must have emigrated or died.

18. It is true the advantage last described only comes into effect in bad seasons; but there is another advantage, which is of a permanent nature, viz., that it is the *personal interest* of the farmer to prevent the soldiery from destroying the crops and other property of the cultivators as much as he can, and consequently, if he be a man of common sense, he will endeavour to protect the Ryots in that one respect at least; whereas an Amanee Amil, unless he be a particularly good man, is far more indifferent on that point, because he has no personal interests in aiding the Ryots for the following year. He is a mere collector of what revenue he can get, and is not responsible for the amount.

19. I have mentioned the above circumstance not with any intention of praising the farming system generally, but merely to show that, with many defects, it has still something to recommend it, under a native Government, where it is almost impossible to find honest men to conduct the Amanee system, and hence I mean to suggest that we should be cautious in recommending rapid changes from the farming to the Amanee system in Oude, and especially in regard to large districts, filled with armed Rajpoots; and above all, I mean to say, that such changes should not be urged on this Government, if the Sovereign be averse to the experiment, until he shall have somewhat improved the Amanee system, from what it has been heretofore.

20. As I do not find that any of my predecessors have described the mode in which the Amanee system is carried into effect, I think it my duty now to describe the position in which those who carry it into execution are placed.

21. As the Amanee Amil does not give security (which the farmer gives) for the amount of revenue agreed for by the landholders, this Durbar does not think it necessary to give him anything beyond a very

paltry salary; 500 rupees a month is the *utmost* sum hitherto allowed to any of the Amanee Amils, though some of their districts yield a legitimate revenue of seven lacs of rupees per annum. Further, the King (in imitation I am told of Saadut Alee Khan) has thought it expedient to surround each Amil with checks, with the view of preventing embezzlement and extravagance. For this purpose all his subordinates are appointed independently of him. He has neither the power of nominating them to office, nor of dismissing them for misconduct. They are not even appointed by the advice of the same person who recommends the Amil himself. The Amil is appointed by the prime minister; the Tuhseeldars of revenue, stationed in different villages, and the Mootsuddees in the Amil's Cuchery, are appointed at the recommendation of Raja Balkrishen the Minister of Revenue at the capital.

22. The Treasury servants whose business it is to record the amount of revenue paid by the different landholders, are recommended by the chief Treasurer at the capital, Capt. Futteh Alee Khan.

23. The news writers are appointed by Ajoodheea Pershad, a favourite courtier; and the Sebundee sepoys are appointed by Bukshee Tipper Chund.

24. Of all those subordinates *in name* rather than in *reality*, the Mootsuddees are the persons who stand most in the way to prevent that promptitude of action, without which it is absolutely impossible for an Amil to keep the turbulent Rajpoot Talookdars and Zumeendars of Oude in proper order. Those Mootsuddees are considered as Counsellors of the Amil, and the latter cannot undertake the coercion of any refractory landholder, or even an open freebooter without the consent of the Mootsuddees; neither can he repair a fort, or even a single gun without their consent. If those authorities disagree, which they almost always do, when a plan is proposed for any emergency, the case is represented by both parties to the Durbar, each party reporting to their Chief at the capital, and then orders are despatched, after much discussion and delay, to the Amil; but in the mean time whole villages may be and have been attacked and plundered, and an extent of evil committed that cannot be repaired in six months. In short the authority of the Amil is so paralyzed by this system of checks, that where the population happens to be of a turbulent character, I

consider *it to be absolutely impossible that he can succeed;* the Mootsuddees and newswriters being considered by the people, and justly so, to have very great power, are constantly bribed by the landholders, and though the Amil himself is probably bribed also, either by other persons or perhaps by the very same persons too, he is generally so vexed and hampered in his authority that he very soon resigns, or he is dismissed for alleged incapacity or corruption, and the consequence is that the office of Amil is at present held in utter contempt by the Talookdars and Zumeendars of Sultanpoor and Pertabgurh.

25. Adverting to this decided failure of the Amanee system as at present administered, I have during the last four months frequently advised the King to alter it materially by placing the Amils in more respectable positions as to income, and above all to lessen some of those numerous Counsellors attached to his person, whose presence and independent proceedings paralyze his authority and render him incapable either of collecting the revenue or maintaining tranquillity in the country.

26. Now that the King has obtained such decided proof of the inefficiency of his own plans, in that respect he is more willing than usual not only to take advice in good part, which he has always done, but also to act up *to that advice,* which has *not always* been the case in respect to my own Councils or those of Colonel Caulfield. At the time of making any promises to adopt suggestions, I do think that his Majesty honestly intends to adhere to such declarations, but owing to his physical weakness and declining energies, he has often deviated from his original good intentions at the importunity of those favourite courtiers and old servants, who have been so fully described in the despatches of Colonel Caulfield.

27. But his Majesty has now publicly declared his resolution to make some important changes without delay, and I think they cannot fail to be of public advantange; one thing seems to me to be positively certain, that the proposed alterations cannot by any possibility produce worse results than the present Amanee system has done in all those parts of the country where there are turbulent and powerful Rajpoots, who it is notorious will never pay one-half of the revenue that they really ought to pay, unless they be either actually compelled to do so by force of arms, or unless they know that the Government Amil has

the power at any moment of marching a sufficient body of troops against them to coerce and punish them if they should refuse to pay what is due.

28. The chief changes that the King proposes to make, are as follows.

29. The salary is to be raised by a per-centage on the revenue of the district (according to the public assessment of the lands), so as to make the income vary from 700 rupees to 1000 rupees per mensem, for the Amil, according to the value of his district, and he is to have the nomination of his own Mootsuddees and Sebundees, and the news-writers hitherto attached to his person as authorised spies (and ordered never to quit him from morning till night), are to be abolished altogether. The Tuhseeldars, though still to be appointed by the Government, are to be apprised that although they are entitled to make representations direct to the durbar, they must, in the first instance, obey the orders of the Amil; that they are to consider themselves as public servants, under the orders of the Amil, and not in the light of independent counsellors; and that, if they be guilty of misconduct, they shall be dismissed, and others shall be appointed in their places, at the nomination of the Amils. The Treasury servants are to remain as at present, but their business is only to record the amount of the sums actually received into the local treasuries.

30. The troops are to be under the sole orders of the Amils, without any consultation with the Tuhseeldars and Mootsuddees; but in all cases that will admit of delay, the Amil must refer to the Capital before employing the troops against the refractory Zumeendars. On emergent occasions he is to be allowed to employ the troops at once, explaining the cause in his report to the Capital.

31. The King assures me that a change, such as that above described, shall take place in all the Amanee districts, at the commencement of the revenue year, viz., the end of next month, and it has already been done in Khyreegush, where Maloomed Khan, the Amil, has just had his salary increased to 1,000 rupees per mensem. and he has been allowed to appoint his own Mootsuddees and Sebundees.

32. If this plan be steadily followed up, I am confident that a very considerable improvement will be the result. The great risk is that the favourites at the Court, hitherto at the head of various departments, which no longer exist separately from the Amil's office, may succeed in poisoning the King's mind as to the working of the new system, in the

hope of his reverting to the old one. It shall, however, be my business to prevent that mischief by every means in my power, and at present His Majesty is so vexed at the decided failure of his own plans, that he seems quite resolved to give the new one a fair trial.

33. Both Colonel Caulfield and I, having reported that the Huzoor Tuhseel mode of managing lands has been more successful than any other, I will now add a few brief remarks on the subject. The King seems quite sensible of the advantages of that system, and he wishes to extend it; but this is not always practicable, because Zumeendars of sufficient wealth and respectability of character, cannot always be found. The system in question is only applied (and only considered to be applicable) by the Oude Government, to small portions of lands. When a village is made Huzoor Tuhseel, the management is entrusted exclusively to the chief Zumeendar of it, an original occupant of the land. He gives previous security for the amount of revenue agreed for, which is paid by his agent, or sometimes by himself, into the Royal Treasury at Lucknow, and he is not interfered with at all by the Amil of the district in which his lands are situated, whether that district be under a farmer, or an Amanee Amil. In fact, the Huzoor Tuhseel Zumeendar is very much in the situation of a small farmer, but with this great practical advantage for the public interests, that he and his family belong to those particular lands by birth, and domicile, and connections; and those circumstances give him a degree of sympathy with, and regard for the inhabitants of the lands under his management that is never felt by the farmers of *large* districts, who are seldom natives of any part of the country of which they have the charge; and even when they are so, they still have many *other* lands under their charge, in which they have no relatives, and concerning which they feel no personal interest.

34. It will be observed that in the present report on the actual condition of Oude, I have not specified particular instances of rebellion, or acts of plundering the country; I have purposely avoided doing so, not only because such details would have extended this dispatch to too great a length; but because, ever since my return to Lucknow, I have inserted in my weekly Diaries all events of that nature that came to my knowledge, and also because the enclosed paper, drawn up by Lieutenant Hollings, contains ample details of the disorder prevailing, during the last two years and a half, in the two very large districts of Bahraitch

and Khyrabad, and as those districts are notoriously in greater confusion than any parts of Oude, the perusal of the paper in question, in addition to this general report from me, will enable the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council to form a correct notion of the actual state of things in this Government and Kingdom.

35. I think it proper to make a few remarks respecting the enclosed memorandum, drawn up by Lieutenant Hollings. That paper is a very interesting one, from the full description given in it of some parts of Oude (and some tribes of men also) which were not much known, I believe, heretofore to the Government of India. It is also a valuable paper, from the authentic information it contains of the oppressions committed by tyrannical Amils, and turbulent Rajas, Zumeendars, and others; but as some of the expressions used in the latter part of the paper might lead a reader of it to infer that the mass of the people throughout the kingdom of Oude were in a state of wretchedness and discontent, I think it necessary to state my opinion that such an inference would not be a correct one.

36. There can be no doubt that great discontent prevails, and very naturally so, in the districts described by Lieutenant Hollings, and also in Sultanpore and Pertabgurh; but if the King shall succeed, as he hopes to do next month, in nominating more efficient Amils to those districts, I should not be at all surprised if, in the short period of twelve months, the very people who are now so discontented, and who even then may have many just causes of complaint, should, upon the whole, be as much satisfied with their mode of life, owing to their peculiar habits and prejudices, as many of the cultivators of the soil are with their position in our own territories, though in the latter there is a degree of security for life and property which there never has been in Oude, and in my opinion never can be (for a long continuance) either in Oude or in any other native Indian state. The experience of the last sixty years has proved that the inhabitants of Oude greatly prefer their own country to any other, and also that, unless on particular occasions when they have been oppressed to a very great extent, and I may say in a peculiar degree, they have evinced a steady preference to their own irregular government, and to their own rough usages, over other governments and other systems which, according to our notions, ought greatly to be preferred by all classes of subjects. Without enlarging further on this part of my subject, I shall only mention that I concur

entirely as to the accuracy of the information given to me, and in the opinion expressed to me some years ago by Mr G. F. Brown, then collector and magistrate at Juanpore, which I herewith subjoin, in the shape of an extract from one of my own general reports on the condition of this kingdom.

Extract of a Paper on Oude Affairs (dated at Allahabad and Calcutta), sent to Government by Lieutenant-Colonel Low, with his Letter of the 30th of December, 1834.

I beg now to add, that I happened this morning to see Mr Brown, the collector of Juanpore, and that I asked him particularly what he now thought of the general state of things in Oude towards his district in regard to cultivation, and in regard to the condition of the people? His reply was in the following words precisely, viz.:—

By Mr Brown—"I have not seen much of the interior of Oude myself, but have heard a great deal of it from conversing on business and otherwise with the inhabitants of my own district. In regard to cultivation I think that, generally speaking, there is much more of jungle and wooded tracts in Oude than in our territories, but that the cultivated portions of Oude grow very superior crops; that the district of Fyzabad, however, is almost entirely cultivated, and beautifully so—it is indeed a perfect garden; that the original assessments throughout those portions of Oude, of which I have good information, are moderate. The people, however, complain much of subsequent exactions, but they never, that I have heard of, emigrate into our provinces; they like the country in which they were born and bred, notwithstanding the misrule of which they complain. The government may be a bad one, but not entirely unsuited to the genius and habits of the people."

Mr Brown, to prevent any mistakes, wrote the above in pencil this morning.

(A true Extract.)

(Signed) J. Low, Resident.

37. From the tenor of the last four paragraphs of this report, it will be seen that I do not admit the existence of what can be called *general discontent in Oude*, excepting perhaps in the districts of Bairaitch, Khyreegurh, Pertabgurh, and Sultanpore; but there are many other parts of this kingdom in which the people, generally speaking, are, to the best of my belief, well contented with their lot in life. This I conceive to be the case in the four following districts, viz., Fyzabad,

Jugdeespore, Russoolabad, and Suffeepore; also in several smaller tracts of land, both under the farming and the Amanee modes of management, and in almost all the Huzoor Tunseel villages.

38. Lastly, I may mention the city of Lucknow itself, where there is now a very efficient police, where the well-disposed portion of the inhabitants are comfortably situated, and pursue their occupations without molestation: indeed, when I reflect upon the personal appearance of the mass of the people in this city, and its immediate vicinity, of their clothing, their habitations, and their public conduct, I think it may be truly said of them, that they have as many of the comforts, and as few of the vexations, of this world, as any equal number of persons in our own territories.

39. In stating what I have done in the last two paragraphs, my sole object is to show to the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council, what I conceive to be the reality, as to the state of things in different parts of Oude, and not with the least intention to conceal the bad side of the picture—on the contrary, I hereby declare my opinion that at least *one-half* of this fine country is, at present, in a state of *very great disorder and misrule*, and that being the case, I need scarcely say that I think the paramount state ought to do everything that is justly and legitimately in its power to improve the Government of Oude, and ameliorate the condition of its inhabitants. This leads me to the concluding part of my report, viz., to point out (as directed by my instructions) my own views as to the most proper measures to be adopted by the Government of India, towards this state.

40. In the first place I beg to observe that I am decidedly averse to one measure, which has at different times been recommended from this Residency, viz., the appointment of a Prime Minister, to be under the direct control of the Resident, and responsible to the British Government only for his conduct. That system was tried here fully with Hyder Beg Khan, as the minister, who entered into a written engagement not to depart "a hair's breadth" from the wishes of the British Government; but it proved a complete failure. It was tried also at Hyderabad for a long course of years with Rajah Chundoolol as the minister of our choice, and failed to produce any good effects on the comfort or happiness of the people. It was tried again at Jeypoor with Rawul Bairee Laul, and failed completely, though the minister was a man of a highly respectable character, and he was guided first by Captain (afterwards Lieu-

tenant-Colonel) Stewart, and next by Lieutenant-Colonel (now Major-General) Raper; both of whom were not only men of excellent general talents, but were remarkable for the patience and conciliatory conduct which they exhibited in their proceedings at Jeypore, yet the experiment was a total failure, nevertheless, from the same causes (apparently) that produced a similar failure here, viz., the bitter jealousies and persevering secret counteraction of all the influential persons about the Court; and in my opinion a measure of that kind would always fail, because it would always give birth to the same causes for failure, excepting perhaps when the natural Sovereign of the country *is a minor*. In that particular case, such a measure might prove successful. It certainly did succeed admirably in Mysore, with Poorneah as our minister; but on the other hand the same measure failed at Jeypore, as above mentioned, notwithstanding that the Rajah was an infant; and at all events, though such an experiment might be tried, when the natural Sovereign of a country is under age, I think it ought never to be attempted again with an adult Sovereign. If ever such anarchy should prevail in Oude, as would justify our degrading the character of the native ruler so much in the eyes of his subjects, as to appoint a minister against his will; it would surely be far better to go a step further at once, and thus ensure the success of our interference as regards the comfort of the people, since it is on their account only that our interposition is justifiable at all.

41. Another experiment was tried here for a short time by the late Colonel Baillie. It was that of recommending individuals for the situation of Amils in the interior of the country. It failed immediately, though some of the men, whom he recommended, had previously been very efficient public officers in our own provinces. All the general reasoning against our nominating a minister, apply with equal force to the nomination of Amils. Indeed I consider the latter sort of appointments on our part to be even worse than our selection of a Prime Minister, because a native court is always more jealous of interference, which appears to come *direct from the Resident*, than when they know that it has been ordered by the *Supreme power*. I have no doubt that Colonel Baillie's recommendation of Amils was made from public motives only, but they had the *appearance of private patronage*, and there is no one thing more required on the part of a Resident here, than that he should never interfere with patronage, even with regard to the meanest appointments, under the native Government. If he did

not let it be clearly seen that he has no *personal* objects to serve, he would lose almost all chance of being able to exercise any useful influence in the great affairs of the State, over either the King or his ministers.

42. But there is an essential difference between the paramount state nominating a person to an office, and our only causing the removal from office of an unfit person; and the latter degree of interference may sometimes be useful, in regard to the important office of Prime Minister. I would never advocate the *nomination* of one by the paramount state, as long as the chief responsibility shall rest with the native ruler for the government of the country: I would not even *insist* upon the dismissal of a minister, deemed by us an incompetent one, *if the native Sovereign expressed a decided opinion in favour of his continuance in office;* but, in the latter case, I would hold such language as the following: I would say, "If things be not managed much better than they are now, in a few months hence, by this minister (if you be so anxious, contrary to our advice, to give him a farther trial), or by some other person in his stead, we shall then take the remedy into our own hands." There is, however, no case of that description at present required to be taken into consideration, and I therefore proceed to advert to the actual position of affairs.

43. Upon the whole I should say, that as there is evidently a sincere desire on the part of the King and his present ministry to improve the administration of the government, it would not be just on our part at this time to apply any more certain remedy for the existing evils than that which is now practised, viz., that the Resident should carefully watch the progress of affairs; that he should show by his frequent inquiries that the Governor General of India takes an anxious interest in the prosperity of Oude; and that he should frequently give earnest advice confidentially and verbally to the King and minister on those points, wherein there can be no doubt that the advice, if attended to, would be productive of good. I say *verbally*, because when written and publicly recorded advice is given *as to general plans of improvement*, involving of course complaints of the general inefficiency of the King's own plans, the credit for any improvements, if they occur at all, is attributed by the people about the Court, and through them to the influential local officers in the country, to the British power, and not to the native government, which excites a feeling of jealousy on the part of

the King. We are liable also to be thwarted by many other persons, by some from a feeling of loyalty to their Sovereign, and by others for the sake of doing mischief. The authority of the native government is greatly injured, and no general good is effected by our remonstrances. Such at least has been the effect heretofore of interference of that nature during the last three reigns, and I have every reason to think that the same effects would be produced by similar causes with the present King; for with all his good qualities, and his willingness to receive advice in good part when addressed confidentially to himself, he is very anxious that all general improvement should appear to emanate from himself alone.

44. Lastly, my opinion is this, that if the present system shall fail to produce such a degree of good government and general tranquillity in Oude, as will stand the test of comparison with those other native states connected with us, which are considered to be in the best condition, we should, after giving the King a fair trial, say twelve or fifteen months, and after giving him a most distinct and *specific* warning of what our intentions really are, take the remedy into our own hands in the following manner.

45. I would fix upon that portion of Oude which happened at the time to be in the greatest state of disorder and misrule (avoiding to take a very large tract of country in the first instance), and I would undertake its management *in all departments* by British officers, allowing the King of Oude to have no concern whatever with that portion of the kingdom, excepting to receive from the Resident the surplus revenue of it, after all the expenses of management were paid on the spot to the British Superintendent of the district. This plan was pursued by Sir Richard Jenkins in several districts of the Nagpore territory, and was attended with eminent success.

46. There is another plan which was adopted by Sir Charles Metcalfe in the Nizam's territories, viz., to have European officers stationed in different parts of the country, to witness the agreements entered into by the Zumeendars with the Amils, and then to take care that the latter should not afterwards depart from the demand originally agreed upon. This also was attended with considerable success in protecting the cultivators from direct exactions of the Amils, but I have always understood that it did not equal the generally beneficial effects of the plan adopted at Nagpore.

47. It may be said, that the Hyderabad plan is not so great an interference with the machinery of the native state, and consequently would not be so offensive to the native ruler;—I confess I do not think that there would be much difference in that respect, since both schemes would be naturally very much against the inclinations of any sovereign prince who had once had the management of the whole of his country in his own hands; and even supposing that one plan should be more unpalatable than the other, I would assuredly adopt that which was most likely to be *thoroughly successful*. The Hyderabad plan would go far to save Zumeendars from the exactions of Amils, but the Nagpore one would not only do that, but would also secure, after a short time, a general state of peace and order in a district among *all* classes of its inhabitants. Those results would be *certain*, and I think it may fairly be presumed that *other* good effects would follow in those parts of the country still left under the native authorities. The Oude Government, and many of the local Amils also, seeing that one district had been taken possession of by us, on account of daring misrule, and that we did not interfere with those parts of Oude that were well-governed, would perceive that it would be their own interest to refrain from grossly oppressing the people, with a view to avoid the loss to themselves, which would follow an extension of our interference to the lands under their charge; and as no motives are so powerful with such men as those of self-interest, it seems to me indisputable that some exertions would be made by many of the native Amils to improve the administration of their districts, and thus various contingent advantages would probably be produced in their parts of this kingdom, consequent to the adoption of the plan I have proposed in addition to the *positively certain benefit* that would be conferred on the inhabitants of the district placed under the management of the British Government. I repeat therefore my opinion, that in the case supposed, the best plan will be to assume, *in all its details*, the *entire management* of the part of the country; one only would not do.

I would recommend, however, that in taking the management of any part of this kingdom into our own hands, we should deviate as little as possible from the old usages and forms of the native state. The general system of the native Government, *in its theory*, is well suited to the genius and habits of the people of Oude; in practice, as every one well knows, it often fails to produce good results, but this is not owing to any serious defect in the system itself, but because so few of the men

in authority will administer it honestly. If an able and upright English gentleman were placed in charge of a district in Oude, he might safely be ordered to adhere almost exclusively to the native system of management, because it would, in that case, be purely administered, and I have not a doubt that, in a short period of time, the measure would be eminently successful.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) J. Low, Resident.

Lucknow Residency, 15th July, 1841.

(True copy.)

J. Low, Resident.

Copy.)

Fort William, 20th September, 1841.

Sir,

I have received and laid before the Governor General, in council, your report of the 15th of July last, on the state of Oude, and in reply I am directed to inform you, that the manner in which you appear to have acted up to the instructions of government, in personally and confidentially advising the King on general and important questions connected with the administration of affairs, meets with the approbation of his Lordship in council.

2. The chief points on which you appear to have advised the King and the ministry are, to prevent breach of faith on the part of the Aumils towards the landholders, to reduce the irregular forces and increase the regular army, to improve the police, to lower the custom duties, to make roads and bridges, and to put down professional dacoitee. You do not appear to have thought necessary to urge any reforms in the administration of justice, and you explain your reasons for refraining to press for the more general introduction of the Aumanee system of revenue management; you add, that the advice which you have given has been generally well received, and for the most part followed with good results, but that time will be required ere much improvement can be looked for.

3. The improvements which his Majesty has promised to introduce at the commencement of the ensuing year in the management of the Aumanee districts, as detailed in paragraphs 28 to 31 of your report, appear to be very valuable, and if fairly and honestly carried out, can hardly fail to produce a good effect on the success of the experiment. You will of course exert your influence to prevent the counteracting

interests to which you allude in the following paragraph, being able to corroborate the present good intentions of the King in this respect.

4. The Governor General in council is happy to perceive that the Huzoor Tuhseel system is attended with success, but presumes that it is confined to districts near the capital, and is not extended to those at a great distance, where it must be liable to produce aggression or collusion between the Huzoor Tuhseel Zemindars, and those who pay their rents into the Mofussil treasuries.

5. On the subject of the disorder prevailing in Oude, and the discontent of the people, which are discussed in paragraphs 34 to 39 of your report, and Lieutenant Hollings' notes, the Governor-General observes it stated that disorder is not everywhere prevalent. Some districts at Fyzabad, Jugdeespore, Russoolabad, and Suffeepore are well managed; in others, as Bariaah, Khyrabad, Purtaubghur, and Sultanpore, the case is very different, and the two first of these districts are the asylum of unsubdued gangs of professional robbers, and in the 39th paragraph of your report you declare your opinion that "at least one-half of Oude is at present in a state of very great disorder and misrule." What increases his Lordship's regret at this state of things in even half of the kingdom is, that matters appear to have been growing worse ever since his Majesty lost the able advisers who were entrusted with the ministry at the beginning of his reign; and that, excepting through the intervention of the British Government in some shape "to improve the government of Oude, and ameliorate the condition of its inhabitants," there can be little prospect of amendment.

6. In the remaining paragraphs of your despatch you have discussed the merits of the different modes which in your opinion this intervention may be exercised. You are averse to having a minister appointed to this office under the influence of the Resident, and have still stronger objection to the exercise of the Resident's authority in the selection of the subordinate officers of government, and you think that this kind of interference should be limited to urging the removal from power of an objectionable minister. You recommend that matters should remain on their present footing for a season, the Resident continuing to give advice on all necessary points of reform in the manner that has been practised by you since your return to Lucknow, and if in the space of twelve or fifteen months this system of admonitory interference in the affairs of the kingdom should fail to produce a satisfactory result, you propose that the British Government should take a portion of the most

disorderly districts of Oude under its direct and exclusive management, accounting only to the King for the surplus revenues; or that the system which was once introduced in the Nizam's territories of deputing British officers to superintend the revenue settlements, and to see that the engagements to the people were not broken by the Nizam's officers, should be adopted in Oude. You would prefer the former of these as more complete, and not more unpalatable to the native government, than the latter, and in case of its adoption you would adhere to the theory of government now in force, trusting to British control for the prevention of those evils which practically attend it.

7. These views, I am directed to inform you, appear moderate and judicious, and have the general concurrence of government. The Governor General in council, with reference to the sincere desire manifested on the part of the King to improve the administration, and to the success which in some respects has attended his endeavours, is willing before he resorts to the extreme measures sanctioned by the Honourable Courts' despatch, dated the 16th July, 1834, to admit the expediency and justice of allowing a farther probationary period to develope the practical effect of that kind of interference by advice in all important measures of the Oude administration which has been introduced, and his Lordship in council will be rejoiced to find it as satisfactory as he could desire. A copy of your despatch, and of these remarks, will be immediately forwarded to the Honourable the Court of Directors, for their consideration and orders.

8. It is not the intention of his Lordship in council to discuss in this place the comparative merits of the Amanee and Ijarek systems of revenue management. Both will be bad if badly administered. The latter is, however, most objectionable in principle, and can be advisable or necessary only where former misrule and oppression have destroyed confidence between the people and their rulers, and led to each defrauding the other on every opportunity.

10. The notes of Lieutenant Hollings are interesting, and reflect credit on that officer's observation.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) T. H. Maddock,

Secretary to the Government of India.

To Lieutenant-Colonel J. Low, Resident at Lucknow.

(True copy.)

J. Low, Resident.

LIEUTENANT HAMMERSLEY AT KHELAT.

Major-General Nott's Letter to the Officiating Adjutant-General at Cabul, respecting his Prohibition of the Entry into Khelat of the Political Agent.

Camp Deh Ghazie, 3rd December, 1840.

SIR,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 872 of the 19th ultimo, enclosing copies of a correspondence between Lieut. Hammersley and myself, and calling upon me to explain the circumstances noted in No. 11.

I must express my regret that Sir Willoughby Cotton should have been troubled with the letters alluded to; I have reperused them, and have only to state my conviction that no person can read them without perceiving my forbearance and my wish to avoid so unnecessary a correspondence, and to prevent any angry feeling, notwithstanding the plain and obvious endeavours of this young officer to goad me into irksome and disagreeable disputes, but as the correspondence which I certainly never supposed would have been a case of reference speaks for itself, I shall not further notice it, and will confine myself to that most extraordinary letter from Lieutenant Hammersley (No. 11 of the 4th of November) on which I shall make no comments but merely state a few facts.

In the first paragraph of No. 11, Lieutenant Hammersley complains of my interfering with him. I know not what he means, and I am certain that I never interfered with him either verbally or in writing or in any other way except in replying to his letters now under review.

On approaching Kelat on the 1st of November, I thought it necessary under a supposition of a serious defence of that fortress by the rebel Chiefs, to introduce a Persian proclamation into the city; the accompanying document. (No. 1) is a correct translation of it and was shown to Lieutenant Hammersley before it was sent. Late in the night of the 2nd of November, several of the head people of Kelat came to my

camp in much fear, and begged to know whether the inhabitants could place reliance upon the promises which I had made in the proclamation above alluded to, saying that the rebel Chief had left the city, and that the inhabitants were ready to open their gates on assurance from me of protection from plunder. They remained in my camp until the march of the detachment on the following morning, when they again expressed their fears and begged for protection from plunder and oppression, and stating their reasons for the fears they had, which I do not think necessary to mention in this letter. I assured them that every care should be taken of them and their property, and to quiet their fears and to restore confidence, I immediately, and on the march, issued the accompanying order, No. 2, which it will be perceived applied to all, and at the moment I certainly did not think of Lieutenant Hammersley, nor had I the most remote idea that he intended to enter the city with the advanced guard under Colonel Stacy. On my arrival before the walls of the city I found that the Staff Officers who ought to have been marking out the camp had disobeyed the above-mentioned order, and instead of performing their duty were amusing themselves in the palace and citadel. The troops were halted and obliged to wait one hour for these gentlemen. I therefore sent to Colonel Stacy and directed him to obey the orders he had received and to order every person out of the city except the guards. It appears that Lieutenant Hammersley was in the city and, as the order mentioned all, he was told by the officer on duty that he was included. While conversing with some of my officers in camp and waiting for the tents being pitched, I was much surprised by Lieutenant Hammersley riding furiously up to me, saying "You have ordered me out of the town, Sir. You have exceeded your authority, and I insist upon having your reasons in writing." I shall make no remark upon these words, but the tone and manner of this officer were such as I could never for a moment allow from any man whatever his rank or station. It was insolent in the extreme, and called for all my patience; it was, moreover, entirely uncalled-for, as I had no previous communication, either written or verbal, with him on the subject, and he had received no provocation whatever from me. If this officer thought himself aggrieved by the accompanying order No. 2, issued on the road in the hurry of march, he, I should think, might have come to my tent, or he could have written to me, but instead of this he grossly insults me

in the presence of my officers, adding to his language already noted above, "you had no right, Sir; but I took care not to obey your order. I left the city of my own accord, or at my own pleasure." All this language was used without my having said a word to him. I was indignant at this gross conduct, and I then certainly told him that he had better hold his tongue and go to his tent. Seeing him rise in his saddle, and about to reply in the same tone and style, I told him not to utter another word or I would place him under restraint, and I most certainly would have done so, for a more unwarrantable, uncalled-for, and insulting attack I never heard of; and to this moment I am utterly at a loss for the motive which could have urged him to commit it. From the moment the army of the Indus assembled at Kurnal I have ever treated him with the most marked and kind consideration.

Even if circumstances did not render it absolutely necessary, still I should have thought myself fully justified in issuing the accompanying order, No. 2. An order to the same effect was issued, on the army taking possession of the town of Qwetta, in 1839, and I believe also at Kandahar; it was much more necessary at Kelat, for reasons which I will not lengthen this letter by noting.

In the fifth paragraph of No. 11, Lieutenant Hammersley declares that the gates of the town were open to all the officers in camp, but closed against him. The orders and letters I now send, will prove that the assertion is totally unfounded; it is for others to judge whether wilfully so or not. I call attention to the language of this paragraph of No. 11, and I ask whether it is such as ought to be tolerated.

In the same letter, this officer states that I "threatened to seize any person who might bring me intelligence." This too, is a totally unfounded assertion, as the correspondence will show.

Lieutenant Hammersley's conduct appears to me to be open to the severest remarks, but as I have no angry feeling to gratify, I sent in no complaint against him, and as I at all times confine myself to self-defence, I refrain from noticing the tone, the style, and the erroneous statements in his letters, and I now leave others to say whether I have acted unwarrantably, harshly, or insultingly, or whether Lieutenant Hammersley is a fit person to fill the situation he now holds. As I always strictly confine myself to my military duties, I make no comment on the scenes I have witnessed, or the facts I have heard injurious to our national character.

I must beg leave to repeat that the whole amounts to this:—On the night of the 2nd of November, the head people of Kelat came to my tent full of fears, and entreated to know whether they could all rely on the promises I had made in the Proclamation. I did all in my power to assure them, but as they still appeared alarmed, I issued the order No. 2, not thinking of Lieutenant Hammersley at the time, or, of any person in particular: the order speaks for itself, and was intended to keep our people from entering the city, until the fears of the inhabitants should subside, and confidence placed in our promises. The moment Colonel Stacy's exertions had accomplished this, for I did not enter the city myself, until he reported that he had made arrrangements for posting the troops, notice was given to all, as will appear by the accompanying documents, that the prohibition had ceased, and that the political and civil authority were vested in Lieutenant Hammersley.

I have already said, that I will refrain from remarking on Lieutenant Hammersley's conduct, but as a sample of the rest, I need only mention, that he joined my camp on the march with a number of horsemen, and was three or four days with my detachment, before he either verbally or in writing informed me of his presence, or why he came; in fact, he never did so until the correspondence now under review occurred, and yet he complains of the treatment he received from me.

I cannot conclude this letter without expressing my regret, that the assertions of this young officer should pass through the different departments, and possibly find their way to the Supreme government, ere I could have an opportunity of proving that they are totally unfounded. Was it not sufficient that a General Officer should have undergone the responsibility and anxiety of the service I have just performed without being subject to the unfounded and absurd complaints of Lieutenant Hammersley?

I remain, &c.,

W. Nott, Major-General.

To Capt. Douglas, Officiating Assistant Adj.-Gen. Cabool.

THE ADVANCE ON KHELAT.

Candahar, 10th January, 1841.

SIR,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 1233 of the 7th December, 1840, regarding the advance of the troops under my command upon Kelat, and calling upon me for explanation of the motives which induced me to undertake that movement.

It is said that the movement was opposed to the plan laid down by Mr Bell, for the operations of our armies against the forces of Nusseer Khan. This is very possible, and I have only to observe, that I never received the least intimation whatever from Mr Bell, of the plan alluded to.

With reference to the latter part of the first paragraph of your letter now acknowledged, I beg to mention that a letter from Mr Bell to Captain Bean, under date the 27th of September, was sent to me. I have not a copy by me, but to the best of my recollection, it merely stated Mr Bell's opinion, that an advance at that period would have driven Nusseer Khan and his forces towards Kutchee, before the Bombay troops could be prepared to meet them, but contained no prohibition or stated any other reason which I can recollect; that I, as well as Captain Bean, considered it in that light, the accompanying copy of a letter from Captain Bean to me under date the 16th of October, and his reply of the following day, will prove. However, before I had the means of moving from Qwetta, Nusseer Khan and his army had marched towards Gundava, and therefore Mr Bell's assigned wish and reason for not advancing ceased to exist. Further, my move, at the time it took place, had all the probability of calling off Nusseer Khan from the province of Kutchee, to the defence of what he considered to be his capital, Kelat, and thus to relieve Mr Bell from the fears expressed in his letter of the 27th of September, to Captain Bean, and I had calculated upon this, and considered myself well prepared to give a good account of the Khan and his army.

When I noted in my letter of the 27th of October that I regretted not being in possession of Mr Bell's views and wishes regarding the principality of Kelat, it had no relation whatever to the recapture of that fortress, on which head I conceived my instructions full and explicit, but was in allusion to the arrangement which would become necessary consequent on its possession in reference to the concurrent authority which it had pleased the Right Honourable the Governor

General to confer upon me, and stated in that feeling of courtesy which I thought due to Mr Bell, and which I feel so much inclined to show him, as all my letters will fully prove.

Having stated the above in reply to the first paragraph of your letter, and being deeply anxious to clear myself in the mind of the Right Honourable the Governor General from all improper proceedings, I have thought it proper and best: First, to forward copies of letters, orders and instructions, which I received from the envoy and minister, and Sir Willoughby Cotton, directing me to recapture Kelat. Second, copies of extracts of letters to Mr Bell and Captain Bean, on the same subject; and although I regret forwarding such voluminous papers, still I think the perusal of them will place the whole subject before his Lordship, and prove my great anxiety to act cordially with the political authorities, and for the honour and benefit of the public service; but I must observe that, in addressing these private letters to Mr Bell, I never thought for a moment they would have become matter of public reference, though I fully admit the right of their being so considered. They were intended to show Mr Bell how anxious I was to attend to his wishes, and enter into his views; but he never replied to any of them, nor did I once hear from him until after Kelat was in my possession, although it will be perceived that my first letter is dated long before I was aware that Mr Bell would have had any control over the affairs of the principality of Kelat, and indeed before he had even landed in Scinde, but I wished to draw forth, and to be in possession of his opinions on the subject, and recollecting how freely he communicated with me the previous year, when I was in command at Qwetta, I was anxious that he should do so again, and that I should have the benefit of his judgment. I was disappointed.

My reasons for moving on Kelat were:—

1st.—Obedience to the orders and instructions I had received, and which are herewith transmitted.

2ndly.—The late period of the season which rendered it necessary to move on the instant, or to defer it for five months.

3rdly.—The absolute necessity of moving immediately, or of breaking up the force under my command and sending the troops back to Kandahar, as there was not a particle of forage to be procured for the cavalry horses, or for the camels and baggage cattle, and if detained in Shawe they must have perished. There was no cover at Qwetta for the European artillery men, the cavalry, or the sepoys, and they could not possibly exist in tents during the months of frost and snow.

4thly.—The state of excitement which was known to exist in the city of Candahar and its neighbourhood, as well as throughout the provinces of Shawl and Pisheen, and the interest with which all were looking to the operations against Kelat, pointed out to my mind the serious disasters likely to follow should the force under my command retire, leaving the rebel Chiefs in possession of the stronghold, the moral effect of which would have been instantaneous from the Bolan to Ghuznee, to Kandahar, and to the banks of the Helmund. Looking, therefore, to my instructions, and being well convinced that the excellent and compact force under my command was fully able to defeat the army of Nusseer Khan should he fall back from Gundava for the protection of what he considered to be his capital, and that however desperate the defence of Kelat, the troops under my command would most certainly have captured it, under these circumstances, I used that discretion and judgment granted to me in my instructions, and marched upon that city.

As a military man, I always confine myself to my military duties, and it would be thought presumptuous in me were I to offer an opinion on the state of this country, and on the feelings of its people; yet I hope I shall be excused venturing one remark, which I consider to be closely connected with the explanation I am called upon to offer; it is this.—Had I not taken possession of Kelat at the very period I did, Nusseer Khan and the rebel Chiefs, on retiring from the Passes, would have thrown themselves and followers into that fortress, from which place they would, for five months, have detached their marauding parties in every direction, plundering and devastating the provinces with impunity, and causing the greatest excitement throughout the country; but, finding that I had, by a rapid march, taken possession of Kelat, and having no other convenient strong post to retire upon, they were under the necessity of dispersing, when, as I expected, all excitement ceased, and the whole country above the Passes became perfectly quiet. This I conceive to have been the result of my having carried into effect the orders I received on the discretion and judgment allowed me, and I looked with confidence for the approval of Government.

Yours,

W. Nott.

T. H. Maddock, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India.

WARRANT TO HOLD COURTS-MARTIAL.

By His Excellency General Sir Jasper Nicolls, K.C.B., Commander-in-Chief of all the Forces in India, &c. &c. &c. To Major-General William Nott, or Officer Commanding the troops in Candahar and its dependencies, Greeting.

By virtue of the power and authority to me in this behalf given, I do hereby authorise you, the said Major-General William Nott, or Officer commanding the troops in Candahar, and its dependencies, to assemble General Courts Martial, both European and Native, for the trial of officers and soldiers, and all other persons under your command, who may be accused of any of the crimes or offences in breach of the Articles of War, and the regulations of the Bengal Government, or having committed Wilful Murder, or any other crime Capital by the Laws of England, or having used violence, or committed any offence against the person or property of any person entitled to British protection; such power to be vested in you, during the employment of the troops under your command beyond the dominions of the Government of Bengal, and until you may join the head-quarters of the General, or other officer commanding in Affghanistan.

And you are hereby required to transmit the proceedings of the said courts martial, through the usual channel, for my approval as soon after they are closed as possible; and you are hereby authorised, in cases of acquittal, to release the prisoner, whenever it shall appear to you expedient so to do; and as regards Native general courts martial, in cases where immediate example may be deemed necessary, you are further empowered to carry the sentences of the said courts martial into execution, or to mitigate, or suspend, or remit the same, except in cases of commissioned officers adjudged to suffer death, or to be cashiered, or dismissed, in which cases you are to refer the proceedings to me.

And I do further empower you, as occasion may require, to nominate

and appoint a fit person for executing the office of Judge Advocate, and to appoint a provost marshal, to use and exercise that office as it is usually practised in the law martial.

And whereas it frequently occurs that followers, stragglers, marauders, banditti, and others, do frequently commit and perpetrate murder, robbery, rape, arson, and other high crimes and misdemeanours, to the great injury of the peaceable inhabitants of the country and villages, and to the serious inconvenience of the army, and whereas nothing so much tends to deter such evil-disposed persons from perpetrating the enormities before mentioned, as prompt example on the spot; I do hereby further direct and empower you to issue your warrant for the immediate punishment of any such offender or offenders, whensoever seized or taken in the act, beyond the territory of the Honourable the East India Company, due care being taken clearly to identify the person or persons of the offender or offenders aforesaid, and full proof of the fact, on summary trial, being to your entire satisfaction first produced.

Given under my hand and seal at Head-quarters, camp Loodianah, this fifth day of February, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and forty-two.

J. NICOLLS,
General and Commander-in-Chief in India.

By His Excellency's command,
JOHN LUARD, Lieut.-Col.,
Military Secretary.

STANDING ORDERS AND REGULATIONS OF THE 43RD REGIMENT NATIVE INFANTRY.

DRAWN UP BY LIEUTENANT-COLONEL WILLIAM NOTT.

OFFICERS.

1st.—The following are to be considered the Standing Orders of the corps, and as such to be strictly attended to:—

2nd.—Every officer commanding or in charge of a company is to keep a book in which he will insert every standing order of the corps. These books are to be considered as belonging to the company, and to be regularly made over and examined.

3rd.—All officers on joining the regiment are expected to take the earliest opportunity of making themselves acquainted with the standing orders; and after having joined *three months*, the plea of ignorance will not be admitted as an excuse for any neglect.

4th.—Every officer on joining is to report himself to the adjutant, who will wait with him upon the commanding officer, and introduce him as opportunities may offer to the rest of the corps; and in case he has never served in any other regiment, he will attend the drill and all parades, and take lessons at his own quarters from one of the serjeants in the manual, platoon, and sword exercises.

5th.—All young officers are to attend every court-martial or court of inquiry that may be assembled during the first year of their joining, in order that they may make themselves acquainted with that very essential part of their duty—the superintending the proceedings of one.

6th.—Every officer is to perfect himself in the rules laid down (by authority) for the drill and exercise of infantry officers coming on or going off parade—are to pay the compliment of the hat to the senior

present—and when prevented attending the parade or other duties, the cause thereof is to be reported in writing to the adjutant, and if from sickness, a certificate from the surgeon will be required.

7th.—All officers are expected to make themselves acquainted with the orders of the day; and any one neglecting so to do will be equally liable to the consequences of being absent from any duty as if he had seen the orders.

8th.—No officer is to sleep out of camp, garrison, or cantonments without leave from the officer commanding.

9th.—All officers are required to have every part of their dress in strict conformity with general orders, as no deviation will be allowed therefrom.

10th.—Officers obtaining leave of absence are to report in writing to the adjutant where they are going, when they set out, and at what place or places letters may find them; and on their return they are to report officially to the adjutant, and to wait upon the officers commanding their station, corps, and company.

11th.—No officer is to take command (or to receive charge) of a company until he has satisfied himself that all public books are regularly brought up, all balances of cash properly accounted for, and that the buff hides and other stores are forthcoming.

12th.—The following is to be the order issued upon such occasions:—Captain A. will make arrangements with Lieut. B. for delivering over the company to him; and afterwards Lieut. B., having reported that he has received the company from Captain A., in conformity with the regulation laid down in the 11th Standing Order—all reports of that company to be made accordingly.

13th.—Officers holding companies are to hear read every morning a present state thereof by their pay havildars; in the evening a report is to be made to them by one of their native commissioned officers, and all other reports by the orderly (or khote) havildar.

14th.—Officers are to be careful in registering all family remittances, as well as in sending the prescribed roll of the payee with each. Even those presenting their own bills are to be furnished with a descriptive roll; and after a period of two months has elapsed beyond the time at which an acknowledgment might have been received, a report of the particulars of each case is to be made to the Adjutant.

15th.—Officers holding companies are to be very careful in inquiring into all complaints made by their men; and should [duty or other un-

avoidable circumstances prevent their promptly attending to any that may be made, they are to cause two or three native commissioned officers to investigate the same, and to report to them the result.

16th.—Officers holding companies are in every respect responsible to the commanding officer for the interior management and general state of them, as also for the immediate and entire compliance with all orders in their respective companies; they will likewise be held answerable for the uniformity of dress and cleanliness of their men at all parades.

17th.—All officers detached, whether European or native, commissioned or non-commissioned, are to make a weekly report to the adjutant, and copies of all detachment orders that may be issued are to be sent in monthly to the adjutant for the commanding officer's information.

18th.—The rule for officers holding companies is to be the person signing the muster-rolls and pay abstracts to receive the allowances of such companies.

19th.—When on service, officers holding companies will make it their particular duty to see that their men take every care of their ammunition in pouch, and that their flints are well fixed. The flat side of each flint must be placed either upwards or downwards, according to its size and shape, so that it may strike against the hammer about one-third from the top, which is to be ascertained by letting the cock gently down, and observing where it first strikes the hammer.*

20th.—Each flint is to be screwed firm, so as to pass clear of the barrel, care being taken that every part of the edge of the flint comes in contact with the hammer, so as to strike out fire from the whole surface. Every man is to provide himself with a stopper, and each to be furnished with wax cloth sufficient to secure the lock of his musket from the effects of damp or wet weather.

21st.—Officers commanding detachments are to be careful never to take up ground for their camp more than is absolutely requisite, according to the strength of their detachments. They are always to be on the alert, to have double sentries, and to lose no time in strengthening any bad position they may have been directed to occupy.

22nd.—They are enjoined to be very particular in having their sentries relieved at furthest every two hours; to have rounds and patrols;

*The introduction of the percussion lock has rendered this and the following clause obsolete.—Ed.

and if in a standing camp, they should constantly change the position of their picquets, guards, and sentinels.

23rd.—They should always march with fixed bayonets, by verbal orders given at the moment, and not by beat of drum or the sound of bugles—care being taken that their men always get under arms one hour before the dawn of day, whether they march or not.

24th.—When in the field, and that provisions are served out to the corps, it will be the especial duty of all officers holding companies to see that their men have the quantity ordered in their knapsacks, and report accordingly. This being at times of the first importance, the corps will generally be paraded for that purpose.

25th.—When an officer delivers over a company, he is to correct the descriptive roll up to that date, and furnish a present state of the company with the books.

26th.—All property belonging to the estates of deceased men remaining unclaimed at the expiration of one year from the date of the casualty is to be remitted to the general treasury.

27th.—Intimation of the decease of all men is to be sent to their families one week after the casualty has taken place; and officers holding companies will be expected to use their best endeavours to find out the heir-at-law as soon as possible.

28th.—Officers holding companies are to have on undress roll-call in their respective streets after sunset, superintended by the native commissioned officers, who are to report any absentee without leave, and the former will be held responsible that all men absent from their lines at night are duly reported.

29th.—Officers having reason to confine any soldier or camp-follower, are invariably to send a crime with the prisoner to the guard, on the back of which is to be written the names of the witnesses intended to be produced.

30th.—All detachments ordered on command are to be carefully inspected by the senior officer on being delivered over, and if under an European officer, the adjutant is to furnish him with a present state of the party.

31st.—Officers detached are to report their arrival at their destination, and time of commencing their return, to the adjutant, forwarding a copy of all orders they may have received; and they are to acknowledge the receipt, as soon as possible, of all public letters or instructions.

32nd.—When officers are detached on command they are to give timely notice of their approach and intended route to the collector, magistrate, or other civil authorities of the district, to enable them to give orders for supplies, boats, &c. as may be requisite; and any deficiency or inattention on the part of the native servants of government should be reported to the collector or magistrate, as well as to the commanding officer.

33rd.—Officers proceeding in charge of treasure or prisoners cannot be too careful, they are to see their sentries posted, and their orders distinctly explained to them. A proportion of their men should be on picquet, and the whole ready to get under arms at the shortest notice; their sentries and one-third of their men should be loaded, and every man should sleep upon his arms.

34th.—Officers are to explain to their men that they are to keep their huts well plastered with mud, both inside and out, with muchans erected over each cooking place. The native officers are to visit the huts of their company every Friday evening, and officers holding companies will be particular in ascertaining at the inspection of arms on Saturdays that this order is strictly attended to.

35th.—Officers holding companies are to explain to their men, that it is no part of the duty of the Bheestees to provide them with water, for cooking or any other purpose—the establishment being merely intended to supply the different guards and picquets, as also the hospital, in camp and cantonments, all men in trenches and on the march, and such men as may require water to drink.

36th.—Whenever a fire takes place in the lines, officers are expected immediately to repair to their respective companies, first to secure the arms and accoutrements from danger, and afterwards to render every assistance in their power by directing the exertions of their men in extinguishing the fire.

37th.—In selecting sepoys for promotion officers are at liberty to go as far down as the tenth on the roll; but to prevent any deserving man being passed over, all those above the sepoy recommended are to be sent to the commanding officer, and the reasons for passing such over are to be inserted opposite their respective names, in the recommending roll.

38th.—Excepting when orders are issued to the contrary, pay is always to be disbursed, so soon as received, in presence of the Euro-

pean and native commissioned officers, who are to sign the acquittance rolls; and it is to be clearly understood that the surgeon's, adjutant's, and quartermaster's establishments are to be as regularly paid as the corps, and acquittance rolls thereof to be lodged in the adjutant's office.

39th.—No man is to be excused parade or exercise, to be sent to drill or put upon additional duty for a period exceeding three days, without the commanding officer's sanction; neither is any person short of a European commissioned officer ever to give the word of command to the battalion.

ADJUTANT.

40th.—The adjutant (or in his absence the officer of the day) is to draw the companies from their streets by signal for the parade to be formed, in sufficient time before the hour appointed, as will allow of leisure to do what is requisite; and should the corps not be formed in time, the adjutant alone is responsible, and not the officer who may chance to be the senior on parade, for until the parade is actually formed no command exists, and the fixing of that time rests entirely with the commanding officer.

41st.—On parade neither is the corps to be reported by the adjutant to every senior officer as they may happen successively to arrive. But when the hour ordered has expired, it is to be presumed some accident has delayed the commanding officer's arrival, when a report is to be made to the senior officer present, who will proceed with the business for which the parade may have been ordered.—This rule is not to prevent the parade being always reported to the second in command.

42nd.—The adjutant is prohibited from receiving any private communications on public business from any officer whatever, and he is to return all letters or notes that may not be written in the usual form of official correspondence. His post on the march is to be in rear of the column, and at exercise he and the other mounted officers are speedily to give the points of formation; whenever he is temporarily absent the officer of the day is to officiate for him.

43rd.—The adjutant will keep his rosters and list of officers reported sick and well at the end of the orderly-book. The roster for commands is to be one of officers (each taking as far as practicable his own com-

pany), and the rule to be first in, first out. The adjutant is to sign all morning reports.

44th.—The orderly books are to be carried round daily to every officer, by a drummer or sepoy ordered for that duty, and are not to be shown to any person out of the corps. Neither are any of the public books or records, without the commanding officer's *written* authority for so doing.

45th.—The adjutant, serjeants, and all instructors of the drill are to be regular in their attendance of the same, and no man is to be dismissed therefrom till he can go through every part of his exercise, without the least caution in Hindostanee.

46th.—The additional instructors of the drill are as seldom as possible to consist of sepoys, and are to be relieved, at furthest, every four months. No native commissioned officer is to have charge of the drill, nor is any instructor to carry either a stick or cane.

47th.—The men are occasionally to practise at the drill the proper mode of going and receiving the rounds and patroles of relieving guards and sentries, the funeral exercise, and every kind of salute with or without arms, and every point of etiquette is to be carefully explained to each individual, so that no man can plead ignorance of the same.

48th.—It is occasionally to be the practice, both at drill and exercise, to manœuvre with the rear rank in front, and care is to be taken that no practice, however trifling the deviation or showy the effect, is to be introduced at drill, that is not sanctioned by his Majesty's regulations for the drill and exercise of infantry.

49th.—The adjutant is to keep up three orderly books, No 1, to contain nothing but regimental orders, No. 2, general orders, and No. 3, all other orders that may be issued; and he is to have a book for his establishment in every respect similar to those kept by officers commanding companies.

50th.—In the adjutant's office there are to be five books, No. 1, a long roll of the regiment, No. 2, a letter book, No. 3, monthly returns at one end, and alphabetical annual long roll of European commissioned and native commissioned officers at the other, No. 4, register of the estates of all commissioned officers at one end, non-commissioned and privates at the other, and, in the centre, a list of all public books and documents in his office, No. 5, to be for target practice reports.

OFFICER OF THE DAY.

51st.—The subaltern officer of the day is to examine and regularly march off all regimental guards. He is to give them the parole and to receive their reports, to inspect the lines and hospital, to be active in putting out all fires and quelling disturbances, to attend all parades, to act as adjutant during that officer's occasional absence, and, when relieved, to send in a written report (at orderly hour) to the commanding officer, agreeably to the form which will be laid down after these orders.

52nd.—The officer coming off duty on Monday morning will transmit to the commanding officer a detailed report of the number of men at drill or on additional duty during the preceding week, specifying the cause for which, and by whom, they were sent, to drill or put upon additional duty, and for what period.

53rd.—A form for the above report will be hereafter laid down, and, in order to enable the adjutant to furnish the officer of the day with the requisite information, no man is to be sent to drill, or put upon additional duty, without a statement of his case being first lodged in the adjutant's office.

SURGEON'S DUTIES.

54th.—The surgeon is to keep two public books; No. 1 to contain copies of each muster roll, with acquittance roll annexed at one end, and, at the other, pay abstracts; No. 2 to have monthly returns of the sick at one end, and, hospital registers at the other, with a list of incurables or skulkers in the centre.

55th.—The surgeon is to present to the commanding officer, every Monday morning, a written report of all the sick, and, on the 1st of every quarter, a return of such officers and men as may have been upon his list for more than three months, stating his opinion as to the probability there may be of their soon being able to return to their duty.—(See Form, No. 7.)

56th.—Officers to be reported, sick and well, by the surgeon. Few things look so bad as an officer being reported sick after he has been warned for duty, and as this generally arises out of a wish not to be put on the sick list, except in cases of a serious nature, the surgeon will be

expected to report every officer sick without delay, even though his illness may be rather slight.

57th.—The surgeon is to furnish every officer going on command with a supply of medicines, and written instructions how to use them, and all medicines belonging to him are to have the names written upon them in English, and such language as the native doctors can read, in order that they may be got at without difficulty, in case of his sickness or occasional absence.

58th.—Certificates are to be granted for the admission and discharge of all men who go in or come out of hospital, and the former are not to be signed, excepting in serious cases, till the surgeon has pronounced each individual a fit object to be received.

59th.—No sick man is ever to remain in the lines; convalescents may, under certificate from the surgeon, care being taken that they are regularly walked out morning and evening by the hospital orderly.

60th.—The non-commissioned officer on the hospital guard will be held responsible that he reports every man who may absent himself from the hospital (excepting during the period requisite for cooking), and neglecting so to do, he will be brought to trial for disobedience of orders. The surgeon will specify to the commanding officer any particular orders he may wish to give to the hospital guard.

61st.—Men who have been in hospital are neither to be sent to drill or put upon fatigue duty until they have recovered their strength, and the drill is only to be resorted to in such cases where the parties have manifestly forgotten their exercise or relaxed in discipline.

62nd.—Previous to a march it will become a practice to call for returns, specifying the names of such men as were on the sick or convalescent lists during the preceding march, from which the adjutant will compile a general one, and send the others to the surgeon, which, it is to be hoped, will operate as a check against skulkers obtaining admission on the sick or convalescent lists upon such occasions.

63rd.—Whilst on the march, returns, specifying the names of all convalescents, or men unable to keep up with their divisions, are to be forwarded by officers holding companies, to the adjutant's office, every Monday morning, and those officers are enjoined constantly to see and to examine such men. The adjutant will cause the whole of them to be paraded every Monday evening, for the surgeon's inspection and report.

QUARTERMASTER.

64th.—The quartermaster will keep copies of all indents and quarterly returns of survey report, receipts and issues of monthly returns of supernumeraries, and of camp equipage, muster rolls, pay abstracts, and disbursements, in three or four books, and he is, in his capacity of quartermaster, also to keep a book into which all courts martial are to be entered.

65th.—The quartermaster will be expected constantly to visit the magazine, to see that his stores are properly packed and preserved, and he is to have the date of issue marked upon each tent and musket, for the information of committees.

66th.—When in the field, it is the quartermaster's particular duty to see that the camp is properly pitched, that the streets are kept clear, and to order his bildars to make roads of communication from the camp to the public road.

57th.—The quartermaster is invariably to be mounted when the corps is at exercise, and assist the adjutant in giving the points of formation.

68th.—The quartermaster and the superintending officer are carefully to preserve due order and decorum at all courts-martial or courts of inquiry, and are to report the absence of any young officer, by inserting the names of those who do attend at the foot of the proceedings, whose duty it will be to attend, in conformity with the 5th standing order, as also any neglect on the part of the adjutant or officer of the day in not attending to see that the evidences are forthcoming.

69th.—All standing orders having reference to the duties of native soldiers, or in respect to guards, sentries, orderlies, rounds, patroles, or escorts, are to be translated into Hindostanee, under the superintendence of the quartermaster. Each pay havildar is to take a copy, and officers holding companies will be responsible that they are read to their respective companies once a month.

DECEASED MEN'S ESTATES.

70th.—Upon the decease of a native commissioned officer, the adjutant will cause an inventory of his effects to be taken in the presence of three native officers, to be laid before the commanding officer, who will either have them delivered to the heir, if present, or

direct them to be disposed of by public sale; the produce to be duly registered by the adjutant, as well as all arrears of pay, ready cash and debts, &c. &c.

71st.—The heirs or person to whom the produce of the effects, &c., may be delivered, will grant a receipt and sign the book, according to regimental regulations, in the presence of two or more witnesses.

72nd.—On the decease of any non-commissioned officer or sepoy, the officer holding the company is to cause an inventory of his effects to be taken before the subadar or jemadar, and will either have them delivered to the heir, if present, or sold by public sale, and the balance thereof, after deducting all just debts, together with the pay and batta, &c., due to the deceased, is to be duly registered, and either paid to the heir-at-law or remitted to the general treasury.

73rd.—When any doubt may arise as to the right of persons claiming the property of the deceased, the testimony of one or more respectable men is to be added to the receipt, and to be considered as sufficient grounds for making payment to the claimants; the debts are to be discharged agreeably to the 49th section of the Articles of War.

74th.—Officers holding companies are to send in to the adjutant's office on the 1st day of every quarter a roll of such men as may require their discharge, stating the reasons they have for so doing; but it is not to be done when the corps is in the field, or going upon service.

75th.—The native commissioned, non-commissioned officers, drummers, and sepoys are strictly forbid lending money to each other on usury. When they may wish to oblige one another with the loan of small sums, it is to be free of interest, and with the sanction of the officer commanding or in charge of the company.

76th.—No fire of any kind is to be lighted in the streets of the lines or in their vicinity; and in front of each bell of arms there are to be placed 50 or 60 large pots or ghurrahs, filled with water, to be supplied by the regimental bheestees, to whom the quartermaster will give orders for their being kept full.

77th.—No cattle of any kind are to be picketed in the lines. The native commissioned officers are to see that the streets are kept clear and free from the accumulation of filth or dirt, and no dhole or tom-tom is to be beat in the lines after eight at night, without permission of the commanding officer.

78th.—The bells of arms are to be constantly visited by the officers of companies, and no soldier is on any account to be allowed to keep his arms or accoutrements in his hut; and the orderly havildars are to see that no pegs or nails are driven into the walls, or that the public buildings are in any way injured or destroyed.

79th.—Patroles from the quarter and rear-guards are to be sent, both by day and night, to see that no large fires are made in the huts, and none whatever in the streets, or after eight at night, and they are to take up and confine any person that may be lurking about the lines.

80th.—When fires occur often, it will become the duty of officers holding companies particularly to ascertain how, when, and where the fire first broke out; and they will confine and bring to trial such men as may appear to be negligent in not taking the usual precautions.

81st.—When it appears difficult, after the most mature investigation, to ascertain how any fire broke out, officers holding companies will employ trustworthy men in patrolling the streets in their undress, both by day and night, and in watching if they can observe any incendiary lurking about the lines.

82nd.—An in-line picquet of one subadar, one jemadar, three havildars, three naicks, and thirty sepoys, without arms, to mount daily, and on the first alarm of fire, they are instantly to rush to the bells of arms nearest to it, and secure the arms and accoutrements, and afterwards lend their best assistance in putting out the fire. Only one-third are to be allowed to cook at one time, and they are to be equally distributed in the bells of arms.

83rd.—It will be the practice of the regiment invariably to assemble a court of inquiry to investigate into the circumstances attending any fire that may take place in the lines, and in order to ascertain if the standing orders on that head have been properly attended to.

84th.—As soon as the daily orders are issued and explained by the adjutant to the serjeant-major, the latter will assemble the ordinary havildars of companies, and make known to them any part of the orders it may be requisite they should be acquainted with, and which they are immediately to report to their subadars, who at evening roll call (or before if necessary) will explain the same to their respective companies;—this alludes chiefly to general duties. Any orders respecting the internal management or detail of companies will of course be explained by officers to their men.

85th.—The roster of commands and other duties of the native commissioned officers is to be kept by the adjutant; that of the non-commissioned officers by the serjeant-major, under instructions from the adjutant.

86th.—The serjeant-major will be allowed a non-commissioned officer to assist him in keeping a correct roster; and of the quota of men each company is to furnish for commands and the other duties, which is to be made known to the orderly havildar.

87th.—Officers are to explain to their subadars that they will be held responsible that in case the tour of commands, &c., be not correctly and strictly observed in their respective companies, they are instantly to report the same.

88th.—The drill-havildar and naick are on no account to be made the channel of communicating any orders to the corps; their sole duty being the superintendence of the drill, under the direction of the adjutant.

89th.—As sepoys are sometimes in the habit of quitting their lines, and going about armed with swords or clubs, officers in command or charge of companies are directed to prohibit such a practice in the strictest manner.

90th.—Officers holding companies will make it their duty to see that the pouch and bayonet belts are of such length as to admit of the men opening the former and drawing the latter with ease and convenience; and care is to be taken that the appearance of the belts is not spoiled by making more holes in them than is absolutely necessary.

GUARDS.

91st.—All guards are to parade with arms shouldered, unfixed bayonets, without any intervals between them; officers and non-commissioned officers forty paces in front of the centre, in two ranks facing the line, where they are to receive the old parole and such orders as may be given to them; after which the officer of the day will give the word of command.

92nd.—Officers and non-commissioned officers outwards face: Take post in front of your respective guards as soon as they have taken post in front of their respective guards; the words of command will be given.

93rd. — Officers and non-commissioned officers to your guards: March, halt, front. The officer on duty will direct the parade to "order arms, fix bayonets, shoulder arms. Officers and non-commissioned officers inspect your guards."

94th.—As soon as the inspection is over, the adjutant will go down the line and receive the reports, when the officer of the day will order the troop to beat. The guards will then march past in review, and after the third wheel, will support arms and march off at quick time towards their respective posts. The adjutant is to teach all young officers how to march off the guards regularly; and such as are junior to him, and who may be on duty upon Sundays, are to take post, when the adjutant will go through all the forms, as on a grand parade.

95th.—Should the commanding officer of the station or corps, or a field officer of any other corps, be on parade, the officer of the day will ask his permission to march off the guards, and falling in with the front division, salute on marching past, falling out at the completion of the third wheel, and ordering guards to their posts.

96th.—On the new guard arriving near the left flank of the old one, it is to halt, carry arms, and march in ordinary time towards it, wheeling up and dressing in line with it, taking open order. The old guard then presents arms, the drums beating a march; the new one does the same; when finished, both officers move towards each other with swords recovered, giving and receiving the report and orders of the guard, dropping at the same time the points of their swords; then returning to the front of their guards.

97th.—The old guard shoulders arms, orders arms, and stands at ease; the new guard does the same. Sentries are now relieved, and on the return of the relief the drummer of the old guard gives the signal; the officer of which orders attention, shoulders arms, wheels back on the left, and marches off in quick time to the parade, where he directs unfix bayonets, recover arms, ease springs, right face, lodge arms.

98th.—The officer of the new guard (the moment the old one has shouldered, previous to its marching off) presents arms, drummer beating a march, which ended, he shoulders arms, takes close order, faces to the right, and occupies the ground the old guard has quitted; recovers arms, lodges or grounds arms according to the hour.

99th—Not more than one-third of any guard should be allowed leave to be absent (either for the purpose of cooking or otherwise) at one

time, and any commissioned or non-commissioned officer, or private, being absent from his guard without leave, will be subject to trial by court-martial.

100th.—The regimental guards are, to a lieutenant-colonel or major commanding it, to turn out and present arms once a day, and, at other times, to stand by their arms; and to a captain or junior officer commanding the regiment, the guards are to turn out once a day with shouldered arms, and at other times to stand by them.

101st.—When officers entitled to a salute pass guards in the act of relieving, both are to salute, receiving the word of command from the senior officer, and when officers entitled to a salute pass in rear of a guard, it is to stand at shouldered arms, and not to face about or beat a drum.

102nd.—Every commissioned or non-commissioned officer on guard must be careful to explain all orders to the sentinels, particularly to young soldiers. All guards are to turn out at retreat beating and the reveillee, when their arms, flints, and ammunition should be examined, and they may be exercised in the manual and platoon.

103rd.—All native commissioned and non-commissioned officers will be held responsible for the conduct and discipline of guards and detachments entrusted to their charge, and are invariably to be brought to trial for any neglect of a serious nature, and to be reprimanded or otherwise punished for cases of a more trifling description.

SENTRIES.

104th.—In relieving sentinels, if the relief consists of less than four men, it is to be formed in a rank entire, the havildar or naick on the right dressed with the front, taking care that his men march silently and regularly, and that the rear ranks (when there are more than four men) look well up.

105th.—On approaching the sentinel to be relieved, the relief is to be halted at the distance of ten or twelve paces from the post, and remain with their arms carried; the non-commissioned officer then advances with the man going on the post, who with ported arms will approach the sentinel to be relieved, and from him, in the hearing only of the naick or havildar, receive the order of the post; the relieved sentry then takes his place in the relief, which proceeds in its rounds.

106th.—Every sentry is to walk briskly backwards and forwards on

his post not exceeding the distance of ten or twelve yards on each side of it. He is never to quit his arms, sit down, lounge, or loiter, neither is he to converse, eat, drink, or do anything but his duty during the time he is posted as sentry.

107th.—All sentinels are to pay the usual compliments of carried arms by day to any person they know to be an officer, and if a field officer they are to present arms; when paying the compliment they are to stand firm and to front the point especially recommended to their notice.

108th.—After retreat beating, they are to stand steady facing to their proper front with their arms carried whenever an officer approaches their post, and to remain so until he has passed, and this is not to be discontinued till the evening is so far advanced that they begin to challenge.

109th.—Which is to be after tattoo beating, from which period till daybreak they are to face any persons approaching their posts, standing firm in a state of preparation with ported arms, till they have ascertained who is advancing towards them.

110th.—Sentinels are to keep their posts clear, and not to allow any rioting near them, to suffer no man to touch their arms, and when they challenge at night to do so brisk and loud, at the distance of fifteen or twenty yards, carefully avoiding the Hindostanee and unmilitary practice of challenging or firing entirely because another sentry does so.

111th.—They are to stand upon their guard ready to defend themselves in case they should be attacked, to do their duty implicitly, and to be very particular in regard to prisoners' treasure, or anything else entrusted to their charge.

112th.—A sentry is never to be relieved but by an officer, commissioned or non-commisioned, or one acting as such, and any native officer whose duty it may be to superintend such relief who shall knowingly connive at such conduct will be brought to a court-martial.

113th.—No sentinel is ever to be forced or struck; in case he does wrong he must be relieved, and then may be reprimanded or confined; neither is any sentry to be made to stand more than two hours at one time, whether as a punishment or otherwise, nor are they on any pretence whatsoever to quit their arms or their posts; if taken ill, they must call the guard and be instantly relieved.

114th.—As the commanding officer can never overlook the least

neglect that may, in these respects, come to his knowledge. All officers are enjoined to be very particular in seeing that the different guards and sentries perform their duty properly, and whether on duty or not, it is expected they will take proper notice of the least neglect.

REVIEW OF ARMS.

115th.—The following is to be the mode of examining arms: the company at open order and shouldered, open pans, slope arms, carry arms, shut pans, order arms, examine arms, return ramrods, shoulder arms; an inspection of the appointments, clothing, &c., is now to be made, the rear rank then resumes close order, arms are ordered, and the company stands at ease.

116th.—When the adjutant goes down the line to receive reports, as he approaches each company the officer will give the word "Attention," and on delivering report drop his sword, and when the adjutant passes on to the next company, the officer will order his men [redacted] at ease.

BOOKS.

117th.—The books of companies, establishments, and staff, are to be laid before the commanding officer for examination on the 1st days of May, August, November and February, and generally speaking, all quarterly returns that may be called for in the regiment are to be made on those days.

118th.—One week previous to the quarterly inspection of books, officers holding companies are to send them to the adjutant, that he may enter the estates of deceased men into the regimental register. At the same time he will furnish those officers with the requisite information to enable them to complete their descriptive rolls up to the latest period.

REPORTS.

119th.—Unless the occurrence of anything particular renders it necessary personally to deliver their report, officers are permitted to send the same under a sealed cover to the commanding officer.

120th.—Regimental guards are to report their relief to the adjutant and native commissioned, non-commissioned officers commanding guards (with the exception of the bazaar guard) are instructed not to report to the commanding officer.

DETACHMENT.

121st.—Previous to any detachment going on command in charge of a native commissioned or non-commissioned officer, the adjutant will explain the following orders; first, on no account to press the villagers on their route for any purpose whatever, or in any way to maltreat them.

122nd.—Secondly, they are on no account to demand food, earthen pots, or straw, &c., without paying for the same, as well as for every other article of supply furnished them.

PARADES.

123rd.—When the regiment is paraded for exercise the divisions are to be numbered 1, 2, 3, and so on from right to left without reference to the number of the company; when there is occasion to mention any division on parade, the number as it stands in line and not the number of the company the men may belong to is to be made use of; grand divisions also are to be invariably numbered 1, 2, 3, and so on from right to left, and in all firings to be so denominated.

124th.—Before the divisions leave their streets they are to be numbered, and the native commissioned and non-commissioned officers to be made acquainted with the numbers; officers are to ascertain that they and particularly their pivot men are acquainted with the number of their company.

125th.—The regiment invariably to be told off in ten divisions when the number of men will admit of there not being less than twenty files each.

PAY HAVILDARS.

126th.—The pay havildars are to supply themselves with small books for the insertion of the standing orders and such of the articles of war as will be hereafter pointed out to them—and these are to be read to each company at evening roll-call on the first Sunday of every month.

127th.—The books of pay havildars are to be made to correspond as much as possible with those of their officers, and no accounts are to be kept by them on loose pieces of paper relative to their companies.

128th.—The duties of the khote are to be taken by havildars only, who are to be relieved weekly—and are to be called orderly, or khote havildars—the drill havildar is to be confined to his proper duties, and never to be erroneously called havildar major.

129th.—Pay havildars are to be restricted to a performance of their proper duties, and are to take their share of all regimental duties. No sepoy is ever to act or to be appointed to that situation.

130th.—With a view to distribute as much as possible the rewards due to merit, as well as to prevent any non-commissioned officer receiving greater pay than a jemadar, the situations of colour and pay havildar will never, except in cases of very extraordinary merit, be given to the same person.

131st.—And with a view to prevent any deviation from the foregoing rule, as well as to preclude the possibility of any pay havildar being displaced without a cause, the names of those non-commissioned officers will hereafter be always published in regimental orders. This is not to invalidate the right of patronage held by officers holding companies, excepting in the instances above noticed, when the commanding officer will exercise his controlling authority.

BOOKS.

132nd.—In future there is only to be one book for each company—to contain a descriptive roll, muster roll (with acquittance roll annexed) at one end—pay abstracts and abstracts of muster rolls at the other, with family remittances, estates of deceased men, target practice reports, and copies of paymasters' statements in the centre—care being taken that a sufficient space is left between each deficient document, according to the size of the book.

133rd.—These books are to be composed of Europe paper, bound, and as near the size of foolscap as possible—they are to be considered as public property, and as such are never either to be taken away or destroyed.

134th.—Descriptive rolls are invariably to have the men's age inserted from the date of enlistment, and their precise caste, and not under the general terms of Hindoo or Mussulman; and there is to be a column showing when and from whence received.

135th.—No man's name is to be erased or scratched out, but merely a remark made opposite, showing how and when the casualty occurred—

the dates of promotion to the different ranks to be stated as far as can be ascertained.

136th.—Upon every occasion of making out a new descriptive roll, the old one is previously to be carefully examined and all errors corrected; and every young soldier is to be measured afresh, in case they should have grown since the last one was made.

137th.—All public letters and papers are to be regularly backed and numbered—those in the adjutant's office are to be bound up into bundles every quarter—those in the quartermaster's department, half-yearly—and in the surgeon's annually, and the two former officers are to keep a public day book to refer to in case of letters being lost.

ORDERLY HOUR.

138th.—Orderly hour is to be ten o'clock, and all officers and soldiers wishing for an interview with the commanding officer will generally conform thereto, and all reports or papers for inspection or signature are then to be delivered or sent in.

139th.—Letters from soldiers requiring to be franked are to be sent in on Monday, and the writer's name to be written in English on the back of each; and they are to be left open for inspection if deemed requisite, as instances have occurred where this indulgence has been greatly abused.

140th.—Native commissioned officers are to provide themselves with small tents, to be pitched half-yearly, for the commanding officer's inspection; and officers holding companies are to be careful in seeing that their native officers do not on any occasion reside in the sepoys' tents.

SERJEANTS.

141st.—Placed as the European serjeants are in the midst of a corps of natives the most exemplary conduct will at all times be expected from them, as well for the reputation of the corps as in support of the character of British soldiers—and the plea of their being employed writing for any officer will never be admitted as an excuse for neglecting their duty.

142nd.—The serjeant-major is enjoined to keep up his authority among the men—who are never to report or address him on duty without paying the proper compliment; he is to inspect all parties and

ordeflies previous to their marching off parade, and must at all times be in or near the lines ready to receive any orders from the adjutant or officer on duty, to whom he is expected to report without the least delay all irregularities that may come under his notice.

143rd. The drum-major is to be very attentive to the dress and behaviour of the drummers and fifers; to be answerable that they are at all times clean, and that their drums, fifes, and other appointments, are constantly in proper condition. He is frequently to take them out to practise, and is not to pass over any irregularity or improper conduct, but must instantly report the same to the adjutant.

144th. Whenever a survey takes place on any of the arms or accoutrements, a memorandum of such as may be condemned is to be entered by the pay havildars into their books.

145th. For any trifling offence the men are to be reprimanded, sent to drill, or put upon additional duty, but on no account are they to be beat with a ratan or cat.

146th. The light company will not only be kept complete, but five men per company are to be drilled to the light infantry exercise, in order to augment or complete that company at any time, and there are generally to be two European officers attached to the company.

147th. The camp colour-men are to act as armourers to their respective companies, taking care to have all spare arms and accoutrements in good order and ready for inspection every Saturday; they are to fall in at exercise, as the regimental classies are to place the flags for passing in review, and all other points of formation are to be given by mounted officers.

148th. The men's parade shoes are to be made after a pattern which will be hereafter lodged in the adjutant's office.

149th. During the months of November, December, and January, there will be exercise once a week by companies, and in the last month each company will be inspected under its own officer; there will also be a parade every Saturday for the inspection of arms.

150th. The commanding officer expects all officers detached to conform strictly to these rules regarding exercise as far as the nature of the duties on which they are employed may render it practicable; and to ensure the same, all detachments, on re-joining, will be inspected by the commanding officer, and due notice taken of any neglect on this head in public orders.

151st. All non-commissioned officers and privates who exceed their leave are to be reported to the adjutant, on the day it expires, as absent without leave, and at the expiration of two months from that date they are to be struck off and returned as deserters.

152nd. No excuse will be admitted of or from any man for exceeding his leave even for a single day, unless from sickness, duly certified by some medical, military, civil, or commercial officer.

153rd. A list of such as act in defiance of the foregoing order is to be kept by the adjutant, and they will be held to have forfeited all claim to a similar indulgence in future, besides being subject to such other punishment as the nature of the case may seem to require.

154th. The native commissioned, non-commissioned, and privates, are at all times to pay the greatest respect to officers, whether of their own or any other corps, or whether dressed in uniforms or otherwise, knowing them to be officers. The following rules are to be observed on this head, and to be constantly practised at drill:—

155th. All native commissioned, non-commissioned officers, drummers, and privates, without arms, in passing or meeting an officer, are to continue to move on, and to raise their right hand to their turban, with the elbow square to the shoulder; and they are to look at the officer with that degree of confidence and respect which becomes a soldier.

156th. Private soldiers passing with arms are to carry their firelocks well shouldered, march past with life, and look the officer full in the face. Havildars are to carry their pikes, and naicks, or lance naicks, their arms advanced.

157th. A non-commissioned officer, or soldier, with arms, coming to speak to an officer, is to march up boldly and deliver his message or report with recovered arms, without fear or diffidence, and whilst speaking stand perfectly erect and steady.

158th. In speaking to an officer without arms they are first to salute him with the right hand, as described in passing officers, and then to remain in a soldierlike position, with the hands placed along the outside of the thighs.

159th. The native commissioned and non-commissioned officers are to be active, diligent, and attentive, to every part of their dress and appearance, and perfectly acquainted with every part of their duty.

160th. It behoves them to keep a watchful eye over the behaviour

of each individual, and to make themselves acquainted with the temper, conduct, and character of every man under their command, reporting at once any irregularities they may observe.

161st. They are to treat the men with mildness and good humour, but are to insist upon every form being punctually attended to. They are to enforce all orders, and to see that every soldier does his duty, taking care not to lower themselves, or lessen their authority, by too much familiarity with the sepoys.

COMPLAINTS.

162nd. It is to be distinctly made known to every soldier that they are not at liberty to complain to the general, brigadier, or officer commanding the post or detachment until such time as they have first in vain sought redress from the officer commanding their company and corps.

163rd. Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers having well-founded complaints against the sepoys, are to prefer the same through the regular channel of redress, and never to take upon themselves to confine them.

164th. Neither are they ever so far to forget themselves as to strike or abuse any man whatsoever. Should any man think himself aggrieved (taking care that he has just ground for complaint) he is to represent it in the usual manner to the officer of his company, who will either settle the matter, forward it himself, or allow the complainant (with the orderly havildar) to wait upon the commanding officer, who will never fail to do his utmost to procure the man redress.

165th. But should any number of men in the corps at any time have reason to complain, they are by no means to assemble in a tumultuous manner, hold private conferences, murmur, or express any general terms of discontent. One or two may, in a becoming manner, lay their complaints before the commanding officer, who will at all times readily listen to them, and have a satisfaction in rendering them justice to the extent of his power.

166th. And upon any such occasion of disorderly conduct (as above recited) reaching the knowledge of commissioned or non-commissioned officers, whether European or native, who do not instantly report the same, he or they shall be held liable to punishment as principals.

ROUNDS.

167th. The following rules are to be observed in challenging, going and receiving the rounds, on any round:—Approaching a sentry, he is to call out "Who comes there?" Answer—"Rounds." The sentry is then to reply, "Stand, rounds; advance one with the parole." On receiving the countersign the sentry is to say, "Pass, rounds," and to present his arms to the escort as they pass him.

168th. On rounds approaching a guard, the sentry on duty there challenges; on being answered "Rounds," he is to say "Stand rounds—turn out the guard to rounds." The guard immediately getting under arms, the officer commanding detaches a havildar and two files of men to meet the rounds. The havildar, after marching his party about twenty or thirty yards from the guard, halts and calls out "Who comes there?" On being answered "Rounds," he replies, "What rounds?" On being answered "Grand rounds," or "Visiting rounds," he is to reply, "Stand, grand rounds," or "Stand, visiting rounds—advance one with the parole." The havildar of the escort then advancing alone gives the parole to the havildar of the guard, who, on receiving it, orders the other to return to his escort, and leaving his party goes back to the guard and informs the officer of the countersign he received, who finding it right gives the word "advance" grand (or visiting) rounds; the havildar in the meantime having rejoined his detachment orders the men to form a lane, and on the approach of the officer he makes his party present arms. The officer passes on to the front of the guard, but the escort is kept back.

169th.—The officer of the guard, on the approach of the officer of the rounds, makes his men present arms, and recovering his sword meets the officer of the rounds, to whom, if grand rounds, he gives the parole, or from whom, if visiting rounds, he receives the parole. The escort is then suffered to advance. The guard shoulders, recovers, and lodges arms.

170th.—No round is to advance after a sentry has challenged and ordered them to stand; a sentry when he challenges is to port his arms. If any round meets the grand round, it must give them the parole; when other rounds meet, that which challenges first receives it from the other.

171st.—Should the rounds on being challenged by a sentry answer

at once "Grand rounds" or "Visiting rounds," he is to reply after having received the correct countersign, "Pass, grand rounds," or "Pass, visiting rounds." In this case also the havildar of the guard has no occasion to call "What rounds?"

172nd.—When marching no signals either by the drum or bugle are ever to be made between the general and assembly. So soon as the general beats the men are to dress, then strike and load their tents, when the native commissioned officers will proceed to form their companies according to the order of march which may have been directed.

173rd.—At the assembly the covering havildars will (under the superintendence of the sergeant-major) take up the distance from that flank by which the corps is to march for their sections or divisions, and the adjutant, or in his absence the officer of the day, will forthwith, by word of command, march the companies upon the points thus taken.

174th.—After each march on arriving at the ground the roll is to be called, and no company is to be dismissed until it is ascertained whether or not all are present; every man absent is to be instantly reported as such. All fires are to be put out at an early hour, and the utmost silence is to be enforced during the night by patrols from the quarter and rear-guards.

175th.—The proper order and formation is at all times to be preserved on the march, the same as on a drill parade, for which the commissioned and non-commissioned officers will be held responsible. No officer is to ride (or any baggage admitted) between the divisions.

176th.—On arriving at a rivulet or fordable nullah the corps is to be halted by word of command, and shoes taken off, and on the word "Forward" the whole are to advance as regularly as if no obstacle existed; when passed it is to be again halted, shoes put on, and the word "March" given.

177th.—In like manner, in going through a pass or defile, the front of a column may be decreased; but it is always to be done regularly, and by word of command, and when cleared the former order of "March" is to be instantly resumed.

178th.—Should the divisions have opened out, or the corps have lost ground from the preceding one, they may be ordered to step out, or close to the front, at the double march.

179th.—No man is to quit his file or division without leave, and when obtained they are invariably to be sent on the reverse flank to the

front, and are to rejoin their divisions as it passes them, as all falling in the rear is most peremptorily forbidden.

180th.—Such as are from weakness or severe indisposition unable to keep up with the corps, after being pronounced so by the surgeon, are to be entrusted to the care of a non-commissioned officer, who will put them into dhoolies or any other conveyance that may offer, or he will march them slowly but regularly to the next ground.

181st.—All officers on meeting or passing the officer commanding their company, corps, station, detachment, or division, are invariably to recognize him as such, by paying the compliment of the hat, and any one intentionally neglecting so to do will be liable to the penalties attached to a disobedience of orders, and a wilful disrespect to his immediate commanding officer.

182nd.—The following extract from General Orders, under date the 26th August, 1791, is here published for the guidance of officers:—"When officers are constrained to appeal on points of real importance from the decision of their commanding officer, it is their duty to state facts only in temperate language with decorum and propriety, without making any comments on the arrangements or orders of their superiors, and to abstain from any strictures whatever, as all attempts to prompt or prepossess the judgment of the officer who is to decide must ever be discouraged."

183rd.—That every officer may acquire a competent knowledge of the duty of making out the several papers required for a company, no young officer who has never before held a company shall receive one unless he promises to write for the same for a period of six months, at the expiration of which period it is to be hoped he will see so many advantages arising out of such a practice as to induce him voluntarily to continue it.

184th.—Whenever the quartermaster shall be nominated to act in any other staff situation, he must either signify to the commanding officer his willingness still to be answerable for a due performance of all the duties attendant on his regimental appointment, or another officer shall be ordered to act as quartermaster.

185th.—All stores of every description that may be received from a magazine by any officer belonging to, or actually doing duty with, the corps are to be brought upon the quartermaster's book without loss of time, and are by him to be properly accounted for to the military board in his quarterly returns.

185th.—Neither the quartermaster or any other officer is to consider himself at liberty to make over any of the public stores without obtaining a receipt for the same; and when practicable, a survey is to be held previous to the delivery of any stores.

187th.—It will be the duty of the quartermaster, on the death of any officer who may be detached, to ascertain as soon as possible, and without the least delay, that all public stores borne upon his books with that detachment are forthcoming and in good order, or properly accounted for.

188th.—Whenever it is practicable, the quartermaster is to make out the indents for stores, and not the officers who may command companies or detachments: and whenever the exigency of the service is such as to require the latter to do it, they are instantly to report the same to regimental head-quarters; and with a view to prevent confusion, and to obviate mistakes, the receipts of such officers are, generally speaking, to be redeemed by a regular indent, made out by the quartermaster, countersigned by the commanding officer.

189th.—In order to enable the commanding officer to satisfy himself by occasional personal inquiries that the duties in the quartermaster's department are properly conducted, that officer will wait upon him every Monday in cantonments, and every day whilst in camp.

190th.—During heavy rain, the officer of the day will cause the regimental guards to march direct from parade to their respective posts without passing them in review, or going through the usual forms of guard mounting. But whenever this is done, it is to be entered in his report.

191st.—All circumstances of an extraordinary nature that may occur are instantly to be reported by the orderly havildars to the serjeant-major and native officer of the day, and by the former are to be made known to the adjutant, and by the latter to the subaltern officer on duty.

192nd.—All fees for making out leave of absence chits are most positively forbid; and any man taking such shall be subject to the penalty of disobedience of orders; and the person paying the fee, either directly or indirectly, shall be considered as having forfeited every claim to leave of absence in future.

193rd.—Nothing more than what is absolutely requisite to pay the jarriwallahs and regimental sweepers actually present is ever to be

deducted from the men, and it is to be delivered into the hands of the native commanding officer on quarter guard duty on the day that pay is disbursed, and is by him to be paid to the men, and to be reported accordingly to the officer of the day and to the adjutant.

194th.—In future, the native commissioned officers and havildars are to wear white cotton gloves when employed upon any duty whatsoever. Each man is to furnish himself with four pairs, that they may always appear in clean ones.

195th.—No native officer, non-commissioned or sepoy, who may have been passed over as unfit for promotion, is ever to be employed as an orderly, or to be placed upon any guard or picquet of importance when it can be avoided. Such men are generally to be retained in the lines for the performance of trifling duties, and are to be considered as worn out, and only waiting to be invalided or discharged.

196th.—Officers holding companies or establishments are to send in to the adjutant's office, three days after muster, their pay abstracts, and two days after the issue of pay their acquittance rolls, without waiting for further orders so to do.

197th.—On all occasions of the review or inspection of corps, and on grand parades, officers who may attend the same will be particular in appearing in their full regimental dress. No firing, beating of drums, or sounding of bugles is then to take place so as to disturb or inconvenience the troops thus paraded.

198th.—In order to enable the commanding officer to ascertain at one view what European officers have from time to time the best claim to leave of absence, all leave, over and above four days, shall be recorded at the end of each regimental orderly book, and shall be annually copied into the public letter book; no leave for a period exceeding four days will ever be granted, except on public application, in writing.

199th.—No officer on the sick list will be allowed more than one company, unless his sickness proceeds from wounds or illness brought on by actual service, in which case he will be allowed to get a friend to receive the reports and do the duty for him.

200th.—Every company shall be told off into five divisions, to each of which there shall be attached a havildar and a naick, the first three to be under the subadar, and the remaining two under the jemadar, and these native commissioned and non-commissioned officers (*when*

present) are to be held responsible for the orderly behaviour and good conduct of their men, both on and off duty, and are expected to be particular in ascertaining that every man comes to parade clean and uniformly dressed.

201st.—If any non-commissioned officer, drummer, or sepoy wilfully or carelessly lose or spoil any of his arms, accoutrements, or other personal equipments, the property of government, stoppages shall be made out of his pay, by monthly instalments, not exceeding half his pay, at the following rates:—

	RS.	AS.	P.
Bayonet, musket	1	0	0
Belt, buff, bayonet	1	8	0
„ pouch, buff	1	8	0
„ buff, sword, havildars	1	8	0
„ „ „ drummers	1	8	0
„ „ „ serjeants	1	8	0
„ „ „ native commanders	3	0	0
Cartridge, balled, musket	0	0	4½
Lock musket	4	0	0
Musket, with lock ramrod	18	0	0
Ramrod, iron, musket	0	12	0
Scabbard, bayonet	0	12	0
„ sword, drummers	0	12	0
„ „ havildars	0	12	0
Sword, drummers	5	0	0
„ havildars	5	0	0
Leather bayonet belts	1	0	0
„ pouches	0	12	0
„ drummers	1	4	0
„ havildars	1	4	0
„ serjeants	1	4	0
Fifes, Europe, large	3	6	0
„ „ medium	3	4	0
„ „ small	2	2	0
Pike, havildars	5	4	0
Pouch, with box	2	8	0
„ box wood	0	8	0
Pricker, with brush	0	3	0

	RS.	AS.	P.
Sling, buff, musket .	0	8	0
„ fife case .	1	0	0
„ horns, bugle .	1	0	0
Turnkey, with havildar .	0	4	0
Warm musket . .	0	2	0

202nd.—And upon all such occasions wherein any of the public property shall have been lost or injured, a memorandum thereof shall be entered into the books of companies by the pay havildars, and a written report is to be made by the officers of the particulars of each case to the quartermaster, accompanied by an order to the paymaster for the stoppages to be made, which will receive the commanding officer's counter signature.

203rd.—Previous to any survey taking place it will be the quartermaster's particular duty to have the reports made out, neatly and correctly, according to the prescribed forms. He will attend every committee, but in conformity with the practice which prevails in Fort William, he will only sign the office copy, until the committee's remarks have been made and the reports filled up, when they will again be sent to the quartermaster for examination, and when that officer shall have satisfied himself, by the most careful examination, that the filling up is correct, in every respect, he is to sign the rest and return them to the president.

204th.—The quartermaster will either keep a book, into which he is to enter all orders that have or may be issued relative to the duties of his department, as well in regard to indents, reports, or returns as to whom they are to be forwarded, or he will make himself so perfectly acquainted with those regulations as not only to render such a measure unnecessary, but also to obviate the possibility of his papers being returned, which cannot fail to be equally unpleasant to him, as it must ever be distressing to the commanding officer.

205th—When a man on leave forwards a sick certificate, the commanding officer will write on the back of it the extension to be granted, which is to be signed by the officer of the company and the adjutant, who will be held responsible that a memorandum thereof is entered into their books, as well as into those of their havildars.

206th.—Any non-commissioned officer who shall be proved, to the commanding officer's satisfaction, to be unfit for his situation, either from

extreme neglect of duty, from total incapacity to command, or from any act of disrespect to those set in authority over him, shall be instantly reduced to the rank of a private sentinel, by order of the commanding officer, and without the intervention of a court-martial.

207th—The crimes and sentences of all general courts martial, as well as his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief's remarks thereon, are to be translated by the quartermaster, and are by him to be carefully explained to the native commissioned officers at the first parade. Copies thereof are to be furnished to the pay havildars of companies, who are to read them to the men at their successive roll calls.

APPOINTMENT OF GENERAL NOTT TO THE RESIDENCY AT LUCKNOW.

The following general order was appended to the order containing General Nott's despatch announcing the capture of Ghuzni. Lord Ellenborough had for some time held the appointment of Resident in his hands (after the resignation of Lieutenant-Colonel Low) intending it as the reward of the recapture of Ghuzni :—

Head-quarters, Simla, September 21st, 1842.
Political Department.

MEMORANDUM.

Lieutenant-Colonel J. Low, C.B., having intimated to the Governor General his wish to resign the appointment of Resident at the court of Lucknow, from the 30th of November next, with the view of proceeding to Calcutta, and thence to England, his lordship is pleased to accept Lieutenant-Colonel Low's resignation from the day so named.

The Governor General cannot allow Lieutenant-Colonel Low, C.B., to quit India without expressing to him the strong sense he entertains of the value of the public service he has, during a long course of years, and recently under his lordship's immediate instructions, rendered to the Government.

The Governor General is pleased to nominate and appoint Major-General William Nott to the office of Resident at the court of Lucknow, from the 30th of November next.

By order of the Right Honourable the Governor General of India.

(Signed) T. H. MADDOCK,
Secretary to the Government of India,
With the Governor General.

After Major-General Nott had passed the Sutlej, another order was issued, dated 23rd of December, which altered the title and exalted the office:—

"Major-General Nott, appointed Resident at the court of Lucknow, will bear the title of Envoy to the King of Oude, and that of 'Excellency' in all communications with his Majesty."

DOCUMENTS CONFERRING THE GRAND CROSS OF THE BATH.

Kensington Palace, Dec. 12, 1842.

My Lord,—Her Majesty having been graciously pleased, as a mark of her Royal approbation of the distinguished services of Major-General Sir William Nott, of the East India Company's Service, to nominate him to be a Knight Grand Cross of the Most Honourable Military Order of the Bath, I am to signify to you her Majesty's pleasure that you should invest him with the Insignia of that Order (herewith transmitted), in conformity to the enclosed Royal Warrant; and it being her Majesty's intention that the same be done in the most honourable and distinguished manner that circumstances will allow of, you will concert and adjust with him such time and manner for investing him with the Ensigns of a Knight Grand Cross of that Most Honourable Military Order, as shall appear to you most proper for showing all due respect to her Majesty's Order, and at the same time mark in the most public manner her Majesty's just sense of the zeal and abilities Sir William Nott has displayed in the service of his Sovereign and country.

I am, my Lord, with consideration,
Your's, &c.,
Augustus, Acting Grand Master.

To the Right Honourable Lord Ellenborough,
Governor General of India, &c., &c., &c.

VICTORIA REGINA.

Victoria, by the Grace of God, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Queen, Defender of the Faith, and Sovereign of the Most Honourable Military Order of the Bath, to our right trusty and well-beloved Councillor Edward Lord Ellenborough, our Governor-General in India, Greeting: Whereas we have been graciously pleased to nominate and appoint Major-General William Nott, of the East India Company's Service, to be a Knight Grand Cross of our aforesaid Most Honourable Military Order of the Bath, and whereas, in consequence of his absence from Great Britain, the ceremony of investing him cannot personally be performed by us, know ye that we, of our princely grace and special favour, do hereby authorise and require you, at such time and place as may appear to you most proper and expedient, to proceed in our name and on our behalf to the Ceremonial of the Investiture of the said Sir William Nott with the Ensigns of a Knight Grand Cross of our said Order, wherein you are to take especial care that nothing be omitted which may redound to the honour, splendour, and dignity of our said Most Honourable Military Order, and which may at the same time evince the sense we entertain for the said Sir William Nott.

Given at our Court at Windsor, under our Sign Manual and the Seal of our said Order, this seventh day of December, 1842, in the sixth year of our Reign.

By her Majesty's Command,
AUGUSTUS, Acting Grand Master.

Warrant empowering Lord Ellenborough, the Governor-General of India, to invest Major-General Sir William Nott with the Ensigns of a Knight Grand Cross of the Most Honourable Military Order of the Bath.

THE COUNTRY TRAVERSED BY THE ARMY OF CANDAHAR, FROM KURNAUL.

THE COUNTRY BETWEEN KURNAUL AND FEROZEPORE, viâ KHYTUL, is a low, flat, sandy plain, slightly undulating in particular districts. A very large proportion of it is overgrown with jungle of dak, boer, dwarf babool, kureel and other stunted trees and shrubs. There are, however, extensive sheets of cultivation occurring in the neighbourhood of the towns and villages several of which, of considerable size, are met with on the route.

Soil.—The soil is generally light and fertile, and only wants canals to be rendered extremely productive. At present it is dependent upon wells for irrigation, many of which are of great depth; the surface about half way down, and the water is considerably above 100 feet below that point.

Water.—The water is, in general, sufficient for the supply of troops, although it is frequently rather saline and brackish.

FEROZEPORE.—The town of Ferozepore stands about four or five miles inland, or south of the left bank of the Sutledge river, in latitude 30° 56′ 50″ being 26° 17′ north of Delhi. Its height is supposed to be about 700 feet above the level of the sea.

The first part of the route through what were called the 'Protected Sikh States' before our acquisition of the Punjab, is only partially cultivated, much land being overrun with high jungle of grass, reeds, babools, boer, jhow, &c.

BUKKER.—Bukker is a fort on an island situated in the middle of the Indus, in latitude 27° 41′ 32″ N. and longitude 69° 14′ E. Its height is about 200 feet above the level of the sea.

Route.—The distance between Ferozepore and Bukkor is 440 miles. The road runs parallel at first with the Sutledge, and afterwards with the Indus, along the narrow strip of land that lies between these rivers and the great desert; the first forty-eight miles of which are through the territory called the 'Protected Sikh States,' then for 300 miles it traverses the extreme length of the Bhawulpore, or Daodpootra country; the last ninety miles being in the Khyrpore government, or Upper Scinde. This tract of comparatively fertile land, which separates the river from the desert, varies in breadth from three to thirty miles, The *average* breadth may be stated to be about ten miles. In many places, however, the desert comes close up to the margin of the river, and threatens to overwhelm the towns. At Khyrpore, a considerable town in Daodpootra, the sand has been heaped up by the winds to a level with the outer wall, so that one can step from it to the tops of the houses. It seems to be encroaching every year; formerly canals were carried from the river thirty miles inland, and conveyed the water from the Sutledge far into the desert, fertilizing this otherwise barren region.

Climate.—The average temperature of nineteen days of February at Bukker was as follows:—

At day break, in open air	44°
At noon, in tent	82° 4′
Greatest cold	40°
Greatest heat in shade	91°

Bhawulpore. — *Soil.* — The soil of the Bhawulpore territory is light, sandy, and tolerably fertile, when well irrigated, but considerable portions of it are rendered barren from the quantity of salt intermixed with it. The periodical rains, upon which so much depends, in British India, are here extremely scanty, and often altogether wanting. Scarcely any rain fell for three years. The inhabitants chiefly depend upon the rise of the river, from the melting of the snow in the Himalayahs, for irrigating their crops. When the river rises, in May and June, to a level with the country, the water flows into the numerous canals, and is conveyed by them often a long way into the interior, and the country is, at that time, almost impassable, intersected as it is by numerous water courses, deep and broad. These are dry in the cold

season, but at that time, in many places, the water is raised from the river by means of the Persian water wheel.

Climate.—The climate of Bhawulpore and Upper Scinde is particularly dry. The cold season is sharp and bracing and remarkably pleasant. The thermometer in December is generally below freezing at day-break. The hot season is dreadful, high storms of wind, and clouds of dust darken the air, and the shifting sands of the desert threaten to resume their ancient rule up to the river's edge. This severe heat is little or not at all mitigated by the rains, for but little rain falls: in fact the seasons may be divided into two, the hot and the cold. A proof of the scantiness of the rains is exhibited in the style of building adopted by the inhabitants in their houses, which are generally formed of blocks of mud with flat roofs. One good shower of rain, such as occurs in the provinces, would wash down all their villages and half of their best towns.

Much of the land even of what may be called the fertile or inhabited district, is overgrown with jungle.

Forest Trees.—The Jhow tree, (Tamarisk) is the most common, and in Bhawulpore, and still more in Scinde, attains a great height, and becomes a fine tree, very different from the stunted bushes known by that name, in the provinces. Extensive forests of it are met with in Scinde.

Porducts.—The date tree is first met with near Bhawulpore, and continues all through Scinde, forming a striking feature in the landscape, and is a most important tree to the inhabitants, furnishing them with a wholesome article of diet, which they consume in large quantities, either fresh or dried, besides using it in numerous forms when cooked. It is a considerable article of exportation, and the wood, leaves, fibres, and, in fact, every part of the tree serves some useful purpose. The rest of the products, grain, vegetables, &c., are much the same as those of Upper India, and require no further comment.

Population.—The country is sparingly inhabited, but several large and important towns are situated on the left bank of the river. Bhawulpore, the capital of Daodpootra, a large and populous town, about four miles from the river, is the chief. The country has a very gentle slope from Ferozepore to the sea.

SUKKER.—The town of Sukker is situated in a barren plain on the right bank of the river Indus, and about a quarter of a mile from that river, separated from it by a range of hills running up from the east. It is at present a miserable pile of ruins; but it was at one time a place of consequence, and numerous tombs, mosques, and minarets, with their porcelain tiles, which are scattered over the plain, attest its former importance. What cultivation there is, is found on the banks of the river, which, here wooded to the water's edge with date trees, are remarkably beautiful. Further inland, the country is extremely barren and overgrown with jungle.

Climate.—The average temperature in the air, in the month of January, at day break, is 45°, and at noon in the tent 80° 8′.

ROREE.—The town of Roree stands on the left bank of the river Indus, opposite to an island in the middle of that river. It is partly built on the slope of a low range of hills, which, running up to the water's edge, from the east, partially shows itself in three small islands which it forms in the river, and again rising up on the right bank runs between the town of Sukker and the river Indus for a short distance. This range of hills is chiefly curious from the enormous quantity of sea shells which it contains. It is a conglomeration of shells of a great variety embedded in lime stone; great masses of flints, agate, and jasper, are also contained in the same matrix.

COUNTRY BETWEEN THE RIVER INDUS AND THE MARSHY DESERT, LEADING TO DADUR. — The country lying between the Indus and the marshy desert is, except in the immediate vicinity of the large town of Shikarpore, overgrown with jungle of Kureel, Boer, Babool, &c. It bears marks of being at times overflown, but in February 1839 it was dry and parched up. Tracts of desert occur; both the sandy dry desert of India and marshy damp plains with salt efflorescence oozing out, which is a sign of contiguity to the salt desert.

There is a plant very common in this part of the country, especially where the soil is impregnated with salt, called Lanee Caree. It is a prickly shrub, with thick spungy stalks, and contains a great deal of sap, which has a very bitter saline taste. When burned, it yields a quantity of soda, and the ashes are used for bleaching.

Water.—There is a great scarcity of water, and the little procurable is brackish and impregnated with salt, and often as thick as pea-soup.

TRACT OF COUNTRY BETWEEN THE MARSHY DESERT AND THE TOWN OF DADUR, VIA SHIRKARPORE.—The marshy desert, which commences about thirty-eight miles beyond Shirkarpore, is twenty-six miles and a half broad, and extends from North to South upwards of a hundred miles. It is a dead level, a flat plain unbroken by the slightest undulation, and completely destitute of all life, animal or vegetable; not an insect nor a blade of grass to be seen. It is impossible to conceive anything more perfectly barren than this desert; the deserts of India when compared to it are fertile. Here a thin covering of brushwood covers the wavy, undulating hills, and binds down the sand. A camel or a deer can at best find a scanty meal.

Soil.—The soil is firm and crisp, and impregnated with salts.

Water.—The water for some miles on each side of this desert is brackish, and a very scanty supply is only procurable from a few cutcha wells and holes dug in the beds of nullahs. Some miles beyond the desert lies the river Nharee, where is an abundant supply of water bunded up a little below the town of Baugh.

CUTCH GUNDAVA.—This country, which lies between the towns of Shikarpore and Dadur, is in the months of February and March, a wide and cheerless plain, parched and dusty, and unrefreshed by a single tree except in the vicinity of Baugh. The upper part of this plain is much cut up by deep and broad ravines, which in the rains are roaring torrents.

It is a thickly peopled country, but poor and solitary.

Rivers.—The rivers Pharee and Khanhee traverse it from North to South, but the waters in the cold season do not reach further than Baugh, being bunded up and exhausted for the purposes of irrigation.

Climate.—The heat is excessive, and the glare of the sun reflected from its white soil, very trying. The thermometer in the months of February and March ranges at day-break in open air to 54° 7′, and at noon in tents on an average of 91°, but often as high as 106°.

DADUR.—The town of Dadur, which is distant 140 miles from the Indus, is situated at the northern extremity of Cutch Gundava, at the

foot or entrance of the Bolan Pass, in latitude 29° 28' 13". Its height is 740 feet above the level of the sea.

THE BOLAN PASS.—This passage commences immediately on leaving the town of Dadur. It is narrow, and runs through the mountains which separate Hindoostan from Khorasan. These mountains are of moderate height, steep and rugged, and extremely barren, scarcely having a shrub or a blade of grass growing on them, and are composed chiefly of lime stone.

The road which runs in long reaches between the hills, is, throughout the whole length of the Pass, a distance of 50 miles, covered with loose shingle, pebbles, and huge holders, and is merely the bed of the mountain streams which carry off the waters from the hills into the plain.

The lower part of the Pass has a considerable stream, the Bolan river, running through it, and is sometimes impassable, from the rising of its waters; but towards the upper division, water becomes scarce, and is to be met with only at certain seasons.

The passage between the hills is, at first, broad and open, being at its foot nearly three miles in breadth, but it soon contracts, and is narrower in some parts than at others, varying from half a mile to a hundred or fifty yards, and towards the top it becomes still narrower; and its outlet, which is a narrow passage between two high and perpendicular walls of rock, is not above 10 yards wide. The ascent is very gradual, the foot of the Pass at Dadur being 740 feet, and the highest part of it 7,000, gives an average rise of 125 feet per mile. But the ascent is much less than this in the lower part, and considerably greater during the last 30 miles.

In 1839, it rained very heavily for three days, when the hill streams became swollen, and suddenly came down, causing several deep and rapid rivulets, which carried property of all sorts down their streams.

Climate.—The cold in the Pass is very severe, and most cutting winds occasionally blow. At the top of it the cold is much greater; and at Dusht-i-Bedowla, which is a barren plain 6,700 feet above the level of the sea, the thermometer, at sunrise, on the 21st March, 1839, was 26°, and snow had fallen two days before.

QUETTA.—At the distance of a few miles beyond the Bolan Pass stands the small town of Quetta, the capital of the district of Shawl,

in latitude 30° 11′. Its height above the level of the sea is 5,500 feet. It is a poor miserable town, consisting of a sort of mud edifice called a fort, built upon a mound of earth, and having about 400 wretched mud hovels with flat roofs clustered around its foot.

The district of Shawl is situated between the 29° 50′ and 30° 50 of north latitude, and the 66° 4′ and 67° 20′ of east longitude;—and is bounded on the North by the Tukatoo mountains, on the South by the Bolan range; on the East by those of Zurgoon and Tharkoo, and on the West by Chuhultan. The general aspect of this country is hilly, rocky, and sterile, particularly on the south side; but where mould exists (which is the case on many of the northern faces) vegetation is luxuriant, and a variety of English trees, shrubs, and herbs are to be found, such as cherry, almond, hawthorn, barberry, &c. &c.; also the juniper, which grows to the height of from 18 to 30 feet.

Within eight miles of Quetta there is a forest of the above description on a piece of table-land, which affords an inexhaustible source of fire-wood, and also rafters for building. The wood of the juniper is exactly similar to that used in cedar pencils, and the scent equally aromatic. The Assafœtida grows in abundance in these hills, many of which are composed of mica and chalk. Coal of an inferior description is found in the Bolan Pass. Around Quetta are numerous orchards filled with apricots, and almond trees, plums, peaches, apples, and fine poplars, with vines trained up their trunks.

All the high mountain peaks are covered with snow in March and April. The valley slopes from North to South, and also from East to West. It is studded with villages, which are hid amongst gardens and orchards, and is a lovely plain, being refreshed with sweet waters, and clothed with luxuriant vegetation. It is intersected by numerous small canals and water-cuts, which are supplied by means of Khareez These Khareezes, upon which so much depends in Affghanistan, consist of a number of shafts or wells sunk in the upper part of the plain where there is water, until they meet with springs. They are connected at the bottom by subterraneous galleries, and the whole united in one canal which is carried under ground down the valley at nearly the same level, or at least with only sufficient slope, so as to cause the water to flow; while the slope of the country being much greater, the canal, of course, gradually emerges to the surface. Wells are sunk along the line at the distance of every fifteen or twenty yards,

through which the soil is brought up from the canal, and air admitted to the workmen. They are never closed, but remain in a line of open wells, marking the course of the canal underground, which are often of great length, being many *miles*. When the canal makes its appearance on the surface of the country, and becomes an open watercourse, it is often carried for twenty or thirty miles, fertilizing the country through which it passes. A number of these Khazeeres which unite together at a place called Sir-i-âb or head of the spring, a few miles south of Quetta, from the source of the Shadeezy Lora river, a considerable stream, of great importance to the country, being thus in a manner artificially formed.

Soil.—The soil in the vallies is rich and of a light brown colour; the southernwood and many other sweet smelling herbs grow luxuriantly, and in spring flowers of various descriptions carpet them. The soil generally, is well adapted to all descriptions of horticulture and agriculture, especially all kinds of English vegetables. Some portion of the vallies are waste lands in consequence of no water being procurable for irrigation; and there the artesian wells might be adopted with great success. The fruits, though good, are not equal to those of Candahar and Cabool.

Rivers.—There are no large rivers, but one or two considerable streams; the chief of which is the Lora into which most of the inferior streams empty themselves.

Climate.—The climate is delightful, and the year may be considered to be divided into four seasons: spring which commences in March and continues till May, during which time the thermometer ranges at the highest to 70°, the lowest being 50°; summer from June to August, the highest range of the thermometer being 80°, and the lowest 70°; autumn from September to November, the highest range being 60°, and the lowest 40°, and the winter from December to February, the highest range of the thermometer being during that time 50°, and the lowest 30°. The prevailing winds are westerly and southerly, and are always cool. A good deal of snow falls in the valley in January and February. During spring the weather is very variable, there being alternate rain and sunshine, heat and cold, violent storms and calms.

Population.—The population of Shawl may be estimated at about 4,000 men, of whom a third are kasees or cultivators of the soil: 2,000

may be reckoned as Afghan kakurs; and the remainder as mixed tribes, including the Hindoos of the town of Quetta.

Productions.—The hills abound with wild sheep, goats, and hogs, and there are good sized bullocks for carriage and draught, camels and sheep in abundance. A great variety of English plants is found. Iron is found in some parts of the district. The chief agricultural productions arew heat, barley, Indian corn, rice, peas, lucerne, madder, carrots, bauglaus, spinage, cucumbers, pumpkins, and melons.

The Implements of Agriculture are the common small Indian plough, the spade, and hoe.

Commerce and Manufacture.—Madder, wool, carpets, blankets, and numdahs. The first two are the only articles of inconsiderable export, in consequence of the great consumption in the country, the habitations of the people being chiefly composed of blankets, and their gram-bags and ropes being made from the wool, the staple of which is eight inches, but coarse. The whole of the inhabitants are clothed in numdah postaks.

Vallies of Kuchak and Pisheen.—These vallies lie between Quetta and the foot of the Khojah Amraum hills. Neither of them is so fertile as Shawl, and the soil is much impregnated with salts. The valley of Pisheen is, however, tolerably fertile, and with a little care might be made much more productive. The soil is generally good, and water abundant. It is completely bare of trees.

The climate is fine. The thermometer at daybreak in the open air in April stands at 45°, and in a bad tent the highest point reached during the day is 87°.

Very little grain is procurable, and what little there is sells very high.

The Khoja Amraun Hills and the Kojhuk Kotul Pass.—These hills lie on the line of road between the vallies of Kuchâk and Pisheen, and Candahar. The height of the Pass is about 7,500 feet above the level of the sea, and the ascent for the last two miles very steep. The peaks of the Khoja Amraun hills on each side of it rise up several hundred feet higher. These hills are chiefly composed of slate, and many fine springs of water gush out of their sides. Only at their lower parts, however, there is a scarcity of water. They are covered

with shrubs and flowers, the wild cherry and plum, the wild thyme, rhubarb, gentian, assafœtida, yellow and red tulips, anemonies, grasses, together with wild oats and barley which are to be met with amongst them.

The climate is delightful, although the glare of the sun reflected from the rocks is very powerful.

On the north-west or Candahar side of the hills is a fine meadow, clothed with natural grasses, and having very fine springs of sweet water.

The foot of the hills on this side is 5,600 feet above the sea. The temperature here is very pleasant, about 80° in the tent; but in the barren plain which lies between these hills and the Gautee range, halfway to which is water at a place called Dundee Golab, the heat is very great. This place is about 4,000 feet above the sea, and has a descent of 1,600 feet from the foot of the hills. The increase in the temperature is most striking, as the thermometer stands nearly all day at 102° in the tent; the general range is between 90° and 100°, but it falls at daybreak to 44°.

The water here is a pool of clay-coloured, and muddy, but sweet water, brought from a distant kahreeze.

The Gautee Hills, &c.—The Gautee hills, which lie beyond the Amraun hills, are a low range covered with stones, and cut up by ravines extremely barren and destitute either of water or vegetation. The Moel Manda is situated twelve miles beyond the Gautee hills, in a narrow slip of valley lying between the Gautee hills and another ridge which runs parallel to them. The water here is very fine, but scanty.

The Doree River lies at a distance of twelve miles from Moel Manda. It is a considerable stream, and its water slightly saline, and very muddy. The banks are exceedingly barren, there being no grass, and only a few scanty patches of wheat and barley.

Between the river Doree and Candahar the first half of the country is barren, miserable, and thinly populated. It is intersected by low ranges of arid sterile hills. The latter half is a fertile and well cultivated country.

There is water in abundance as the road keeps near the Doree.

CANDAHAR.—Candahar is situated in 31° 35′ North latitude and 60° East longitude, at the foot of the valley of the Turnuk, and is separated from the river of that name by a short range of hills, which divides the lower part of the valley and runs parallel with the river for about 20 miles. These hills are named the Torkanee hills. Candahar is encompassed on three sides by lofty mountains, the open side being that on the East. These mountains spring up abruptly from the plain, and are particularly bold, broken, and isolated, with steep sides, rising up into high, sharp-pointed spires and peaks. Like the other hills in Affghanistan, they are bare rocks, treeless, and destitute of vegetation.

Around Candahar the country is fertile and well cultivated. There are rich meadows clothed with green turf, and gardens and orchards filled with fruit trees, together with numerous broad fields covered with sheets of corn, wheat, and barley, and fine crops of lucerne and clover, while numerous canals, divided into a multitude of little rills, bring the waters of the Urghundaub river through a break in the hills, and convey them over the surface of the plain. The extent of rich land is, however, extremely limited. Three or four miles to the east of the city, it is again a barren and cheerless plain, covered with stones and wild southern-wood, and scantily supplied with water.

Both the Turnuk and Urghassaun rivers, for many miles before reaching Candahar, are dry in the hot season, the waters being carried off for the purpose of irrigation. In the vicinity of Candahar, water is very near the surface. In the meadow land around the town, within two feet, and about two miles east of the city, numerous wells were dug and abundant supplies of water obtained within sixteen feet of the surface.

The town of Candahar is a considerable city built in the form of an oblong square, the long faces of which are 2,000 yards with a breadth of 1,600, and a circuit of 4½ miles. It is surrounded by a high, but thin and weak, mud wall, and has a narrow and shallow ditch. The town is built upon a more regular plan than is usually seen in Eastern cities. The four principal streets, leading from a gateway which opens about midway on each face or side of the town, meet together in the centre in a large enclosed domed building, about eighty feet in diameter, called the '*Charsoo*.' These streets, which form the principal bazaars, divide the town into four nearly equal districts, where the streets are narrower, and the houses higher than the principal streets;

and being numerously inhabited and seldom cleaned, and the tops being used for the purposes of relieving nature, these quarters are by no means agreeable either to the eye or the nostril.

The climate of Candahar is much superior to that of Hindoostan. During April, May, and June, the heat during the day is extreme, but the nights are cool, and the mornings bracing. The thermometer ranges between 50° to 70° at sun-rise; between 100° and 112° at noon; and falls to 74° to 82° at sunset.

The climate is exceedingly dry.

The wind, which is generally easterly in the morning, comes gradually round to the west by seven or eight o'clock, when the hot wind commences, and which continues all day with clouds of dust. It falls about sunset, and during the night an easterly breeze springs up. In the month of June, the hot wind very often continues all night, but this is rare, and for the most part the nights are cool, and the mornings very pleasant. Upon the whole, the climate of Candahar, with proper protection, is very much superior to that of Hindoostan, though inferior to the other parts of Affghanistan.

Firewood is extremely scarce about Candahar. The Affghans of the poorer classes supply this deficiency by a most disgusting substitute, which few would adopt—human ordure—which, in this dry climate, soon becomes a hard mass, is collected by the poorer women, and used as fuel.

Grain is very dear, as also other necessaries of life which are scanty. It is a mistaken idea to suppose that the Hindoostanni lives merely upon *Atta Chuppaties*. They form the staple article of his food, but he must have other accompaniments to render this simple diet sapid and digestible.

The Kajawa, which is a square box or hamper made of four upright pieces of wood bound together by a rope network, or sometimes in the form of a chair, is used by the natives of Affghanistan to convey their women in, and is covered over with a purdah. At best it is a most unpleasant, painful carriage for the sick, and the exclamation which a sick European was heard to utter on getting out of his box at the end of a long march as he rubbed his sore and weary bones, 'By Jasus! I had better a mighty dale been walking!' will give some idea of the degree of comfort attending upon such a mode of conveyance. It is a dangerous conveyance for bad roads or difficult ground.

THE COUNTRY LYING BETWEEN THE URGUNDAUB AND HELMUND RIVERS, except the first fifteen miles from Candahar across the Urgundaub river (a deep and rapid stream, the banks of which are fertile and highly cultivated, studded with villages, encompassed with gardens, orchards, and clothed on both sides with a fringe of trees), is a bare and desolate plain, covered with loose stones, and destitute of grass or vegetation, cut up by ravines, and bounded by naked rocks.

Water is procurable throughout the whole route.

THE VALLEY OF THE TURNUK.—This valley extends from Candahar up to Ghuzni, a distance of 225 miles, and runs for the greatest part of its length in a direction nearly from north-east to south-west. For the first 87 miles between Candahar and Kelat-i-Ghiljee, its direction is east and west, and the higher part of the valley has a direction from N.N.E. to S.S.W. It is bounded on each side by high ranges of barren mountains, with sharp and precipitous sides; that on the south separates it from the valley of the Urghessaun, while beyond the range which forms the northern barrier lies the fertile valley of the Urgundaub river. This last range of hills, when it approaches the foot of the valley, takes a circular sweep from north to south, and, running about three miles west of the city of Candahar, joins the southern boundary, and shuts up the mouth of the valley.

The ridge which shuts up the valley at its foot has several breaks in it, through one of which, some miles south-west from the city of Candahar, passes the road to Herat, and a little way further south flows the Turnuk river through a gap on its way to join the Helmund.

The greatest breadth of the valley at its lower extremity, where the town of Candahar is situated, may be about thirty miles, but higher up it rapidly contracts. The least breadth of it is about half a mile. The height of some of the peaks is 5,000 feet above the plain. The lower part of the valley is a stony and barren waste, destitute of forage, and chiefly covered with southernwood, wild thyme, and jewassa. In parts of the valley there is a considerable breadth of level country, but in general it rises up from the banks of the river Turnuk in a series of low undulating hillocks, which increase in size as they approach the barrier ranges. These hillocks are very bare and uninteresting, having a thin and scanty covering of thyme and southernwood bushes. Other portions of the valley are, however, open and level, and well cultivated,

and the higher districts especially are much more fertile than the lower, being well watered by numerous canals, brought at an enormous labour from the river, and are much more populous, being studded with numerous villages, which are protected by walls and small forts called Ghurries, and encompassed by fine orchards of fruit trees, and many clumps of willows and poplars and large fields of corn are near each village.

The lower division of the valley is almost shut up in several places by the hills approaching each other, leaving only a narrow passage for the river, and the road passes through narrow and strong defiles, or runs over and along the face of the hills, having the river flowing below it at the depth of some hundred feet.

The ingenious, not to say scientific, manner, in which the inhabitants bring the water from the river (Turnuk) along the canals, is deserving of remark. The river being contained between high and steep banks, much below the level of the surface of the country, the water would be useless to it; but by bringing the water from a higher level, often commencing many miles higher up the river than where it is intended to make its water available, and carrying them in a canal along the side of the river, but with a much less fall than either the river or the slope of the country has, the water is gradually brought to the same level as the surface of the country. Immense labour is expended in the construction of these canals, more than is to be expected in such a thinly populated and disturbed country.

The slope of the valley—that is, the ascent from Candahar to Ghuzni, is extremely gradual. Up to Khelat-i-Ghiljee, which is nearly eighty-seven miles east of Candahar, the slope is twenty-five feet to the mile, and beyond that above fourteen. Besides the slope from north to south, the valley has a slope from east to west, on which latter side runs the river Turnuk.

The top of the valley is, like its foot, surrounded on three sides by hills. It is a fine broad plain, undulating upon each side as it approaches the hills, and is fertile and cultivated, and covered with numerous villages, kheils, &c., which are generally encompassed and hidden by the trees of the orchards and gardens, which every village in this part of the country possesses.

The river Turnuk rises from a collection of fine springs, which gush out of the rock and ground at a place called Mookloor, 163 miles above

Candahar. It runs into the Helmund river after it has passed Candahar, but its waters in the hot season do not get lower than about fifteen or twenty miles above that place. Like other rivers in Affghanistan, it is larger at its source than anywhere else during its course, for not being fed by other streams (unless when the mountain torrents are called into existence by rain or the melting snows), and its waters being carried off for the purpose of irrigation, it diminishes in its progress, and eventually and suddenly disappears. There is generally a fertile slip of alluvial soil on one or both of its banks, which is well cultivated with wheat and barley, madder, &c.; but at a very short distance from its banks the plain is barren, covered with stones, and uncultivated.

GHUZNI.—The town of Ghuzni is situated at the top of the valley of the Turnuk, close under the termination of a range of hills (which running nearly east and west, shuts up this valley, and separates it from the Caubul valley), in 33° 34′ latitude, or 1° 58′ 28″ north of Candahar. Its height is about 8,000 feet above the level of the sea, or 4,500 feet higher than that of Candahar. It is built upon an isolated portion of this ridge, on a natural mound partly rocky and partly composed of earth. On the highest portion of the mound, which has a considerable elevation, stands the citadel, which is nearly in the centre of the town, but touching the wall on the north side. The outer wall has a circuit of about a mile and a quarter. The form of the town is a sort of irregular square, the wall being built so as to suit the outline of the tumulus upon which it is built. This is in places scarped and high, in others low, the foundation of the wall being little above the level of the surrounding country. It is a filthy, mean town, inside, and has narrow streets of mud houses, many of which, however, are square buildings of two stories in height, and having flat roofs, with small windows in the upper storey and holes pierced for matchlocks, are capable of being defended. It might contain from 1,500 to 2,000 inhabitants.

The following is the average of the thermometer in the month of July:—

	Lowest.	Highest.	
At Sunrise...	57°	62°	In open air.
„ 2 P.M.	84° 5′	95°	In tent.
„ Sunset	75°	80°	In air.

In a tomb the thermometer never rises during this time of the year above 76° during the day.

At Ghuzni abundance of supplies are procurable—viz., fruits, raisins, milk, ghee, vegetables, &c.

COUNTRY BETWEEN GHUZNI AND CAUBUL AND THE VALE OF CAUBUL.—The distance between Ghuzni and Caubul is ninety miles. The road after quitting Ghuzni, three or four miles east of the town, passes over a defile in the hills, which separates the valley of the Turnuk from the valley of Caubul. The top of this pass is at least 1,200 feet above Ghuzni. There is then a descent of 200 or 300 feet into the vale of Caubul, the top of which is at least 1,000 feet higher than the head of the Turnuk valley. The valley has a general slope from this point down to the city of Caubul, but many hills with steep ascents and descents block it up in several places, leaving only narrow gorges through which the Caubul and the Logur rivers make their way to the more open country near Caubul. Besides this slope, the country slopes from east to west, on which side of the valley the Caubul river runs. The upper part of the valley is barren and strong; fertile tracts of land are met with chiefly along the banks of the rivers. A very beautiful and fertile tract of land, called the valley of Maidan, occupies the valley of Caubul about twenty miles from the city. It is a very rich country, and lies low, being surrounded on all sides by high hills, and intersected with numerous streams, and appears one sheet of gardens and orchards.

The country between Ghuzni and Caubul is blocked up with snow for several months in the year. The temperature in July and August ranges between 47° and 57° at sunrise, reaches 85° to 100° in mid-day, and falls to about 75° to 80° at sunset.

The atmosphere in this part is most highly charged with electricity, sometimes pulling off one's clothes, or pulling up the bed-clothes, give rise to such a series of sparks being emitted that the whole bed seems to be on fire.

The Logur, which is a fine, broad, and rapid river, crosses the valley about thirty miles from its top, coming out through a narrow gorge in the hills, and after crossing the valley, leaves it by another. This is the strongest part of the country between Ghuzni and Caubul, as the low land could be flooded by the river, and rendered nearly impassable for anything but light troops—while the ground is hilly and very strong on the opposite bank, that next to Caubul. This river falls into the

Caubul river, but not until the latter has passed the town of Caubul, and ten or twelve miles on its way to the Indus.

CAUBUL.—The city of Caubul lies in 34° 30′ 30″ North latitude, in a triangular gorge, formed by two ranges of high and steep hills, which, running north-west and south-west, nearly meet a little west of the town, and leave a narrow entrance between them through which the high road from Ghuzni and the Caubul river pass. It is therefore closely encompassed by hills on three sides; on the southerly more especially so, as the hills completely overlook the city, there being only a narrow path between the city wall and their base. These hills are steep, bare, and rocky, and are crowned with a long line of wall (having round towers occuring at regular intervals), which is carried up their nearly perpendicular sides, and along their summits, and across the narrow entrance which lies between them. This wall was intended as a defence against the Ghiljies, and shuts up all entrance from the west, but it has been allowed to fall into ruin.

The town of Caubul is in length, from east to west, about a mile, and in breadth from north to south, half a mile. It is surrounded by a high, but weak, mud wall, and has no ditch. East of the town, and separated from it by a ditch on the top of a rocky eminence, stands the Bala Hissar, and on the slope of this acclivity are situated the king's palace and gardens, with an extensive bazaar, all surrounded by a wall and ditch, and quite distinct from the city.

The chief bazaars in the town run east and west; the largest and best runs nearly through the centre of the town. It is a spacious, broad street of good houses, two stories high, and covered over by a flat roof extending between their tops. This was at one time gilded and painted. This long street is broken into three or four districts or divisions by small squares, which are open above, and have passes leading out to the right and left into the adjoining streets. The rest of the town does not differ much from other Eastern cities, having dirty, narrow, and irregular streets, with high flat roofed houses built of cutcha brick; no stone is used, although such an abundant supply lies all round.

The population of Caubul, according to Burnes, consisted in 1838 of 60,000 souls.

The thermometer in August, September, and October, ranges be-

tween 43 at sunrise, and 82° at sunset, sometimes reaching 94° in mid-day in August.

The Caubul river, which enters at the north of the gorge from the west, flows eastward, close under the northern wall, and a rich slip of meadow land covered with gardens, rises up from its northern bank to the base of the hills on that side, increasing in breadth as the river flows eastward. This is clothed with verdure, fields of lucerne and clover, gardens and orchards; a delightful spot in which trees of all kinds flourish. The river from August to October is a mere brook, but it is at times so swollen as seriously to endanger the walls of the city.

Towards the east of Caubul, the country is more open than on the other sides: the two ranges of hills separating widely to the north and south, have a broad valley lying between them, down which the road to Peshawur runs nearly due east. This valley extends for about 25 miles east of Caubul, and is shut up by a cross range of nearly impassable rocks, over which a difficult pass, called the 'Lata bund,' is practicable only for a man and horse. It is about 10 miles broad, but at a short distance from the town, a low, rocky, and barren ridge runs from west to east for about three miles, dividing the valley into two nearly equal portions.

On the northern side of the valley runs the Caubul river through a fertile tract of country; and on the southern the river Logur, which enters it through a break in the hills, and runs for some distance close under their feet, crosses the valley from south to north, five miles east of Caubul, and falls into the Caubul river. Their united streams pass out of the Caubul valley through a narrow opening in the 'Lata bund' hills.

The country on the south side of the valley, on the banks of the Logur, is low, marshy, and often under water. It is very fertile, as is also that in the northern side where the Caubul river flows; but the centre of the valley, where the rocky range extends, is dry and barren.

Towards the west of Caubul lies a broad valley or plain, which is separated from it by the hills through which the narrow entrance to the town passes. This plain, which is about 8 miles broad by 12 in length, is a spacious amphitheatre, encircled on all sides by lofty hills, over the tops of which a succession of ranges rises up, each higher and higher till the view is terminated by the tops of the Hindoo Coosh mountains. It is a most lovely landscape: the plain being refreshed

with numerous streams brought from the Caubul river, and covered with green fields fringed by rows of poplars and willow trees; orchards filled with fruit trees of every description, and gardens well laid out and stocked with flowers and useful vegetables. The Caubul river runs through it, and has its banks shaded with trees and well-built forts; and villages and hamlets are scattered on its surface. It is a very fertile tract of land. The environs of the town on the western side are very beautiful.

The country around Caubul is exceedingly fertile; grain and provisions of all sorts are in great abundance. The most delicious fruits of every description are considerably cheaper than grain, and the poorer classes chiefly live on them while in season.

Country between Caubul and Jellalabad.—The distance between these two places is 105 miles, and the line of road on leaving Caubul is for the first ten miles nearly due east, down the valley of Caubul, with a considerable descent. The next ten miles, on leaving the above valley, commence by turning up south, through a long and narrow defile, between lofty and steep hills, which are devoid of verdure. Down this defile, which is only a few yards broad, runs a brawling, noisy stream, which has to be crossed nearly twenty times. The whole breadth of the pass is covered with a mass of pebbles and boulders. At its top the elevation is considerably higher than at Caubul, being 7,500 feet above the sea. At this height the thermometer on the 7th October, 1839, was 26° at daybreak, 64° at two p.m., and 52° at sunset. At a distance of ten miles beyond this defile or pass stands Tezeen, the elevation of which is still higher, being 8,200 feet, where the thermometer on the 8th October was 19° at sunrise, and the hill streams were frozen over with a thin coating of ice. From this height there is a descent of 1,600 feet into the small valley of Tezeen, which is 6,480 feet above the level of the sea.

The last-mentioned twenty miles, with the next sixty-seven, are through one of the most inhospitable and barren countries it is possible to imagine, being a wide waste of bare and naked hills, encompassed by high and inaccessible mountains, over whose tops far in the distance are to be seen the lofty summits of the Himalayahs on the north, and the Safaed Koh to the south, having their peaks covered with perpetual snow. The road across this mountainous district is such as has seldom

been crossed; the celebrated Bolan Pass is a trifle to it. It scrambles up and down steep acclivities, over long ranges of bleak hills and through narrow defiles, bounded on each side by steep rocks, and is so covered with large stones, pebbles, and rocks, as to render the feet sore and lame, both of men and cattle. The only road is often, too, down the bed of a stream, which is a very disagreeable route.

The only inhabitants of this miserable region are a few starved wretches, who live in caves and chambers excavated out of the sides of the rocks.

At Gundamuk, which may be considered as the commencement of the valley of Jellalabad, the country improves much, is well cultivated, and has numerous pretty villages, with orchards and gardens around them. These produce remarkably fine fruits, grapes, and pomegranates, which are superior even to those of Caubul. Gundamuk is yet at a considerable height, 4,600 feet, and for the next ten miles a very rough and stony road leads over an undulating, hilly country, which is cut up by deep ravines, having a descent of 2,400 feet before reaching the plain in which Jellalabad stands. Here the change is very agreeable, from barren rocks to a fertile plain, covered with villages and forts, which are hidden in thick clumps of high and lofty trees, contrasting pleasantly with the treeless and sterile country which had been previously traversed.

JELLALABAD.—Jellalabad, which is a very small town, very dirty, and very poor, consisting of about 400 houses, surrounded by a mud wall, is situated 2,000 feet above the level of the sea, in 34 25' North latitude, and six miles only to the south of Caubul. It stands nearly in the centre of a plain, extending from west to east for about twenty miles, and having a breadth of ten or twelve. Only a narrow tract of this space, in the immediate vicinity of the river which traverses the plain on its northern side, is level; and this is very fertile and well cultivated, being clothed with verdure of all sorts, and studded over with groups of fine trees, together with crops of sugar-cane, cotton, rice, jewarrie, and Indian corn. Numerous villages are scattered along the margin of the river, but the breadth of this fertile tract seldom exceeds a couple of miles, and a very short way south of the river the country is a stony waste of low, undulating, and barren hillocks, which gradually rise up to the base of the Safaed Koh, distant about twenty

miles from the river. Here it again improves, and numerous villages are to be seen clustered under the foot of this gigantic range, or perched a considerable way up its slope; the Caubul river is here a broad, rapid and clear stream. It has a breadth during October of 100 yards, but its banks are far apart and low. It can be forded in several places. Travellers cross it on bullock hides stuffed with straw, on which they first place their clothes, and lying upon them flat, kick away with their feet. It is astonishing what a little way they go down the stream, considering the force of the current. The temperature of the river at sunrise is 55°, air being 60°; and at sunset 60°, air being 66°

The cultivated part of the plain of Jellalabad is much intersected with water cuts brought from the river, and is low and swampy. There is much rice cultivation.

COUNTRY BETWEEN JELLALABAD AND PESHAWUR.—The road distance between these two places is ninety miles, and the country between Jellalabad and to within fifteen miles of the town of Peshawur is very strong, and, generally speaking, exceedingly barren. It may be described in a general manner, as a tract of hilly country lying between two ranges of mountains, which, running east and west in length, enclose between them a breadth of about twenty miles from north to south. It gives a most erroneous idea of this tract to call it a valley, as it is divided into a series of small plains by cross ranges of hills, which pass between the Sufaed Koh and the secondary ranges of the Himalayahs. These plains are generally barren and stony, and have a considerable slope from north to south. The river which runs along their northern margin has to make its way through several narrow passages in the rocks, while the only road in one of these isolated plains is over the southern skirts of the cross ranges of hills; and while the distance of the road is ninety miles, the difference of longitude between Jellalabad and Peshawur cannot be much more than half that amount.

From the above tract for the next thirty miles high hills shoot up between the Sufaed Koh and the secondary ranges of the Himalayahs, which completely block up what is termed the valley of the Caubul. The river has to force its way through narrow gorges amongst the rocks, while the road clambers over the high hills, called the Lundi-khana Pass, in performing which an elevation of 3,400 feet is gained.

A steep descent from this height leads into a narrow valley, extending from east to west for above nine miles; and on the east of this valley is the top or entrance to the Khyber Pass, which is a narrow ravine between high and steep hills, running in zig-zag lengths from west to east. Its length is about twelve miles. The elevation at its head or top is about 3,000 feet, and at its foot 1,670; and four miles from the top, on a conical hill which rises up in the centre of the pass, is the fort of Ali Musjid. A fine stream which gushes out of the sand and rocks at the head of the pass, rushes down its bed. Both the Lundi-khana and Khyber hills are covered stunted brushwood, which, contrasted with the barren hills hitherto seen, look almost fertile. They are, however, barren enough.

THE PLAIN AND TOWN OF PESHAWUR.—The plain of Peshawur stands between the Khyber Pass and the town of Peshawur, and has a descent of 600 feet from the foot of the former to the town, and probably as much more thence to the Indus. It has a length of about sixty miles, extending west and east from the Khyber hills to the river Indus, and a breadth of between thirty and forty miles, lying between two high ranges of mountains which run from west to east. The southern barrier is a continuation of the Rajgul or Sufaed Koh mountains, which, when they approach the river Indus, take a circular sweep from south to north across the valley, and, running parallel with the river, separate it from the plain by a narrow pass or defile called the Gidur Gully, and afford an outlet from the valley down upon the banks of the Indus. The Caubul river emerges from the valley to join the Indus a little to the north of this passage. The Sufaed Koh also sends a shoot across the Indus, which rushes through a narrow opening in its rocks. This appears in the Punjaub under the name of the "salt range."

The plain of Peshawur is, with a few exceptions, fertile and well cultivated. The crops on the ground which are cut in November are Jewarrie and Indian corn. The exceptions above alluded to are the first six or eight miles from the foot of the Khyber hills on the western side of the plain, which is an extremely barren and stony tract, and destitute of water. The Jumrood rivulet, which runs down the pass, hardly emerges beyond it, being dried up in the sands. Towards the lower or eastern side of the plain it again becomes barren

and stony, and covered with boer and jhow bushes, and the country is hilly and undulating, and cut up by deep ravines.

The town of Peshawur stands in latitude 34°, being little more than thirty miles to the south of Caubul on the slope of a gentle elevation, which rises out of the plain at this particular point. It is almost equidistant from the hilly ranges which bound the valley on its northern and southern extremities, and is fifteen miles from the Khyber hills, and forty-four from the Indus. Its height is 106 feet above the sea.

The principal bazaar, which has a steep descent from east to west, extends the whole length of this city, which is about half a mile long. It has good shops filled with the produce, both of India and Khorassan; and many of the houses are three stories high, and built of pucka brick. Individually, they are superior to those of Caubul; but as a whole, the town is far inferior in every way—in population, in trade, in appearance, &c.

The environs are pretty, the town being encompassed by gardens and clumps of fine trees, amongst which are the baubul and date. On the river as well as on numerous temporary accommodations, are suspended from twenty to thirty men by the neck, a proof, according to a celebrated traveller, of a considerable advance in civilization. The Persian wheel, which is constantly at work round the town in raising water for irrigation, is a more pleasing one.

The Caubul river flows down the plain of Peshawur from west to east, about eight miles north of the city. It has here a fine broad stream of nearly 200 yards in breadth, and is not fordable. It has a current of two miles an hour.

The following is the average of the range of the thermometer in part of November, at Peshawur:—

	Lowest.	*Highest.*
At sunrise in air	34°	55°
" 2 P. M. in tent	66°	85°
" sunset in air	61°	71°

TREATY WITH SHAH SHOOJA OOL MOOLK AND RUNJEET SING, THE MAHARAJAH OF THE PUNJAUB.

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1. SHAH Shooja Ool Moolk disclaims all title on the part of himself, his heirs and successors to all the territories lying on either bank of the river Indus, that may be possessed by the Maha Raja; viz. Cashmere, including its limits, E.W.N.S. together with the fort of Atuk, Chuk Huzara, Khebel Amb, with its dependencies, on the left bank of the aforesaid river, and on the right bank Pyshawur, with the Yusufzay territory, Khutuks, Hushtnugur, Mechan, Khohat, Himgoo and all the places dependent on Pyshawur, as far as the Khybur Pass; Bunoo, the Vuzyry territory, Dour, Frank, Gorang Kalabaugh and Kushal Ghur, with their dependent districts, Dera Ismayl Khan, and its dependency together with Deera Ghazee Khan, Kot Mithan, Osmar Kote and their dependent territory, Singhur, Dajeb, Hajeepore, Kajenpore, and the three Kuchies, as well as Maukera, with its districts, and the province of Mooltan, situated on the left bank. These countries and places are considered to be the property, and to form the estate of the Maha Raja; and the Shah neither has, nor will have, any concern with them, they belong to the Maha Raja and his posterity, from generation to generation.

2. The people of the country on the other side of Khybur will not be suffered to commit robberies, or aggressions, or any disturbances on this side. If any defaulter of either state, who has embezzled the revenue, takes refuge in the territory of the other, each party engages to surrender him, and no person shall obstruct the passage of the

stream which issues out of the Khybur defile, and supplies the fort of Futtyghur with water, according to ancient usage.

3. As, agreeably to the treaty established between the British Government and the Maha Raja, no one can cross, from the left to the right bank of the Sutlej without a passport from the Maha Raja, the same rule shall be observed regarding the passage of the Indus, whose waters join the Sutlej, and no one shall be allowed to cross the Indus without the Maha Raja's permission.

4. Regarding Shikarpoor and the territory of Scinde, lying on the right bank of the Indus, the Shah will agree to abide, by whatever may be settled as right and proper, in conformity with the happy relations of friendship subsisting between the British Government and the Maha Raja through Captain Wade.

5. When the Shah shall have established his authority in Cabool and Kunduhar, he will annually send the Maha Raja the following articles; viz., fifty-five high-bred horses, of approved colour and pleasant paces, eleven Persian scimitars, seven Persian poinards, twenty-five good mules, fruit of various kinds, both dry and fresh, and sirdas or musk melons of a sweet and delicate flavour (to be sent throughout the year), by way of the Cabool river, to Pyshawur, grapes, pomegranates, apples, quinces, almonds, raisins, pistahs or chionuts, an abundant supply of each; as well as pieces of satin of every colour; chogas of fur, kim-khabs wrought with gold and silver, and Persian carpets, altogether to the number of 101 pieces. All these articles the Shah will continue to send every year to the Maha Raja.

6. Each party shall address the other on terms of equality.

7. Merchants of Affghanistan who will be desirous of trading to Lahore, Amrutsir, or any parts of the Maha Raja's possessions, shall not be stopped or molested on their way; on the contrary, strict orders shall be issued to facilitate their intercourse, and the Maha Raja engages to observe the same line of conduct on his part with respect to Affghanistan.

8. The Maha Raja will yearly send to the Shah the following articles, in the way of friendship:—fifty-five pieces of shawls, twenty-five pieces of muslin, eleven dopatahs, five pieces of kim-khab, five scarfs, five turbans, fifty-five loads of bur rice (peculiar to Pyshawur).

9. Any of the Maha Raja's officers who may be deputed to Affghanistan to purchase horses, or on any other business, as well as those who may be sent by the Shah in the Punjaub for the purpose of purchasing piece-goods or shawls, &c., to the amount of 11,000 rupees, will be treated on both sides with due attention, and every facility will be afforded to them in the execution of their commissions.

10. Whenever the armies of the two states may happen to be assembled at the same place, on no account shall the slaughter of kine be permitted to take place.

11. In the event of the Shah taking an auxiliary force from the Maha Raja, whatever booty may be acquired from the Barakzays in jewels, horses, arms, great and small, shall be equally divided between the two contracting parties. If the Shah should succeed in obtaining possession of the property, without the assistance of the Maha Raja's troops, the Shah agrees to send a portion of it by his own agent to the Maha Raja, in the way of friendship.

12. An exchange of missions charged with letters and presents shall constantly take place between the two parties.

13. Should the Maha Raja require the aid of the Shah's troops in furtherance of the objects contemplated by this treaty, the Shah engages to send a force, commanded by one of his principal officers. In like manner the Maha Raja will furnish the Shah, when required, with an auxiliary force, composed of Mahomedans, and commanded by one of his principal officers, as far as Caubul, in furtherance of the objects contemplated by this treaty, when the Maha Raja may go to Pyshawur, and the Shah will depute a Shahzaduh to visit him, on which occasion, the Maha Raja will receive and dismiss him with the honour and consideration due to his rank and dignity.

14. The friends and enemies of each of the three high Powers, that is to say, the British, and Sikh Governments, and Shah Shooja Ool Moolk, shall be the friends and enemies of all.

15. Shah Shooja Ool Moolk engages, after the attainment of his object, to pay without fail, to the Maha Raja, the sum of two lacs of rupees, of the Nanuk Shahy, or Kuldar currency, calculating from the date on which the Sikh troops may be dispatched for the purpose of re-instating his Majesty in Caubul, in consideration of the Maha Raja stationing a force of not less than 5,000 men, cavalry and

infantry, of the Mahomedan persuasion, within the limits of the Pyshawur territory for the support of the Shah, and to be sent to the aid of his Majesty whenever the British Government, in concert and counsel with the Maha Raja, shall deem their aid necessary; and when any matter of great importance may arise to the westward, such measure will be adopted with regard to it, as may seem expedient and proper at the time to the British and Sikh Governments. In the event of the Maha Raja requiring the aid of any of the Shah's troops, a deduction will be made from the subsidy, proportioned to the period for which such aid may be afforded; and the British Government holds itself responsible for the punctual payment of the above sum annually to the Maha Raja, so long as the provisions of this treaty are duly observed.

16. Shah Shooja Ool Moolk agrees to relinquish for himself, his heirs and successors, all claims of supremacy and arrears of tribute over the country now held by the Ameers of Scinde (which will continue to belong to the Ameers, and their succession in perpetuity) on condition of the payment to him by the Ameers, of such a sum as may be determined, under the mediation of the British Government, 15,00,000 of rupees of such payment being made over by him to Maha Raja Runjeet Sing; on these payments being completed article 4th of the treaty of 12th March, 1833, will be considered cancelled, and the customary interchange of letters and suitable presents between the Maha Raja, and the Ameers of Scinde shall be maintained as heretofore.

17. When Shah Shooja Ool Moolk shall have succeeded in establishing his authority in Affghanistan, he shall not attack or molest his nephew, the ruler of Hurat, in the possession of the territories now subject to his Government.

18. Shah Shooja Ool Moolk binds himself, his heirs and successors, to refrain from entering into negotiations with any foreign state without the knowledge and consent of the British and Sikh Governments, and to oppose any power having the desire to invade the Sikh or British territories by force of arms, to the utmost of his ability.

The three Powers, parties to this treaty, viz. the British Government, Maha Raja Runjeet Sing, and Shah Shooja Ool Moolk, cordially agree to the foregoing articles. There shall be no deviation from them, and

in that case, the present treaty shall be considered binding for ever; and this treaty shall come into operation from and after the date on which the seals and signatures of the three contracting parties shall have affixed.

Done at Lahore, this 26th day of June, in the year of our Lord 1838, corresponding with the 15th of the month of Asarh, 1895, era of Bikarmajit.

(Signed) AUCKLAND,
RUNJEET SING,
SHAH SHOOJA OOL MOOLK.

THE BRITISH RELATIONS WITH OUDE.

THE Vizier now the King of Oude is one of our most ancient allies. His territory was guaranteed by us as early as 1765.

In 1768, the Vizier agreed not to maintain an army of more than thirty-five thousand men, of whom not more than ten thousand should be trained and disciplined like English troops.

In 1773, the King of Dehlee having abandoned Allahabad, and given Currah and Gurrah to the Mahrattas, which places had been assigned by the British Government for his Majesty's maintenance, that Government bound itself to place the Vizier in possession of those districts, on his paying fifty lacs of rupees; and the Vizier further agreed to pay a brigade consisting of two battalions of Europeans, six battalions of sepoys, and a company of artillery, at the rate of two lacs and ten thousand rupees per mensem, whilst their services should be required.

In 1775, the British Government undertook the defence of the Oude country for which the Vizier made certain cession of territory.

In 1781, the temporary brigade was withdrawn, and the troops left in the Oude territory limited to cost only rupees 3,10,000 per mensem. The Vizier was permitted to resume all Jageers, except those guaranteed by the Company. The Governor General recommended the Vizier to reduce his troops to the number he had the means of paying; that he should receive into his private purse only a sum sufficient for the expenses of his person and household; and that he should leave the remainder in the public treasury, under the management of his minister, and the inspection of the resident. In 1787, the Marquis Cornwallis negociated with the Vizier the terms of his future subsidy, which was to be fifty lacs a year; when more troops were required, the Wuzeer

was to pay for them; when any of those for which this payment was made, were recalled, the amount was to be reduced accordingly. The entire management of his country was to remain with the Vizier.

In 1797, the Vizier agreed to defray the cost of a regiment of Dragoons, and one of native cavalry, provided it did not exceed five lacs and a half of rupees per annum.

In 1798, a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance was entered into with the Vizier. The subsidy was increased to seventy-six lacs of rupees, to commence from the accession of Saadat Alli Khan to the Musnud. The subsidiary force maintained in Oude never to be less than ten thousand men of all arms. The fortress of Allahabad was also ceded to the Company. The Vizier agreed to reduce his establishments, and to consult the Company's Government on the best mode of effecting this. No political relations were to exist on the part of the Nuwab, without the knowledge of the Company.

In 1801, the Vizier ceded to the Company in perpetuity, and in commutation of his money payments on all accounts, territory yielding one crore and thirty-five lacs of rupees per annum.* The number of the Vizier's own troops was limited, the British Government undertaking the defence of his territories against all foreign and domestic enemies, a detachment of British troops, with a proportion of artillery, remaining at all times attached to H. E. The possession of the remaining territory guaranteed to H. E. his heirs and successors, with the exercise of his and their authority therein. His Excellency will always advise with, and act in conformity to, the councils of the officers of the Hon'ble Company in the Government of his country.

In 1816, certain territory, conquered from the Goorkas, was ceded to the Vizier, in commutation of the second loan of a crore of rupees, furnished to the Company in the previous year.

In 1819, the Vizier of Oude assumed the title of King, and was crowned in the following year. By this act he threw off the nominal allegiance which he owed to the King of Delhi, as holding the office of Vizier and Soubadar of the province of Oude under the Great Mogul.

* A Board of Commissioners was immediately appointed, at the head of which was the Hon'ble Henry Wellesley, for the provisional settlement and administration of the districts.

During the Burmese war, the King of Oude advanced in 1825, a third crore of rupees on loan, the interest of which was also appropriated to the payment of stipends. The pensioners on this, as well as on the former occasion, were, by the King's desire, placed under the guarantee of the British Government. There is a third class of pensioners under British guarantee, the legatees under the will of the Bhow Begum, mother of the late Nabob Asof-ul-Dowlah. The Company were guarantees to an engagement between her and the Nabob Suadat Alli on his accession in 1798, and she afterwards, by a will dated 29th October, 1813, constituted the Company heir to her property, which at her death (28th December, 1815,) was estimated to amount to 89,48,916 rupees. The condition attached to this bequest was, that the Company should guarantee the payment of certain specified stipends to her relations and dependents, and take them under their protection. The British Government, though they consented to carry the provisions of the will into effect, declined to take advantage of the pecuniary bequest in their favour, and accordingly have received no more of the property than was sufficient to enable them to pay the pensions. The residue was paid over to the late King of Oude.

A further loan of fifty lacs, or half a crore of rupees, was also made by the King of Oude, during the Burmese war, and the late King's predecessor was very desirous of appropriating the interest which was received (six per cent.) as a provision in favour of three of his wives and a daughter, whom he much wished to place under our guarantee. The inconvenience experienced from the former engagements of this nature, disinclined Government to accede to the proposition; they, however, consented to a less exceptionable arrangement in regard to the pensions.

Nothing particular in our relations with Oude occurred between the year 1830 and 1837.

On the 7th of July of the latter year, Nuseerood deen Hyder, the reigning sovereign died—and Nusseerood-Dowlah the next heir succeeded him. His succession, however, was not secured without a daring attempt on the morning of the 8th of July, on the part of the Padshah Begum (Queen Dowager) to seize, by a coup de main, the throne for her grandson (by adoption) Moona Jaûn, in which she so far was successful, that the boy was actually seated on the throne of the Oude Government, and in the Barradurree of the palace, about

three hours and a half, part of that time being before the arrival of the British troops (which had been sent for at the commencement of the Begum's attempted disturbance from their cantonments) and part after their arrival.

During the interval, the Begum's partizans were very outrageous within the palace, keeping in restraint the Residency officers, and actually threatening the life of, and offering personal violence to, the resident and his assistant.

The resident made four attempts, one in person, and three by vakeels, to persuade the Begum to remove her adopted son from the throne, and to depart in peace. At last seeing these attempts utterly fruitless, and that her followers were increasing in numbers, as well as in insolence and turbulence, the resident (Colonel Low) ordered an attack by the British troops upon the dwelling in which the Begum was holding her Durbar, when her followers were speedily expelled, losing between thirty and forty men, and the Begum, and the young Pretender, and the chief ring-leader of the rebels were all three captured. On this, tranquillity was soon restored.

The Begum and her son were sent state prisoners, first to Cawnpore, and then to Chunar.

Besides Fureedoon Bukht, whose birth was deemed spurious, and his brother Khywan Jah (since dead) Yemenood-dowlah, and Ekbalood-dowlah the one, the elder, the other, the younger son of Nawab Shumsood-dowlah claimed the throne of Oude. Their claims, however, were inadmissible on the principle of Mahomedan law, that the eldest surviving paternal uncle is to be preferred to any other uncle.

Yemen-ood-dowlah went to Benares, and Ekbal-ood-dowlah, after in vain trying to obtain the recognition of his claim in England, determined upon passing the remainder of his days in a life of sanctity in Turkish Arabia.

DESCRIPTION OF THE KINGDOM OF OUDE.

THE kingdom of Oude, exclusively of the metropolitan pergunnah of Lucknow, is divided into eleven districts, viz. Sultanpore, Aldeman, Partabgurh, Pachhamrat, Bainswara, Salon, Ahladgunje, Gonda, Bahraich, Sarkar, Khairabad, Sandi, and Rasodabad, which are again subdivided into 65 pergunnahs; and if the subdivisions of Lucknow be included, the whole number will amount to 70.

The general surface of the country, except in the vicinity of its rivers, is a plain, declining to the E. S. E. at the rate of about 7 inches in the mile; and its general aspect is greatly influenced by the seasons, presenting during the hot season one uniform ashy hue, diversified by occasional patches of irrigated crops, and the deep green scattered clumps of trees bounding the horizon; but with the first fall of rain, verdure ensues and progresses with the rains till the commencement of the cold season during the course of which it decays.

CLIMATE.—The climate of Oude is chiefly dry, and may be considered as 'excessive,' being excluded from the sea breeze. The temperature rises as high as 112°, and sinks to 28°. The mean daily range is about 30°, and the mean temperature 74°.

The year is divided into the hot, rainy, and cold seasons. The first of these includes the months of March, April, May, and June; the second commences from July and terminates in October; and from this time to February is the cold season, during which the air is dry and agreeable, and the nights cool. Ventilation is unnecessary in a good house. The cold is sometimes intense, and ice is easily formed. The mornings in the hot season, at which time the wind blows from the east and changes to the west about mid-day, are generally cool till the middle of May; but it is found necessary to exclude the air from

the house about an hour after sunrise. The hot winds commence in April, and carry along with them clouds of a fine light grey sand, which enters every crevice, and from being hot and dry, warps and cracks furniture when exposed. During the height of the hot winds, travellers occasionally fall down dead from the heat. North-westers occur during this season just after an easterly wind, and usually come on in the afternoon, being often preceded for a day or two by dense clouds in the north. In some of these storms no rain falls, hence the name of *dry north-westers;* but generally there is considerable rain and great damage to buildings and trees caused by them. The wind blows from the west about 200 days, and from the east during the remainder of the year. When the wind occasionally blows from the east in the hot season, the air is more free from dust, but it is clogged with watery vapour brought from the Indian ocean, or the swamps of Bengal and Assam. The heat is not thermometrically so great, but it is equally and sometimes more oppressive from its clammy dampness. The S. W. monsoon begins to be felt after the 20th of May.

The rainy season generally commences about the 15th of June, with very heavy rain, eight to ten inches falling within the first forty-eight hours. During calms, the heat is oppressive, even in the house when not relieved by artificial means. The annual fall of rain within the last 30 years, has varied from 70 to 30 inches, and from four to two months in duration, but on an average of five or six years it has been steadily decreasing.

Hoar frost occurs almost every year; towards the end of the rainy season the air is occasionally highly transparent, affording sometimes a distinct view of parts of the Himalaya Mountains, distant nearly 200 miles, but during the whole of the day, it generally holds in suspension a quantity of fine dust which impairs its transparency towards the horizon.

Rivers.—The principal rivers in the Southern district are the Ganges, Deoha, Gumti, Sai, Tons, and the Son.

The *Ganges*, and *Dehoa*, which form the south-west and north-east boundaries, are usually navigable, at all seasons, for the largest class of boats. Their annual rise is about 30 feet, and their courses proportionally rapid during the freshes. The *Ganges* has a low bed, four miles wide, and changes its course annually, whilst the smaller internal rivers are prevented from deserting their channels by the permanence of their

banks, which are composed of kankar, between which they have gradually worn out for themselves narrow channels. The surface of their waters is from twenty to eighty feet below the level of their banks during the dry season, and seldom rises more than fifteen feet during the rains—frequently only half as much. The *Gumti*, which is about 140 yards broad and has its origin in the Tarai of Rohilkund, is excellently adapted for navigation, but it is intersected at every four or six miles by kankar ridges two or three yards wide, which in the dry season diminish the depth from four to two feet. It empties itself into the Ganges between Benares and Ghazeepore, and is navigable during the rains for boats of 1,000 and 1,200 maunds. Its water during this season is unfit for drinking, being loaded with an immense quantity of yellow clay, and from November till July being of a pellucid green colour.

The *Sai* is navigable in the rains for boats of 300 maunds as far as Rae Bareily, where it is as broad as the Gumti, but only half as deep. Ferries are to be seen on it.

The *Tons* is an arm of the Deoha, which it leaves five miles above Faizabad, and after uniting with the little Tanju, empties itself into the Ganges, ten miles below Buxar. It is not navigated above Azimgurgh.

The *Son* rises near Shahabad, and, running between the Ganges and the Sai, falls into the latter about three miles above Rae Bareily. It forms, for two or three days in the rains, a considerable torrent, but is never navigable.

Lakes or Marshes.—There are no permanent lakes of any considerable extent, but extensive shallow collections of water form in the hollow part of the plain, among the most remarkable of which are the Bagaha Tal, about half a mile broad and from four to six feet deep in the rains, commencing north of Dangarman, and running into the river Son, and a jheel eight miles W. N. W. of Manikypur, which is sixteen miles long and eight miles broad. Its western extremity is now ten miles from the Ganges, and its eastern is connected with that river.

Agriculture.—This branch is at present in a miserably depressed state, arising from the ill-contrived and worse administered revenue system, and the generally prevailing insecurity of life and property, combined with the annual gradual decrease in the quantity of rain.

Agricultural Implements.—These are rude and simple, and consist of

the hal (plough), phar or iron ploughshare, kudāl, narrow hoe or pick-axe, pharua or broad hoe, scrawan, plank for smoothing the ground, machi or yoke, pur or garra, a leathern bag, and the dogla or basket for raising water.

Soil and Productions.—The soil is generally light, with a preponderance of siliceous and calcareous earth, the latter existing in the form of kankar, which is generally, though not always, found by digging six or eight feet. In many places it constitutes the surface of the soil, and acquires at first a dark green coating, which becomes black as the rain departs. The sandy soils called Usar frequently contain large quantities of sulphate, muriate, and sub-carbonate of soda, and nitrate of potash. In some places the soil is a dark rich loam, and considerably deep. Patches of yellow clay are dispersed over the country, and clayey soils hardly ever occur in too great proportion. The richest soil is that round the villages, which is enclosed and reserved for raising vegetables.

The articles of cultivation are Kodū, Narūā, Sāmwa, cotton, makāi, or bhuttā, jūndi or joar, bājra, cordh or mās, mothi, arhari, fil, asaclian kharif (untransplanted rice), jarhan (transplanted rice), chana, genhun, jaw, surson, tisi or arsi, gauha or barra, kusum (safflower), rāsūr, the poppy, sugar-cane, baingan, sen or bākila, mirsa, taroī, alū, kaddū, paror, khira, kan kali, jauki, kuraila, guihā, tobacco, &c. The following fruits are also raised, viz., pine, lemon, katahl, jamani bair, and custard-apple. The European fruits and vegetables come to perfection during the cold season.

The trees which are planted are chiefly the mahua, which yields annually an oil and spirit, to the value of ten or twelve rupees. The seeds yield one-fourth of their weight of oil, which is used for burning, and substituted for ghee by the poor; it is very palatable, and Mahajuns employ it to adulterate ghee. The mangoe, gular, jamani, nim, katahl, barhar, aōula, &c., are also planted in smaller proportions.

Natural Productions.—*Animals.*—The most remarkable are the wolf, hyæna, jackal, fox, hare, deer, nilgae, wild hog, porcupine, otter, mungoose, squirrel, mouse, field-mouse, rat, musk-rat, two species of wild cat (the katas and ban-bilao), bat, flying fox, and porpoise. Tigers and wild buffaloes are seen in Bainswara. The domestic animals are the oxen, buffaloes, and sheep.

Birds.—The adjutant, saras, partridge, quail, vulture, hawk, kite, crow, raven, jay, parrot, paddy-bird, maina, swallow, sparrow, dove, cuckoo, koel, lark, kingfisher, wild goose, wild duck, woodpecker, and humming-bird.

Reptiles.—Alligators, snakes, and lizards of various kinds abound. The poisonous snakes are the karait and the cobra di capello; the Biskopra is also seen.

Crustaceous and Insect Classes.—The chief are the crab, prawn, scorpion, centipede, locust; white, black, and red ant; flea, bug, house-fly, manfis, musquito, sand-fly, eye-fly, beetle, cricket, grasshopper. The cochineal insect is sometimes seen.

Medicinal Substances.—There is a great variety, common to most other parts of Hindoostan.

Forest Trees.—These are the tamarind, pipal, banyan, jhau, chilwal, rian, sinhor, bar, dhera or aghor, ch'hiaul, d'hak, akahr, bargad, karaunda, makoe, and hains. Most of these forests, which vary from 10 to 2 miles in length, and from 8 to 6 in breadth, are allowed to retain their very large and ancient trees, on account of the thickly covered pasture growing under their shade, which the cattle subsist upon from the end of June till the middle of January, the fallen leaves yielding them food for the remainder of the year. The soil in some is extremely fertile, and agriculture is pursued. They also afford shelter to oppressed and refractory Zemindars and their adherents from the exactions of the Chakledars, who sometimes follow them into these forests, but are generally unsuccessful in the pursuit.

Resources and Supplies.—All fruits and vegetables common to other parts of Hindoostan and Europe may be obtained at proper seasons, together with the sheep and goats, which are bred for the supply of the surrounding provinces. Their price when compared with that of Calcutta is indeed surprising, being 10 annas for a full-grown sheep in good condition, and 6 to 8 annas for the smaller.

Water.—There are numerous wells and tanks, which, notwithstanding the calcareous nature of the soil, and the abundant efflorescence of nitrate, carbonate, and sulphate of soda apparent on its surface, afford good water.

Building Materials.—The rivers Gumti and Tons supply a considerable quantity of shells, which afford a beautiful mortar like that of

Madras. The only woods fit for building purposes are the mahua, nim, jamani, and mangoe; unburnt bricks are generally used, or layers of clay three feet broad and one foot high, each layer being allowed to dry before the next is laid on.

Routes and Approaches.—There are several roads in Oude, besides the military road which connects Lucknow with Cawnpore.

The cantonment of Sultanpore Oude is most easily accessible by the river Gumti, which is navigable at all seasons of the year for boats of light draught, from Lucknow on the north-west, and Ghazeepore, Benares, and Jaunpore on the south-east. The roads connecting it with Jaunpore, Allahabad, Kare-Manickpore, Lucknow, Fyzabad, and Goruckpore, are in a wretched condition; the last-mentioned in particular being hardly practicable for wheeled conveyances. The Gumti is crossed by a handsome stone bridge at Jaunpore, and at its embouchure by a bridge of boats, which is maintained there from the middle of October to the middle of June.

Commerce and Manufactures.—The internal trade comprises dealings in money, cotton, cloth, grain, &c., and besides the daily sales in every city, town, and large village, there are established periodical fairs, called Mélá, Hát, and Gunj, at which may be had cloths of different kinds, corals, pearls, looking-glasses, toys, sweetmeats, brass and copper vessels, swords, matchlocks, bullocks, drugs, unwrought iron and copper. The exports consist of salt, saltpetre, and bullocks; and the imports are matchlocks, lead, swords, shields, horn bows, reeds for writing purposes, paper, soap, iron, copper and brass vessels, tin, horses, elephants, Lahore salt, medicinal substances, spices, silks, Moorshedabad rice, kimkhwabs, shawls, &c. &c. The principal manufactures comprise salt, saltpetre, gunpowder, arms, cotton cloths, dye-stuffs, blankets, sugar, paper, and glass. Oil, paint, and indigo are also manufactured on a small scale, but the latter is generally of inferior quality.

Manners and Customs.—These accord with those of other parts of Hindoostan. Wealthy Zemindars present small rent free lands to Brahmins sufficient to ensure them the necessaries of life, which cost them little expense. These grantees do not cultivate the ground, but employ field labourers, being restricted by their caste from so doing.

They are kind and indulgent masters, and usually assist their dependants with small pecuniary advances, especially at the celebration of marriages, which are conducted in the following manner:—The procession consists of the bridegroom's friends, the officiating pundit, and a set of dancing women, and on the third day accompanies the bridegroom to the bride's house, where the party remains three days. The bridegroom is carried in a palkee, either bought or borrowed; the whole ceremony occupies 7 or 8 days, and the expenses are divided equally between the fathers of the couple, who are about 13 years of age, and sometimes older, but never below nine.

Population.—The population of the towns and principal villages of Oude may be estimated at 650,000 souls, consisting of Indus and Mussulmans; the former of whom are in proportion of 3 to 2 of the latter.

Character.—The natives are naturally humane, and exhibit a love for justice and forbearance, but the principle of government, both in its protective and judicial functions, gives scope for cupidity, personal dislike, envy, vindictiveness, and all the worst passions of human nature.

Tribes and Religion.—They are divided into brahmins, shukuls, tiwaris, dūbés, pataks, upadhyas, chaube, rajputs, chhatri, and a number of inferior genera. These are Indus. Besides, there are the Mussulmans. The religious excitabillity of the Mussulmans of Oude seems to range lower than that of their co-religionists in Rohilkund, Hydrabad or even Bengal.

Language.—The language spoken is Hindoostanee, generally containing fewer Hindee words than the dialects of the eastern districts, but in *Salon* there is a larger admixture of Hindee, resembling that spoken at Lucknow.

THE 'QUARTERLY REVIEW' ON SIR WILLIAM NOTT'S LETTERS AND CAREER.

THE following extract, from the 'Quarterly Review' of October, 1846, is referred to in the Preface to the first volume.

"We hope that the public may be admitted to see the greater part of Sir William Nott's letters during the Affghan campaigns, which might be advantageously interwoven with his military dispatches and political documents; but such a work would require a careful editor, one well acquainted with India, and fully impressed with the conditions under which alone a man like Nott would have sanctioned the publication, either of a private correspondence or of official communications of a confidential nature. Such caution will be especially needful in this case, for the General thought strongly and felt keenly, and there is a scorching vehemence in his language whenever his bile had been stirred. But under proper revision the materials are here for a book of most lively interest and of no transitory value, for here are the details of a great national lesson. His history is one that will arouse deep reflection, almost as deep as had been roused in Prussia, before she could look back from the heights of Montmartre to the defiles of Jena. It carries the same lesson that we ourselves were taught at Walcheren, in 1809, and which we ought to have been taught by the Burrard monitorship of 1808, the lesson that no state can afford to trust her armies to incompetent men, merely because they are men of rank and affluence, but least of all when we have a competent man upon the spot, or permit his being thwarted, trammelled, and superseded by imbeciles, however splendidly his superiors, in everything save the knowledge of their calling and the sense of their duty. British India needed that lesson, and she has largely profited by it

already. She needed also a lesson which is enforced by every line of Nott's history, the folly of underrating any rank or class of the Company's armed force, the officers of which are proved and examined before they are trusted with any work of importance, and are compelled, if they have either brains or hearts, to be well acquainted with the feelings of the men whom they command, and to treat them with the courtesy to which they are in every way entitled: for the brave sepoy is the son, generally speaking, of the respectable landlord and cultivator, holding a situation quite on a par with our excellent yeomanry, and he will endure as well as dare everything when he is trusted and led as he deserves to be. He will shrink neither from the Alpine winter nor from the desert march; he will brave thirst, hunger, watching, and die where he stands, with an English huzza on his lips, whenever he knows that he is under the guidance of a Nott or a Pollock, a Smith or a Hardinge."

GENERAL NOTT'S COMMON-PLACE BOOK.

(The extracts and original observations were made while he was yet a Lieutenant.)

To hasten their march in close and compact column, which, according to the disposition of the ground, might readily be changed into any order of battle; to secure themselves against the surprises of the night, by strong posts and vigilant guards; to prevent resistance by their unexpected arrival; to elude examination by their sudden departure; to spread the opinion of their strength and the terror of their name; and to join the main army at a certain time and place—such are the duties of detachments in the field.

The laws of war, that restrain the exercise of national rapine and murder, are founded on two principles of substantial interest;—the knowledge of the permanent benefits which may be obtained by a moderate use of conquest, and a just apprehension lest the desolation we inflict on the enemy's country may be retaliated on our own.—Gibbon's 'Rome,' vol. 6, p. 53.

Experience has shown that the success of an invader most commonly depends on the vigour and celerity of his operations—the strength and sharpness of a first attack are blunted by delay; the health and spirit of the troops insensibly languish in a distant climate; the naval and military force, a mighty effort which perhaps can never be repeated, is silently consumed; and every hour that is wasted in negociations accustoms the enemy to contemplate and examine those hostile terrors which, on their first appearance, he deemed irresistible.—Gibbon's 'Rome,' vol. 6, p. 202.

The policy of an action may be determined from the tardy lessons of experience: but, before we act, our conscience should be satisfied of the justice and propriety of our enterprise.—Gibbon's 'Rome,' vol. 11, p. 12.

For every war, a motive of safety or revenge, of honour or zeal, of right or convenience, may be readily found in the jurisprudence of conquerors.

Genius may anticipate the season of maturity, but in the education of people, as in that of an individual, memory must be exercised before the powers of reason and fancy can be expanded; nor may the artist hope to equal or surpass, till he has learned to imitate, the works of his predecessors.—Gibbon's 'Rome,' vol. 12, page 140.

Human virtue stands on a tottering foundation, and is subject to be blown down by every gust of wind; and it is an established maxim, that those are in most danger of falling who triumph most in their own strength. Of all the various contests among men, we must allow this to be an admonition of the soundest philosophy and most divine religion—"Remember thy end, and let enmity cease." To court that which is ungrateful to us, or to fly from that which we love, are hard lessons; but in many cases they are essential to our happiness: and this we are sure of—that the forgiveness of injuries is the condition of divine mercy.—Hanway, vol. 1, p. 364.

A military leader cannot be formed, like many other characters of respectability in the state, by mere experience in the common course of business. At the same time that he endeavours to control accidents by general maxims and comprehensive views, he must vary his particular measures with the varying moment of action. In the midst of danger, and at a moment's warning, he must call to his aid all the results of his past experience and observations; banish from his mind every extraneous idea that fancy or casual association might suggest to distract his thoughts and mislead his judgment, and perceive at a glance the shortest and most effectual process for attaining his object. —Thomson's 'Maxims of War,' page 483.

The noblest triumph of patriotism consists in forgetting our private animosities and resentments—our feelings of unrewarded service, and injured, perhaps insulted, merit; when the good of our country again requires our active exertions.—'Military Mentor,' vol. 1, p. 67.

I can suppose—I could almost excuse—the reluctance of subjects to serve on a distant frontier, at the will of a tyrant. But the man who dares not expose his life in the defence of his children and his property has lost in society the first and most active energies of nature.—Gibbon's 'Rome,' vol. 12, page 203.

He that confines himself to his own views only, however just they may be, is in most cases less likely to improve than he that adopts, compares, and enlarges upon the thoughts of others. In all ages men have been accustomed to learn from one another. It is only after an attention to the best authors, and consulting such as have drawn their reflections from experience, that we can treat with confidence any subject upon which we design to write.

To reflect justly is the function of the mind; to feel sensibly the impulse of these reflections is the pleasure of the heart; but to find our own happiness in that of others—this, surely, is the most exquisite and refined delight of which human nature is susceptible.—'Military Mentor,' vol. 1, page 183.

Every officer ought to have constantly in his mind the maxim of Homer, that "good advice does as much honour to him that takes, as to him that gives it."—'Military Mentor,' vol. 1, page 196.

Precision, energy, and simplicity of style are important acquisitions for a military man, who ought to know how to express himself with neatness, as well by writing as verbally. It may be very possible to plan with skill a military operation; but this has been sometimes known to miscarry, from the orders having been confusedly given, and thus misapprehended. You ought, therefore, to accustom yourself betimes to attempt at writing with purity and precision.—'Military Mentor,' vol. 1, page 217.

It is the distinguishing trait of an able General never to fight but when he pleases, and it is an equal proof of want of ability to be obliged to engage in action contrary to your inclinations.—'Military Library,' vol. 2, p. 464.

"Letters," says Cicero, "ennoble the character of youth, and are the charm of advanced age; they give an additional grace to prosperity, and adversity receives from them her sweetest consolations. In our houses, in those of others, in travelling, in solitude, in all seasons, and in all places, they are the greatest charm and solace of our lives."

Politics is the art of governing a state, and of directing its public concerns. It comprises, of course, a knowledge of the relative situations and interests of other powers. This ought to be studied by an officer as a science immediately connected with that of war.—'Military Mentor,' vol. 1, page 219.

Kingdoms or states, though they have received many overthrows, should never cowardly yield themselves up to be slaves to their enemies or tyrants, but endeavour to look fortune again in the face, and to be ready to overcome or lose more gloriously, or get more honourable terms of agreement. Because by yielding they can hope for nothing but the saving of the lives of their inhabitants, and it will be in their enemies' power to deprive them of those whenever they think proper; and peace is assuredly more grievous to men in subjection, than war can be to those persons who enjoy their liberties. For it is an incontestible truth, that all men whose last hope and resource rest in arms nourish that hope, and grow adventurous in it. A just cause is the best defence against a strong enemy.

Subordination consists in a perfect submission to the orders of superiors, and in a perfect dependence, regulated by the rights and duties of every military man, from the General to the private. Without subordination, it is utterly impossible that a corps can support itself, that its motions can be regularly conducted and performed, and the service carried on; in fact, it is subordination that gives soul and harmony to the service; it adds strength to authority, and merit to obedience; it supports the staff of the Field-Marshal and the sword of the soldier, and secures both the efficacy of the command and the honour of the execution; it is subordination which prevents disorders, and procures every advantage to an army.

If to mean honestly and to act rightly be all that is necessary to constituto happiness, it should seem a sort of impiety to call that man miserable who is conscious of having always regulated his conduct by the best intentions.—Cicero.

High on a rugged rock the gods ordain,
Majestic virtue shall her throne maintain:
And many a thorny path her sons must press,
Ere the glad summit shall their labours bless.
There joys serene to arduous toils succeed,
And peace eternal is the victor's meed.—Hesiod.

Honours and riches may be conferred on any man, though undeserving of them; but reputation and glory proceed only from ourselves. High birth and other accidental circumstances, if properly applied, contribute much to acquire and establish personal consequence, because they place a man in a situation where he can give scope to his genius, whereas another, though possessed of the most extensive abilities, if deprived of these advantages, is continually checked and kept under by the superior influence, jealousy, and malice of the great, who think they have a right to everything, without being at the trouble of acquiring the knowledge and science necessary to fulfil the duties of the employments they aspire to.

No position in political philosophy is more obvious than that systems of polity, civil or ecclesiastical, must be adapted to the sentiments, habits, opinions, and even prejudices of the people: such reforms, therefore, as overlook these, however abstractedly agreeable to reason and rectitude, are neither reasonable nor right in their application to those particular cases, because they do not conduce to the happiness of the subject.—Bissett's 'George III.'

A General ought to compare each circumstance, foresee everything, and he should, above all, have a thorough knowledge of the country; a presence of mind that nothing can disconcert, and a firmness of soul that will remain unshaken amidst the most apparent danger.—Count Turpin's 'Art of War,' vol. 2.

The chief constituents of national prosperity are—first, the means of subsistence, through agriculture, mines, fisheries, manufactures, and commerce; secondly, defence in military and naval strength for securing these advantages, comprehending also connections with foreign countries, when conducive either to benefit or security; thirdly, the preservation and improvement of that physical and moral character which is best fitted for restraining and promoting the advantages; this head requires the encouragement of useful and liberal arts, and in every civilized and enlightened country the promotion of science and literature; fourthly, the gratification of prevalent habits of comfort enjoyments, as far as depends upon government, unless restriction be necessary for the public good and the liberty of the subject, without which, to vigorous and independent spirits, no other blessings of life can afford perfect enjoyment; fifthly, subsidiary to the rest is provision for the continuance of these, as far as human foresight can extend.—'Bissett's 'George III.'

Foresight and activity are the first steps toward great actions; a General endowed with these qualities may accomplish all, or at least a great part of whatever he undertakes. The more difficult an enterprise appears, the more should a General try his genius to find out such expedients as may do honour to the imagination of a great soldier. A General, with a genius and a liking for his business, will find resources on every occasion; want of strength will be supplied by art, and stratagem will prevail over stratagem.—Count Turpin's 'Art of War.'

An officer's negligence is more dangerous than his inability. The desire of acquiring honour gives activity; but it is the love of his profession that gives him the penetration necessary for searching into the most secret designs.—Count Turpin's 'Art of War.'

A detachment cannot be too cautious in its march, and the officer who neglects this betrays the confidence reposed in him by the generals, exposes himself to the danger of being beat, and to the disgrace of owing it to his own negligence. Witness Captain Blackny's defeat and death during the Nepaul war.

An officer who commands a detachment, for any expedition whatever, cannot possibly take too much care to foresee the checks that may happen to him. If he is beaten, it should be wholly owing to a superiority of force. He who, after taking all the precautions possible, is beaten by an enemy who has the advantage of number, has nothing to reproach himself with; but he who, with ability, has nevertheless neglected certain precautions, and is beat because they were not taken, is certainly culpable in the eyes of intelligent men. But if this check induces him to neglect nothing necessary to the avoiding of a second, he cannot pass for a bad officer; that appellation is only applicable to him who, suffering himself to be blinded by conceit, or the false lights which self-love makes him take for the effects of a superior genius suffers the enemy to obtain an easy victory.

In all great enterprises, the attempt appears impracticable to little minds; but the brave and valiant know that to dare is to conquer.—'Tacitus's Hist.'

Prosperity tries the human heart with the deepest probe, and draws forth the hidden character. We struggle with adversity, but success disarms us.—'Tacitus's Hist.'

The noble mind stands a siege against adversity, whilst the little spirit capitulates at once. True courage grapples with misfortune, and, in the last distress, still makes head against every difficulty. The mean and abject sink down in despair, and yield without a struggle.

It can hardly be questioned, but however brave a nation may be its valour is of little avail unless its troops are properly armed, thoroughly disciplined, judiciously organised, and ably commanded.—'Military Library.'

A clear, unblemished character, comprehends not only the integrity that will not offer, but the spirit that will not submit to an injury; and whether it belongs to an individual or to a community, it is the foundation of peace, of independence, and of safety.—'Junius's Letters.'

Never approach a wood or mountain, unless you occupy it entirely, is a rule that must for ever be observed, and cannot be transgressed without imminent danger.—'Lloyd's German War.'

It ever happens, when a barbarous nation is conquered by another more advanced in the arts of peace, that it gains in elegance a recompense for what it loses in liberty.—'Gen. Hist. of Eng.'

Hope is, indeed, very fallacious, and promises what it seldom gives; but its promises are more valuable than the gifts of fortune, and it seldom frustrates without assuring us of recompensing the delay by a greater bounty.—Johnston.

It is the misfortune of weak and ill-disciplined minds to be incapable of discerning that point of moderation where to stop is prudence—to proceed, inevitable ruin.

The right of discussing public measures belongs to every free-born Briton; its exercise promotes his sense of personal importance—the best nourisher of liberty and independence.

In our present condition, which is a middle state, our minds are, as it were, chequered with truth and falsehood; and as our faculties are narrow, and our views imperfect, it is impossible but our curiosity must meet with many repulses. The business of mankind in this life being rather to act than to know, their portion of knowledge is dealt to them accordingly.—'Spectator.'

The multitude, in all countries, are patient to a certain point. Ill-usage may rouse their indignation, and hurry them into excesses, but the original fault is in Government.—Junius.

Few are qualified, by their own reflection, to mark the boundaries between vice and virtue. To separate the useful from that which leads to destruction is not the talent of every man. The example of others is the school of wisdom.—Tacitus.

By important scenes of action the powers of the mind are roused; the heart expands to meet the occasion; while, on the other hand, feeble spirits shrink from a great opportunity, and grow less by elevation.—Tacitus.

Commercial monopoly, which solely considers present gain, is of all others the most unfit spring of government, which ought to regard the advantage of distant posterity. The views of Lord Cornwallis and Sir George Barlow being confined to temporary tranquillity, had they been followed by their successors, India would have been lost to the British Empire.

Flattery wears a badge of servitude, while malignity speaks the tone of independence, and is therefore well received.—Tacitus.

The civil power in every well-constituted government ought to be supreme; to obey is the virtue of a soldier.

He that has delivered his country from oppression, or freed the world from ignorance and error, can excite the emulation of a very small number, but he that has repelled the temptations of poverty, and disdained to free himself from distress at the expense of his virtue, may animate multitudes by his example to the same firmness of heart and steadiness of resolution.—Johnston.

There is a general succession of events in which contraries are produced by periodical vicissitudes; labour and care are rewarded with success, success produces confidence, confidence relaxes industry, and negligence ruins that reputation which accuracy had raised.

THE END.

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